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Introduction / Introduccción
Augustine of Hippo as Politician. 
Political Practices at the Service of Christian Ideals 
Debate is ongoing about Augustine’s political philosophy, and more particu-
larly about his views on the relations between Church and State. This volume 
brings together a number of contributions that examine Augustine’s theoreti-
cal views on the subject. The current chapter tests Augustine’s political theory 
against his own practice. How did Augustine actually relate to the politics, civil 
authorities, and power relations of his time?
Church and State were not fully separate institutions or autonomous spheres 
in the early fifth century as they currently are in our Western society. First, 
bishops in those days were not isolated individuals. 
A bishop in those days was a very great man. Even if he lived with his clerics 
in a monastic community, he did not in any way resemble a metropolitan in 
old Czarist Russia; he did not, like the latter, live withdrawn from the world 
in his monastic residence in some provincial town, nor was he, again like the 
latter, on certain specified occasions received politely but with unmistakable 
coolness by the governor, who invariably kept up running conversation right 
through the liturgy. Nor must we think of a French bishop of the time follow-
ing on the separation of Church and State, when a bishop might be honoured 
if he possessed some special personal quality, but was normally completely 
ignored. It would be truer to say that Augustine was the secret or, rather, the 
openly revered spiritual governor of the town (van der Meer “Augustine” 265).1 
In addition, there were personal contacts between the  ecclesiastical and 
political-administrative hierarchies. Thus Augustine  maintained friendly re-
1 Lancel has written that had Augustine not been elected a bishop, he would have been able 
to dedicate himself fully to study and community life as he himself  initially desired, and 
he would therefore have been no more than a Christian intellectual, without any lasting 
impact, with at most a moral responsibility: “It may seem paradoxical, but it was only by 
placing himself fully at the service of the Church that Augustine placed himself at the ser-
vice of his times, and of Africa, with all that this entailed” (15).
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lations with Macedonius and Marcellinus, imperial functionaries in North 
Africa, and with Boniface and Darius, mili tary attachés who worked in the 
African province. This cooperation involved more than simply personal ties. 
The governments of the Catholic Church and of the Roman Empire worked 
together  closely and intensively. Augustine himself pointed to the substan-
tial interconnectedness between Church and State: “Church and  state must 
learn to know and understand each other; and in  order to attain this, they 
must become united with each other. For they have one origin, i.e. justice; 
one common goal, i.e. order and  peace” (qtd. in Duijnstee 253). According to 
Augustine, Church and  State were independent spheres that were simulta-
neously interconnected.  Augustine wrote that the Church is useful for the 
civil  society, because it is a school of ethics (mor., 1, 46), civic virtue (ep., 138, 
15), and fraternity (mor., 1, 63). In short, Augustine thought Christians were 
the State’s best citizens.2 In practice, the Church, and Augustine as one of its 
bishops, also exercised functions on behalf of the State, such as the admin-
istration of justice in civil trials, and care for the poor and for orphans. Con-
versely, the State assisted the Church by giving support and protection. The 
apostolate of the State Church was supported financially by the State (Dui-
jnstee 282-315). Moreover, the State guaranteed the unity of the Church, and 
thus religious peace in the Empire, by protecting it against all non-Christian 
and dissenting Christian movements.
Bishops became politically active after the Edict of Milan (312) afforded Chris-
tianity freedom of religion, and certainly after the elevation of Christianity to 
the status of State religion by the  Emperor Theodosius (391). This must not be 
seen as an attempt by the  bishops to acquire  secular power. In fact, it was the 
opposite. The Roman Empire appealed to the Church’s hierarchy for help. As 
the Roman Empire slowly collapsed and the imperial administration became 
unable to safeguard the unity of the empire, this appeal by the emperor to the 
Church became even more insistent:3
2 “Indeed, though Augustine is sometimes questioned by his correspondents about the 
compatibility of Christian teaching and public duty (ep. 136.2), he in fact argues that 
 Christians indeed make the best citizens, precisely because of their principled understand-
ing of the human condition and the role of political authority in human communities, and 
because they obey the law out of a religious duty (epp. 137.5.17; 138.2.9-10). In numerous 
places Augustine argues that the city would be much  better off, even in earthly terms, if all 
the citizens were Christian (epp. 91.6; 138.2.15; civ. 2.19; conf. 3.8.15-16)” (Dougherty 194-195).
3 “We must assess Augustine’s views in the light of the situation of his time. It cannot be 
denied that as the old Roman Empire slowly collapsed the emperors  assigned great power 
to the Church in order to save their own power. If the Church therefore exercised certain 
secular functions in Augustine’s time, this was not due to its thirst for power, but to the 
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The secular power observed that the taxes were no longer coming in, the 
finances of the State were in bad shape, the courts were losing  influence,  
the governors in the provinces were exceeding their authority. Therefore the 
people sought support from the Church, because it was able to weather all 
storms (Duijnstee 256). 
The bishops took on secular tasks that were bestowed upon them by the civil 
authorities. In Augustine’s time, bishops had various institutional responsibil-
ities towards, and relations with the civil authorities. Thus they were in touch 
with the various levels of government and administration (municipal, provin-
cial, imperial) and with the various jurisdictions (political, military, legislative, 
ecclesiastical).
Augustine did not write any treatise on political theory, or a practical hand-
book on Church-State relations. Nor did he leave any political memoirs. He 
wrote an account of his conversion in the  Confessiones when he had just been 
consecrated a bishop. His ministry as a bishop, and therefore also his relations 
with the political world, had yet to start at that point. For a reconstruction of 
Augustine’s actual relations with the State we must therefore search for traces 
in a variety of sources. One important source is the  biography of Augustine 
written by Possidius (Vita Augustini), a good friend of Augustine’s who lived 
with him for a long time and  subsequently became Bishop of Calama. This 
source is somewhat limited by its genre, as it is conceived as a hagiography 
and does not contain many factual details about Augustine’s relations with the 
political authorities. Possidius’s Vita Augustini has therefore been read in con-
junction with Augustine’s correspondence (epistulae), particularly the letters 
that Augustine himself exchanged with the civil authorities of his time. This 
information has then been complemented with a number of clues from his 
sermons and other writings. 
This source material offers two ways to approach the analysis of Augustine’s 
specific dealings with politics, and each one illustrates the two roles that Au-
gustine fulfilled: the administration of justice—Augustine as a judge and as 
a pastor, and theological controversies —Augustine as a theologian and as a 
Church leader.
secular power’s weakness, which imposed these functions upon it. As we shall see, Augus-
tine was no admirer of these responsibil ities and would have preferred to see the Church 
remain within its own sphere” (Duijnstee 245-246).
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Judicial Responsibilities4
Ever since the Emperor Constantine, bishops had the right and even the re-
sponsibility to give judgment in civil trials. In 318, the episcopal courts had 
been given the same legal jurisdiction as the civil courts.5 The bishop’s civil 
jurisdiction was known as the audientia episcopalis. Historians of Roman law 
are not agreed on whether this episcopal jurisdiction in the late Roman Em-
pire was limited to ecclesiastical cases and arbitration between Christians, or 
whether it was truly on a par with the civil courts both as regards competency 
and actual functioning. 
Whatever the precise historical and legal answer to this question may be,6 the 
reality is that Augustine had to deal with a dizzying array of legal cases which 
he had to resolve. Possidius tells us in Vita Augustini (19) that Augustine acted 
as a judge in civil cases in his episcopal town of Hippo. Every morning—and 
often even part of the afternoon—Augustine, surrounded by his secretaries, 
held session in the secretarium of his church. The sources show that he had 
to rule on a wide range of cases: usually related to property rights, contracts, 
and successions. He also presided over cases concerning the status of slavery 
and accusations of adultery. Other examples are a case in which Augustine 
was the judge of a Donatist bishop who had broken the ban on rebaptism, 
and of imperial function aries who had infringed the right of asylum (Dodaro 
“Church” 177). Both members of his own denomination and other (non-Cath-
olic) citizens of Hippo—including pagans, schismatics, and heretics—appeared 
before his court. 
Augustine was entitled to give judgment—for instance by impos ing fines, and, 
for Christians, the sentence of excommunication (ep., 153, 21). He did not hes-
itate to impose the punishment of flogging, though in moderate form (ep., 
4 This chapter is based primarily on the following studies: Dodaro ("Between the two cities" 
99-115);  Dodaro ("Church" 176-184); Raikas 459-481; van der Meer ("Augustine de zielzorger" 
244-245).
5 Frederick van der Meer has described this evolution in somewhat oversimplified fash ion: “...
the legal procedure of the time, with its sanctions and its appeal to force, had been replaced 
by a procedure in which persuasion and good counsel played a determining part. ... Judicial 
authority was beginning to pass from the strict representative of the laws of the Empire to 
the mild man who judged issues by a purely religious yardstick” (“Augustine” 260).
6 “However, the lack of precise information concerning the specific nature of the majority 
of legal cases brought to Augustine makes it difficult to know in each case whether he was 
exercising civil or ecclesiastical jurisdiction and whether, in either case, he was acting as 
arbiter or as judge” (Dodaro “Church” 177).
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133, 1, 2; 134; ep. Divjak, 8; 9, 2; 10, 3-4).7 Imperial law stipulated that clerics 
could only be tried by an ecclesiastical court. The sentences that could be im-
posed upon clerics were excommunication or dismissal from the clerical state, 
and Augustine did actually impose these sentences (ep., 65, 77-78; 106 s., 355; 
Divjak 20). Augustine himself emphasised that a bishop- judge should exercise 
evangelical gentleness (mansuetudo) in admi nistering justice, and should ob-
serve moderation in sentencing (en. Ps., 50; s., 13). He pointed in this context to 
a difference with the civil courts, which set greater store by the deterrent effect 
of the  punishment. Bishops should pass sentence from a different  perspective, 
oriented to the moral conversion of the convicted  person (ep., 134, 3-4).
Two important legal issues frequently facing Augustine’s episcopal court were 
slavery and the ecclesiastical right of asylum.8 Slavery was permitted under Ro-
man law. Possidius writes that  Augustine often used Church funds to redeem 
slaves (Vita Augustini 24).  Augustine did not contest the existence of slavery. 
On the one hand this can perhaps be explained through the importance which 
he attached to the existing order and to stability. Augustine rejected every 
form of injustice, but was certainly not moved by any desire to reform the 
whole of earthly society: “With regard to social theory, therefore, Augustine in 
no way could be classified as a social reformer; he rather was a most effective 
spokesperson for the social and political establishment” (Mathisen “Society” 
806). On the other hand, Augustine’s insight into the dire economic condi-
tions of his time was sufficiently great to understand that slavery for many 
people offered greater social security than freedom in poverty (s., 21, 6; 356, 
3-7; en. Ps., 99, 7). These dire economic circumstances—especially towards the 
end of Augustine’s life, when the Roman Empire was slowly but surely disinte-
grating—are clearly evident in his newly discovered letters (Epistulae Divjak). 
These also show that Augustine, as a judge, had to rule on the legal status of 
slaves (ep. Divjak, 8; 10; 24). His court most frequently had to deal with the legal 
distinction between born slaves and temporary slaves. Temporary slaves were 
originally free citizens, who of their own free will had sold their labour for a 
certain amount of time and thus acquired the status of slaves. This distinction 
had consequences for children handed over as temporary slaves by their par-
ents when these parents died. The question was whether the status of these 
children changed due to the death of their parents, i.e. from temporary to 
permanent slaves (ep. Divjak, 1; 4; 24; 83). Augustine vehemently resisted the 
abuses committed by slave traders in  North Africa, who violently abducted 
7 See also Houlou (5-29).
8 See di Berardino (731-733); Mathisen (“Roman” 733-735).
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free citizens, forcing them into slavery. He sent his friend and fellow bishop 
Alypius, who had legal training, to the court of Ravenna with the purpose of 
search for a legal text issued by the Emperor Honorius which gave bishops the 
authority and jurisdiction to act against these crimes by the slave traders (ep. 
Divjak, 10). In ep. Divjak, 10, Augustine pointed out that this was the responsi-
bility of public authorities and functionaries, who had the task of applying this 
law against forced slavery, and of preventing Africa from being emptied of its 
inhabitants (ep. Divjak, 10, 3). The Bishop of Hippo not only confronted the civil 
authorities with their responsibility, he also contended that the abuses were 
due to the fact that the existing legislation was not being applied by the func-
tionaries of the State, insinuating that they had been bribed for this reason (ep. 
Divjak, 10, 4-8).
Churches were entitled to offer asylum to any accused person, and thus to 
postpone the verdict or the execution of the sentence. There was only one ex-
ception: no asylum could be granted to tax dodgers. The emperor only granted 
this full right of asylum (which the Council of Carthage had already demanded 
in 399) in 419. This initial exception to the right of asylum is further illustration 
of the unfavourable economic circumstances in the Roman Empire in the early 
fifth century. The economic crisis, in combination with high taxes, had caused 
financial hardship for many. Roman law allowed debtors who were in default 
to be punished legally (often with corporal punishment) at the behest of their 
creditors. However, these debtors could then seek Church asylum. In Hippo, 
too, this right of asylum belonged to the jurisdiction of the  bishop (Augustine). 
He granted asylum to Fascius, a parishioner of  Hippo, when the latter faced 
this kind of punishment due to his failure to pay outstanding taxes (ep., 268). 
Augustine intervened in a similar way in favour of Faventius, a tenant farmer 
from Hippo, who had been unlawfully imprisoned by Florentius, an officer, as a 
result of a financial suit against Faventius. Augustine invoked the existing legal 
procedures for his ruling. In other words, Augustine used existing legislation 
to prevent the unjust treatment of the accused (ep., 113-116).
Through the work of individual bishops, with Augustine as a clear example, and 
also through communal action—for instance the African councils during Au-
gustine’s time—the Church fought political and social  injustices and demanded 
administrative reforms from the State, such as reform of the laws on slavery 
or asylum. This is the context in which the Council of Carthage’s demand (in 
 September 401) for the appointment of a defensor civitatis must be seen. A de-
fensor civitatis was a functionary, an ombudsman as it were, who defended 
the rights of the poorer classes and protected them from exploitation. In 409 
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Honorius granted the right to choose a defensor civitatis to the clergy, togeth-
er with the bishop and the important citizens. Thus the Church authorities 
caused the secular power to develop a new civil office focused on social justice, 
and the same Church also bore responsibility for the appointment of the holder 
of this new office. Augustine wrote to Alypius in 420 asking him to make the 
case in Ravenna for a defensor civitatis for the city of Hippo (ep. Divjak, 22).9
Augustine’s interventions on behalf of convicts must be seen in the same con-
text (ep., 100; 133; 134; 139; 151; 153; 155). These interventions were not the result 
of his jurisdiction, because they did not appertain to the bishop’s legal rights or 
responsibilities.  Augustine himself confirmed this. He explained that he made 
these interventions purely out of pastoral concern and religious compassion 
(ep., 154, 4-6). When Macedonius, the Catholic imperial emissary for Africa, 
inquired whether Augustine was planning to turn these interventions into a 
customary right of the Church—Macedonius was doubtful as to whether this 
was a requirement of religion— Augustine denied this. All he wanted to do is 
mediate in capital cases, to avoid the supreme punishment as it did not lead to 
repentance.  Augustine believed that the purpose of punishment was to reform 
criminals, not to destroy them. He emphasised in his letter that it was the task 
of bishops to plead before public officeholders in favour of convicts, in order 
to ensure that unjust excesses would be avoided in the just execution of pun-
ishments (ep., 151). Thus  Augustine asked Donatus and his successor Apringi-
us, the proconsuls responsible for Carthage and Hippo, not to impose capital 
punishment upon Donatists convicted of murder (ep., 100; 134). He banned 
capital punishment and torture from his own court, and advised others to fol-
low suit. Augustine’s purpose in doing so was not to interfere as a bishop in the 
judicial independence of the  public authorities or to arrogate this authority 
to himself. Instead, as a pastor, he wished to guarantee that the evangelical 
values would also be respected in that independent sphere.10
9 In Africa, the position of defensor ecclesiae was also common: laymen who represented the 
local church communities in court cases and administered the land owned by the Church.
10 On the basis of this dual interpretation of the episcopal office as a judge and as a pastor, 
Augustine assumed responsibility not just for the city of Hippo, but also for the surround-
ing countryside. “It was a semi-feudal world of poor peasants who were dependent on 
masters and mistresses who applied the legal rules according to their own interpretation. 
Augustine used the privileged relations which he necessarily had as a bishop with these 
domini and dominae to improve the plight of the serfs.” Thus Augustine wrote ep. Divjak, 
14, to Dorotheus, a senator and landowner, because one of the latter’s agents had raped a 
religious sister (Lancel 18).
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Augustine dedicated much of his mornings to the administration of justice, 
although he had not been trained for this.11 Yet he made efforts to become 
acquainted with Roman law, and his personal studies gave him wide-ranging 
knowledge of it.12 He regarded this as a form of pastoral ministry, in order to 
guarantee that he would exercise Christian justice in his own judicial prac-
tice. Nor did he hesitate to use the expertise of people who had received legal 
training. On slavery, for instance, he consulted the Roman lawyer Eustochius 
(ep. Divjak,  24) and Alypius.
The traces of Augustine’s legal career that we have do not testify to a well-de-
veloped, premeditated programme for the good  administration of justice and 
just governance. Instead, they show how Augustine, moved by the ideal of jus-
tice, was confronted on a daily basis with all kinds of contested issues and with 
concrete forms of injustices. In dealing with these cases, he tried to use the 
existing judicial structures to promote social justice on the basis of his evan-
gelical inspiration.
Appeals to the Power of the State to 
Defend Catholic Orthodoxy
In practice, the Church gave support to the civil authorities, for  instance in 
the form of episcopal jurisdiction and care for the poor and for orphans. In 
the eyes of the Church, the  relationship was  mutual. Thus the State had the 
responsibility to finance the Church’s apostolate. And it was also incumbent 
11 Knowledge of Roman law was not easy to acquire in Augustine’s time because imperial 
legislation had not yet been codified. This only happened after Augustine’s death (Codex 
Theodosianus, 15 February 438/1 January 439). In other words, Roman law was often a com-
plex tangle for Augustine’s contemporaries. No one could know all the laws that had been 
promulgated. In addition, the promulgation of a law did not necessarily mean that it would 
be actually applied (for instance because a pagan provincial governor refused to apply re-
pressive measures against non-Catholics), or even that it could actually be applied. The 
Edict of Unity was promulgated in 405, and was applied only a few months later in Carthage. 
In Hippo, by contrast, this law had not yet been applied two years later (ep., 86; 89; s., 299B, 
9). See also di Berardino (731-732). Augustine shows that he had the legal knowledge neces-
sary to live in a Roman city (ep., 34; 35, 3; 91, 8), and had know ledge of the laws on personal 
freedom and judicial procedure (ep., 115), and of the legal context of property rights (ep., 83). 
See also di Berardino (733).
12 Thus Augustine quoted laws that would otherwise have fallen into oblivion, for instance in 
ep. Divjak, 24, 10. He has also given us the most precise description of the legal procedure 
of manumissio in ecclesia, the process in which a slave owner freed his slave through the 
mediation of the Church (s., 21, 6; 185).
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upon the  State to safeguard  orthodoxy from anything that was non-Christian 
and non-Catholic (Dodaro “Church”). After the creation of a State Church, mo-
tivated particularly by the  political desire to guarantee unity,  peace, and sta-
bility (in religious affairs also) in the  empire, successive emperors  issued laws 
that increasingly  suppressed anything that was not Christian and  Catholic. 
The  bishops of  North Africa often appealed to this legislation,  requested the 
stricter application of  these laws, or even demanded more  stringent  measures. 
This legis lation was  directed  primarily against the pagans, Jews, Manichaeans, 
Donatists, and  Pelagians. Thus the Council of Carthage asked the  emperor to 
 outlaw  statues of pagan deities, temple sacrifices, and  pagan  festivals on Sun-
days and Christian feast days, to  protect converts to  Christianity, and to re-
move all idols from the city  (15 June and 13 September 401). Augustine himself 
asked the  civil  authorities for protection of the Christians against pagans  (ep., 
50), and  defended imperial measures against the pagans (cons. ev., 1, 22; 1, 41; c. 
litt. Pet., 1, 9, 15). Anti-Jewish laws were every more  frequently adopted in the 
Roman Empire, but  there is no indication that  Augustine supported these an-
ti-Jewish edicts or himself asked for their application. It is true, however, that 
 Augustine  supported the imperial laws against Manichaeism, a sect of which 
he himself had been a member in his younger years (c. Faust., 5, 8; c. litt. Pet., 3, 
25, 30; c. Felic., 1, 12; 1, 14; 2, 1). The  bishops of North Africa first asked Ravenna 
for protection of  the Catholic bishops against the Donatists, who sometimes 
used violence, then requested the emperor to compel the Donatist bishops to 
take part in public debates with their Catholic counterparts, and finally, after 
the emperor’s denunciation of Donatism, asked for the punishment of refrac-
tory Donatists. Augustine and his North African  colleagues, confronted with 
a reluctant pope, succeeded in convincing the emperor to denounce Pela-
gianism as a heresy, which meant that the existing anti-heresy laws could be 
used against Pelagianism.  According to Augustine, this oppression of pagans 
and heretics ought to happen with the moderation of a good housefather, 
who never hesitated to chastise his children out of love (s., 302, 19; ep., 138, 
14; 140, 7-10; 153, 17; 173, 3; 185, 21-23), but never lost sight of mercy either, in 
order to avoid excesses (s., 13, 9; ep., 86; 100; 133, 1-2; 134, 2-3; 139, 2; 204, 3). 
Just as for criminals, Augustine accepted the principle of punishment, on the 
condition that moderation was observed. 
In sum, the Church, the North African episcopate, and Augustine appealed to 
the secular arm of the law for the management of religious affairs. We will now 
look at two examples: Augustine’s involvement in the Donatist and Pelagian 
controversies. 
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The Donatist Controversy13
The Donatist schism had existed for more than a century, dividing North Af-
rican Christianity into two camps that were—sometimes literally—at daggers 
drawn with each other. Donatism denied the validity of the sacraments cele-
brated by clerics (the so-called traditores and lapsi) who had avoided martyr-
dom during the time of the persecutions of Christians by collaborating with 
the pagan civil authorities. Donatists endeavoured to create a pure and elitist 
Christianity, and they advocated a strict separation between the Church and 
the world, between Church and State. Anything within the Church was holy 
and pure. Everything outside it was sinful and to be rejected. In addition to this 
theological component, Donatism was also a nationalist movement, a social 
and political protest movement: poor versus rich, countryside versus city, Af-
rican Christianity versus a Romanised Church. Despite imperial persecutions 
in the periods between 317-320 and 346-348, the schism continued and flour-
ished in North Africa. 
In Augustine’s time, this Donatism had developed into the dominant Christian 
denomination in North Africa. Augustine responded on substance to Donatism 
in various writings: Contra Epistulam Parmeniani (400), De Baptismo (400-
401), De Unitate Ecclesiae (401), Contra Cresconium (405), Breviculus Conlatio-
nis cum Donatistis (411), Contra Gaudentium (420). These writings responded 
to the Donatist accusations against the Catholics, and refuted their claim to be 
the one true (martyrs’) Church. Augustine also had real-life encounters with 
Donatists; thus there was a Donatist antibishop in his own city. Two dimen-
sions can be discerned in Augustine’s  actual dealings with the Donatists in the 
context of his relations with the civil authorities: his requests for political sup-
port against the Donatists, and—after the denunciation of the Donatists—his 
plea to the same authorities for moderation in  punishment. 
Appeal for Government Support Against the Donatists14
A first tactic that Augustine applied in his struggle against Donatism was 
to appoint reliable friends to the sees of surrounding dioceses: Alypius in 
13 On the Donatist controversy see Frend (“Donatismus” 128-147); Maier (“Le dossier du Dona-
tisme 1” 303-361; “Le dossier du Donatisme 2” 361-750); Markus 284-287; Tenström; Willis.
14 See particularly Hermanowicz “Possidius and the legal”; “Possidius of Calama” 
83-220; Gaumer.
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Thagaste, Severus in Mileve, Possidius in Calama. The same concern to form 
a united front against Donatism caused the Catholic bishops to hold a plenary 
council every year in Carthage (Munier and Sieben 1085-1107; Merdinger 248-
250). This enabled them to speak with one voice against the Donatists, and to 
appeal with one voice to the emperor. During these councils, great emphasis 
was also placed on  discipline among the Catholic clergy, in order to obviate 
any Donatist criticism. The regular occurrence of these councils emboldened 
the  Catholic  bishops in their struggle against Donatism. One example is that 
the council  decided, in 401, to send out missionaries to convert Donatists to 
Catholicism. 
This Catholic proselytism, and the constant danger for the Donatists that the 
anti-heresy laws might (once again) be applied to them made the Donatist 
camp nervous. Polemics and apologetics increased sharply on both sides. 
Circumcelliones, a violent rebel movement linked to Donatism, attacked 
Catholic clergy and State functionaries (cath. fr., 19, 50; 20, 54; Cres., 3, 42, 
46). Major disturbances occurred. In order to restore the peace, the Catholic 
bishops decided to organise a public debate with the Donatists. Augustine 
and Aurelius therefore invited the Donatist bishops to attend the 403 Coun-
cil of Carthage. However, when the Donatists refused to participate in this 
debate, the Catholics made a first appeal to the civil power. At the Catho-
lics’ behest, the proconsul Septimus compelled the Donatists to participate. 
However, this did not contribute to restore order; on the contrary, Possidius, 
a friend of Augustine’s and the Bishop of Calama, was attacked by a gang of 
circumcelliones led by a Donatist priest. The case went to court. The pro-
consul Septimus decided that Crispinus, the Donatist bishop of this priest, 
was responsible for the crimes of his priest. Furthermore, Septimus ruled 
that Crispinus was guilty of heresy according to the 392 law of the Emperor 
Theodosius, and that he had to pay a fine (Cres., 3, 47, 51). This was the first 
time Theodosius’s anti-heresy laws were used against the Donatist Church, 
and the first time the Donatists were designated as heretics and enemies of 
the State. But Augustine and Possidius were not unreservedly happy with 
this ruling. The Donatists were always eager to present themselves as the 
martyrs’ Church, oppressed by the Roman State. Were Crispinus actually to 
have to pay this fine, this would only strengthen this self-image, and en-
courage further violent reprisals by the circumcelliones. Nevertheless, before 
they were able to prevent the execution of the sentence, Crispinus appealed 
to the court in Ravenna. The imperial court confirmed the punishment and 
even doubled the fine. 
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In the meantime, the riots and the raids by the circumcelliones continued apace. 
Augustine and the African bishops in general opposed large-scale and heavy 
persecution of Donatism, because this would fuel the movement’s claims to 
martyrdom and resistance against the “Roman oppressor” (claims which can 
partially explain its initial success), possibly leading to a revival of Donatism. 
The 405 Council of Carthage therefore opted not for violent repression, but 
for the imposition of fines and the forfeiture of property and of the succession 
rights of Donatists, in conformity with the Theodosian laws. In the spring of 
the same year, the Emperor Honorius issued the Edict of Unity, in which he 
decreed the unity of all the churches in  Africa and simultaneously condemned 
the Donatists as heretics. The application of this law saw the confiscation of 
Donatist property, the exiling of Donatist clergy, the abrogation of Donatist 
property rights, and the banning of the Donatist practice of rebaptism.
However, the Donatists did not disappear, and in fact their new martyrdom 
caused a revival. In the year 410, when Alaric, the Visigoth leader, was menac-
ing Italy and Rome, the importance for the Emperor Honorius of North Africa 
being quiet and stable only increased, as he required a possible place of refuge 
for the Roman Empire. He therefore sent the Catholic count (comes) Marcelli-
nus to North Africa with the express task of eradicating Donatism for once and 
for all, no matter the cost. With this purpose in mind, Marcellinus convened 
a general African council in Carthage for 1 July. To prevent the Donatists from 
boycotting the council, he  returned previously confiscated basilicas to them, 
much to the Catholics’  annoyance. The Donatists responded positively to his 
gesture, and attended the council with a delegation of 284 bishops. But the 
council turned out totally different from what they had expected. They want-
ed open debate with the opportunity to explain their point of view, in the hope 
of undoing the Edict of Unity. Marcellinus had in fact lured them to the council 
to invite them to convert to Catholicism. He was planning to issue a final con-
demnation of Donatism if they were to refuse. After an extremely brief council, 
Marcellinus decided in favour of the Catholics. This decision was immediate-
ly imposed upon the entire province. The Donatist bishops appealed to the 
emperor, but in vain. The Emperor Honorius adopted further anti-Donatist 
measures, but he avoided capital punishment so as to preclude new Donatist 
claims of martyrdom.
During the 411 Council of Carthage, the religious and secular authorities 
joined forces to bring about the end of Donatism as an institutional group, 
as an organised denomination. Donatist possessions were confiscated and 
many Donatist communities were forced to join Catholic communities. Al-
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though it was now officially banned, Donatism disappeared only very slowly. 
It continued to lead a clandestine existence, especially in the countryside 
and in family contexts, surviving the collapse of the Roman Empire in Africa 
after the Vandal invasion. Augustine was strongly conscious of this at the end 
of his life (Io. ev. tr., 10, 5; ep., 185, 7; 30).15 Small pockets of Donatism perhaps 
still existed in North Africa when Islam arrived. 
Plea for Moderation in the Punishment of Donatists16
Ever since the Emperor Constantine, the State had sought the  punishment 
of the Donatists, ranging from restrictions on citizenship rights to execu-
tion (Grasmück). Augustine strongly opposed the execution of capital pun-
ishment and of torture. Augustine wrote to the proconsul Donatus, who had 
been sent to North  Africa with the task of suppressing the Donatists, that 
he should not be motivated by the desire to kill Donatists, despite the na-
ture of their crimes, but that he should offer prayers for them (ep., 100). In a 
similar vein, Augustine wrote to the tribune Marcellinus, who had to judge 
the circumcelliones who had murdered a Catholic priest, not to apply the 
law of equal retaliation (ep., 133). According to Augustine, the fundamental 
purpose of punishment is to convert those who err, to bring them back onto 
the straight and narrow path. This result cannot be obtained by imposing 
capital punishment. Augustine also warned against executing pagans who 
had attempted to restore pagan worship and had committed acts of violence 
against Catholics (ep., 91, 1; 104, 1). 
Augustine rejected capital punishment and the practice of torture as a matter 
of principle.17 Initially he even repudiated any form of coercion of haeretici and 
schismatici. He wrote to Maximinus that he favoured the peaceable exchange 
of views with the Donatists, and that he was consequently planning to post-
pone discussions with them until the armed force was no longer in the vicinity 
(ep., 23, 7). He did not want to coerce the Donatists to return against their 
will, but wanted to convince them of the truth of the Catholic faith (ep., 34, 
1). Augustine forbade a father to force his Donatist daughter to return to the 
Catholic Church. According to Augustine, the woman could only return to the 
15 See also c. Gaudentium, 1, 23, 26.
16 This section is based largely on Dupont (30-47).
17 In an early work Augustine did not yet oppose the death penalty and/or torture due to his 
desire for order in society: ord., 2, 4, 12 (November 386-March 387): “What is more horrid 
than a public executioner? And yet he has a necessary place in the legal order, and he forms 
part of the order of a well-governed society.”
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Catholic Church if she wanted to do this and desired it herself (ep., 35, 4).18 
Initially, Augustine even opposed applying the imperial anti-heresy legislation. 
In a letter to Januarius, he explained why he did not apply the existing laws in 
the name of charity and leniency. The same letter reveals that Augustine was 
willing to countenance only the imposition of a fine in cases of proven acts of 
violence against Catholics, whereas the law of Theodosius stipulated that all 
heretics had to pay this fine anyway (ep., 88, 7).
The year 400 saw a change in Augustine’s attitude. From that point on, he 
accepted the use of coercive measures as stipulated in the imperial legisla-
tion, and he justified the use of them (Brown 382-391; Burt 25-54; Himbury 
33-37; Gaumer and Dupont 345-371; Jans 133-163; Lamirande). In ep., 185, 
addressed to the tribune  Boniface, Augustine explained that the Donatists 
must be treated by the Church and the State like doctors treat their pa-
tients, that they must be rebuked like disobedient sons are by their father, 
corrected like wives by their husbands. The idea that no one must be  forced 
to accept the faith against their will  remained a  crucial  aspect for Augustine 
(c. Gaud., 1 8; 1, 28). Conversion  requires  interior  assent, which can, however, 
be furthered by external coercion (s., 112, 8). This coercion, as a last resort, 
must be accompanied by teaching with a view to accomplishing the interior 
conversion (ep., 93, 2). Augustine never tired of exhorting the imperial func-
tionaries whose responsibility it was to administer justice and to do so with 
mildness and leniency (ep., 153). 
Augustine himself also proposed a number of punitive measures: the abro-
gation of certain citizenship rights, a ban on worship and on rebaptism,19 the 
confiscation of Donatist ecclesiastical properties (c. litt. Pet., 1, 102; c. Gaud. 
1, 50-51; c. ep. Parm., 2, 18-20), the declaring null and void of Donatist wills 
(s., 47, 22). He accepted the imposition of fines, provided that the convicted 
persons would still have enough money to support themselves (ep., 104). He 
also accepted flogging, a customary practice in schools and before the epis-
copal courts, given that this served to discover the guilty party as quickly as 
possible, thus avoiding the risk of pun ishing the innocent (ep., 133, 2). 
Augustine’s change of attitude was perhaps due to the  failure of his peaceful 
attempts. One of his own priests, Restitutus, was  murdered by the circumcel-
18 Augustine opposed forced conversions in order to avoid false conversions. He sum-
marised in retract., 2, 5, by recalling that he had confessed to the Donatists in the lost 
Contra Partem Donati: “it has never pleased me that schismatics are forced to return to the 
community under coercion by the civil authorities.”
19 This measure was stipulated in the edict of 12 February 405.
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liones. His good friend  Possidius became the victim of an attack. Augustine 
himself only  barely  escaped an ambush. His acceptance of coercive meas-
ures against the  Donatists was founded on the desire to protect the  Catholic 
 community against Donatist violence (ep., 185, 18). He  articulated the  rationale 
for his appeal to the secular power and argued that the civil authorities, the 
State, had the duty to act in religious affairs, as they must pursue the good of 
their subjects. As  Christians, they were held to defend the highest good, i.e. 
the  faith and the unity of the faithful. Because the emperor was a Christian, he 
could not content himself with measures that eradicated violence, but must 
also prevent error (ep., 185, 2). This argument rests upon the interpretation of 
schism or heresy as a crimen, which, like all other crimes, falls under the em-
peror’s and the public authorities’ judicial power. The Donatists, as a matter 
of principle, advocated the strict separation between the religious and the 
secular, between Church and State.20 But Augustine argued, in rather polem-
ical tones, that the repressive intervention of the civil power was justified, 
because the Donatists themselves accepted it. Thus their “founder” Donatus 
himself had argued his case before the emperor. The Donatists had them-
selves appealed to the imperial authorities, the secular power. They had been 
the first to address their petitions to the imperial court. Augustine recalled 
that the Donatists had collaborated with the oppressive government during 
the persecutions of the Christians under Julian the Apostate (ep., 93, 12). The 
Donatists also supported the imperial repression of the pagan cult (c. Gaud., 
1, 51; ep., 93, 10). The Maximianists had effected a split within Donatism, and 
these Maximinianists had themselves been prosecuted in the courts by the 
Donatists. In other words, Augustine ac cepted—both in theory and in prac-
tice—the intervention of the State in religious issues whenever the Church 
requested the State to do so (Frend “Augustine” 49-73).
20 Donatist thought can be summarised as “separatist”, as it used schemes of opposition and 
separation. In theory, the Donatists wanted full separation between Church and State, so 
as to avoid contamination of the holy community by contact with the impure world. Au-
gustine recognised the Church and the State as independent spheres, which are, however, 
mutually connected here on Earth, and Augustine also realised that the earthly Church was 
situated in the concrete world. Furthermore, the Donatists were convinced that the Afri-
can Church was the only true Church. Augustine, by contrast, regarded the Catholica as a 
universal bond between all churches worldwide. Finally, the Donatists were moral elitists as 
they believed that all sinners had to be expelled from the Church community, leaving only 
the saints. Augustine countered with the notion of the Church as a corpus (per)mixtum: 
within the Church there are both sinners and non-sinners. He doubted also whether any-
one could truly be totally without sin (see the section “The Pelagian Controversy”). More-
over, he believed God alone had the right to separate the just from the sinners.
[24] Agustín de Hipona como Doctor Pacis:  estudios sobre la paz en el mundo contemporáneo 
The Pelagian Controversy21
The Donatist controversy was concerned mainly with ecclesiology (“what is 
the true Church community?”) and with sacramentology (“who are the true 
ministers?”). The Pelagian controversy was a fundamental theological debate 
about the relationship between grace and human freedom, about whether it 
is possible to lead a sinless life, about the meaning of human mortality, and 
about the question whether there was such a thing as the transmission of an 
original sin. In the following outline of Augustine’s attitude to politics in this 
controversy, the various theological positions defended will also be mentioned 
and briefly  explained. 
The controversy began when Caelestius, a follower of Pelagius, ar rived in Car-
thage after the fall of Rome. He asked to be ordained to the priesthood (Honnay 
271-302; Bonner 693-698; Lamberigts 129). This request was refused, because 
he had contended that children are born without original sin, and that the rea-
son for infant baptism was not therefore the remission of sin. In 411, a council 
met in Carthage which condemned Caelestius.22 Augustine did not attend this 
council, but when he was appraised of the views of Pelagius and Caelestius, he 
wrote a number of treatises in which he defended the necessity of infant bap-
tism on account of the peccatum originale that rests upon every human since 
Adam’s fall. He also proved that impeccantia, the possibility of living without 
sin, is impossible, precisely because of every human being’s original sin. Two 
of these writings from the early phase of the Pelagian controversy were ad-
dressed to Marcellinus, the imperial emissary who had de nounced Donatism: 
De peccatorum meritis et remissione (411-412) and De spiritu et littera (spring 
412). The tone of De natura et gratia (415), Augustine’s answer to Pelagius’s De 
natura, was still polite rather than polemical, and it focused on the theological 
issue at stake. 
This tone soon changed when Pelagius, who had moved from Rome via Car-
thage to Palestine, received the support of bishops in the East. The North 
African bishops had sent envoys to Palestine to denounce Pelagius’s and 
21 This chapter is based on Carefoote; Lamberigts 363-375; Wermelinger. For an overview 
of the history and theological content of the Pelagian controversy, see the first chapter of 
Dupont (“Gratia”).
22 This Carthaginian council accused Caelestius of six errors: 1. Adam was created a mortal; 
2. Adam’s sin affected only himself; 3. Children are born in a prelapsarian condition; 4. Hu-
manity does not die because of Adam’s sin; 5. The law, just like the Gospel, gives access to 
heaven; 6. There were people without sin before Christ.
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Caelestius’s heterodoxy. A synod in Jerusalem (28 July 415) decided that Pe-
lagius was innocent, and shortly afterwards a synod in Diospolis (Decem-
ber 415) acquitted Pelagius of the charge of heterodoxy. News of this ac-
quittal was received as a bombshell in Carthage. Provincial councils were 
convened  immediately in Carthage and Milevis in the later summer of 
416. The North African council fathers decided to appeal to the Bishop of 
Rome, Innocent I, and sent him three letters.23 In short, the African bish-
ops argued that the bishops in Diospolis had been insufficiently informed 
and had been misled by Pelagius. The three letters then expressed great 
respect for the sedes of Rome, without however assigning any primacy to 
this Roman see (Marschall 127-150). They regarded Rome more as an equal 
see, which was subject, just like the see of Carthage, to the higher author-
ity of Scripture. They did not seek the  judgment of Rome as such (as if 
Rome were a higher authority), but  Rome’s help (as an equal partner). As 
far as the theological substance is  concerned, the Pelagians were accused 
in these three letters of denying that infants must be baptised in order to 
be saved (ep., 175, 6).24 The Pelagians were also accused of promoting hu-
man freedom to the extent of leaving no room for God’s grace (ep., 175, 2; 
176, 2).25 Pope Innocent replied in three letters of his own (27 January 417) 
(ep., 181; 182; 183).
Pope Innocent (pontificate: 402-417) was attempting to expand the prima-
cy of Rome (Lamberigts “Innocent I”; “Innocentius”). He considered that the 
episcopal see of Rome had a unique position, because in the West the Gospel 
had been preached from Rome. He entertained the view that the Western 
churches should follow Rome in the field of discipline, and that Rome was the 
highest court of appeal for causae maiores. This Roman primacy was by no 
means self-evident yet in the early fifth-century Church, let  alone a  reality. 
The letters of the North African bishops drew  Innocent into the Pelagian 
23 The corpus of African letters to Innocent consists of three letters: Council of Carthage: 
ep., 175; Council of Mileve: ep., 176; and the letter written by Augustine, Aurelius of Carthage, 
Alypius of Thagaste, Possidius of Calama and Evodius of Uzalis: ep., 177. The bishops of Rome 
during Augustine’s life time were: Damasus (366-384), Siricius (384-399), Anastasius (399-
401), Innocent (402-417), Zosimus (417-418), Boniface (418-422), and Celestine (422-432).
24 It must be mentioned here that no “Pelagian” denied the necessity of infant baptism. They 
did however refuse to associate this necessity with the existence of an inherited original 
sin. 
25 This was not entirely fair of the North African bishops. In fact, Pelagius and Caelestius 
did not deny the necessity of grace (in Christ). They did, however, attack the idea that 
additional grace was necessary due to some kind of original sin. See also Dupont (“Die 
Christusfigur” 321-372).
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controversy. His letters show that Innocent’s answer, and the condemnation 
of Pelagius and Caelestius which it  contained, was based solely on the files 
that the Africans sent him. The main emphasis of his letter was the auctoritas 
of Rome.  Whereas the Africans had approached him as an equal partner, he 
distorted this equal approach to make it look like the consultation of a higher 
authority. Thus he wrote that the council of Carthage had acted rightly by 
submitting the Pelagian issue to his judgment, even  though this had not in 
fact been the Africans’ intention.26 In the same breath, Innocent presented 
Rome as the source (natalis fons) for all the churches, implying that the opin-
ion of Rome was binding on all the churches. Finally, he condemned Caeles-
tius and Pelagius because they regarded human freedom as equal to God’s 
grace, and regarded divine assistance as superfluous (ep., 181, 8). Innocent 
tellingly said nothing about the  issue of the peccatum originale, which was a 
crucial factor in the Africans’ rejection of Pelagianism. The conclusion must 
be that for Innocent Church politics were more important than theology. 
 Innocent used the Pelagian controversy to underline papal authority, and 
was more interested in the support of the entire African episcopate than in 
the standpoints of two theologians who lacked influence  (Wermelinger).
Carthage appealed to Rome in 416. The North African bishops had not need-
ed Roman support before, in 411, when they had  condemned Caelestius. 
When handling the Donatists,  Carthage had equally operated entirely with-
out recourse to the bishop of Rome.27 The acquittal in Diospolis, however, 
necessitated a Church political change of attitude. This acquittal threatened 
the legitimacy and orthodoxy of the African Church. The reversal of a con-
demnation for heterodoxy inevitably raises questions about the orthodoxy of 
the authorities responsible for issuing the initial condemnation. Faced with 
the patriarchate of Jerusalem, the Africans did not feel strong enough. They 
needed a new ally: Rome. For reasons of self-interest, Carthage recognised 
the authority of Rome in a very limited way. The approval given by this Roman 
authority afforded greater legitimacy to their own conciliar decisions. That 
26 “Significantly, the Fathers had merely asked him to confirm their denunciation of Pela-
gianism, but Innocent treated their request as a plea for an authoritative papal decision” 
(Merdinger “Roman” 728).
27 The councils of Carthage had regularly consulted the bishops of Rome on whether con-
verts from Donatism might be admitted to the Catholic clergy. Pope Siricius did not reply 
to this query (393 and 397). Pope Anastasius answered that it was not permitted. But the 
Council of Carthage, going against this papal advice, decided to permit it on the basis of 
an evaluation of individual cases. Despite the fact that they ignored the papal decision, the 
North African bishops ensured that their relations with Anastasius were cordial.
Introduction [27]
this recognition must not be equated with full submission to papal authority 
is evident from the relationship between the African bishops and Innocent’s 
successor, Zosimus, whose authority they did not automatically recognise.
Pope Innocent I died on 12 March 417. Augustine was under the impression 
that the Pelagian controversy had been definitively settled (s., 131, 10: “cau-
sa finita”). Six days later, however, the Greek-speaking Zosimus was elected 
bishop of Rome (Merdinger “Roman” 728-729). Caelestius and Pelagius ap-
pealed to the new pope, who acquitted them on 21 September 417 of the 
charge of heresy and rehabilitated them. It is striking that this pope and his 
theologians did not object to Caelestius’s proposition that children are born 
without original sin, which involves a rejection of the doctrine of original sin. 
What is more, Pope Zosimus in his letters Magnum Pondus and Postquam 
a Nobis (addressed to Paulinus of Milan, Heros, and Lazarus among others) 
strongly criticised the accusers of Caelestius and Pelagius. Just like his pre-
decessor, Zosimus founded his authority to rule in this matter on the spe-
cial authority of the see of Peter. In his letters to the African episcopate, 
Innocent had stressed the formal right of the see of Peter to take doctrinal 
decisions for the universal Curch. Zosimus used the same authority to take a 
contrary decision. The North Africans, however, informed the pope that they 
were not planning on changing their view, and that they were maintaining 
their condemnation. The pope replied that he was not planning to change 
his acquittal either, again underlining the authority of Rome. He incidentally 
also indicated that his decision had been based on more thorough study than 
his predecessor’s had been. Innocent had based himself solely on the letters 
from the North African bishops. Zosimus, together with his theologians, had 
meticulously studied both camps’ propositions, had interrogated Caelestius 
himself when he was in Rome, had perused the writings of Caelestius and 
Pelagius, and consulted other bishops and theologians. Both “camps” were 
becoming entrenched in their  positions. 
The North African bishops concluded that they had to change tactics again 
in order to vindicate their position. Messengers were sent from North Africa 
to the imperial court in Ravenna. The condition of the empire was far from 
stable and prosperous at the time. Britain had been lost, the barbarians were 
on the offensive in Gaul, and Spain was in trouble. In other words, the Em-
peror Honorius could not afford religious unrest in North Africa, all the more 
so as  peace had only recently been restored after the Donatist controversy. 
In addition, the empire was strongly reliant both economically and militarily 
on North Africa. This province was the granary of Italy, and it also supplied 
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horses for the emperor’s cavalry, and he needed a well-equipped army in trou-
bled times. Religious calm had to be restored whatever the cost. The Emperor 
Honorius therefore intervened personally, without consulting the pope, and 
condemned Pelagius and Caelestius (edict of 30 April 418), expelling all their 
adherents from Rome. This decision was not inspired primarily by any doc-
trinal concerns on the part of the emperor, but by the political imperative to 
guarantee stability.28 The emperor decided to back the strongest party, i.e. the 
influential African episcopate, at the cost of a small group of idealists without 
any great political influ ence. The wording of the imperial condemnation was 
similar to that of the councils of Carthage (both the 411 condemnation of Cae-
lestius and the reaction to the acquittal at Diospolis (415) in 416), and of the 
African letters to Rome: the Pelagians were misleading the ordinary faithful by 
teaching that Adam had been created as a mortal (i.e. that his mortality was 
not the result of his sin), and that Adam’s sin had no consequences at all for his 
progeny. The North African bishops explicitly referred to these two points in 
a new condemnation (issued by the council of Carthage on 1 May 418). Anyone 
who taught that Adam had been created a mortal, that infant baptism was not 
necessary, or anyone who held a reduced concept of  grace, was excommuni-
cated. This plenary council, in which more than two hundred bishops partici-
pated, sent this decision to Zosimus and told him that they would henceforth 
abide by Innocent’s, rather than Zosimus’s own decisions. The emperor once 
again confirmed his position in edicts against the Pelagians issued in June 419. 
He did not contact the bishop of Rome even once throughout the affair.
This alliance between Carthage and Ravenna forced Pope Zosimus to rethink 
his stance. Zosimus grudgingly accepted the African viewpoint (21 March 418). 
He condemned Pelagius and Caelestius in a letter addressed to all the Italian 
bishops (Epistula Tractoria of later June 418), not on the basis of any substan-
tive reasons, but because he wished to avoid total political isolation.29 Yet he 
re fused to subscribe to the African doctrine of original sin in this  letter of 
condemnation. Zosimus condemned Pelagius and Caelestius, did not deny the 
necessity of infant baptism (neither had Pelagius and Caelestius, as a matter 
of fact), but refrained from  teaching the doctrine of original sin. He remained 
28 “Having recently witnessed the devastating effects of Donatist fanaticism, Honorius was 
not inclined to tolerate another movement whose teachings might  ignite further civil disor-
der” (Merdinger “Roman” 729). An underlying explanation for this denunciation can perhaps 
be found in the fact that Pelagianism is sometimes  associated with social critiques of wealth, 
and could therefore be regarded as a destabilising factor. See also Kessler.
29 “To put the matter bluntly, Zosimus changed his mind for purely political reasons” (Lam-
berigts 372).
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silent particularly about the African interpretation of infant baptism, i.e. that 
infants should be baptised to remit original sin (which had been present since 
their birth). Innocent had never confirmed this doctrine of original sin, which 
held that children were born in sin, either. Zosimus felt compelled to con-
demn the Pelagians not by force of argument, but by political motives.30 For 
this reason, a number of Italian  bishops led by Julian of Aeclanum refused to 
sign Zosimus’s letter of condemnation (Lamberigts “Iulianus” 453-508). Julian 
of Aeclanum clearly pointed out that Rome’s about-face had been due entirely 
to political pressure, and he proved to be well acquainted with the intensive 
correspondence between Carthage and Ravenna.  Julian even accused the Afri-
can bishops of having bribed the imperial court with horses (Ad Florum, 1, 74; 3, 
35). This accusation of corruption was never proven, and Augustine stringent-
ly denied it, but—leaving the specific accusation aside—the Roman cavalry was 
certainly dependent on African horses after the supply from Spain dried up, 
and Italy was also economically dependent on this prov ince. The following two 
popes, Boniface and Celestine, supported the African viewpoint and dedicated 
their pontificates to combatting Pelagianism.
As the protagonist of the African episcopate, Augustine was very much at the 
forefront of this struggle against Pelagianism. He re sponded to the substance 
of the Pelagian claims and played an important role in the reaction against 
them. He also defended the imperial condemnation of Pelagianism (nupt. et 
conc., 2, 3, 9; grat. Chr., 2, 17, 18). Thus Augustine appealed both to the ecclesias-
tical and to the civil authorities to solve a doctrinal issue. The Africans initially 
attempted to resolve the problem themselves. When they were faced with an 
opposing ecclesiastical authority, the patriarchate of Jerusalem, they sought 
support— under Augustine’s leadership—from the civil power. This recourse to 
the civil authorities was a third option—after their own efforts had failed, and 
the ecclesiastical authority of Rome had turned against them. What is  striking 
is that Pope Innocent and the Emperor Honorius, who  supported the Africans, 
were uninterested in the substance of the issue. The only party who did take 
an interest, Zosimus, refused to back them. The Africans’ tactical power play 
30 Augustine would later act at Zosimus’s behest out of gratitude for this reversal, in an 
ecclesiastical conflict in Mauretania Caesariensis, where a certain bishop Honorius wanted 
to swap sees, something which was not permitted under canon law. When feelings became 
too heated in Mauretania, Augustine submitted the case to Pope Boniface (ep. Divjak, 22; 
23; 23A). Similarly, Augustine submitted the case of Antoninus, the bishop of Fussala whom 
Augustine deposed on account of his avarice, to Pope Celestine (ep., 209; ep. Divjak, 22). 
Apparently the North African bishops also appealed to the pope in disciplinary issues, in 
addition to the doctrinal question of Pelagianism.
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ultimately forced him to concede. Perhaps the Africans’ zeal can be explained 
by their fear of a new schism so soon after Donatism, a controversy that had 
driven the North African province to the brink of a civil war, and by the fact that 
their struggle against Donatism had turned the North African episcopate into 
a  well-organised body.
When Augustine became a bishop, the Donatist controversy had been around for 
some time. Cooperation between the State and the Catholic Church in this con-
flict was also a long-established reality by the time of his appointment. Augus-
tine placed himself in an existing policy, legitimated the conduct of the Catholic 
hierarchy and of the imperial  administration vis-à-vis the Donatists, and pro-
vided theological justifications for this response. The Pelagian controversy, on 
the other hand, arose during Augustine’s epis copate. The course he took was his 
own. Augustine was at the forefront of the intellectual rejection of Pelagianism. 
This is evident from his many anti-Pelagian treatises, sermons, and letters. It is 
also clear from the African council documents of the time. The strong similari-
ties which exist between these and Augustine’s own writings point to Augustine’s 
authorship of these conciliar documents, for instance of the council’s letters to 
Innocent and Zosimus. The fact that Augustine shaped the contours of the case 
against the Pelagians implies, as his letters show, that he played an important 
role in the actual move against the Pelagians, in the successive appeals to Rome 
and Ravenna, in seeking papal and imperial support for the condemnation of Pe-
lagianism. As has been seen, Augustine’s reaction to Pelagianism was largely his 
own choice. He chose the same approach he had used in the struggle against 
Donatism, repression with state support, presumably as a result of the traumatic 
experience that he and his fellow bishops had had with Donatism. 
Augustine as a Bishop vis-à-vis the State
According to Duijnstee (257-258),
The good relations between Church and State in the days of the  Bishop of Hip-
po also had their drawbacks. Conscious of their own  impotence, and convinced 
of the Church’s influence, the em perors were all too  eager to use this influence 
for their own purposes, which posed a threat to a healthy cooperation on the 
basis of mutual  independence. Too many secular tasks were entrusted to the 
bishops, so that in  certain respects they in fact became serv ants of the State. 
The Church was  invited on the basis of her authority to assume and guarantee 
a number of public tasks, such as the protection of the poor and of orphans, 
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judicial authority and the administration of justice in civil cases, the  defence 
of the city. 
Augustine accepted this mutual utilitarian understanding between Church 
and State. The State used the Church’s well-organised, hi erar chical and mo-
bile structure. The Church, in its turn, assumed responsibility for official com-
missions and used the facilities that the Roman Empire had to offer. Augustine 
assumed the secular responsibilities that were assigned to him, but he did not 
allow himself to be reduced to an uncritically obedient servant of the State.
The first way to approach Augustine’s attitude to politics is that of his involve-
ment in the administration of justice. As a judge, Augustine himself exercised 
civil authority. He did not ask for this, but he fulfilled this task conscientiously. 
In order to be able to take decisions that were legally right, he studied Roman 
law. He was guided in his interpretation and execution of the civil law by the 
law of the Gospel. This is where the roles of judge and pastor converged. As a 
judge, he endeavoured to  judge moderately. He petitioned civil and military au-
thorities to exercise the same moderation. These interventions were not based 
on any  legal power of intervention that bishops might have had, but derived 
from the pastoral responsibilities of the episcopal office. As a pastor, he asked 
that the authorities should not follow the letter of the law, but should be clem-
ent with a view to the conversion of the convicted person. He did this both for 
criminals and for Donatists, which is another way in which the two ways—judi-
cial authority and theological controversy— converged. 
As a practicing judge, Augustine accepted the existing body of  legislation. He 
also called for the civil obedience of Christians to the Roman State. But this 
obedience was not blind or unquestion ing. To put it differently, Augustine only 
approved of obedience to the State if the State in its turn was obedient to the 
highest authority, that of God. This is a theme that recurs frequently in his 
sermons on the feasts of martyrs. It is a  characteristic of martyrs that they 
 disobeyed the (pagan) State that attempted to force them to commit apos-
tasy, thus preserving their faith intact, even though this resulted in death. 
In the sermons on the martyrs, Augustine contended that obedience to the 
civil authorities was premised on the strict condition that these authorities 
should not violate  divine commandments (s., 62).31 The martyrs’ resistance to 
the State, however, was peaceful resistance. Martyrs resisted the injustice that 
forbade them to profess their God and forced them to commit idolatry (for 
31 For Augustine’s theology of matyrdom see Leemans and Dupont (365-379).
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instance by sacrificing to the emperor), but they did not therefore take up 
arms. Thus Augustine in s., 302, condemned the murder of a corrupt imperi-
al civil servant in Hippo by pointing to the examples of the martyr Laurence 
and of Christ. Both resisted injustice, but without using violence. According to 
Augustine there was always an existing political order, which Christians were 
called to respect (this civil obedience was based on the exhortation of Rom., 13, 
1). If this political order was the author of injustice, peaceful resistance was the 
only permissible response for Christians, as the examples of Christ and Lau-
rence show. This peaceful resistance testified to a higher justice. Augustine 
thought it was impossible to obtain a just system through violence, which was 
always fundamentally unjust in his eyes.
Although Augustine was a protagonist in the struggle against the Donatists and 
despite the fact that he legitimated the imperial  repression of the Donatists, 
he himself resisted the state by re fusing to tolerate capital punishment. Thus 
Augustine coupled his request to the proconsuls Donatus and Apringius not 
to execute Donatist murderers with the threat that Catholics would refuse to 
cooperate in such executions, as this policy could not bring reconciliation but 
would lead only to further entrenchment of the two camps. The underlying 
proposition is that violence does not solve violence, but only breeds further 
violence. This example also demonstrates that Augustine followed politicians, 
but not un critically. Whenever the civil authorities took unwise decisions, he 
did not hesitate to threaten a boycott. Nor did he fear criticizing  holders of 
public office: “A certain Romulus, whom he himself had baptized, was threat-
ened by him in a letter with ‘wrath that is piling up before the judgement seat 
of God’, because he was squeezing double the taxes due from some wretched 
coloni” van der Meer “Augustine” 262). The senior military officer Boniface, 
whom he had previously congratulated on halting the Moors who had invaded 
North Africa, received a strong rebuke from Augustine in 425/426 because 
he was unable to prevent the Moors from plundering Numidia. Augustine’s 
critical attitude with regard to political leaders was founded on his basic 
conviction that Christ was the only true leader of society, both the current 
society and the society which is to come. Only Christ is the founder of jus-
tice. Augustine thought that political leaders should imitate Christ’s example, 
especially by practicing the virtue of humility, so that they would not indulge 
in self-glorification, and would continue to critically assess their own actions 
on a moral basis. Augustine respected the existing political order, participat-
ed in political decision making, but was never uncritical. He recognised the 
val ue of a legal framework, and furthered correct knowledge of this judicial 
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system, but also regarded this framework as subject to the requirement of 
justice. Thus he used the same pericope of Rom., 13, 1-7 to legitimate the obe-
dience that was incumbent upon Christians to the civil authorities, and to 
remind political leaders of their duty to govern justly and mercifully (Dodaro 
“Church” 182).32 Augustine took his commitment to the civil society and the 
secular State very seriously. He regarded the intrinsic purpose of the earthly 
society and the earthly state (civitas terrena)—the promotion of peace and 
justice—as very valuable. But he did not regard this earthly peace and jus-
tice, the politics of the here and now, as absolute values. Ultimately, despite 
Augustine’s own  struggle against concrete instances of injustice, Augustine 
continued to regard earthly politics as inevitably imperfect. It is  evident from 
Augustine’s De civitate Dei that he had relinquished the ancient notion of a 
Christian empire as an instrument for the salvation of humanity after the fall 
of Rome. Political aspirations and real isations were always temporary and 
fleeting. Human life within this civitas  terrena, this earthly dispensation, was 
no more than a peregrinatio, a pilgrimage. Real happiness transcended  these 
 temporary and fleeting things.33
Augustine also assumed his responsibilities as a theologian and Church leader: 
the truth of the faith and the unity of the Church could not be compromised. 
He did not hesitate to appeal to the civ il authorities in the pursuit of this goal. 
In fact, he even ventured to deploy the  civil authority, the emperor, against an 
ecclesiastical authority such as Pope Zosimus. This appeal to the secular arm of 
power was inspired on the one hand by Augustine’s concern for the preserva-
tion of order and  peace, and on the other by his faith in the rights of truth. Yet 
32 “True political justice requires that each person be ‘given his or her due’, a principle which 
necessitates that society also practices true worship or piety (vera pietas) in order to ‘give to 
God what is due’ (civ. 19.21). This true worship, which is constitutive of justice, also requires 
that political leaders and citizens acknowl edge their moral failings openly and pray for the 
forgiveness of their sins, while at the same time they extend forgiveness to their enemies (civ. 
19.27; cf. 5.24, 26). Only Christ, who alone is both just (solus justus) and justifying (justificans), 
can establish and rule society justly (civ. 17.4; cf. 2.21; 10.24; 20.6). Political leaders who would 
act justly ought to imitate Christ’s example—in particular, his mercy toward sinners (s. 13; ep. 
153; en. Ps. 50)” (Dodaro “Justice” 483).
33 “Augustine’s political thought, therefore, reminds us of the contingency of political achieve-
ments, and that any outcome will not likely endure as long as expected or longed for. Human 
beings are permanently caught in the tragic situation of longing for true happiness, but they 
face the mysterious impossibility of not being fully capable of attaining it. This does not mean 
that political activity is fruitless; it means only that the fruition of our greatest longings lies 
elsewhere, an insight achieved only by thinking and acting in the world, and by discovering 
that such longings reorients our being in the world. Between our political activities and that 
fruition, we long and live in hope” (Heyking 260-261).
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this aspiration of Augustine’s was not absolute either. He rejected the idea that 
humans should be converted forcibly, against their will. He also condemned 
anything that compromised the physical integrity of  human beings.
In short, Augustine recognised the value of the political system. This served 
to safeguard the good ends of earthly life, i.e. peace and justice. But Augustine 
believed this earthly peace and justice were reflections of the heavenly peace 
and justice, which are the foundation of earthly order and stability. Augus-
tine, himself a civil func tionary in his capacity as a judge, and a practitioner of 
Church politics as a bishop, shaped his responsibilities and his dealings with 
the temporal sphere on the basis of his love of God; therefore he called on 
Christian politicians to adopt the same orientation. Augustine’s theoretical 
views on the civil society, on politics, and on the secular State are in harmony 
with his actual experience of, and practical dealings with them.
Anthony Dupont, PhD.
Research Professor of Christian Antiquity
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“On the Way to Truth 
and Peace” (ep. 33, 6): 
Augustine’s Anti-Donatist 
Readings of John 14: 27a
En el camino de la verdad y la paz. 
Lecturas anti-donatistas de san 
Agustín de Juan 14, 27a
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Abstract
This chapter traces the development of Augustine’s 
discourse on peace in light of anti-Donatist polem-
ics found in both his earlier letters and formal trea-
tises. First, it presents evidence of Augustine’s effort 
to secure peace in North Africa from his letters; and 
second, the author focuses on Augustine’s appeal to 
the Latin text of John 14:27a in light of contemporary 
social and ecclesial unrest. Whereas the first point of 
departure asks how Augustine’s thoughts on uphold-
ing the public order appear at the level of social and 
political reflection, the second dimension turns to ex-
amine the concurrent role of biblical interpretation to 
a similar, yet distinct end. Both were essential forms 
of expressing his disagreements with Donatist views. 
In this way, the chapter demonstrates how the an-
ti-Donatist message of peace was delivered along at 
least two supporting avenues: 1. Of promoting social 
stability through networking and letter exchange; and 
2. Of promoting ecclesial unity and fidelity to Christ 
via biblical support. For Augustine, the pax Christi as 
described in this verse of the Gospel of John—unlike 
the pax Donati—provided for an authentic common 
good within time and history, as well as in the light of 
eternity. A Donatist notion of peace would appear to 
rest upon undervaluing the secular order and limited 
interpretation of John 14: 27a. In describing the Johan-
nine gift of Christ as pax temporalis, however, Augus-
tine remained aware that any form of peace achieved 
in the present was to be regarded as a passing and im-
perfect anticipation. 
Keywords: biblical interpretation, Donatism, letters of 
Augustine, religious polemic. 
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Resumen
Este capítulo describe el desarrollo del discurso de san 
Agustín sobre la paz a la luz de las polémicas anti-Do-
natistas presentes en sus cartas como en sus tratados 
formales. Primero, se estudia la evidencia de los esfuer-
zos de Agustín para asegurar la paz en el norte de África 
a partir de sus cartas; segundo, el autor se centra en la 
apelación de san Agustín al texto latino de Juan 14, 27a 
en relación al descontento social y eclesial contempo-
ráneo. El primer punto de partida es analizar cómo los 
pensamientos de san Agustín sobre la defensa del orden 
público aparecen en el nivel de la reflexión social y po-
lítica, mientras que en un segundo momento se centra 
en examinar el papel de la interpretación bíblica frente 
a un fin similar, aunque con elementos diferenciadores. 
Ambos aspectos eran formas esenciales de expresar los 
desacuerdos de Agustín con los puntos de vista Dona-
tistas. De esta manera, el capítulo demuestra cómo se 
transmitió el mensaje de paz anti-Donatista en al me-
nos dos vías de apoyo: (1) promover la estabilidad social 
a través de redes sociales y el intercambio de cartas; 
y (2) promover la unidad eclesial y la fidelidad a Cristo 
a través del apoyo bíblico. Para Agustín, la pax Christi, 
tal como se describe en este versículo del evangelio de 
Juan, a diferencia de la pax Donati, aportó un auténtico 
bien común dentro del tiempo y la historia, así como 
a la luz de la eternidad. Una noción Donatista de paz 
parecía menospreciar el orden secular y la interpreta-
ción limitada de Juan 14, 27a, sin embargo, al describir el 
don Juanino de Cristo como pax temporalis, Agustín era 
consciente de que cualquier forma de paz lograda en 
el presente debía considerarse como una anticipación 
pasajera e imperfecta.
Palabras claves: Polémica religiosa, Donatismo, inter-
pretación bíblica, cartas de san Agustín.
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“On the Way to Truth and Peace” (ep. 33, 6): Augustine’s Anti-Donatist Readings of John 14:27a [45]
As many sources demonstrate, Augustine was a man of peace. Even when he 
later allowed for possible intervention of the Roman authorities, Augustine 
still sought a peaceful reconciliation with his Donatist opponents. In an early 
(395/396 A. D.) letter to the Donatist Bishop of Hippo, Proculeianus, for ex-
ample, written in the first years of his own ministry as the “Catholic” bishop of 
the city, Augustine spoke in conciliatory, even endearing terms, of how both 
men ought to guide and correct their flocks, so that “by our unfeigned charity, 
they may be recalled from error and dissension to the way of truth and peace 
(in veritatis et pacis itinera)” (ep., 33,6, trans. Parsons). This pastoral ideal of 
appealing to his opponent’s humanity, however, was informed by a biblical, 
Christological principle found in the words of John 14: 27, which Augustine 
cites to the Donatist bishop in the opening of his letter: 
Therefore, as far as the Lord will give me strength, I will search out and dis-
cuss with you the cause, the origin, and the nature of the sad and lamentable 
division which has arisen in the Church of Christ, to which he said, “My peace 
I give unto you, my peace I leave you” (ep., 33, 2).1 
How, Augustine implies, could the followers of Christ nullify and revoke the 
gift of this peace even in their treatment of one another?
Clearly, the broken peace of the Church in North Africa was a pervasive prob-
lem of pastoral concern that threatened not only the integrity of those who 
identified as Christ’s followers, but also the stability of Roman society. In the 
same letter (ep., 33, 5), Augustine laments,
You see with what wretched foulness the families of the Christian home are 
defiled. Husbands and wives agree about their bed and disagree about the al-
tar of Christ. They swear by Him in order to have mutual peace, but they can-
not have it in Him. Sons share one home with their parents, but they do not 
share the same house of God. They wish to receive the inheritance of those 
with whom they quarrel about the inheritance of Christ; slave and master tear 
asunder the common God who “took the form of a servant” (Phil 2:7) that He 
might free us all from slavery… what injury has Christ done to us that we tear 
His members apart?2 
1 “Quod te multum gaudeo nostrae humilitati offerre dignatum neque ullo modo possum 
tantam occasionem benigni animi tui deserere, ut, quantum vires dominus praebere 
dignabitur, quaeram tecum atque discutiam, quae causa, quae origo, quae ratio in ecclesia 
Christi, cui dixit: pacem meam do vobis, pacem meam relinquo vobis” (CSEL 34, 2; 19). 
2 “Vides, quanta et quam miserabili foeditate christianae domus familiaeque turpatae sint. 
Mariti et uxores de suo lecto sibi consentiunt et de Christi altari dissentiunt: per illum sibi 
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As unflattering as these details may be, for Augustine they were simply the 
symptoms of a deeper problem, which lay at the root of disagreement be-
tween “Donatists” and “Catholics.” The causa, origo, and ratio of the African 
schism was “a dispute about our very Head.”3 Yet the result, described briefly 
in this letter and explored at length in modern scholarship (Frend 1952; Shaw), 
was a state of disarray and conflict. Indeed, by the time of Augustine, what be-
gan as an ecclesial dispute in the early fourth century had reached such levels 
of intensity that imperial intervention became increasingly necessary. 
Rather than rehearse the so-called Donatist controversy in broad outline, I 
propose instead to build upon Augustine’s comments in ep. 33 to Proculeianus, 
as a point of departure for his thought on peace in the historical context of 
North African religious polemics. Jennifer Ebbeler has recently provided an 
able and insightful point of departure for studies of Augustine’s use of letter 
writing in relation both to polemical concerns and biblical exegesis.4 With the 
principles established by her work in mind, in the first section I aim to indicate 
the various audiences to which Augustine wrote as he was administering, in-
structing and intervening in the midst of the religious and social conflict.5 As 
he addressed individuals from distinct social backgrounds, Augustine adapted 
his message about peace and presentation of the many concerns arising in 
light of the Donatist-Catholic schism. The evidence seems to point toward 
the early development of his thought on bellum iustum, although I make no 
remarkably new claims; yet my reason for introducing this material is rather 
to situate Augustine’s rhetoric about peace and violence within his own social 
milieu, thus further anchoring his exegesis appropriately.
iurant, ut inter se pacem habeant, et in illo habere non possunt; filii cum parentibus unam 
domum habent suam et domum dei non habent unam; succedere in eorum hereditatem 
cupiunt, cum quibus de Christi hereditate rixantur; serui et domini commune deum diuidunt, 
qui formam servi accepit (Phil 2:7), ut omnes serviendo liberaret; honorant nos vestri, 
honorant vos nostri; per coronam nostrum nos adiurant vestri, per coronam vestram vos 
adiurant nostri; omnium verba suscipimus, neminem offendere volumus; quod nos solus 
Christus offendit, cuius membra laniamus?” (CSEL 34, 2; 22).
3 “Non de auro, non de argento, non de fundis et pecoribus, pro quibus rebus cotidie submisso 
capite salutamus, ut dissensio hominum terminemus, sed de ipso capite nostro tam turpis 
inter nos et perniciosa dissension est” (ep., 33, 5) (CSEL 34, 2; 22).
4 See especially in relation to Donatism her chapter on the controversy as it appears in 
selected letters of Augustine (151-189).
5 Here, I also have in mind work on textual communities and social identity, as found especially 
in the chapters of the volume edited by Richard Miles: Miles, “Textual Communities and the 
Donatist Controversy” (249-283), and Rebillard, “Augustine in Controversy with the Donatists 
before 411” (297-316).
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In the second section, I transition to consider Augustine’s exegesis of a single 
verse—John 14: 27, which he had already identified in the mid-390s as a key 
biblical locus for discussion with Donatist leaders. This study, in contrast to 
the somewhat expansive overview of the previous section, offers a detailed 
account of how Augustine processed his mediation efforts in light of the tes-
timony of the scriptures, and the light of Christ, by reference to a single Jo-
hannine saying of Jesus. In line with much of his anti-Donatist argumentation 
elsewhere, for example in the early tractates on John (Io. ev. tr., 1-16), Augus-
tine’s sacramental theology, in particular his doctrine of baptism, is entirely 
Christ-centred.6 This feature shines forth clearly in his readings of John 14: 27a, 
frequently joined with favourite Pauline passages such as Ephesians 2: 14, in 
which we witness a consistently anti-Donatist, polemical use of the Latin text. 
My modest purpose here is simply to suggest how Augustine’s discourse on 
peace as a secular virtue dove-tailed with his engagement with Donatist po-
sitions on ecclesial communion and self-definition. Does Augustine present a 
uniform teaching on this “Johannine”/anti-Donatist peace; or could one de-
tect possible waves of diachronic variance and (subtle) shifts of opinion?
Peace and Violence in the Anti-Donatist  
Letters of Augustine7
Early evidence from Augustine’s episcopal career, when he first encountered 
Donatism and engaged in debate with Donatist bishops, may appear to suggest 
just how friendly his efforts of correction and reconciliation were. Although 
he remains sensitive to the significant division among so-called “Christians” 
6 For example, “Now whereas John had received a baptism that would properly be called 
John’s, the Lord, Jesus Christ, however did not wish to give his baptism to anyone, not that 
no one might be baptized with the Lord’s baptism, but that the Lord himself might always 
be baptizing. This was done so that the Lord might baptize also through ministers, that is, 
that those whom the Lord’s ministers were going to baptize, the Lord, not they, would be 
baptizing. For it is one thing to baptize in the role of a minister; another to baptize with 
power” (trans. Rettig). “Quoniam ergo acceperat Iohannes baptismum, qui proprie Iohannis 
diceretur; dominus autem Iesus Christus nolvit baptismum suum alicui dare, non ut nemo 
baptizaretur baptism domini, sed ut semper ipse dominus baptizaret: it actum est, ut et per 
ministros dominus baptizaret, id est, ut quod ministry domini baptizaturi errant, dominus 
baptizaret, non illi. Aliud est enim baptizare per ministerium, aliud baptizare per potestatem” 
(Io. ev. tr., 5, 6, 1) (CCSL 36; 43).
7 While writing this chapter, I presented a draft of the following section at the 52nd 
International Congress on Medieval Studies at Western Michigan University in Kalamazoo, 
for M. Djuth’s pre-arranged session, “Augustine’s Correspondence: Networking from North 
Africa.”
[48] Agustín de Hipona como Doctor Pacis:  estudios sobre la paz en el mundo contemporáneo 
in North Africa, Augustine nevertheless regards his Donatist counterpart, the 
bishop Proculeianus, as something akin to a co-worker in shepherding the 
people of God, “on the way to truth and peace” (ep., 33, 6). Yet this conciliatory 
nature was not always evident, whether in Augustine’s letters or anti-Donatist 
treatises, especially in view of the much-studied question of his changing po-
sitions on religious coercion (Brown 1964). In this section, I wish to outline in 
broad fashion the contours of this difficult area of interpretation for scholars 
of Augustine, in order to ask the question of how his reading of John 14: 27a 
may have changed ever so slightly over the same period. Is it possible to index 
a growing frustration on the part of the (Catholic) bishop of Hippo, even when 
he turns to explain an otherwise benign verse of the Scriptures? Any possible 
suggestion I might venture in this direction will require an initial survey of how 
Augustine’s thought on peace and violence may have evolved over the course 
of his role in the Donatist controversy.
Status Quaestionis
At least two studies on the relation between Augustine’s letters and the City 
of God have been undertaken: the more significant being that of Prete, who in 
1968 demonstrated a broad connection along the lines of “good and evil, and 
the two cities”, “the city of God and the Roman empire”, “the earthly city and 
the state”, “pagan and Christian religion”, “eschatology”, and “the superiority of 
divine peace to human peace” (Morán 169-170). Courcelle (264-265) summa-
rizes the study’s results, as identifying a profoundly spiritual vision of “truth”, 
“happiness” and “God”, as well as the deeply human concerns for “death”, the 
“fall”, “prayer” and the nature of “time.” Of course, as another scholar writes, 
“the correspondence of Saint Augustine constitutes, as we know, an irreplace-
able resource for knowledge of the man, his life, his activity, and his thought.” 
Yet, I would like here to highlight ways in which these personal letters on 
coercion seem to anticipate a particular, widely discussed element of the City 
of God, that of the “just war” (civ., 19, 15)—a work dedicated to Flavius Marcelli-
nus, who figured prominently in Augustine’s anti-Donatist letters on religious 
coercion.
For better or worse, Augustine of Hippo is often credited as a major player in 
developing the concept, made popular in Western political thought at least 
since the time of Thomas Aquinas, yet with clear precedent in earlier authors.8 
8 For evidence of Augustine’s own literal mention of the phrase, see civ. 19, 15 (CCSL 48, 682): 
“Nam et cum iustum geritur bellum, pro peccato e contrario dimicatur; et omnis victoria, 
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A number of recent studies, which tend to view Augustine and the concept 
of “just war” unfavourably—blaming him and his “bad idea” for contemporary 
invasions, for example—seem to assume a more static view of Augustine’s own 
development.9 Yet even scholars of Augustine have been tempted to such 
a synchronic reading, failing to distinguish the context and growth of his 
thought and pastoral efforts.
The antecedent of what becomes perhaps his final expression of anything that 
would approximate a theory of bellum iustum in the City of God was, among 
other competing pressures, his thought on religious coercion—which, as Peter 
Brown’s important paper given at Oxford in 1963 pointed out, turned princi-
pally on his encounter with the “Donatist” Church in North Africa.
Yet, in contrast to any static view, Brown was quick to observe that on the 
topic of “coercion” (correptio, “rebuke”; not cohercitio, “restraint” or “punish-
ment”)—as with most any other topic of theological interest or otherwise—, 
“never appears as a ‘doctrine’ in a state of rest: it is marked by a painful and 
protracted attempt to embrace and resolve tensions” (Brown 107).10 Brown 
adds, that in addition to Donatism, the “sudden collapse of paganism” in the 
fourth century was a contributing factor to Augustine’s apparent “optimism” 
in the early years of his correspondence with Donatist leaders between a. d. 
392-402, until his eventual transition to the more harsh view in support of any 
intervention after A. D. 405, and final attitude IN A.D. 420 as a “harsh and cold 
victor.”11 Yet, this sharp distinction in the chronology of Augustine’s attitudes 
cum etiam malis provenit, divino iudicio victos humiliat vel emendans peccata vel puniens.” 
On the inseparable relationship between “war” and “peace,” see above at civ. 19, 13 (CCSL, 48, 
679): “Sic est quaedam pax sine ullo bello, bellum vero esse sine aliqua pace non potest.” Many 
studies on Augustine and bellum iustum are to be found; e. g., see Weithman “Augustine’s 
Political Philosophy (234-252); and “Augustine and Aquinas” (353-376). 
9 See, for example, Bourgeois (449-474); Reed and Ryall; Messina and de Paulo; and Wynn. For 
a more contextual, historical approach, on the other hand, which I hope to develop here, see 
Markus; and Langan (19-38).
10 See also Gaumer (171-203); and Gaumer as well as Dupont (345-371). Henry Chadwick (113) 
remains correct in his statement that, “in later ages [Augustine’s] arguments came to be 
disastrously exploited by inquisitors, ecclesiastical and secular, who neglected his crucial 
proviso that the form of correction must be seen to be a loving familial chastisement, a 
minimal force, absolutely excluding torture or death even for cases of violence.” 
11 Brown writes (109), for example: “The historian of the Later Roman church is in constant 
danger of taking the end of paganism for granted. Yet the fate of paganism filled the 
imagination of the Christian congregations; and the place of the bishop in Roman society, 
indeed, the whole sense of direction of his church, was intimately linked with the fortunes of 
his traditional enemies—the pagan gods.”
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on coercion and violence is largely external to the bishop of Hippo—since it 
was in A. D. 405 that imperial laws were established—the edict of unity, es-
tablished by Honorius, identifying the “Donatists” as dissident Christians, and 
therefore criminals to the empire (Shaw 516).
Thus, rather than psychologise Augustine, as Brown may have done in his ear-
liest work, including his biography on Augustine, the degrees of continuity 
amidst change, particularly on the issue of coercion and state-sponsored vio-
lence, may indicate not only the internal path of Augustine’s own thought, but 
also reflect the social realities in which he participated. In this respect, I wish 
to explore and contextualise a limited number of Augustine’s letters, especially 
those prepared after A. D. 400, during the phase of his most intensive anti-Do-
natist rhetoric, and before A. D. 427, by which time he had completed the final 
books of the City of God.
Overview of Relevant Epistolary Evidence
In addition to the nine letters written to opposing bishops highlighted in 
Brown’s early essay, Augustine would write on Donatism, in relation to the use 
of force—to other important audiences in the first and early-second decade 
of the 5th-century A. D.12 These included fellow Catholic Christians, at least 
one pagan and one ex-Donatist, and, finally, Roman officials of his region. This 
last group was, in fact, the largest, and drew Augustine’s attention increas-
ingly in later years surrounding the Conference at Carthage of A. D. 411, when 
Donatism was declared illegal by the imperial authority. It also offers another 
possible connection with “just war” and the thesis I would like to develop, in 
that presiding at the event was a certain Roman “tribune and notary” by the 
name Flavius Marcellinus, to whom Augustine would eventually dedicate his 
work, the City of God, and with whom he shared a correspondence on, follow-
ing the successful verdict of A. D. 411 (epp., 128-129, 132-139, 143, 151, 165). A rela-
tively modern French dissertation has argued that “Donatism” was remarkably 
downplayed in letters between Augustine and Marcellinus, despite their value 
as evidence for exchange of Roman learning and civic virtue (Moreau 3-181).13 
Nevertheless, the link with religious “coercion” and the question of “just” vio-
lence is unquestionable, as one finds also in the much later ep. 185 to Boniface; 
so how do these letters function within the three-fold scheme of Augustine’s 
12 For basic overview of the letters of Augustine, see the introduction and bibliography in 
“Saint Augustine Letters.” 
13 See also Sabine (212).
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audiences? What shades of continuity and difference may be found on the 
question of apparent sanctioned violence? 
Though the three major audiences of Donatist bishops, fellow Catholics and 
Roman leaders overlap slightly in their chronology of when Augustine was ac-
tively corresponding with each, there is a clear developing line of preference 
to move from his religious rivals, to his religious friends, and finally the “sec-
ular” authority. Along the same trajectory, as scholars seem to agree, Augus-
tine develops an increasing affinity for the use of violent means to achieve 
just ends, which at first glance might seem unexpected in light of the gift of 
Christ’s peace to his apostles described in the Gospel of John.
To adjust the parameters of Augustine’s development on religious coercion 
and violence as elements of what may be called “precursors” to a full-blown 
“just war” theory, I would also like to acknowledge and test a methodology 
and set of working assumptions already set in place by Brent Shaw and Éric 
Rebillard in their separate monographs, published in the past decade. These 
authors, in a relatively harmonious way, propose to view the various strata 
and layers of Roman society as multiple “identities”, which implies both indi-
vidual and group identities. As Shaw rightly observes, “given the plurality of 
identities from which an individual might choose or have activated in a given 
situation, being Christian was only one (Shaw 772).” Thus, Augustine was both 
Roman and Catholic, and his correspondence with Roman officials and other 
Christians variously relies upon both of these identities, in addition to that of 
his being from North Africa; while in his approach, Rebillard wishes to suspend 
judgment about the objective fact of social identity or identities, in order to 
question, “when and how individuals do form groups, when attempts to form 
a group fail (5)” Thus, I will hold up three distinct social markers, and suggest 
how Augustine activates certain social identities depending on his audience—
pagan or Christian, or “dissident.” These modes of discourse, however, may not 
be self-sustaining, nor entirely separate one from the other.
“Fellow Catholics”, “Fellow Saints”? 
Letters to “fellow” Christians on the topics of religious coercion and the rela-
tionship between justice, apparent violence, and love are by contrast relatively 
fewer in number. The most prominent of which is likely letter 95, to Paulinus 
of Nola and Therasia, written in the second half of A. D. 408. Here, Augus-
tine’s concerns also touch upon a deeply spiritual and existential question of 
death, resurrection, and eternal life. These probing meditations are designed 
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as response to the issue of punishment, which Augustine reminds Paulinus 
and Therasia is ultimately for the good of those punished. This element refers 
both to the purpose of punishment, as well as to the need for setting it within 
proper limits. Human life is rather difficult, Augustine acknowledges, and of-
ten seems like a constant struggle and even form of warfare (Job 7: 1). Yet in 
encounter with Donatists or pagans, Augustine develops a complete picture 
of the nature of temporal punishment, and its theological value, especially in 
relation to the practice of Christian charity and justice, as well as in relation to 
a more lasting, eternal punishment. 
Educated pagans, former Donatists? 
Augustine also wrote on the theme of coercion with educated pagans, as well 
as former Donatists. To Vincent, in ep. 93, Augustine wrote before A. D. 411, 
that love for one’s enemy may include acts of violence against him, such as 
God’s behavior toward Paul at his conversion. Similarly, to the pagan Nectarius 
in ep. 91, Augustine showed preference for the correction of punishment, over 
a false show of mercy: “There are ways in which evil men are open to pun-
ishment by Christians but only out of kindness and to their own benefit and 
improvement” (91, 9).14 
Roman Tribunes and Proconsuls
The letters to Roman officials about Donatism and coercion are slightly more 
complex, in part since each correspondent occupied multiple social, political 
and religious identities, with overlapping or conflicting spheres of influence.
In ep. 89, to Festus, imperial representative (A. D. 406), Augustine’s goal is to 
discuss the correction of non-Catholics, whether pagan or “Donatist”, which 
he claims is “pleasing to God.” To support himself, Augustine gives a history of 
the Donatist movement, and highlights that they have “separated themselves 
from the peace of the Church.” Because of his audience, the imperial official 
Festus, Augustine gives priority to explanation of the “extra-ecclesial” reality 
of Donatism, and the need for a proper response on the part of ruling author-
ities. As a key element of this history, Augustine mentions the long-standing 
legal context and standing of the Donatist churches—in particular, their prior 
appeals to the emperor for judgment, dating back to the earliest years of the 
movement in the early 4th-century.
14 See Eno (309).
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The measure of punishment is not directly addressed, as the purpose of this 
letter seems rather to be establishing the setting for religious conflict in North 
Africa, for a Roman representative less familiar with the social and political 
milieu, not to mention the inter-ecclesial discord. Though Augustine men-
tions baptism as a defining feature of the disagreement between Catholics 
and Donatists, and even indicates prominent biblical verses central to their 
respective baptismal theologies, Augustine’s frame of reference is instead the 
“secular” and especially legal context: because the Donatists resist “reason” 
and “authority,” Augustine must meet with Festus in person to prepare an im-
proved response. 
Brent Shaw highlights the need for such a form of explanation on the part 
of a local bishop for the sake of imperial officials: “Being a transient figure, 
the governor was not always well versed in local affairs. He often came from 
outside Africa and would face a myriad of local problems that were peculiar 
to the region and about which he would have to be educated (Shaw 499).” Yet 
a response to open conflict was called for, as Augustine had described in his 
Contra Cresconuim, written in the same year, on dissident practice of violence 
(521-522).15
Shaw describes four major cases of dissident violence in A. D. 403, which were 
attacks of “dissident Christians” on servi Dei: the Catholic bishop of Thubursicu 
Bure, Augustine the Catholic bishop of Hippo himself, Possidius, the Catholic 
bishop of Calama and Augustine’s biographer, and Maximianus, the Catholic 
bishop of Bagaï. Another series of major cases involving Restitutus, a Catholic 
priest of Victoriana, Marcus, another Catholic priest from Casphaliana, and 
Marcianus, the Catholic bishop of Urga, occurred in the years immediately 
following, A. D. 405-406 (Shaw 522-531). Portions of these stories appeared 
in a dossier prepared for the imperial court at Ravenna, and Augustine would 
repeat them in his letter to Boniface, more than a decade later (Shaw 532).16
In letter 128, to Marcellinus, Augustine balances these two perspectives: that 
of the secular-legal context and sensitivity to a fellow Christian audience. 
Here, he speaks of the aftermath of the Conference of A. D. 411 in Carthage, 
and the need for protection against Donatists violently protesting the out-
come. The legal history of appeal to Christian emperors, Augustine traces all 
the way back to the case of Caecilian, in the first part of the 4th-century. On the 
whole, the extended correspondence between Augustine and Marcellinus that 
15 See Cresc. 3, 43, 47 (CSEL 52, 454-455).
16 See ep. 185, 29, 30 (CSEL 57, 27-28).
[54] Agustín de Hipona como Doctor Pacis:  estudios sobre la paz en el mundo contemporáneo 
remains bears distinctive markings of a public letter, written for the benefit of 
all in the region, for the purpose of advancing the Christian peace. Likewise, 
letter 129 again refers to public records and the legal history of imperial in-
tervention. Moreover, it solidifies the reader’s impression of a clear alliance 
between Augustine and Marcellinus.
Written in the same year, letters 132 and 133 are increasingly diplomatic. In 
ep. 133 (late A. D. 411), again to Marcellinus, who was set as judge over Cir-
cumcelliones who had murdered a Catholic priest, Augustine argues that he 
should not apply the law of equal retribution. Rather, he argues for moderation 
and restraint: a Christian judge must respond as a loving father. The tone of 
this letter reveals the immense influence of Augustine had on Marcellinus as 
a bishop (ep., 133, 3).
Letter 134, written at the same time (late A. D. 411) to Aspringius, brother of 
Marcellinus and a Christian judge of sorts—his official title was “proconsu-
lar governor” —, again qualifies the use of “torture” and discipline. In this in-
stance, Augustine intercedes for the sake of preventing capital punishment, 
which he argues should—perhaps, fortasse—only occur in the most extreme 
circumstance. Instead, Augustine recommends the reading of court records 
which detail the legal history of public complaints by Donatists (ep., 134, 4).17 
Yet unlike the administration of a Christian church, Augustine remarks, a pub-
lic State must revert to the use of fear as a deterrent against anti-social be-
havior (Shaw 504). Referring to the entire series of letters written by Augustine 
in the aftermath of A. D. 411, Shaw (715) claims that dissident (“circumcellion”) 
violence was the key reason for a Catholic bishop to consent to such penalty.
Preliminary Conclusions
As the progression through Augustine’s career and various correspondents 
may well suggest, based on the evidence presented above, the Bishop of Hippo 
seems to have entered a sequence of connected phases of his thought on how 
Donatism itself was an affront to peace and stability in the Roman provinc-
es of northern Africa. In the simplest of terms, Augustine came to favor the 
intervention of imperial authorities increasingly, especially after 400-402 A. 
D. when he began to prepare his key anti-Donatist writings. The nearly af-
fectionate tone of address one finds in ep. 33 to the Donatist Bishop of Hippo 
in 395/396 A. D. has all but disappeared by the time of his appeal to Boniface 
17 “Legenda sunt gesta ad sandandas animas.”
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more than twenty years later, after the Conference of Carthage in 411 A. D., 
where Donatism received “final” imperial disapproval.
In the following section, I propose to address the concurrent development of 
Augustine’s Johannine exegesis, conditioned by his prolonged encounter with 
the Donatist party. It would be unfair and dishonest to map a steady decline 
in early optimism with respect to Augustine’s reading of John, yet it is true 
that John 14: 27a remained a constant ally which he summoned in his debate 
with the Donatists. In short, his early pastoral affection for Christ and his fol-
lowers—expressed characteristically in ep. 33, 5-6—never wavers; though his 
sharp disagreement with Donatist ecclesiology and social praxis likewise re-
mained firm and unmoving.
John 14: 27 in Augustine’s Anti-Donatist Writings
The appearance of this particular verse solely within a limited context of Au-
gustine’s anti-Donatist polemic may not be possible to prove conclusively. 
Enough evidence exists, however, to indicate that even from an early date, 
the verse occupied a central position in the polemical exegesis of Augustine, 
and most likely also his opponents (Tilley 81). One is tempted to point out the 
irony of such a verse standing between opposing Christian parties; yet, doing 
so would possibly over-trivialize a grave situation in which violent means to 
violent ends was always a real possibility, and peace a fragile balance that was 
frequently threatened.
Overview of the textual evidence
Between his first arrival back to North Africa in the late 380s and his final 
days as bishop at Hippo in 430, Augustine left for his contemporary and fu-
ture readers a wide range of citations for John 14: 27a, on the gift of Christ’s 
peace to the apostles. Recorded in his “Farewell discourse”, the words were 
firmly established in the Christian mind from an early stage, as even today 
they are accompanied by the giving of a “sign of peace” which they precede. 
While the form “peace I leave with you; my peace I give to you” (RSV) may be 
the most familiar today, and reflects the word order of Greek manuscripts for 
the New Testament, the Latin text of Augustine’s bibles was often given with 
the clauses reversed: “My peace I give you, my peace I leave you” (pacem meam 
do vobis, pacem meam relinquo vobis, ep. 33, 2). Like many verses of the Latin 
bible in the history of its transmission (Houghton 2016), however, variance at 
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times occurred—in the case of Augustine, as for other Latin exegetes, perhaps 
due to his use of a “mental text” or local copies of the bible (Houghton 2008).18 
This feature affected the word order, including the presence or absence of key 
words, such as the absence of meam at Io. ev. tr. 77, 4—where, incidentally, the 
order of clauses is also reversed—which then offers Augustine opportunity for 
what is a form of ex tempore theological speculation about the precise wording 
of each clause, and why one should merit Christ’s use of meam, while the other 
should not.19 This type of variation seems to occupy Augustine’s attention only 
rarely.
en. Ps. 10, 6 (392 A. D.) 
In one of the earliest available references to John 14: 27a, Augustine already 
conceives of the verse’s potential in Donatist debate. Here, he blames his ri-
vals for violating the very peace of Christ through their “unspeakable dissent” 
(quam vos nefanda dissension volastis, CCSL 38; 79). From the first verse of 
this psalm, Augustine’s mind is fixed on the Donatists, the pars Donati (10, 5), 
against which he holds up the model of the imperfect Church, for which the 
moon is an allegorical figure. His mention of the minority group, the circum-
celliones, in section 5 may stand out as the immediate focus of his attention 
in the following section 6, where he speaks of the division in the terms given 
above. To shift the blame entirely on this group within the Donatist party, how-
ever great their actual measure of guilt, would in the very least misrepresent 
Augustine’s positions here. “If Macarius or Caecilian have offended you, why 
do you destroy the peace of Christ,” Augustine asks his Donatist opponents.
en. Ps. 28, 11 (392 A. D.) 
Writing at nearly the same time as the previous Psalm commentary, Augustine 
on a separate occasion turned to reference the same phrase from John 14: 27a. 
In this instance, as the first quotation which does not come from the text of 
the Psalm, the words of Christ giving his peace also close this reflection. When 
Augustine reads that “The Lord will bless his people in peace” (dominus ben-
18 For example, in his 400/403 A. D. work against Petilian (c. litt. Pet., 2,49), Augustine includes 
a citation which instead reads, “pacem meam do vobis, pacem meam dimitto vobis.” The same 
occurs at util. ieiun. 13, written some years later in 408 A. D.
19 “Sed quid est ubi ait: pacem relinquo vobis, non addidit meam; ubi vero ait: do vobis, ibi 
dixit meam? Utrum subaudiendum est meam, et ubi dictum non est, quia potest referri ad 
utrumque etiam quod semel et quaerendum, et ad quod pulsantibus aperiendum?” 
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edicet populum suum in pace, CCSL 38; 171), he recalls that the Lord, that is, 
Christ himself, dwells in peace and gives it to his those who are his own. Like 
many of his meditations on the Psalms, here Augustine contemplates the per-
son of Christ and his relation to his people. With no direct reference to Do-
natism, Augustine nevertheless references a common feature of North African 
ecclesiological typology, for which the followers of Christ in his “Church” were 
like the ark of Noah in the midst of the world. Commenting on Ps. 28: 10, Au-
gustine remarks: “Dominus ergo primum inhabitat diluvium huius saeculi in 
sactis suis, tamquam in arca, ita in ecclesia custoditis.” Thus, when he turns to 
the final verse of the Psalm, Augustine recalls that, “the Lord will give power to 
his people in the midst of the storms of this world and whirlwinds of the bat-
tle” (author’s translation). Building upon the notion of an eschatological peace, 
Augustine explains that the Lord “has not promised peace to his people in this 
world”, in a probable reference to John 16: 33, and its mention of the pressuram 
in mundo to be faced by Christ’s followers. Nevertheless, turning back to the 
text of John 14: 27a, Augustine maintains that the Lord has given his peace as 
the words of the Latin verse make clear. A tension between the present and 
future continues, however, as Augustine only applies the words of Christ in 
John 14: 27a to a future tense verb of Ps. 28, 11b, “dominus benedicet populum 
suum in pace.” Here, Augustine does not spell out the meaning of a temporal 
peace which Christ gives to his followers to enjoy in this life, as he will explore 
in ensuing decades (Io. ev. tr., 10, 4-7 and 25, 12, 3). It seems that Augustine is 
working out how to manage the imperfection of the present, in light of such 
passages in the Scriptures, as well as how to interpret John 14: 27a—or any oth-
er biblical reference to “peace”—in light of his developing theology of time, the 
fall, sin and grace, Christ, his Church, and the hope of salvation.
Io. eu. tr. 10, 4-7 (406/407 A. D.)
In another case, some years later, Augustine merely speaks of the “peace of 
Christ” (pacem Christi), meaning he does not directly cite from the words of 
John 14: 27a. Like the entire series of his first sixteen tractates on John, howev-
er, as a number of recent studies have pointed out (Drecoll; Ployd), Augustine 
has in mind a clear Donatist target. Here, the peace of Christ is the result of 
redemption by his blood, and is immediately contrasted with the temporal and 
transitory things “of this world” (in hoc saeculo, Io. ev. tr. 10.6, CCSL 36; 103). 
Yet Augustine applies this need for Christ’s redemption and peace directly to 
the “those in the church who seek their own [good], and not that of Jesus 
Christ.” He goes on to point out how each side of the Donatist debate had its 
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own  primate, including for example Carthage, Mauritania, and Numidia. The 
immediate origin of the language of “peace” may in fact arise here from the 
text of the Psalm quoted by Augustine throughout (Ps. 34: 27), however the 
reference to John 14: 27a in light of his earlier association with Donatism and 
Christ’s peace in works mentioned above may well suggest that he has the 
same verse near to mind when launching these remarks. His evaluation of the 
Donatist episcopacy and view of the Church is profoundly dismissive, and held 
up in sharp contrast to the ideals Augustine draws from reference to Paul and 
the Psalms.
s. Gulef. 28, 3 (14 September 410 A. D.)
Only a few short years later, however, Augustine turns to the text of John 
14: 27a with some noteworthy extended attention. Verses from Matthew and 
Paul’s letter to the Romans appear, as Augustine holds up the wonders of grace 
and (true) faith. He quickly names the Donatistae, who falsely claim—so Augus-
tine writes—that the authority of Cyprian applies to their positions. In order to 
refute this claim, Augustine holds up the Latin text of Christ’s words in John 14: 
27a, “pacem meam do vobis, pacem meam relinquo vobis” (MA 1; 537). “A disci-
ple of Christ is neither a Donatist or heretic,” he explains, “just as a disciple of 
Christ is no enemy of peace.” Augustine then considers the example of Judas, 
whom Christ permitted to join him at the table on the night on which he was 
betrayed. The point seems to be that Judas was not pre-ordained to commit 
treason in this way against the Lord, but rather that he separated himself from 
Christ, “Iudas se ipse separavit a domino.” Thus, in line with the Christologi-
cal hermeneutic of the voice crying out in the Psalms, “cum his, qui oderunt 
pacem, eram pacificus” (Ps. 119: 7), Augustine explains how Christ tolerated 
such an extreme action by one of his followers. In short, he did not will any 
separation, but rather desired unity and sought to protect his peace, as the 
words of the Gospel declare.20 As Augustine tells his audience, he says these 
things for the sake of protecting the peace from the “haereticos… qui se ab 
ecclesia catholica separaverunt,” even daily, and yet are falsely calling them-
selves catholica (s. Gulef., 28, 4) (MA 1; 537-8). In this context, writing in the 
immediate context leading up to the decisive Conference at Carthage of 411 A. 
D., Augustine goes on to proclaim that the Donatists, “are not falsi christiani, 
but are altogether not christiani at all! (s. Gulef., 28, 4) (MA 1; 538).” In the round 
20 “In illo ergo tolerate usque in finem vehementer commendavit dominus Iesus Christus, 
non esse faciendam separationem, sed unitatem esse diligendam, pacemque servandam” (s. 
Geulf., 28, 3 (MA 1; 537).
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dismissal of Donatism that follows, Augustine holds in mind the peace (and 
passion) of Christ, with constant reference to the teaching of Cyprian. Deliv-
ered on the feast day of the saint, Augustine asks his audience to “keep in mind 
the teaching of Christ, and to hold the example of Cyprian in our hearts… so 
that we may not fear ‘such men’, nor remain silent in their presence about our 
faith and hope” (s. Gulef., 28, 7 (MA 1; 541) author’s translation).
As a whole, the sermon is as much a praise of Cyprian and diatribe against 
the Donatist as it is a linked sequence of biblical citations brought to light in 
order to construct an ever-deepening case against the “heretics” of North Af-
rica. With the imperial conference soon to be called at Carthage the following 
summer, mere months away, Augustine seems to have been at the height of his 
anti-Donatist polemic, and near the end of his patience! None of the fraternal 
spirit of charity evidenced in ep. 33 to Proculeianus the Donatist Bishop of 
Hippo some fifteen years in the past yet remains; rather, Augustine’s audience 
is—presumably, at any rate—entirely made up of Catholic believers, whom he 
exhorts with the encouragement of Christ and the Scriptures and instructs 
with a profound anti-Donatist sentiment.
Io. eu. tr. 77.3-5 (410s A. D.) 
In the course of his Tractates on John (Io. ev. tr.), when Augustine turns to com-
ment directly on the Latin text of John 14: 27a some years later, he perhaps 
surprisingly does not bother to mention the Donatist controversy at all. Nor 
does he indicate the importance of this passage to him in earlier years. In-
stead, in what is a more restrained manner, he cites the prophet Isaiah as the 
immediate echo of Christ’s words in the Gospel of John:
“Peace I leave you,” he says, “my peace I give you.” This is what we read in the 
prophet, “peace upon peace” (Is 57:19, LXX); he left us peace as he was on his 
way, he will give us his peace upon his return in fine. Peace he leaves with us in 
this world, his peace he will give to us in the world that is to come.21 
As he expands this distinction, which largely turns on the lack of meam in the 
first clause of Christ’s words in John 14: 27a, Augustine trades heavily on the 
temporal form of peace received by Christians in hoc mundo (or saeculo), and 
21 “Pacem, inquit, relinquo vobis, pacem meam do vobis. Hoc est quod legimus apud prophetam: 
pacem super pacem; pacem nobis relinquit iturus, pacem suam nobis dabit in fine venturus. 
Pacem nobis relinquit in hoc saeculo, pacem suam nobis dabit in futuro saeculo” (Io. ev. tr,. 
77.3) (CCSL 36; 521).
[60] Agustín de Hipona como Doctor Pacis:  estudios sobre la paz en el mundo contemporáneo 
its difference from the eternal peace to be enjoyed in the time that is yet to 
come. “We do not have that kind of peace now,” Augustine says, “which is why 
we must still pray in our hearts, ‘forgive us our debts’” (Io. ev. tr., 77, 4 (CCSL 36; 
522).22 The peace enjoyed today is not complete (sed non est plena), because a 
perfect harmony does not exist—either within one’s own self, or between indi-
viduals of the community, as much as they seek to love one another.
Most likely, especially in this instance, the later words of John 14: 27, “non quo-
modo mundus dat, ego do vobis,” have informed Augustine—at least in part—as 
he formulated his shifting approach to the verse as a whole. The reality of 
lived experience, perhaps, after long debates with unrelenting opponents, was 
enough to convince Augustine that the peace he dreamed of, and which he so 
boldly upheld in his letter to the Donatist bishop of his own city, would never 
be realized completely, without additional future intervention. The peace of 
this world cannot be true peace (pax vera) without true harmony (vera concor-
dia) (Io. ev. tr., 77, 5) (CCSL 36; 522). Yet even the peace which Christ leaves his 
beloved family the Church, by whatever degree or grade more perfect, never-
theless remains only an anticipation of the eschatological peace. Augustine’s 
response is to trust, not in the peace which the world gives, which seeks the 
mere absence of war and disturbance, but in the peace of the one by whom 
the world was made (Jn., 1: 5), “so that we may live in harmony, with our hearts 
joined together, and so that we may lift up our heart as one, lest in the world 
it be destroyed.”23 This clear shift of interpretation may mark a new phase of 
maturity in Augustine’s reading of John, and of his handling of the issue of Do-
natism, or it may simply signal a new turn of his attention toward the future, 
independent of his longstanding disagreements with his North African peers.
c. Gaud. 1, 27 (419 A. D.) 
Finally, in his last major work written against the Donatists, Augustine 
again refers to the Latin text of John 14: 27a when quoting the words of his 
22 Augustine continues: “Est ergo nobis pax aliqua, quoniam condelectamus legi dei 
secundum interiorem hominem; sed non est plena, quia videmus aliam legem in membris 
nostris, repugnantem legi mentis nostrae. Itemque inter nos ipsos est nobis pax, quia invicem 
nobis credimus quod invicem diligamus; sed nec ipsa plena est, quia cogitations cordis nostri 
invicem non videmus, et quaedam de nobis quae non sunt in nobis, vel in melius invicem vel 
in deterius opinamur” (Io. ev. tr., 77.4) (CCSL, 36; 522).
23 “Nos ergo, carissimi, quibus Christus pacem relinquit, et pacem suam nobis dat, non sicut 
mundus, sed sicut ille per quem factus est mundus, ut concords simus, iungamus invicem 
corda, et cor unum sursum habeamus, ne corrumpatur in terra” (Io. ev. tr., 77, 5) (CCSL 36; 522).
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 addressee, Gaudentius, a Donatist bishop of Thamugadi who was present 
for the meetings of 411 A. D. at Carthage. This passage offers some of the 
clearest evidence in the Augustinian corpus of a pro-Donatist reading of 
John 14: 27a, and of Augustine’s own direct response to such a challenge. The 
words of Gaudentius understandably contrast the pax saeculi with the pax 
Christi, in that each aims for separate ends through distinct means: the one, 
so that war may not exist between nations, established by a kind of mutual 
agreement; the other, as an invitation that does not compel those who are 
unwilling.24 Augustine, taking some displeasure in this slight to his honor, 
explains that the Donatist bishop is misrepresenting facts, when he seems 
to imply that Augustine’s reliance upon coercion was in fact at odds with 
the pax Christi, which never compels the unwilling (non cogit invitos). The 
fact that any Donatist would consider himself (or herself) compelled by the 
external agency of the Roman authorities, Augustine suggests, is proof that 
the opposing party “does not know the Scriptures, or the power of God” (c. 
Gaud., 1, 28) (CSEL 53; 226). Turning to the text of the Gospel of Luke, Augus-
tine recalls the parable in which the master tells his servant to “go out into 
the streets and hedges, and compel them to go in so that my house may be 
filled” (Lk. 14: 21-23). The use of the Latin phrase, compelle intrare, was a well-
used point of reference for Augustine, by which to define his evolving views 
of coercion. As he says here, “We understand the ‘streets’ to mean heretics, 
and the ‘hedges’ as those in schism.” Extending the Lucan parable of Jesus, 
Augustine asks his fellow North African, “Why should you be amazed, if not 
in the case of physical want of food but rather spiritual famine one comes to 
the table who is neither led in freely, nor compelled with undue force (nec 
volenter impulsus)?” Augustine is not willing to accept an accusation that his 
own pastoral model—developed over the course of the Donatist controver-
sy, and outlined above—should deviate from the ideals of Christ. Yet neither 
does Augustine spend his careful distinction between Christ’s peace “left” 
(relinquo) for his followers in the world and his peace that he “gives” (do) only 
upon his return. His effort, rather, is to argue, with apparent success on the 
merit of biblical precedent, against a view that the mere fact of being a freely 
entered arrangement entirely typifies Christian “peace.” 
24 “Sed belliferae, inquit, pacis cruentaeque unitatis se incolas iactant. Audiant dominum 
dicentem: pacem meam do vobis, pacem relinquo vobis; non sicut saeculum dat ego do vobis. 
Saeculi enim pax inter animos gentium dissidents armis et belli exitu foederatur; domini 
Christi pax salubri lenitate tranquilla volentes invitat, non cogit invitos” (c. Gaud., 1, 27) (CSEL 
53; 225).
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Peace in the John Commentaries and Anti-Donatist Corpus
Augustine would revisit the concern for Christian peace, and its relation to 
civil society’s equal need for stability, any number of occasions within his an-
ti-Donatist polemical corpus. It was in many ways one of the recurring themes 
of his episcopal ministry, and perhaps one might even say central to his voca-
tion that he responds to the forms of ecclesial crisis threatening him and his 
contemporaries. There is a need for greater attention to the scope and depth 
of Augustine’s interest in peace throughout his Tractates on John, as well as the 
entire anti-Donatist corpus, for many of the reasons I have sought to address 
here. The use of John 14: 27a, and various strands of Pauline ecclesial thought, 
served Augustine well throughout his preaching and polemical career, with 
some noteworthy directions of interpretation that may have been influenced 
by external factors or simply the passing of time and growing maturity of a 
young North African bishop. It does seem, on the basis of this limited study, 
that Augustine’s readings of John 14: 27a may have grown increasingly escha-
tological, with hopes for reconciliation with the Donatists eventually pushed 
to the side. How this picture might look when fully fleshed out, and in dialectic 
with the eventual production of the City of God and its theological and social 
positions, requires far greater space and time that present circumstances will 
permit. Before reaching my general conclusions, however, I would like to point 
out two final Johannine references to “peace”, which bear upon the foregoing 
discussion.
lo. eu. tr. 103, 3 
First, in a reference to John 16: 33—a verse which I have not explored in detail 
here, precisely because it was not one that occupied nearly as much atten-
tion in Augustine’s exegetical activity—found in one of his later Tractates on 
John, Augustine finally holds up the significance of Christ’s words here. As the 
culmination of his “farewell discourse”, verses of the preceding passage in the 
Gospel of John establish a context of hope in the midst of future suffering: 
“An hour is coming, when each one of you will be scattered to his own place, 
and you will leave me alone” (John 16: 31). Yet, Christ continues: “I have spoken 
these things to you, so that in me you may have peace. You will have trouble 
(pressuram) in the world; but take heart (confidite), for I have overcome the 
world” (John 16: 33; Io. ev. tr., 103, 3 (CCSL 36; 600)). One might expect such a 
verse should hold Augustine captive with speculation, however that seems not 
to have been the case elsewhere. Here, his explanation is rather straightfor-
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ward, explaining that although the disciples were separated, they nevertheless 
went in the peace of Christ, with him as their refuge and the gift of the Holy 
Spirit. Unlike previous interpretations of John 14: 27a, this reading of John 16: 33 
does not qualify the present gift of peace, which here is accompanied by the 
gift of the Holy Spirit (dato quippe illis spiritu sancto), but rather upholds the 
sufficiency of Christ’s presence even in his absence, for the trouble to be faced 
by his followers while still in the world. This apparent difference does not dis-
qualify my suggestions about a developing reading of the Johannine peace of 
Christ, but may reflect either a distinct approach to this verse (John 16: 33), 
or the more pastoral approach of encouraging Christian believers to endure 
and carry on in the world, in the strength and peace of Christ. To diminish the 
efficacy, even in rhetorical terms, of that peace might leave his audience less 
than inspired.
lo. eu. tr. 25, 12, 3 
Finally, by contrast, I would like to return to an earlier tractate, for the reason 
that I believe Augustine’s insight is a valid explanation of the themes outlined 
above, and because I would like to suggest that this reference should also be 
included in a discussion of Augustine’s anti-Donatist, Johannine concept of 
peace, in all the course of its development. In a passing turn of phrase, Au-
gustine writes of Moses that through him the people of Israel were promised,
A kingdom, and a land flowing with milk and honey, temporalis pax, the abun-
dance of daughters and sons, health of the body, and many other things—all of 
them temporal, however, as a figure for the spiritual things to come, because 
they were promised to the “old man” in the “old testament” (Io. ev. tr., 25.12) 
(CCSL 36; 254).
As he goes on the explore of the meaning of Christ’s reference in John 6: 27 
to the cibum non qui perit, sed qui permanet in aeternum, Augustine further 
develops the contrast—yet similarity—between Moses and Christ. In one re-
spect, this image bears resemblance to the imperfect view of the peace left for 
Christ’s followers in this world, imperfect because it signals something great-
er. In that way, the analogy also calls to mind the eschatological interpretation 
of John 14: 27a, for just as the people of Israel anticipated a fullness yet to be 
realized, even in the present world—according to Augustine—the experience 
of peace is not yet complete (plena). This sacramental and typological inter-
pretation of Moses, and of the words of John 6: 27 and surrounding verses 
are, like John 14: 27a and John 16: 33, small yet significant parts of a larger net-
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work of biblical references which Augustine drew upon in his own Scriptural 
imagination. 
General Conclusions
In the first section, by discussing the anti-Donatist letters of Augustine, and 
those which otherwise addressed the troublesome area of violence, coercion 
and the need for peace, this chapter has offered one possible reading of the 
epistolary corpus on these issues. Yet its primary goal was to establish the 
personal network in which Augustine lived and wrote, as context for his devel-
oping interpretation and deployment of a certain Johannine verse. The words 
of Christ’s gift of peace were at the heart of Christian liturgy and might be 
seen as a possible answer to the social “problem” of religious dissidence, dif-
ference and conflict. Although Augustine saw at an early stage the relevance of 
John 14: 27a for his discussions with Donatist leaders, and frequently launched 
rhetorical pleas against the pars Donati based upon these words of Christ, his 
approach at times could be seen as somewhat divisive. To be fair, a pro-Do-
natist reading of the same verse was previously in circulation, and even as late 
as the 410s continued to be put to use by the Donatist bishop Gaudentius. At 
times, Augustine seems to develop his own approach to the verse, featured es-
pecially in his later readings. On other occasions, however, he seems to recycle 
the old, exclusivist claim to Christ’s peace which already existed a generation 
before, opposing the peace of Christ with the peace of Donatus. Such terms of 
comparison do not diminish Augustine’s achievement, which becomes a rath-
er complex interpretation that weaves his Christology and sober observations 
with a wide array of biblical allusions and references. It does leave open the 
question, what other possible voices from North Africa might have said about 
the verse, whether in the century before Augustine’s ministry, or in those that 
followed.
On the one hand, distinguishing Augustine’s audience in the first section allows 
one to identify specific features common to each group of addressee, such as 
the Roman officials, fellow Catholic Christians, or other dissident Christians, 
such as the “Donatists.” For each of these three major categories, Augustine 
in general does display a unique form of argumentation about the use of vio-
lence and coercion, which establish the fundamental principles at work in the 
development of his thought through the City of God, which I have taken for 
granted rather than exploring exhaustively. At the same time, distinguishing 
these three major groups remains problematic, for the divisions are in fact 
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not exclusive: most Roman authorities addressed by Augustine self-identified 
as Christians, and the same is true of the Donatists, who rather viewed them-
selves as Catholic Christians, not criminals or schismatics. 
Augustine himself, to a certain extent, also transcended those same bound-
aries—in virtue of his own commitment to social order as a Christian bishop. 
In his letters, both public and private, Augustine participates in a wider form 
of civic discourse, which he helped to create and promote in his dealings with 
Roman officials, the Donatists, and like-minded Catholic believers.25 I would 
like to suggest that his biblical interpretation, as evidence in the second sec-
tion above, also participated in such a form of discourse, yet remained situated 
on a boundary that included North African traditions of interpretation and 
social dialogue.
25 See Shaw (512) on the relationship of Augustine to legal discourse in his many public trials 
held against the Donatists.
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Abstract
This essay aims to evaluate the concept of peace that 
Dante Alighieri inscribed in De Monarchia, a work 
that is recognized as one of the major achievements 
of medieval political philosophy. Articulating peace 
as the main component of the Christian civilization 
of Western Europe, Dante remained under the influ-
ence of Aristotelian ethical and political thought, an-
cient Christian theologians, and the great authority of 
Augustine of Hippo. Since ancient thinkers believed 
that anthropological concepts should be subject to 
any socio-political investigation, peace, too, was ex-
amined from an anthropological perspective. Aristo-
tle’s anthropological hermeneutic employed the triad 
of body-soul-spirit to understand human nature and 
exposed the notion of universal peace to mean caritas, 
unity, and justice. Relying on Aristotle’s triad and over-
all hermeneutic, Augustine’s anthropological explo-
ration of human nature is a metaphorical portrait of 
man in a constant struggle for harmony between soul 
and body, a harmony which could then be projected in 
society under governing nations. Guided by this initial 
examination of the Augustinian and Aristotelian her-
meneutic, this essay explore De Monarchia in depth, 
so as to demonstrate Augustine’s impact and inspira-
tion on Dante’s monarchical beliefs. The inquiry herein 
will specifically outline how Dante applied Augustine’s 
concept of peace to his current socio-political system, 
both among individuals and particular communities.  
Keywords: Aristotle, Augustine, Dante, Homer, Marsili-
us of Padua, William of Ockham.
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Resumen
Este ensayo se centra en evaluar el concepto de paz 
que Dante Alighieri inscribió en De Monarchia, una 
obra reconocida como uno de los principales logros de 
la filosofía política medieval. Articulando la paz como 
el componente principal de la civilización cristiana de 
Europa Occidental, Dante se mantuvo bajo la influen-
cia del pensamiento ético y político aristotélico, de los 
antiguos teólogos cristianos y de la gran autoridad de 
san Agustín de Hipona. Dado que los pensadores de la 
época creían que los conceptos antropológicos debían 
basarse en cualquier investigación sociopolítica, la paz 
también se examinaba desde una perspectiva antropo-
lógica. La hermenéutica antropológica de Aristóteles 
empleó la tríada de cuerpo-alma-espíritu para com-
prender la naturaleza humana, y expuso la noción de la 
paz universal como caritas, unidad y justicia. Basándose 
en la tríada de Aristóteles y en la hermenéutica general, 
la exploración antropológica de san Agustín de la na-
turaleza humana es un retrato metafórico del hombre 
en una lucha constante por la armonía entre el alma y 
el cuerpo, una armonía que luego podría proyectarse 
en la sociedad bajo las naciones gobernantes. Guiados 
por este examen inicial de la hermenéutica agustiniana 
y aristotélica, este ensayo explora en profundidad De 
Monarchia para demostrar el impacto e inspiración de 
san Agustín en las creencias monárquicas de Dante. La 
investigación aquí mencionará específicamente cómo 
Dante aplicó el concepto de paz de san Agustín en su 
sistema sociopolítico, tanto entre individuos como co-
munidades particulares. 
Palabras clave: Agustín, Aristóteles, Dante, Homero, 
Marsilio de Padua, Guillermo de Ockham.
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Law is a form of order, and good law must necessarily 
mean good order; but an excessively large number cannot 
participate in order: to give it order would surely be a task for 
divine power, which holds even this universe together.
Aristotle Pol., VII, iv, 5 (LCL, 264,554-5)
The term anthropological hermeneutic describes the method which can guide 
our understanding of the notion of universal  peace in the  political thought 
of Dante’s De Monarchia. The foundation of  anthropological hermeneutic be-
gins with the philosophical understanding of “the  human being,” especially of 
his nature in a metaphysical context. The  ontological structure of the human 
being became a pattern for ancient methodology and its principles. We call 
this method “the  anthropological hermeneutic” because it considers the en-
tire ontological composition of the human person. The anthropological sys-
tem regards the  combination of the three conceptual realities of man: body, 
soul, and  spirit. These constitute a unified whole and a harmonious  integrity of 
the human being. The Aristotelian triad of body-soul-spirit  describes the one 
harmonious concord of the whole living being.1 In his  philosophy, Augustine 
delineates this distinctive ontology of created being: “These whole nature of 
a human being is, of course, spirit, soul, and body (an. orig., IV, 2, 3) (CSEL 60, 
383; WSA I, 23, 534)”.2 By the triangular prism of philosophical anthropology 
we can approach and evaluate the system of universal peace which consists of 
perfect harmony among the people of the earthly society; between divine and 
human authority—the Prince of Heaven and the earthly prince; and between 
Church and State, emphasizing the status of the Roman Prince and the Roman 
Pope in the Roman Empire. Inspired by the features of medieval cosmology, 
founded on the two hemispheres (celestial and terrestrial), which are divided 
by the horizon of eternity, Dante aimed to find the resolution of the political 
 universal peace.3 In this medieval cosmology, the human soul is situated in 
the horizon of being, which separates time from eternity, because it is re-
lated to eternity from below and yet is above time. The etymological origin 
1 See Dante Monarchy I, 2; 32-33.
2 “Natura certe tota hominis est spiritus, anima et corpus; quisquis ergo a natura  humana 
corpus alienare vult, desipit”.
3 Circulated under Aristotle’s name, the anonymous Liber de causis is quoted in Dante Mo-
narchy III, 16, 3; 91). See The Book of Causes (Liber de causis) 2, 22; 21: “Indeed, the being that 
is after eternity and beyond time is Soul, because it is on the horizon of eternity from below 
and beyond time.” See Philo Judaeus I, 16, 86; 148-51.
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of hermeneutic as “interpretation”, “explanation” or “translation”, reveals that 
hermeneutic is a methodological rationalistic speculation, as well as a valuable 
strategy, in the interpretation of the concept of universal peace, which Augus-
tine describes as caritas, unity and justice. The medieval political treatise De 
Monarchia is situated between the Aristotelian hermeneutic and the writings 
of Augustine, to whom Dante expresses his highest consideration (Monarchy 
III, 3; 68). Aristotle declares “that man is by nature a political animal” (Pol., I, I, 
9-10) (LCL 264,8-11).4 The aim of De Monarchia seeks to present man’s welfare 
as consisting in living in peace, and in that form of government and social in-
stitution which secure this mode of life. 
In his theological reflection on the Trinity, Augustine provides an essential 
definition that in the Trinity exists the “peace of unity” or pax unitatis (Io. 
ev. tr., 14, 9) (CChr. SL 36,147; FC 79,73). Was Dante—expressing by way of 
syllogisms—inspired by Augustine, when he pronounced that in God all prin-
ciples form an absolute unity? (Monarchy III, 12, 11; 86). The three coeternal 
principles, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, are in total reality one God and one 
substance. The Father is the principle of the Trinity. The unity of the divine 
nature and the distinction between the three Persons is describes thus, “…
in their relations to each other in the Trinity, if the begetter is the Principle 
of the begotten, then the Father is the Principle of the Son since He begot 
Him” (trin., V, 14, 15 (CChr. SL 50, 222; FC 45,193; WSA I, 5,199).5 The Principle 
is one omnipotent God, the tri-potent Father, Son and Spirit (ord., II, 5,16) 
(CChr. SL, 29,116). For Saint Augustine, the Father is the principle and the Son 
is the principle (Pater principium et Filius principium).6 God is to be under-
stood as the beginning. The theological paradigm of the Trinity was thus for 
Dante the argument for universal peace in his current socio-political sys-
tem. It is also a theological postulate that creation should imitate the Cre-
ator, and that unity, in the highest degree, is realized in God. Dante trans-
4 Aristotle recognized that man is a politically active citizen of the State. See also Pol., VII, II, 
2 (LCL 264,538-41). On the political context of Aristotle’s thought see Riesbeck.
5 “Ad se autem invicem in trinitate si gignens ad id quod gignit principium est, pater ad 
filium principium est quia genuit eum.”
6 See Io. ev. tr., 39, 1 (CChr. SL, 36,345; FC 88,116): “Si se dixit Dominus esse principium, 
quaeri potest utrum et Pater principium sit. Si enim Filius principium est qui habet  Patrem, 
quanto facilius intellegendus est deus Pater esse principium, qui habet quidem Filium cui 
Pater sit, sed non habeo de quod sit? Filius enim Patris est Filius, et Pater utique Filii Pater 
est; sed Deus de Deo Filius dicitur, lumen de lumine Filius dicitur; Pater dicitur lumen, sed 
non de lumine; Pater dicitur Deus, sed non de Deo. Si ergo Deus de Deo, lumen de lumine, 
principium est, quanto facilius intellegitur principium lumen de quo lumen, et Deus de quo 
Deus?” 
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ferred the “peace of unity” in the Trinity to the level of humankind, which 
is seeking “the calm of universal peace” (Monarchy, I, 16, 2; 28). Dante came 
to the conclusion that a monarch is the image of the Divine  unity, so that hu-
mankind is made one through him.7 Anthropological hermeneutic, focusing 
on the harmonious Trinitarian unity, renders the interpretation of peace as 
inner divine love and unconditional love toward the humankind. As a phi-
losopher of history, Dante, however, perceives in the divine love the pattern 
for human society in the Roman Empire. Dante articulates the blessing of 
universal peace in the “fullness of time”, when the Son of God —the “Messi-
anic Prince of Peace” (Is. 9: 5-6)— took on human form for man’s salvation. It 
was a unique period of perfect peace among individuals and particular com-
munities, and consisted of a perfect monarchy, during the rule of Emperor 
Augustus (Monarchy I, 16, 1-2; 28).8 This spiritual interpretation of ancient 
history,  formulated during the Middle Ages, was characterized by a spiritual 
glorification and poetical idealization. 
As a political philosopher, using the rules of syllogistic argument, Dante argues 
for the necessity of a universal monarchy, as a means to establish universal 
peace in the secular commonwealth. There can only be one supreme ruling 
power responsible for stable government, as guarantor of peace in the uni-
versal empire. Aware of the fundamental problems of the political and social 
order, Dante recognizes that every person is inseparable from the social envi-
ronment and from the political ideal of the general welfare.
And just as the lesser parts which make up the human race are well adapted 
to it [the whole universe], so it too can be described as being well adapted to 
its whole; for its parts are well adapted to it in relation to a single principle... 
and so absolutely speaking it too is well adapted to the universe (or to its rul-
er, who is God and Monarch) in relation to a single principle, i.e. one ruler. 
And thus it follows that monarchy is necessary to the well-being of the world 
(Monarchy, I, 7; 12). 
7 See Carlyle and Carlyle 115-6: “Dante gives other reasons for holding that the whole hu-
man race should be under one ruler; as, for instance, that it is the purpose of God that every 
created being should be in the divine likeness, as far as his nature will permit, and that 
therefore the human race is best disposed when it is most like to God; and as the essence 
of unity (‘vera ratio unius’) is in the Deity, it is likest Him when it is most one, and this can 
only be when it is subject to one ruler (‘princeps’)”.
8 See also Monarchy II, 10, 4-10 (58-60).
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Dante, in agreement with Aristotle, states that the well-being of single individ-
uals constitutes the purpose and well-being of the State.9 All human energies 
should be directed to an ideal of happiness, which is valid for all humankind, 
for the individual as well as for the State. 
It is incontestable that when Dante was writing his treatise, his concept of 
universal peace was challenged by the  indigenous  political situation in the 
State, which provoked the major  intellectual and political controversies of 
the 13th and 14th  centuries.  Dante’s De Monarchia, consisting of three books, 
reveals a great deal about the political and religious affairs of the late Middle 
Ages, which  separated the secular State from religious authority. Dante is for-
ward-looking in his socio-political concept of the political  autonomy of the 
world-State as a logical necessity. The doctrinal dispute appeared between 
the two political factions: the  papal and the pro-imperial and anti-papal par-
ty: the Guelph party of Pope John XXII (1316-1334) and the Ghibelline party 
supported the Holy Roman Emperor Louis IV of Bavaria in his conflict with 
the Avignon popes. Within the historical context, the realization of peace in 
the Roman Empire is confronted with the new political circumstances. As 
regards the political situation of his own time, the general tendency of the 
treatise is mostly pro-imperial, as it elucidates the need for secular power. 
Both parties realized that peace—and the welfare of peace and  order—was 
the main component of the Christian civilization of Western Europe. In op-
position to the pro-papal party, the imperial party claimed that universal 
peace could be accomplished on the base of fundamental political Aristo-
telian principles. The pro-imperial reform party was also supported by the 
political medieval philosopher Marsilius of Padua (c. 1275-c. 1343). His work 
Defensor Pacis (“Defender of Peace”), written in 1324, extends the tradition of 
Dante’s De Monarchia.10 The political treatise  Defensor Pacis influenced the 
conciliar movement which  declared the authority of the General Councils of 
Christians as superior to that of the Roman bishop (2, 21; 287-98). Marsilius 
appeals to the  authority of Aristotle’s Politics a propos of the law-making 
power resides in the people. According to this position, the human authori-
ty to make laws belongs only to the entire body of citizens. The  prince, sov-
ereign governor, rules by the authority of the whole body of citizens. In the 
Defensor Pacis, Marsilius is concerned with the  general causes of civil peace 
9 See Aristotle Pol., III, IV, 3 (LCL 264,200-1): “The good life then is the chief aim of society, 
both collectively for all its members and individually...”
10 See Marsilius of Padua. The Defender of Peace (Defensor Pacis). Translated by Alan Gewir-
th, New York, Harper Torchbooks: Harper and Row, 1967. 
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and conflict and wants to demonstrate the independence of the Holy Ro-
man  Empire from the temporal power of the papacy. In  practice, the secular 
Christian ruler, who acts as the people’s representative, has the right to call 
General Councils as the supreme authority in the universal Church. Other 
representatives of the Ghibellines were the spiritual  Franciscans, such as 
the English Franciscan friar and scholar William of Ockham (c. 1280-c. 1349), 
who  argued for  peaceful separation of the spiritual and earthly rule and 
opposed the Church’s interference in worldly affairs. Marsilius of Padua and 
William of Ockham were the first medieval authors to advocate a form of 
Church and State autonomy, and of the rights of the spiritual and temporal 
powers. 
It is necessary to take into consideration the important descriptions and in-
sights from his preceding writings, which guided Dante towards the concept 
of universal peace. In his previous work Divina Commedia (Divine Comedy), he 
placed John XXI “Pietro Spano” in his Paradiso’s Heaven of the Sun, along with 
the spirits of other great religious scholars. One of the most scholarly pontiffs 
in papal history, John XXI, would be the only pope whom Dante depicted as re-
siding in Paradise. His reign was characterized by attempts to promote peace 
and justice. In this historical context, Dante, seeking the benefits of peace and 
order, proclaimed the necessity of a single supreme Christian ruler, monarch 
or emperor in the commonwealth, and this monarchy’s relationship to the 
universal Church as the leading light and guide to eternal peace. 
One of the most basic challenges in medieval political philosophy is to ex-
plain the nature and function of the universal emperor and the supreme 
pontiff. In order to resolve the division between the  Roman Prince and the 
Roman Pope, Dante argues with the supporters of hierocratic opinion, who 
introduced the Biblical metaphor that God created “two great lights”, the sun 
and the moon (Gn. 1: 16; Ps. 136: 7-9). The hierocratic argument of the sun and 
moon is completely untenable, since those two lights existed before man’s 
creation. At a time when, as still sinless, man didn’t need controlling pow-
ers.  These two lights, “a greater light and a lesser light,” allegorically  signify 
the two kinds of power: the spiritual and the  temporal.11 In his  monarchical 
11 See Dante Monarchy III, 1,5; 64; III, 4,2; 69; III, 4,12; 71. See also Augustine conf., XIII, 18, 
23 (CChr. SL 27,254): “Quoniam quidem alii datur per spiritum  sermo  sapientiae tamquam 
luminare maius propter eos, qui perspicuae veritatis luce  delectantur tamquam principio 
diei, alii autem sermo scientiae secundum eundem spiritum tamquam luminare minus, alii 
fides, alii donatio curationum, alii operationes virtutum, alii prophetia, alii diiudicatio spir-
ituum, alteri genera linguarum, et haec omnia tamquam stellae.”
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 beliefs, Dante made an essential  distinction between the temporal realm and 
the spiritual realm (Monarchy, III, 4, 20; 72). He regarded the relationship 
 between the Roman Prince and the Roman Pope as a common unity (Mon-
archy, III, 12, 8; 85). He sought to resolve the division, and prevent it from 
going in two directions—implying two authorities, and two governments. He 
proposed the possible coexistence and a system of reciprocal co-equality, as 
well as uniformity in purpose, in order to provide the proportionate services 
to the society. Dante regarded the medieval emperor as supreme arbiter in 
order to settle the dispute between the Roman Pope and the emperor. He 
supported this argument by a quotation from Aristotle, who claims that the 
plurality of authority represents disintegration and disorder, and it is better 
for humankind to be ruled by one than by many, an opinion which Aristotle 
borrowed from Homer.12 Dante followed the Aristotelian governing princi-
ple that plurality involves conflict, defect, and disorder.13 Thus, according 
to Dante, “whoever embodies imperial authority is not allowed to divide the 
empire” (Monarchy, III, 10,9; 82).
Dante denied that the pope,
As God’s vicar, had the authority to give and take away temporal power and 
transfer it to someone else, so now too God’s vicar, the head of the universal 
church, has the authority to give and to take away and even to transfer the 
scepter of temporal power; from which it would undoubtedly follow that im-
perial authority would be dependent in the way they claim (Monarchy, III, 6,2; 
73-4).14 
In this moment, Dante confront a formal error of hierocracy, where the pope, 
as the highest authority, appoints the emperor, but he doesn’t embrace the 
opposite situation, where the emperor, as the highest  authority, has a strong 
influence in the election of the pope.
Dante proposes a new solution. The supreme pontiff and the  emperor are 
separate but equal, each supreme in his own  domain: the one in the spiritual 
and the other in terrestrial realm.  Dante  proclaimed the spiritual power of 
12 See Dante Monarchy, I, 5; 10; I, 14; 25. See also Aristotle Pol., IV, IV, 4 (LCL 264,302-3); Ho-
mer Il., II, 204 (LCL 170,76-7): “No good thing is a multitude of lords; let there be one lord, 
one king…” See also Aristotle Metaph., XII, X, 14 (LCL 287,174-5). According to Suetonius, 
the Roman Emperor Domitian (81-96 A. D.) used this sentence as his political principium, 
see Suetonius Dom. VIII,12 (LCL 38,346-7).
13 See Aristotle Metaph., X, VI, 6 (LCL 287,32-3).
14 See also Monarchy III, 15, 9; 90-1: “...the power to confer authority on this earthly kingdom 
is in conflict with the nature of the church...”
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the Roman Pope thus: “The  supreme Pontiff, [is] the vicar of our Lord Je-
sus Christ and  Peter’s successor…” (Monarchy, III, 3,7; 66). In respect to the 
temporal power of the Roman Prince, “imperial authority  derives  directly 
from the summit of all being that is from God” (Monarchy, III, 13,1; 86). In 
his political theory, deeply  rooted in his personal  convictions, Dante claims 
that the secular authority of the emperor is not dependent on the pope, but 
comes directly from God, without the intervention of the Church. As Gilson 
concluded, “Dante’s Pope is entirely without control of any temporal power 
(184)”. Neither the Emperor nor the Pope may aspire to the exercise of this 
twofold authority (186). Dante refutes the hierocratic opinion that all Chris-
tian kings should be obedient to the supreme pontiff as to Christ himself. In 
practice, he rejects that temporal power should be subordinate to ecclesias-
tical power. Dante argues against particular opponents who recognizes that 
“the  authority of the empire is dependent on the authority of the church”, 
claiming that they use, in Aristotelian terms, an invalid syllogism (Monarchy, 
III, 4, 1; 69). Here, Dante appeals to the authority of Augustine in quoting from 
De civitate Dei15, (Dan. 7, 7-9) and De doctrina christiana16, (cited hereafter 
doctr. chr.) with respect to methodology, as he articulates that people who 
reach these conclusion are mistaken, and are incorrect in the interpretation 
of sacred Scripture. Syllogistic arguments in regard to mystical or allegorical 
interpretation (Gn. 1: 16) can be erroneous. Augustine states that “Allegory 
 occurs when words seem to point to one thing, while they signify something 
else to the mind” (en. Ps. 103, 1,13) (CChr. SL 40, 1486; WSA III, 19,123).17 The 
allegorical sense emerges when the text  produces an image, which calls to 
mind a reality that is the object of faith. Dante cites Augustine, according to 
whom in the prophetic history of the sacred Scriptures all the events narrat-
ed are symbolic, and can be approached by diligent historical research with 
exactitude concerning past events, but also with the forecast of things to 
come. It is possible in the historical narratives of the biblical account to dis-
cover the correct facts or prophecies of the future. In this way Dante refutes 
the opinion that the two lights allegorically signify two kinds of power, since 
this is incompatible with the  intention of the original writer. It is his major 
15 See Dante Monarchy III, 4, 6-11; 70-1; Augustine civ. XVI, 2 (BA 36,184-7; CSEL 40.2,127; FC 
14,489-90). Augustine’s explanation is reminiscent of 2 P. 1, 20-21, so that the interpretation 
of scriptural prophecy is not a matter of private comment, because it was written under 
the influence of the Holy Spirit.
16 See Augustine doctr. chr. I, 36, 41 (CChr. SL 32, 30; WSA I, 11, 124).
17 “Et sic multa aliud videntur sonare, aliud significare; et vocatur allegoria. …Ergo quod 
dicimus allegoriam figuram esse, sacramentum figuratum allegoria est.”
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contention that the temporal realm does not owe its existence and authority 
to the spiritual realm. Dante also rejected other allegorical interpretations 
in his polemic with the supporters of the hierocratic theory of two powers, 
who use other arguments apart from the biblical account of “two swords” 
(Lk. 22: 38), as a prefiguration of these two powers (Monarchy, III, 9,12; 77-80). 
Nevertheless, Dante is attempting to protect temporal divinely appointed rul-
ers, who would serve the interest of the people and protect the common ben-
efit.18 This idea of Aristotle, according to which the purpose of government 
is the rational fulfillment of  humans’ natural desire for a “sufficient life’” was 
developed in Marsilius’ Defensor Pacis. Dante pretends to argue for a univer-
sal monarchy, in order to temper the political authority of the papacy, which 
is based on the claim to plenitude of power in ecclesiastic and civil affairs—
spiritual as well as temporal—of the Roman bishop over the power of the Ro-
man prince and principality. Thus, he articulates imperial supremacy over the 
Church. The claim to plenitude of power not limited by human law stimulated 
the rise of the medieval theory of Papal Monarchy, which consists of imperial 
prerogatives and privileges based on the so-called “donation of Constantine”, 
papal absolutism, and universal hegemony (Monarchy III, 10; 80-3; III, 13, 7; 
88). Marsilius describes the secular State as the defender of universal peace, 
which is the most essential benefit of human society. In De Monarchia there 
is a hostility felt toward the papacy, because papal interventionism in political 
affairs has disturbed civil life instead of promoting peace (Monarchy, III, 3; 66). 
The medieval Church should maintain its original position of noninvolvement 
in the political order, and promote the spiritual welfare of its citizens. Uni-
versal peace is the consequence of the  restoration of political order, in the 
purpose to establish the stability and harmony of the human society, which 
is impossible without unity and justice. Thus, “the foundation of the empire 
is human right”, and “the empire is not allowed to do anything which is in 
conflict with human right” (Monarchy, III, 10, 8; 82). His views on the origin, on 
moral nature and the function of the State are Aristotelian. The purpose of the 
well governed State is to promote the most ideal mode of life, and to educate 
its citizens, so that they become good and virtuous men.19 Here is an echo of 
the Aristotelian remark that the unity of the political community is formed by 
education, as well as by moral and political virtues, which make the society 
morally good and without these there can be no justice, peace or happiness 
18 See Aristotle Pol., II, VI, 20 (LCL 264,144-5).
19 See Aristotle Pol. II.I.1-2 (LCL 264,68-9); See also Pol. III, V, 10 (LCL 264, 212-3): “...the state 
was formed not for the sake of life only but rather for the good life...”
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on Earth (Pol., II, II, 10 (LCL 264,90-1). This personal and particular character-
istic of citizens is that they possess a political conscience, and are disposed by 
justice, charity and the right love, to enjoy the promises to “live in peace”. The 
virtues of love and justice are the two component parts of peace:
Since among the other goods available to man living in peace is supremely 
important…, and justice principally and most effectively brings this about, love 
most of all will strengthen justice, and the stronger love is the more it will do 
so (Monarchy, I, 11,14; 18).20 
Common law is a rule to guide humans to live in peaceful relationships 
(Monarchy, I, 14, 7; 25). While justice stimulates one to live in peace, love in-
spires one to do justice: “Justice is a  virtue that  operates in relation to other 
people” (Monarchy, I, 11, 7; 17). Employing Augustine’s expression “charity or 
rightly ordered love” (civ. XIV, 7) (CChr. SL 48, 421-3; CSEL 40, 2,13; FC 14, 
359-60),21 Dante states that charity is integrity in love, which refines and 
clarifies justice. A universal monarch exercises authority in “the habit of 
justice”, in which exists “rightly ordered love.” The medieval emperor must 
love the good of humankind more than any other; he must be the servant of 
all. The reason for this lofty pre-eminence is based on the nature of nobility 
possessing the attributes of moral and intellectual virtues in completeness.22 
The reward of these moral and intellectual virtues, which seeks the good of 
the people, is found in the noble person in respect to universal domination. 
For it is proper that a noble people should be placed above others because 
they are eminently disposed to act in accordance with justice.23 In Dante’s 
political concept, the emperor is identified with a sage, who is defined by 
the Stoics as a person of moral and intellectual  perfection. The supreme 
monarch, ruling by his highest moral and intellectual faculties, is more ca-
20 See this idea of the “good disposition” in Marsilius of Padua 1, 19, 2; 90: “For tranquility 
was the good disposition of the city or state, whereby each of its parts can perform the 
functions appropriate to it in accordance with reason and its  establishment. ...These are 
the mutual association of the citizens, their intercommunication of their functions with 
one another, their mutual aid and assistance, and in general the power, unimpeded from 
without, of exercising their proper and common functions, and also the participation in 
common benefits and burdens according to the measure appropriate to each, as well as the 
other beneficial and desirable things...”
21 “Recta itaque voluntas est bonus amor.”
22 See Aristotle Pol., I, V, 7 (LCL 264,62-3); V, VIII, 2 (LCL 264,438-9).
23 The nature of nobility and the changing concept of nobility was the moral  commonplace 
of the late Middle Ages—the strict antithesis between the nobility of birth and nobleness of 
soul. See Vossler 201-2 and 300-4.
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pable than others of correct judgment and justice, and in consequence his 
actions are rightful.24 Augustine had led Dante into a deeper consideration 
of the proper government of human affairs, as a necessary element of man’s 
happiness or good (Bergin 177). But the idea is profoundly that of Augustine 
of the existence of human happiness in the present life and divine  felicity 
in eternal life; in the eternal City of God and in the temporal city of this 
world, in the heavenly society and the earthly society.  Humanity endeavors 
to achieve temporal peace in this world and eternal salvation in the next:
Now these two kinds of happiness must be reached by different means, as 
representing different ends. For we attain the first through the teachings of 
philosophy, provided that we  follow them putting into practice the moral and 
intellectual virtues; whereas we attain the second through spiritual teaching 
which transcend human reason, provided that we follow them putting into 
practice the theological virtues, i.e. faith, hope and charity (Monarchy, III, 16, 
8; 92). 
At the end of the third book Dante returns to the anthropological interpreta-
tion, based on a twofold human nature—corruptible and incorruptible:
In order to understand this it must be borne in mind that man alone among 
created beings is the link between corruptible and incorruptible things; and 
thus he is rightly compared by philosophers to the horizon, which is the link 
between the two hemispheres. For if he is considered in terms of each of his 
essential constituent parts, that is soul and body, man is corruptible; if he is 
considered only in terms of one, his soul, he is incorruptible (Monarchy, III, 
16, 3-4; 91).
Dante incorporated into his political thought the dualistic concept of the 
universe and its twofold stage of existence—temporal and eternal. If human 
nature is based on the twofold distinction between the soul and the body, the 
human goal must also be twofold: 
Thus if man is a kind of link between corruptible and incorruptible things, 
since every such link shares something of the nature of the extremes it unites, 
man must necessarily have something of both natures. And since every nature 
is ordered towards its own ultimate goal, it follows that man’s goal is twofold: 
24 See Aristotle Pol., III, II, 5 (LCL 264,188-9): “Now we say that a good ruler is  virtuous and 
wise, and that a citizen taking part in politics must be wise.” See also Seneca Ep. 95, 57 (LCL 
77, 92-5): “Peace of mind is enjoyed only by those who have attained a fixed and unchang-
ing standard of judgment; the rest of mankind  continually ebb and flow in their decisions, 
floating in a condition where they  alternately reject things and seek them.”
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so that, just as he alone among all created beings shares in incorruptibility and 
corruptibility, so he alone among all created beings is ordered to two ultimate 
goals, one of them being his goal as a corruptible being, the other his goal as 
an incorruptible being (Monarchy, III, 16, 5-6; 92-3).25
One final human goal is in accordance with his corruptible and mortal body, 
and another in accordance with incorruptible and im mortal soul.26
To accomplish earthly happiness and future felicity, humanity needs two 
guides, corresponding to these two goals: emperor and pope. Both leaders 
derive their authority from God superior power, and both are leading men to 
the respective values. While the emperor directs men to their temporal end, 
the pope directs men to their eternal end. Prue Shaw emphasizes in Dante’s 
writing the fact of man’s double nature: the combination in human beings of 
body and spirit, corruptible and incorruptible, as well as the ultimate goals 
proper to two natures, in the terms of anthropological hermeneutic: 
Pope and emperor are what they are by virtue of their  relationship to other 
people, which are relationships of authority, whereas man is a substance, de-
fined in terms of his essential nature. As man, they are referred to a single man; 
as pope and emperor, they are referred not to a person, but to the principle of 
authority: either God himself, or some lower principle of authority emanating 
from him (Shaw XXVIII). 
Both, pope and emperor, a master and a spiritual father, have to focus on uni-
formity; both are amenable to this principle of divine authority, which is eter-
nal law. As Etienne Gilson notes: “For God is the measure and the supreme au-
thority that governs, measures and judges all substances and all relationships” 
(Gilson 190).
The aim of the monarchy is to demonstrate the necessity of a  single ruling 
power; a single governor, the world-ruler, capable of  ordering the will of 
collective humanity, in peace and concord, and as the uniform movement of 
many wills due to the “unity of wills” (Monarchy, I, 15, 5; 26).27 Dante intro-
duces the triad of  “being”, “unity”, and “goodness” as an orderly combination 
25 See Aristotle Pol., VII, I, 2 (LCL 264,532-3): “For as regards at all events one classification 
of things good, putting them in three groups, external goods, goods of the soul and goods 
of the body, assuredly nobody would deny that the ideally happy are bound to possess all 
three.”
26 See Cic., Fin. IV.VII,16-18; 318-21
27 See Aristotle Pol., III, IX, 2 (LCL 264, 252-5); see also Augustine conf., XIII, 9, 10 (CChr. SL 
27, 246; Chadwick 278): “In bona voluntate pax nobis est.”
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of three  principles.28 Being precedes unity and unity precedes goodness. 
Being “one” is the foundation of being “good”. Thus, the  well- being of hu-
mankind depends on the unity of its will. Dante asserts that, as humanity 
depends on complete unity of will, thus a  single  highest authority is es-
sential to maintain fraternal harmony. In explaining it, Dante uses the an-
thropological paradigm of the  unity and concord in soul and body, with the 
purpose to transpose it to the family, the city, the State and all humankind 
(Monarchy, II, 9, 2; 54). 
In order to accomplish the political unity of humankind as the “universal 
community of the human race”, it is necessary that the collective effort of 
all humanity be properly coordinated. The duty of the citizen is to obey the 
commands of political authorities, in order to preserve the unity and cohe-
sion of the entire State. The responsibility of the State is to maintain law, 
order, stability, and peace.29 Dino Bigongiari perceives the obvious paral-
lelism between Augustine’s concept of peace and Dante’s universal human 
community:
...Augustine’s grand conception of peace as the justification of all political re-
gimes serves as the capstone of a theory of humanity properly organized for 
its universal task. The world should therefore constitute one single state. Each 
one of us is a civis of the universal communitas, which is fittingly called by 
Dante humana civilitas (XII). 
Etienne Gilson describes the process of creation, this intellectual concept of 
Dante’s universal community, in the following terms: 
In order... to conceive of the possibility of a universal temporal community, it 
was necessary to borrow from the Church its  ideal of a universal Christendom 
and to secularize it. On the other hand, it was impossible to secularize this 
ideal without  establishing  philosophy as the basis of the universal community 
of all mankind, subject to the same monarch and pursuing the same form of 
 happiness in obedience to the same laws (166). 
Gilson reaches this conclusion, which is the foundation of Dante’s political 
theory: “No universal human community, no peace; no peace, no opportunity 
28 On the topic of the always associated predicates of being and unity see Aristotle Metaph. 
III, IV, 24-30 (LCL 271,133-5); IV, II, 6-10 (LCL 271,148-51); XI, I, 10-1 (LCL 287,56-7); XI, II, 8-9 
(LCL 287,60-3); XII, IV, 3 (LCL 287,132-3).
29 For different approaches to the concept of peace see Rouner “Religion, Politics” and “Ce-
lebrating Peace”; see also Siebers 115-130.
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for man to develop to the highest pitch his aptitude for discovering truth or, 
consequently, to attain his goal” (170). Dante cannot think of the Roman Em-
pire without its connection to Christendom. 
Influenced by Aristotelian ethical and political thought, as well as patristic 
theology, Dante affirm that no single household or society can bring peace 
to realization. Universal peace is required to order the collective human 
will to the goal of realizing its  intellectual potential, assigned by God to hu-
manity (Monarchy, I, 4; 8-9). He emphasized the guidance of reason to know 
the  divine natural law and the collective human will in respect to human or 
positive law, which is ethically binding on human society. Dante recognized, 
following the Stoic system of the law of nature, that is in conformity with 
the divine reason inherent in the unlimited potential of the human mind. He 
perceives the power of the human will in submission to the will of collective 
humanity, which is represented by the Roman prince. Thus, an individual 
man should act in conformity with the will of collective humanity. A uni-
versal human community does indeed appear necessary in order that man 
may attain his ultimate goal (Gilson 167). Man only develops his capacity in a 
society, rightly organized for his political, economic and spiritual welfare.30 
Man’s intellectual perfection requires universality, and this cannot be done 
without a unified direction by a single authority. Thus, mankind lives best 
under a single  government, not only for the attainment of peace and justice, 
but for the realization of all his abilities, moral and intellectual, as found in 
human nature (Monarchy, I, 15; 26-7). The intellectual activities proper to hu-
mankind are under the control of wisdom, and almost divine are performed 
in the calm of tranquility and peace (Monarchy, I, 4, 2; 8). 
Dante gives many reasons for universal peace. As A. J. Carlyle points out in his 
“Conception of unity of Europe”: 
And just as each individual requires peace and quietness if he is to  attain to 
perfection in knowledge and in wisdom, so too it is peace that enables the 
human race as a whole best to achieve its almost divine work. Universal peace 
is thus the best of those things which are ordered for our happiness (Carlyle 
and Carlyle 115). 
Dante is arguing in favor of monarchy as the best form of secular well-or-
dered government. The provoking question arises: What does Dante mean by 
30 See Schindler; see also Boyle.
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 monarchy—a person or a principle? Is he arguing for solitary ruling civil power 
or the rule of universal law? 
Universal peace is achieved only by the universal invariable rule, which in-
sures justice by establishing the laws which promote the good of the com-
monwealth, as a kind of perfection, binding the humankind together and 
leading all toward peace. It would appear much more likely that Dante argues 
for one authentic law, which would lead all humanity to the ultimate goal of 
peace and freedom. The influence of Cicero serves to clarify the political 
thought of Dante. However, the following quotation is not found in his work:
And there will not be different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different laws 
now and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for 
all nations and all times, and there will be one master and ruler, that is, God, 
over us all, for he is the author of this law, its promulgator, and its enforcing 
judge (Cicero Rep., III, 22) (LCL 213,210-1).31 
In the period of the adoption of Christianity as the official religion of the Ro-
man Empire, Augustine examined anew the  fundamental issues of social and 
political life, particularly the early Church’s  attitudes toward the secular State 
and its political and legal activities, in promoting peace and justice. As Herbert 
A. Deane stated,
It is one of Augustine’s great accomplishments that he formulated the Church’s 
view of the state and political power in a manner which took into account both 
the traditional Christian attitudes which have been mentioned and the new 
situation in which the Church of the fifth century found itself (Deane 10).
In his evaluation of political and social ideas in the works of Augustine, Deane 
emphasized that the perfect peace occurs only in the heavenly homeland in “…
the very society of saints, where there will be peace and full and perfect unity” 
(Io. ev. tr., 26, 17) (CChr. SL 36, 268; FC 79, 274):
There is only one true republic in which perfect peace, harmony, justice, and 
satisfaction are assured to all the citizens; that society is the civitas Dei, which 
exists eternally in God’s heaven and is the goal of God’s elect while they so-
journ as pilgrims in this sin-ridden, wretched earthly life (Deane 11). 
31 “...nec erit alia lex Romae, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthaec, sed et omnes gentes et 
omni tempore una lex et sempiterna et immutabilis continebit, unusque erit communis 
quasi magister et imperator omnium deus, ille legis huius inventor, disceptator, lator...”. See 
also Lactantius Inst. Div. VI.8,6-9 (SC 509,184-7).
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Augustine introduced his understanding of anthropological hermeneutic to 
explain the peace of two communities, in the eternal City of God and in the 
earthly society:
The peace, then, of the body lies in the ordered equilibrium of all its parts; 
the peace of the irrational soul, in the balanced  adjustment of its appe-
tites; the peace of the reasoning soul, in the harmonious correspondence 
of conduct and conviction; the peace of body and soul taken together, in the 
well-ordered life and health of the living whole. Peace between a mortal man 
and his Maker consists in ordered obedience, guided by faith, under God’s 
eternal law; peace between man and man consists in regulated fellowship. 
The peace of a home lies in the ordered harmony of authority and obedience 
between the members of a family  living together. The peace of the politi-
cal community is an ordered harmony of authority and obedience between 
citizens. The peace of the heavenly City lies in a perfectly ordered and har-
monious communion of those who find their joy in God and in one another 
in God. Peace, in its final sense, is the calm that comes of order. Order is an 
arrangement of like and unlike things whereby each of them is disposed in 
its proper place (civ. XIX, 13) (CChr.SL 48,678-9; CSEL 40.2,395; FC 24,217-8).32
The series of definitions of peace present two aspects of individual and so-
cial human life in the civ. The anthropological  description of peace, in har-
monious arrangement, exemplifies the graduation from the material level, 
indigenous to its socio-political order, to absolute perfection in the heavenly 
society. The sequence has its origin from the peace of the body; the peace of 
the irrational and rational soul; the peace of the body and soul together; the 
peace between a mortal man and his Creator; the peace of people in rela-
tion to each other; the peace of the home, “family”, the  peace of the political 
community; and, finally, the peace of the heavenly city. Augustine’s meth-
od of anthropological hermeneutic guides one gradually, step by step, with 
human intellect, toward deeper understanding of the complexity encom-
passed in the term of peace. Following Augustine’s logical thought, which 
began with the peace and order of human body and soul, one is directed 
32 “Pax itaque corporis est ordinata temperatura partium, pax animae inrationalis ordinata 
requies appetitionum, pax animae rationalis ordinata cognitionis actionisque consensio, 
pax corporis et animae ordinata vita et salus animantis, pax hominis mortalis et Dei or-
dinata in fide sub aeterna lege oboedientia, pax hominum ordinata concordia, pax domus 
ordinata imperandi atque oboediendi concordia cohabitantium, pax civitatis ordinata im-
perandi adque oboediendi concordia civium, pax caelestis civitatis ordinatissima et con-
cordissima societas fruendi Deo et invicem in Deo, pax omnium rerum tranquillitas ordinis. 
Ordo est parium dispariumque rerum sua cuique loca tribuens  dispositio.”
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towards law and order in the socio-political milieu: “Well then, now let us 
see what is due order in man himself. A nation is made up of men bound 
together by a single law, and this law, we have said, is temporal (lib. arb., I, 7, 
16, 52) (CChr. SL 29, 221; ACW 22,49).”33 In every human being is inscribed the 
eternal law which governs the proper order: “Therefore, to explain shortly 
as far as I can the notion which is impressed on us of eternal law, it is the 
law by which it is just that everything should have its due order” (lib. arb., I, 
7,16, 52) (CChr. SL 29, 220; ACW 22, 49).34 Although Augustine made a parallel 
distinction between human and divine law, for him the temporal law origi-
nates from eternal law: “I think you also see that men derive all that is just 
and lawful in temporal law from eternal law” (lib. arb., I, 6,15, 50) (CChr. SL 
29,220; ACW 22,49).35
At the end of the Middle Ages, Dante maintained that the temporal power 
of the papacy pertains neither to natural law, or divine law, nor to universal 
agreement. He recognized Pope as the spiritual  father of humankind. It would 
appear that Dante wished to reduce the question of the two powers to an Au-
gustinian view of the world: a natural and supernatural order of creation. The 
order of nature (material) and the order of grace (spiritual), summarized by 
Augustine, “From God I received the gift of being, and from him I received the 
gift of being good” (en. Ps., 58, 2, 11) (CChr. SL 39, 753; WSA III, 17, 177).36 Man can 
only attain his supernatural goal by recourse to grace. Thus, spiritual guidance 
is incontestable. Yet Dante emphasizes the natural and political order much 
more than the order of the Church. Dante’s dream of the medieval emperor 
who would be able to unite all humankind in perfect peace, and to establish 
a  secular empire of universal peace, to reside only in his political desire and 
imagination to be a Messianic prince of peace. His vision of freedom, peace, 
unity, and justice are thoroughly inscribed in this medieval worldview. 
33 “Age nunc, videamus homo ipse quomodo in se ipso sit ordinatissimus. Nam ex hominibus 
una lege sociatis populous constat, quae lex, ut dictum est, temporalis est.”
34 “Ut igitur breviter aeternae legis notionem, quae inpressa nobis est, quantum valeo, ver-
bis explicem, ea est, qua iustum est, ut omnia sint ordinatissima.”
35 “Simul etiam te videre arbitror in illa temporali nihil esse iustum atque legitimum quod 
non ex hac aeterna sibi homines derivaverint. Nam si populus ille quodam tempore iuste 
honores dedit, quodam rursus iuste non dedit, haec vicissitudo temporalis ut esset iusta 
ex illa aeternitate tracta est, qua semper iustum est gravem populum honores dare, levem 
non dare.”
36 “Porro quia te nemo melior, nemo te potentior, nemo te in misericordia largior, a quo 
accepi ut essem, ab illo accepi ut bonus essem.”
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We cannot negate the influence of Augustine on Dante’s  political thought. 
Karl Vossler remarks upon the essential difference  between the civilization 
at the end of Christian antiquity and the medieval Christian civilization: 
“Augustine could not make the  development of the Roman state diabolical 
enough; Dante cannot make it  sufficiently divine” (Vossler 287). The political 
structure of the secular State is not the work of the evil one, nor a direct 
divine foundation, but arises out of the necessity of human interests and 
social life. 
The eclectic system of Dante Alighieri is the resolution of a synthesis be-
tween the philosophical thought of Christian and  classical writers. In the De 
Monarchia, the  concept of political universal peace is a product of Aristote-
lian ethical and political thought, combined with its perception of Augustine’s 
anthropological hermeneutic. The political philosopher, Dante, “a poet and 
political dreamer”, accepted Augustine’s concepts of earthly and heavenly 
happiness by recourse to the secular State and Church in this state (Vossler 
286). He emphasized the positive relationship between the two powers in his 
idealistic concept of universal peace. Peace as the predominant component 
of Dante’s concept of universal monarchy, interpreted by the prism of Au-
gustine’s anthropological hermeneutic, illumines the political understanding 
of human beings as citizens, as well as of human society, in  relationship to 
the eternal ruler. 
The fundamental component in the modern notion of peace is a return to 
the understanding of political philosophy exemplified by Aristotle, Augustine, 
and Dante. The practical requirement of peace is essential to the pursuit of 
human progress. Peace allows us to flourish in modern society and to grow 
in social relationships on the basis of personal involvement and commitment 
to intellectual and ethical goals. For Augustine, the Biblical statement “God 
is the author of peace” (1 Cor 14:33) implies a philosophical anthropology, be-
cause it concerns human existence and relations to each other. In Christian 
thought and spirituality there always exists continuing tension between the 
personal and communal aspect of peace. 
Biblical theology as the basis for philosophical-theological anthro pology re-
flects an essential voice as a guide to national and international relations in 
our contemporary political system. Both  Augustine and Dante promote the 
idea that human beings have been created to live in community in a har-
monious organized society, developing a political conscience and embracing 
justice, charity, and well-ordered love. Peace does not concern only eternity, 
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but has to do with temporal affairs, which are oriented to building up an 
earthly city. In the Christian view the creation of new human relations based 
on justice and peace gives much value to earthly and temporal affairs which 
include every aspect of existence. In their mutual relations, the human com-
munities striving for goodness converge toward world peace. The world be-
comes less divided by choosing the paths most likely to lead to justice and 
peace. The inclination toward unification of people living on the same con-
tinent by creating one community which respects individual and collective 
identity, also the well-being of single  individuals and society, undoubtedly 
leads to peace. Universal peace is the consequence of political order, which 
preserves stability and harmony in human society based on unity and justice.
In Dante’s political thought, it is obvious that religion articulates the needs of 
society and has a valid voice in the political process, especially a healing role 
focusing on spiritual power in the relations between self and other. Religion 
effectively serves the cause of peace, helping to achieve social justice through 
the  transformation of society, by correcting injustice in the concrete circum-
stances of actual life, challenging political doctrines and authority in the ser-
vice to humankind, promoting equal economic standards and providing ac-
cess to education for all. There is no denying that religion has a major social 
and political impact on political power guiding it to international harmony 
and reconciliation. Thus, recognition of religion in the political community 
enriches free and active social life. Moreover, in order to present a coherent 
vision of peace, the gaps in our understanding of the governance of modern 
and ancient civilizations from a Christian perspective should be bridged by 
combining the purest conceptualizations of love, unity, and justice.
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Abstract
This essay describes how Augustine conceives of 
peace within the marriage of man and woman. Ac-
cording to Augustine, true peace is found where 
humans love the same goods in the right way. How 
does that work in marriage? First, the essay de-
picts the decline of the traditional understanding 
of marriage in Western societies. Subsequently, it 
treats Augustine’s view of “marital peace” in three 
stages: before the fall, its corruption after the fall, 
and its redemption by divine grace. A final section 
answers the question: What present-day Christians 
can relearn from Augustine with regard to a peace-
ful relationship between husband and wife?
Keywords: Augustine, headship, husband and wife, 
marriage, peace, sexual revolution, submission.
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Resumen
Este ensayo describe cómo san Agustín concibe la 
paz dentro del matrimonio del hombre y la  mujer. 
Según Agustín, la verdadera paz se encuentra 
 donde los seres humanos aman los mismos bienes 
de la manera correcta. ¿Cómo funciona eso en el 
matrimo nio? Primero, el ensayo describe el  declive 
de la comprensión tradicional del matrimonio en 
las sociedades occidentales. Posteriormente, se 
trata la visión de san Agustín de la “paz conyugal” 
en tres etapas: antes de la caída, su corrupción des-
pués de la caída, y su redención por la gracia divina. 
Una sección final responde a la pregunta: ¿qué pue-
den aprender los cristianos actuales de san Agustín 
con respecto a una relación pacífica entre marido 
y  mujer?
Palabras clave: San Agustín, revolución sexual, ma-
trimonio, paz, esposo y esposa, jefatura, sumisión.
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Introduction
Since the 1960s the traditional Christian understanding of marriage is on the 
decline. One of the reasons for this development probably is the emphasis in 
Western culture on the freedom of the individual and the satisfaction of per-
sonal desire. Traditional marriage required a lifelong bond of fidelity between 
one man and one woman, the raising of children, and contained particular 
roles of husband and wife. Personal freedom was found within these bonds 
of marriage. This traditional understanding of marriage became increasingly 
criticized as a patriarchal institution that suppressed human individuality, es-
pecially of women, and denied them the possibility of personal growth. 
Today, the heritage of the sixties is palpable in our societies. There is a wide-
spread fear of losing one’s own freedom by binding oneself to another. This is why 
divorce rates are so high, and why many young people prefer a form of cohabita-
tion before they marry, if they marry at all. Sociological research has demonstrat-
ed, however, that the ethic of self-actualization has many negative effects on per-
sonal well-being and on the well-being of society at large. It has not led to more 
happiness, but rather to more personal and societal problems (Eberstadt 21-25). 
At the same time, the longing for enduring relationships remains. As Augus-
tine already noted, people prove to be made for a life in communion, and the 
union between a man and a woman is the first natural form of this communal 
life (bono coniug. 1, 1). It is not surprising then, that in our culture scepticism 
about marriage coexists with a high veneration of romantic love. Philosopher 
Ernest Becker has even argued that the ideal of romantic love has replaced the 
afterlife in Western society. He has coined this “apocalyptic romanticism.” The 
enduring love and ultimate happiness that people used to seek from God, they 
now seek in the relationship with their love partner (167-168). The relationship 
becomes an idol. We expect it to give us what only God can give. These high 
expectations of love relationships leads to disappointment between love part-
ners, and subsequent break-ups or divorces.
Men and women in our societies long for true communion, but its individual-
ism and “apocalyptic romanticism” stand in the way of finding it. This paradox 
illustrates what Augustine remarked in the City of God: “There is nothing so 
social by nature, so unsocial by its corruption, as [the human] race” (civ., 12, 
28) (CCL 48; 384).1 Men and women long for true companionship, but sin keeps 
1 “Nihil enim est quam hoc genus tam discordiosum vitio, tam sociale natura” (NPNF 1/2; 243). 
Text editions were taken from Corpus Augustianum Gissense. Translations are my own, or 
were taken from the Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers series (NPNF).
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them from finding it. This essay explores Augustine’s thought on what makes a 
well-ordered marriage, in which husband and wife find happiness and peace. 
The essay consists of three main parts. First, I will treat marriage before the 
fall, then I will treat the fall and its effects on the marital relationship, and fi-
nally, I address the restoration of marriage through grace. Last, I ask the ques-
tion: What we can learn from Augustine? 
Marriage Before the Fall
In Augustine’s view, marriage is from the beginning a temporal institution.2 
God joined man and woman in order to mirror the unity of God and his people 
(civ., 14, 23). This is the sacrament of  marriage. Man and woman had to bring 
forth this people of God in time. When all the predestined were born and per-
severed in obedience until the end, they would be transferred into the state of 
immortality. At that moment, the sacrament of marriage would have reached 
its fulfilment in the eternal and unbreakable  communion of God with his bride. 
Just like God created humans to keep themselves alive with food and drink, he 
created them to marry and procreate, but he did so in order to bring them into 
the eschatological condition in which food, drink and marriage will no longer 
exist (1 Cor. 6: 13; Mt. 22: 30).3 
Union of Man and Woman
Augustine regards the union of man and woman as the first natural form of 
human friendship and communion (bono coniug. 1, 1). God created Adam and 
his wife to form an intimate, enduring and unbreakable companionship. God 
created the woman from the man (Gn. 2: 21) in order to indicate how dear this 
union should be to them (civ., 12, 27; 14, 22; Gen. litt., 3, 21, 34; bono coniug. 1, 1).4 
They are not aliens to each other, but are each other’s flesh and blood. Although 
the relationship between husband and wife is hierarchically ordered, this does 
not contradict the companionate character of their union. Augustine explicitly 
says that the woman was created from the side of the man in order to  indicate 
that they are companions who walk side by side on the same path, pursuing the 
same goal. Augustine writes at the beginning of De bono  coniugali (1,1): 
2 The literature on Augustine’s view of marriage is extensive. The relationship between man 
and woman is treated in Børresen; an overview of the development of Augustine doctrine of 
marriage (with special attention to contextual influences) is given by Clark 139-162. See also 
Schmitt; Pereira; and van Bavel “Augustinus. Van liefde” 54-66.
3 See Gn. litt., 9, 3, 7.
4 See also van Geest 187.
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[God] did not create these each by himself, and join them together as alien by 
birth: but He created the one out of the other, setting a sign also of the power 
of union in the side, whence she was drawn. For they are joined to another 
side by side, who walk together, and look together whither they walk. 
In order to form this companionship the man and the woman were both cre-
ated in the image of God. Augustine emphasizes this at several places. The dif-
ference between man and woman only extends to the body, not to the soul. “In 
this grace”, that is the grace of the image of God, “there is no male and female” 
(Gn. litt., 11, 42, 58). Both man and woman were created to know God with their 
minds and to subject their bodies to their mind in the service of God. Some 
have suggested that Augustine denies that the woman was created in the im-
age of God, but this would contradict the entire idea of marriage as common 
service to God.5 Only if the man and the woman are both created in the image 
of God, they can obey Him together and serve each other in obedience to Him. 
To be one heart and one soul in God (Act. 4: 32) is the one great goal of mar-
riage. Augustine sees marriage as an institution, given by God and regulated 
by God, in which husband and wife serve God together  through their distinct 
callings. In doing so they form one heart and one soul in Him. They are not 
primarily made for each other, but rather given to each other to love and serve 
God together. This is what makes them happy, and what makes them flourish 
as husband and wife. It is important to understand this, in order to value Au-
gustine’s view of the roles of husband and wife, and the importance of procre-
ation, which are so central in his view of marriage, but so different from the 
view that has come to prevail in the West. In the Western view happiness is 
sought in the partner, whereas the happiness of marriage that Augustine has 
in mind consists of enjoying God together, and the spouse in God. 
Difference between Man and Woman
Having discussed the union between husband and wife and the purpose for 
which they were united, we now turn to the different roles that God gives 
man and woman in marriage. Augustine  regards the husband as the head of 
the marriage bond. This idea of male headship is inherent to the sacramental 
meaning of  marriage. From the beginning, the union between Adam and Eve 
signified the bond between God and the united souls of his people (Gn. litt., 
5 See for this feminist criticism, for example Ruether “The Liberation;” “Augustine,  Sexuality.” 
For more nuanced accounts of Augustine’s view of the woman as image of God, see van Bavel 
“Augustine’s View on Women;” and Stark “Augustine on Women” 216-41.
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11, 37, 50).6 This is a hierarchical relationship, in which God rules his people 
and gives them life, whereas his people subject themselves to God in trust 
and obedience (bono coniug., 20; nupt. et conc., 1, 9).7 The husband’s relation to 
his wife and family should mirror the way in which God relates to his people. 
The husband is the primary agent in the process of procreation  (although not 
without the woman), and he is called to care for his family and to rule them 
with benevolent authority, just as God rules his people.
Augustine (Gn. litt., 11, 37, 50) describes this way of exercising  authority with 
the apostle Paul as “service in love” (Gal. 5: 12). The husband has the respon-
sibility to lead his wife and family in the worship of God, and defend them 
against the intrusion of sin. Augustine argues that several details in Genesis 2 
and 3 suggest this responsibility. God gave the commandment not to eat from 
the tree of the knowledge of good and evil specifically to Adam (Gn. 2: 16-17), 
probably in order to transmit it to his wife, who still had to be created. If she 
was already created, it is even more striking that God only addressed Adam 
when he gave the command. This even more underlines his primary responsi-
bility as family-head to lead his wife in obeying this commandment.8 It seems 
also for this reason that God called Adam first to account after the fall. Al-
though Eve had sinned first, Adam as the head of his wife had the primary 
responsibility to keep her away from sinning. Therefore, the order of justice 
(ordo iustitiae) required that Adam was called to account first, although he had 
sinned only after his wife had done so (Gn. litt., 11, 34, 45). 
6 In this passage, Augustine says that the rule of the man over his wife, and her service to him 
existed before the fall. They served each other through love, the husband ruling, the woman 
obeying. Only after the fall the servitude of the woman became a penal condition. But see Ben-
nett 69, who argues that the hierarchical nature of marriage as such is a consequence of the fall.
7 Augustine stretches the comparison of God’s relation to his creatures to the man’s relation 
to his wife quite far. First of all, the man seems to represent the singularity of God over 
against the plurality of his creatures. Therefore, in the Old Testament, one husband could 
have many wives, without violating the nature of marriage. The man represents God, and the 
many women represent the many human souls that are bound together by God. Augustine 
also makes a connection between God’s  creative power, and the ‘life-giving’ power of the 
male seed. Many women can conceive of one man, but one woman cannot conceive of many 
husbands. This illustrates the power of the higher nature (vis principiorum) over inferior 
natures. The husband represents the one true God, who can make many souls fruitful. Else-
where, Augustine argues that the law of nature requires that the higher reason rules over the 
lower reason. This means that man in general rules over the beasts, that parents rule their 
children, and that husbands rule their wives (civ., 19, 15).
8 Augustine argues that this method of teaching (disciplina) is maintained by the apostle in 
the Church, when he says: “If they (women) want to learn something, let they ask their hus-
bands at home” (1 Cor. 14: 35).
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Having discussed the position of Adam, we now turn to Eve. Why was she cre-
ated as distinct from the man and given to him as his helper? In order to under-
stand Augustine’s answer to this question, we need to understand a bit more 
about the position of human beings in creation. Augustine argues from Genesis 
1 that God made man his co-worker. God rules his creation by natural and vol-
untary providence (Markus 88-92). By natural providence he himself gives life 
to all the creatures that he has made, but in his voluntary providence he uses 
the wills and actions of humans and angels to fulfill his purposes for creation 
(Gn. litt., 8, 9, 17). These rational creatures are co-workers under God.9 Augus-
tine argues that God used Adam and Eve in his providence, by giving them the 
task to increase and multiply and to rule and subject the Earth (Gn. 1: 27-28). 
The latter part of this commandment could be obeyed by Adam alone. Accord-
ing to Genesis 2: 9, God gives Adam the task to till the garden and thus discover 
the richness of creation (Gen. litt., 8, 8, 15, 16). The first part of God’s command, 
however, namely to increase and to multiply, could not be fulfilled by Adam 
alone. God created Eve for this specific purpose.
Genesis 2 states that God made a helper like Adam (adiutorium  similis ei), but 
it does not say for what purpose Adam needed this helper. Searching for an 
answer to this question, Augustine denies that Adam needed her help to till 
the ground, as before the fall Adam did not yet experience any difficulty in his 
work. Moreover, if he needed help, a man would have been more suitable to 
him, because men are physically stronger than women. Neither did God make 
the woman to keep Adam company, Augustine argues. If that were the reason 
for the creation of the woman, it would have been more logical that Adam re-
ceived the company of another man, “for how much more pleasantly (congru-
entius) would two friends live together, than a man and a woman, to associate 
and talk with each other” (Gen. litt., 9, 5, 9) (CSEL 28, 1; 273).10 To modern ears 
this  might sound harsh, but what Augustine is doing here, is to seek the specif-
ic reason why God made a woman for Adam. He does not deny that Eve helped 
Adam tilling the earth and that he found  solace in her friendship, but this does 
not explain why God created another human being that only differed from the 
man with regard to the body. Augustine finds the most probable reason (nihil 
9 In Gen. litt. 8, 8,15-16, Augustine refers to 1 Cor. 3: 6-9, for the concurrence of divine 
providence and human cooperation: “I planted the seed, Apollos watered it, but God made 
it grow. So neither he who plants, nor he who waters is anything, but only God, who makes 
things grow... We are God’s fellow workers; you are God’s field, God’s building.”
10 “Quanto enim congruentius ad convivuendum et conloquendum duo amici pariter quam 
vir et mulier habitarent?” Augustine’s remark still raises the question, of course, why a man, 
before the fall, would converse more pleasantly with another man than with a woman.
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aliud probabiliter occurit) for the creation of the woman qua woman in the 
begetting of children. 
The Cooperation of Man and Woman in Marriage
God created Adam and Eve and gave them different roles to fulfill the divine 
purpose of marriage. The man is called to rule his wife and his family with 
benevolent authority, the woman was given to obey him with love, thus mir-
roring the unity of God and his people. At the same time she was given to him 
as an indispensable helper for the begetting and raising of children for the city 
of God.
With regard to the role of the woman as mother, feminists interpreters of Au-
gustine have said that Augustine reduces the woman to a breeding-animal. 
This explanation of the creation of the woman seems so at odds with his view 
of the spouses as companions, expressed in de bono coniugali (Clark, 161). I 
think, however, that in Augustine’s view companionship and procreation be-
long intimately together (Bennet 63-65). Man was created to love God and to 
fulfill his commandment. Part of this commandment was to fill the  Earth with 
a human family. For this purpose, God made the woman from the side of the 
man, in order to make procreation possible. In other words, by creating the 
woman God made clear that his commandment could only be fulfilled through 
the companionship of man and woman, which they “exercise” in the act of pro-
creation and the subsequent education and raising of children for Him (Gen. 
litt., 8, 21, 33). Many modern readers have accused Augustine of a negative 
view of sexuality. His view of sexuality before the fall (free of what we would 
call “sexual arousal”, and ruled by the rational will of man and woman) seems 
a rather technical act in which bodily or psychological pleasure is not allowed 
to play any role ( Ranke- Heinemann qtd. in Lamberigts 175). This evaluation of 
Augustine’s view of sex, however, is to be explained from a different evaluation 
of the telos of sexual intercourse between a man and a woman. Under the in-
fluence of the sexual revolution, sexuality has become emancipated from God 
and from nature.11 It has become an act of mutual bodily and psychological 
satisfaction, disconnected from the purpose for which sexual intercourse was 
designed by God, namely to beget children for his kingdom.12 
11 See Kuby 179-180.
12 To the extent that people connect sexuality to spirituality, they seek a kind of sublime 
experience in sexuality itself. The experience of the divine is sought in the sexual act itself. 
Augustine would deem this idolatry, the exchange of the creator and his creation. A popular 
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In Augustine’s view, this experience of sexual intercourse misses the right end, 
if it is not ordered by the divine law. It reverses the order of creation, which 
commands that lower goods always serve higher goods (bono coniug., 9, 9). In 
other words, the mind should serve God and the body should serve the mind 
that loves God. This means that husband and wife should have sexual inter-
course in  order to fulfill the divine purpose of this act, and use their bodies for 
that purpose. Augustine does not deny that even in paradise Adam and Eve 
had concupiscentia carnis, a bodily desire for sexual intercourse (Ep. 6*, 4-6),13 
but this desire was subject to the law of the mind. It did not have a dynam-
ic of its own, which battled against the law of the mind. Sex in paradise was 
well-ordered. Sexual intercourse was an expression of one will to serve God 
with the intention to beget children for Him, and to raise them for Him. Hus-
band and wife offered their bodies to God for that  purpose. What the spouses 
loved in each others was not their bodies per se (or any other external proper-
ties), but rather their mutual will to obey God both with their mind and their 
bodies (nupt. et conc., 1, 15).14
The Fall and its Consequences
The distortion of the peace of the marriage bond did not start with Adam 
and Eve, but with the devil. The devil refused to accept his place in the divine 
order, and subsequently tried to persuade man to join him in his rebellion 
against God’s order. 
In the order of justice, God came to the man, with his commandment, so that 
the man would teach this commandment to his wife. The devil turns this or-
der upside down. He comes first to the woman to tempt her to transgress the 
divine commandment, and then she tries to make her husband a companion 
in her disobedience. This must have been Satan’s design. He knew that the 
woman had the heart of her husband. The bond of love with his wife, made him 
vulnerable to follow her in her sin. This is exactly what happens. Her husband, 
rather than persevering in obedience to God, and ruling his wife by guard-
ing her against Satan and sin, listens to his wife, and becomes disobedient 
to God together with her.15 Adam knew that he disobeyed God in doing so, 
book in which this spirituality is promoted (over against traditional Christianity), is Brown 
The Davinci Code.
13 See Lamberigts 184.
14 See van Bavel “Augustinus. Van liefde” 61.
15 See Gn. litt. 11, 42, 58 on the reason why the devil seduced Eve and not Adam. See also 1 
Tim. 2, 13 (“Adam was not deceived, but the woman”).
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but he preferred the bond of peace with his wife to that with God. Augustine 
compares this behaviour with that of Salomon who was endowed with wis-
dom, which preserved him from the sin of idolatry. Nonetheless, Salomon fol-
lowed his wives in their idolatry, because he did not want to disappoint them. 
He committed what he knew should not be done, in order not to grieve his 
“deadly sweethearts” (mortiferas delicias) (Gen. litt., 11, 42, 59; civ. 14, 11). Both 
Adam and Salomon sinned from a “certain friendly benevolence, by which it 
happened that God was offended in order to avoid that a human being from 
being a friend became an enemy” (Gen. litt., 11, 42, 59) (CSEL 28,1; 378).16 In do-
ing so, Adam preserved peace with his wife, but it was an unjust peace. The 
instability of this peace, becomes apparent when God calls Adam to account 
for his disobedience. He transfers his guilt to his wife, and is unwilling to take 
responsibility for his own failure in exercising his headship over her (civ., 14,14).
Through the first sin, peace with God was distorted, and as a punishment for 
that sin the man and the woman experience concupiscentia carnis in them-
selves. This is much more than misdirected sexual desire (Lamberigts 179). It 
is sinful desire as such that rebels against the law that God has ordained for 
the flourishing of human relationships. The next section discusses how this 
carnal concupiscence distorts the peace of marriage after the fall. Marriage 
remains a good, but the sinners who engage in marriage distort this good 
through their sin. 
The Distortion of the Peace of Marriage
Augustine emphasizes that the institution of marriage remains a good after 
the fall, even if it is the marriage of unbelievers. God uses marriage in his prov-
idence to produce new life and to restrain man’s sinful nature. Augustine ar-
gues, for example, that the begetting of children stimulates the parents to take 
responsibility and work together (bono coniugi., 3). Also the fidelity of hus-
band and wife, albeit for the wrong reasons, has a certain civil goodness that 
contributes to the stability of society.17 Augustine also regards the patriarchal 
16 “...amicali quadam benevolentia, qua plerumque fit ut offendatur Deus, ne homo ex amico 
fiat inimicus...”. See civ. 14, 13.
17 This does not mean that chastity in unbelievers is a genuine virtue, for “what  comes not 
from faith is sin” (Rm. 14: 23). The chastity of unbelievers is sinful, because it is not moti-
vated by the love of God, but rather by a desire for the praise of men, to avoid trouble, or 
to serve demons. Nonetheless, Augustine argues, one sin can suppress another sin (nupt. et 
conc., 1, 4). Therefore, the chastity of unbelievers can contribute to the temporal peace of the 
earthly city.
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structure of the family a providential means by which God preserves order in 
the world. He does not in the least justify the despotic rule of husbands and 
fathers in their households (civ., 19, 14). Nonetheless, after the fall, the society 
of sinful men needs coercive power to preserve a certain degree of order. This 
also applies to the family. God uses the coercive power of the pater familias 
to preserve a kind of order that contributes to the  stability of the earthly city. 
Thus, marriage after the fall is a means to contribute to the temporal peace of 
this fallen world.
At the same time, Augustine observes how sin distorts the  peace of marriage 
and family. When something else than obedience to God’s will becomes the ob-
ject of human desire, this must necessarily lead to a distortion of God’s order for 
marriage. First of all, this becomes apparent in the violation of fidelity. Where-
as God intended the spouses to be faithful to each other in order to  mirror 
the covenant between God and his people, sin sacrifices  fidelity to something 
that it values more than obedience to God. This is the case, for example, in the 
gratification of sexual lust. If this becomes the highest object of desire, it might 
eventually lead to fornication. Augustine also points to another instance in 
which fidelity is sacrificed to another earthly good, namely procreation. When 
a man discovers that his wife is barren, he takes another wife to  beget children, 
in order to realize his ideals, such as the  preservation of his family-estate or 
the endurance of his  family-name (bono coniug, 17).18 Thus misdirected human 
desire breaks the sacramental unity between husband and wife.
Augustine also observes how the harmonious cooperation of man and wom-
an in the begetting of children becomes distorted by sin. As we have seen, 
God united husband and wife to sacrifice their bodies as living sacrifices to 
Him in the act of intercourse. In doing so, they would work together in the 
service of God, to beget children for Him. But after the fall, carnal concupis-
cence distorts the sexual act. It is no longer undertaken in order to obey God 
together, but to seek a certain earthly good for its own sake, for example, the 
gratification of bodily lust. Husband and wife use each other’s bodies to find 
satisfaction for their carnal desires (nupt. et conc., 1, 5). In this way, their com-
panionship is seriously distorted. They no longer work together in the service 
of God, but use each other’s bodies to serve their own desires.  Augustine es-
pecially warns men not to possess their “vessel in desire as the heathens do” 
(I Tess. 4, 5). If they do so, they do not treat her as their wife (future mother), 
18 Augustine justifies this behaviour with regard to the patriarchs in the Old Testament (for 
example Abraham and Hagar), because of the requirements of this  dispensations within the 
divine economy. See further below.
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but they abuse her as a prostitute. This way of using one’s wife is the seedbed 
of infidelity and fornication, because the man seeks his own interests using 
his wife, rather than respecting her as his God-given helper in the service of 
God. In short, sin isolates sexual intercourse from the religious friendship and 
cooperation of husband and wife in the service of God, and makes it into an act 
in which individuals use each other for their own private interests. This is why 
Augustine says in the Confessions that he distorted the true bond of friendship 
through carnal lust (conf., 2, 1, 3, 1).
Augustine sees the effects of the misdirected will in the way people treat the 
children that are conceived from sinful sexual intercourse. The distorted will 
that engaged in sexual intercourse, solely for the reason of bodily satisfaction, 
shows itself in the unwillingness to care for the children that are born from 
this sexual union. Spouses commit abortion or treat their children in an un-
caring way once they are born (nupt. et conc., 1, 17, 15). However, this does not 
mean that sexual intercourse that is engaged in for the sake of begetting chil-
dren is good in and of itself, because the ultimate purpose for which people 
want to have children can be wrong. People get children in order to further 
their family-estate, or to serve the glory of the earthly city by offering their 
children to its service.19 Their care and sacrifices for their children can still be 
driven by carnal concupiscence. Augustine illustrates this in the Confessions 
where he describes how his parents, especially his father, saved a lot of money 
to enable Augustine to pursue a wordly career (conf., 2, 5). For that purpose his 
parents even held him back from marriage, which could have restrained his 
sexual desires (conf., 2, 8). 
Although Augustine argues that God makes a right use of the sinful pater fa-
milias to preserve order in society, he simultaneously points out how fathers 
and husbands can use their authority in a sinful way and oppose the bond of 
peace that should tie husband and wife and father and children together. If 
they no longer  regard themselves as vice-regent of God or Christ (the head of 
the man—1 Cor. 11: 3), tyranny and infidelity become normal for the behaviour 
of husbands and fathers. Rather than showing their wives the example of fidel-
ity (being the head that should lead the body), they think their male position 
entitles them to be unfaithful to their wives (s. 9; 153, 3-7). And rather than 
using their paternal authority to educate and correct their children and slaves 
19 On sons as means to preserve the economic interests of their father after the  latter’s 
death, see Shaw 20. Augustine refers to this in s. 21, 8 (to save for one’s son as an excuse not 
to give your money to the poor); see also civ. 19, 1 (the pagan virtue of begetting sons for the 
sake of the city or the country).
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in the service of God, they use it to make them obey their own sinful will (civ., 
19, 12). 
Return of Peace Within Marriage
The grace of faith restores the bond of peace in marriage (nupt. et conc., 1, 5),20 
because it makes the spouses willing again to obey the divine order of marriage, 
and to help each other obey this order. After the fall, however, the will has to 
cope with the reality of concupiscentia carnis. This makes Christian spouses 
co-operators in the battle of the Spirit against the flesh, for the sake of realising 
a unity of heart and soul in God.
A Christian marriage is meant to be a sacrament of the relationship between 
Christ and his people. What does it mean to preserve this unity and to embody 
it? For Christian spouses this means that they try to be faithful to each other. 
Augustine emphasizes that the husband, as the head of the marriage bond and 
the representative of Christ, has the primary obligation to be faithful to his 
wife. Rather than considering himself entitled to play around, he should love 
her as his own body (Ef. 5: 28), and exemplify in his behaviour what faithfulness 
means (adult. coniug., 8, 9; s., 332, 4, 9). Furthermore, the spouses help each 
other to be faithful by conceding to sexual intercourse out of lust.  Although Au-
gustine emphasizes that Christian spouses should only have sexual intercourse 
in order to beget children, he knows the weakness of the flesh, and states that 
the spouses should not deny their bodies to each other, in order to help each 
other to be faithful and protect him or her from the temptation of adultery. In 
doing so, the spouses “bear each other’s burdens” as Paul commands Chris-
tians in Gal 6: 2. Augustine also argues that the spouses should never require 
celibacy of the other spouse if he or she is not yet ready for it. This might lead 
the other spouse into fornication, because he or she cannot  sufficiently cope 
with the ardour of lust that is still present in the member of the body (ep., 
262, 1-2; bono coniug., 3). For Augustine, the representation of the relationship 
between Christ and the Church is so important, that everything else is subser-
vient to this primary goal of marriage.
With regard to sexual intercourse, Christian marriage differs from mar-
riage before the fall. Before the fall, the union between husband and wife 
was intended to produce children for the city of God. Man ought to fill the 
Earth with God’s children, and thus cooperate with God for the coming of his 
20 Augustine quotes Rm. 14: 23 (“whatsoever is not of faith is sin”) in combination with Hbr. 
6: 6 (“without faith it is impossible to please God”).
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kingdom. In the Old  Testament, the begetting of children was still of salva-
tion-historical importance, in order to produce the people of God from which 
the Messiah was to be born (bono coniug., 9, 18). This is also why polygamy 
was justified in the Old Testament. The patriarchs took more than one wife, 
not for the sake of lust, but rather for the sake of the begetting of children 
for the Church. This kind of marriage also had a sacramental meaning: the 
many wives under one husband prefigured the many Churches of the New 
Testament under one God. In the New Testament polygamy is no longer al-
lowed, because of the eschatological state of the Church. One man and one 
wife mirror the eschatological relationship between God and his people, who 
are one soul and one heart in Him (bono coniug., 20, 21). Moreover, the beget-
ting of many children is no longer necessary, because God’s children are now 
gathered from the nations. This is also why Augustine regards chastity as a 
higher good than marriage in the time of the New Testament, and celibate co-
habitation of the spouses as a higher form of marriage, because it is closer to 
the eschatological state of the Church: a community of brothers and sisters 
in Christ who are one soul and one heart in God. 
The begetting of children, however, still has an important function within 
Christian marriage. It remains the natural good of marriage, and this natural 
good is sanctified by the graced will of the spouses, who engage in it with the 
desire to have children that will not only be born, but also be reborn by the wa-
ter of baptism and the work of the holy Spirit (nupt. et conc., 1, 5). In this way, the 
misdirected carnal desire (concupiscentia carnis) of the spouses is again direct-
ed at the purpose for which it was created. The peace of the mind with God is 
“embodied” in the sexual act aimed at the begetting of children for God and his 
Church. When Christian spouses become fathers and mothers, they put their 
physical parenthood in the service of their spiritual parenthood of their chil-
dren. They intend to serve God and Christ in the way they treat their children. 
This has important consequences for the way in which  Christian fathers ex-
ercise their authority towards their children. They  acknowledge Christ as 
their head and serve him. They do so by showing “paternal love” (paternum 
affectum) to their children, by teaching them the name and doctrine of Christ, 
and showing by their example what obedience to Christ means. This is why 
 Augustine also calls fathers bishops in their own houses (Io. ev. tr., 51, 13). 
As bishops in their own houses, Christian husbands and fathers also admin-
ister discipline to their wifes, children and slaves with merciful severity. In 
this context, Augustine applies the metaphor of head and body to the rela-
tionship of the pater familias to his household. To take care of his body (Ef. 
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5: 29), also means that the father fights against “the flesh” in those who are 
entrusted to his care. Just as an individual person should subject the flesh to 
the spirit (Gal. 5: 17), the father has the responsibility to make his body obey 
him. But this obedience to the father is not a goal in itself. The father him-
self is a servant of Christ. He is a steward of Christ in his family, and should 
lead them to obedience to Christ (s., 349, 2). Therefore, Augustine reminds 
his readers: “If you want your body to serve you, you are reminded of how 
fitting it is for you to serve your God” (util. ieiunii, 4) (CCL 46; 235).21 If the 
father experiences resistance to his authority from his family, he should not 
just react with the affirmation of power, but also seek wisdom and grace 
from God to react in a loving, Christ-serving way.22 
What about the role of the Christian woman in marriage? By God’s providence, 
the woman has become subject to her husband. She is not allowed to do any-
thing without his consent and should obey his command. This belongs to the 
punishment of Gn. 3: 16, in order to restrain the rebellious nature of the wom-
an. Augustine argues that a Christian woman will not rebel against this order, 
even if her husband is a pagan and treats her ill. Augustine takes his mother as 
an example. She tried to win her husband for Christ, not by words, but by the 
loving and patient manner in which she treated her husband (1 Ptr. 3: 1). She 
bore with his unfaithfulness, and did not go against him when he came home 
with an aggressive mood, but waited patiently for the moment he had become 
reasonable again, and then talked to him. In doing so, she served the Lord, and 
eventually won her husband for Christ. 
From a modern perspective, which emphasizes individual rights and the em-
powerment of women, this behaviour might seem sub-assertive. The woman 
should fight for her own rights, we would say. Augustine, however, sees the 
societal position of the woman as a somehow ruled by divine providence, in 
some way similar to slavery. It is not directly commanded by God, but the 
factual situation is used by him to restrain the sinful nature of the woman and 
to exercise her in virtue (Quaest. Gen., 153).  Rebellion against this condition 
would be a proud protest against God, which would show that the woman is 
not aware of the rebellious nature, that she inherited from Eve. Given the soci-
etal position of the woman, she serves the Lord, by accepting her position, and 
 living faithfully in that position, in order to win her husband for her through 
21 See util. ieiunii 4 (CCL 46; 235): “Cum vis ut serviat tibi caro tua admoneris quomodo te 
oporteat servire Deo tuo.” See cont. 9, 22-24.
22 In util. ieiunii 4 Augustine points to the fact that God “tries” the head through the resis-
tance of the body. This is true in the individual, but also in the household.
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her way of live. In the case of Monnica, God  blessed her love by the conversion 
of her husband, and the love and  respect that accompanied it (conf., 9, 17, 22). 
This does not mean that the Christian woman cannot appeal to her rights. In 
a Christian marriage, the husband and the wife are subject to the law of the 
Church, which is different from the laws of the world (s. 9,4; La Bonnardière 
41). Whereas the laws of the world allow a man to have sex outside of marriage 
(Shaw 29), and to divorce and marry someone else, the laws of heaven forbid 
this, and to these laws a Christian marriage is bound. Therefore, a Christian 
woman has the right and even the duty to report the crime of her husband to 
the bishop, so that he can exercise ecclesiastical  discipline. On the one hand, 
she claims her rights in doing so,23 but at the same time she cares for the soul 
of her husband (s. 392), and strives to re-establish marital peace. 
In the stewardship over the family, the wife is the partner of her Christian hus-
band. They work together, although the woman is not the equal of the husband. 
Augustine emphasizes this in his letter to Ecdicia, who had acted independently 
from her husband in several ways. She had vowed celibacy without his consent 
(which is needed from both partners according to I Cor. 7: 4-5), she had sold a 
large part of the family property to wandering monks without the consent of 
her husband, and she had changed her clothes into those of a widow without 
asking his permission. This made him so angry, that it became the occasion 
for him to commit adultery, whereas he had first vowed celibacy, following his 
wife. It goes without saying that Augustine rejects the behaviour of her hus-
band, but Ecdicia also receives a severe chastisement from him. She was not 
allowed to act independently from her husband, whom she should obey as her 
lord (1 Ptr. 3: 6). With regard to the selling of property, Augustine argues that 
this is in itself a good deed, but the fact that she had done this without the con-
sent of her husband made it wrong. For the husband is the head of the family, 
and should take final decisions. This does not mean that she only had to listen 
and obey. Augustine views the woman indeed as a co-steward of the house-
hold. It would have been good if Ecdicia had made suggestions to her husband, 
in order to make a plan together about what to do with their property. As they 
did not yet know the future calling of their son, they neither knew how much 
property they had to save for his future. Therefore, they should have made a 
plan in order to combine the practice of mercy and the care for their son. She 
could come up with plans and suggestions, but her husband remained the one 
who took the final decisions. This is not because the husband is “the boss”, but 
because God gave him the final responsibility for their son. Augustine empha-
23 See I Cor. 7: 4.
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sizes that their reunion is of great importance, not only for their souls wellbe-
ing, but also for the Christian education of their son (Ep., 262, 11). 
Finally, Augustine argues that the Christian family serves the peace of society. 
In a sermon, held after the lynching of a government official, who had mal-
treated the people, he warns his congregation not to take vengeance. If they 
feel maltreated they should go to the government, but not take the law into 
their own hands. This is what fathers should teach their children. In this way, 
Christian families can contribute to a more peaceful society. If children learn 
how to behave at home, this will influence society at large, because most peo-
ple have become Christians. Thus, Augustine says, those who learn virtue at 
home, because they belong to the city of God, will contribute to the peace of 
the earthly city by their way of life (s., 302,19). 
Conclusion
How does Augustine help us to diagnose the crisis of peaceful relationships 
between men and women in our society? I draw a few  conclusions.
Augustine regards marriage as a bond between a man and a  woman that is 
designed by God. He joins man and woman, and defines the purpose of this 
union, which they, in their turn, have to serve.  Marriage implies the sacrifice 
of autonomy, both from the man and from the woman, in order to serve God 
by submitting their wills to Him. This theocentric perspective is indispensable 
for a righteous peace within marriage. 
Augustine relativizes the romantic concept of marriage in our societies, in 
which the experience of attraction and sexual satisfaction is regarded as the 
highest goal of the relationship. Men and wife were given to each other to 
serve God, and to help each other serve God. Obedience to his will is the sum-
mum bonum under which lesser goods should be ordered, such as friendship 
and sexual desire. They are not denied or suppressed, but receive their proper 
place in the order of love, according to which God is loved in and of himself, 
whereas other things are loved because of Him. If something else is cherished 
by the spouses for its own sake (such as begetting children, or not begetting 
children, sexual satisfaction, etc.) this endangers the fidelity of the spouses to 
each other.
In Augustine’s view, God gives the man and the woman a specific position in the 
marriage relationship. Feminist interpreters of Augustine have criticized him 
as a representative of a patriarchal culture. Augustine emphasizes,  however, 
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that the headship of the man over the woman should reflect the headship of 
Christ over his Church. Male headship is not a justification of abuse or adul-
terous behaviour (as it was in the Roman culture in which Augustine lived), but 
rather a call to rule one’s wife and family in the name of Christ with loving and 
sacrificial authority. The fact that male headship in our culture is treated with 
disdain, might explain why many men don’t know how they should relate to 
women in a responsible way (cf. #MeToo).24
When it comes to the position of the woman, Augustine emphasizes that she 
is the man’s companion and helper. At the same time, the man has received 
the final authority in the household. When the man abuses his position, as 
Augustine knew from his own boyhood experience, a Christian woman will 
seek peace, not so much by rebelling against her subordinate position, but 
by  patiently bearing with it, and by  keeping her conscience clean, in order to 
amend her husband by her good  works. 
This does not mean that Augustine justifies the status quo of sinful male be-
haviour in marriage. He rather takes seriously that male dominance over the 
woman is a consequence of the fall, which cannot be solved by simply improv-
ing the rights and assertiveness of women. For Augustine, only the regener-
ation of a man’s heart can solve this problem. At the same time, God makes a 
good use of the sin of the husband. He uses it in his providence to control the 
rebellious nature of the woman, and to exercise her in virtue. 
From Augustine’s concept we can learn that peace between the man and the 
woman is not reached by the negotiation about individual rights (which is 
driven by self-love), but by regeneration of the heart, which enables them to 
accept the position that God has given each of them, and to bear with each 
other’s sins and weaknessess, for God’s sake. 
Augustine also points to the fact that a Christian household, in which par-
ents educate their children in the fear of God, contributes to the peace of 
the earthly City, because the children learn to treat their neighbors well, and 
respect the temporal authorities that God has given. 
24 This is not to say that the Christian notion of male headship cannot be abused by men for 
malevolent purposes. For the connection between sexual harressment of women, and the 
egalitarian ideology that dominates our culture, see the talk by John Piper “Sex Abuse Alle-
gations and the Egalitarian Myth”. This talk is based on Piper article “Do Men owe Women 
a Special Kind of Care?”.
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Inner Peace and Personal 
Identity. Reflections on the 
Unity of the Confessions
Paz interior e identidad personal. 
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Abstract
The division of the Confessions into an autobiographi-
cal part (book 1-10) and an exegetical part to Gen. 1-2: 3 
(book 11-13) has raised questions with respect to their 
unity. While the view that the Confessions cannot be 
regarded as a unitary whole is now considered as a 
marginal position, there are various approaches to an 
integrating interpretation. This contribution elabo-
rates on the proposal that the unity of the Confessions 
arises from their interpretation as a narrative identity 
construction of Augustine. The underlying meta-nar-
rative in the Confessions is Augustine’s own doctrine 
of grace and original sin, which he has worked out 
in Simpl., 1, 2, shortly before. In the Confessions, Au-
gustine illustrates the effect of divine grace and the 
transformation of man from homo sub lege and homo 
sub gratia to homo in pace exemplarily on the basis of 
his own life story. This understanding is supported by 
the further thesis that Augustine himself deals exten-
sively with the question of “personal identity” in the 
Confessions and perceives identity in the context of 
neoplatonic conceptions as an inner-soul unity and 
harmony, which he conceives as unitas, quies/requies, 
and pax. The source of this unity is the eternal, un-
changing one God. In Augustine, pax also stands for 
the condition of spiritual balance and represents the 
Christianized version of epicurean ataraxia and sto-
ic tranquillitas animi. In addition, the contribution 
shows the systematic interlinkage of the Augustinian 
concepts of pax, unitas, caritas, requies, beatitudo, uti-
frui, res mutabiles-res immutabiles, creatio-creatura, 
temporalia-aeterna, and peregrinatio. 
Keywords: Confessions, harmony, mutability, peace, 
personal identity, self.
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Resumen
La división de las Confesiones en una parte autobiográ-
fica (libro 1-10) y una parte exegética de Gen. 1-2,3 (libro 
11-13) ha suscitado preguntas con respecto a su unidad. 
Si bien la opinión de que las Confesiones no pueden con-
siderarse como un todo unitario, ahora se considera una 
posición marginal, pues existen varios enfoques para 
una interpretación integradora. Esta contribución pro-
fundiza en la propuesta de que la unidad de las Confesio-
nes surge de su interpretación como una construcción 
de identidad narrativa de san Agustín. La meta-narrati-
va subyacente en las Confesiones es la propia doctrina 
de la gracia y el pecado original de san Agustín, que él 
desarrolla un poco antes en Simpl., 1, 2. En las Confe-
siones, san Agustín ilustra el efecto de la gracia divina y 
la transformación del hombre de homo sub lege y homo 
sub gratia a homo in pace de forma ejemplar, lo anterior 
sobre la base de la historia de su vida. Esta compren-
sión se apoya en la tesis adicional de que san Agustín 
trata ampliamente la cuestión de la “identidad personal” 
en las Confesiones y percibe la identidad en el contexto 
de las concepciones neoplatónicas como una unidad y 
armonía del alma interior, que él concibe como unitas, 
quies/requies, y pax. La fuente de esta unidad es el Dios 
eterno e inmutable. En Agustín pax también representa 
la condición del equilibrio espiritual y la versión cristia-
nizada de la ataraxia epicúrea y la tranquillitas animi es-
toica. Además, la contribución muestra la interconexión 
sistemática de los conceptos agustinianos de pax, uni-
tas, caritas, requies, beatitudo, uti-frui, res mutabiles-res 
immutabiles, creatio-creatura, temporalia-aeterna y pe-
regrinatio. 
Palabras clave: Paz, identidad personal, uno mismo, con-
fesiones, armonía, mutabilidad.
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Introduction
The division of the Confessions into an autobiographical part (book 1-10) and 
an exegetical part to Gen. 1-2: 3 (book 11-13), which was noted by Augustine 
himself (retract., 2, 6, 1), has raised questions with respect to their unity. While 
the view that the Confessions cannot be regarded as a unitary whole is now 
seen as a marginal position, there are various approaches to an integrating in-
terpretation (Feldmann). The variety of interpretations ranges from attempts 
to prove the unity of the Confessions on the basis of formal, stylistic and mo-
tivic criteria (Knauer; Steidle “Augustins Confessiones”; “Gedanken”; Fuhrer 
107), to the interpretation as a theology of creation (Nygren) or as proof of 
God (Steur), as a contemplation of the development of salvation (Kusch), an 
anti-Donatist project (Wundt), or as a trinitarian analysis showing the obnubi-
lation of the image of God in human beings after the Fall and its restoration by 
grace (O’Donnell, 2005, pp. 65-86).
My contribution elaborates on a new proposal, which has the  advantage of 
being largely compatible with the above-mentioned interpretations. The unity 
of the Confessions arises from interpreting them as a narrative identity con-
struction of Augustine. According to the contemporary concept of narrative 
identity, personal identity as an answer to the question “Who am I?”1 is con-
structed by narrating the story of our life, and interpreting it with reference to 
philosophical, religious or other cultural meta-narratives, thus giving meaning 
and significance to it (Klessmann 148). The underlying meta-narrative in the 
Confessions is Augustine’s own doctrine of grace and original sin, which he 
worked out in Simpl., 1, 2, shortly before. In the Confessions, Augustine illus-
trates the effect of divine grace and the transformation of man from homo sub 
lege and homo sub gratia to homo in pace exemplarily with  reference to his 
own life story, and thus endows it with unity and  coherence.2 According to 
this interpretation, the memoria-analysis in conf., 10, as well as those of time 
in conf., 11, is reasonable, since man as a temporal being develops his identity in 
a chronological process, and changes and (re-)constructs it from memory. 
Insofar as man is creatura, and as such is related to the whole creation and to 
the creator himself, and because his individual identity must be formed based 
on the conditio humana, the embedding of Augustine’s identity construction 
1 In the philosophy of antiquity, personal identity is therefore addressed under the heading 
of “self-knowledge”. See Hager. 
2 For the interpretation of the four-stage doctrine as a salvation-historical as well as an in-
dividual-historical perspective see Drecoll 183.
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into his theology of creation (conf. 11-13) is meaningful. This understanding is 
supported by the further thesis that Augustine himself addresses explicitly the 
question of personal identity in the Confessions (10, 2, 2; 10, 37, 62).
The compatibility with widely accepted interpretations is particularly evi-
dent in the common understanding of the Confessions as a confession of guilt, 
praise and faith; as part of the narrative elaboration of his identity—based on 
the meta-narrative of his teachings of grace and original sin—Augustine con-
fesses both his culpable affiliation with the children of Adam and his personal 
sins up to the time of the composition of the Confessions (confessio peccati), 
and the testimony of God’s graceful attention which he demonstrates exem-
plarily by his own life also shows features of a confessio laudis as well as that 
of a confessio fidei. In addition, the reference to  meta-narratives which is im-
plied in the concept of personal identity can be based on interpretations of the 
Confessions as autobiography (Misch, 1947); at the same time, it allows their 
extension to the specifically theological context of the work and its intention 
to turn the reader to God (conf., 10, 3, 4). Augustine’s concept of personal iden-
tity brings the topic of  peace (pax) into play. In accordance with the pagan 
philosophical  tradition of antiquity, Augustine discusses personal identity in 
a eudaimonistic context and understands it—following the Platonic as well as 
the Stoic tradition—as inner-psychic coherence, unity and harmony which 
is realized by virtue (Kiesel “Die Emotionstheorie“ 93f).3 This ideal constitu-
tion of the soul can be conceptualized as  “inner  peace.”4 However, unlike the 
schools of philosophy mentioned  above, Augustine believes after his turn to 
the theology of grace that, firstly, this virtuous perfection cannot be achieved 
in this life, secondly, that all moral progress is a gift of God’s grace, and thirdly, 
that perfect virtue as well as fulfilled inner peace can only be realized in eter-
nal blessedness (conf., 13).
A characteristic feature of the Augustinian concept of peace is the diversity 
of its fields of application (Atkins; Budzik). In addition to a social concept of 
peace, which is the prerequisite for a functioning communal life in any human 
3 See the Platonic analysis of the virtues as a harmonious unity of the three soul parts (lo-
gistikon, thymoeides and epithymêtikon) in Rep., IV, 441c-441a. See also  Seneca, ep. mor., 20, 
2, and Aristotle, NE, IX, 4, 1166a: “For [the spoudaios] is in agreement with himself, and he 
strives with all his soul for the same things.”
4 Pax stands in this sense for the state of mental balance and represents the Christianized 
version of the Epicurean ataraxia or the Stoic tranquillitas animi. While the Old Testament 
shalom is almost never used in the sense of “inner peace,”  there is a New Testament link 
between participation in the Christian community and  inner peace in Phil 4, 6-9. See Atkins 
567.
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community, Augustine discusses a closely related political concept of peace 
as an essential goal of earthly governance in domestic and external policy, as 
well as the peace of the Church founded by Christ (pax ecclesiae), and the 
 perfect heavenly peace (pax caelestis civitatis), which the members of the 
citizenship of God will enjoy in the coming kingdom of God. The common 
feature underlying all manifestations of peace is that of order (ordo).5 Order 
assembles various parts of an entity (living being, human, soul) or a commu-
nity harmoniously in a unity (unitas) and is defined by Augustine as “fair dis-
tribution of equal and unequal things” (civ., 19, 13).6 Augustine understands 
inner peace as “peace of a rational soul in the ordered accordance of thought 
and action”, as well as “peace between body and soul in the ordered and be-
lieving obedience to eternal law” (civ., 19, 13). In the eighth book of the Con-
fessions, Augustine discusses this concept of inner peace in more detail and 
analyses it as a harmonious unity of strivings (voluntates), emotions (affectus) 
and  deliberate decisions (liberum arbitrium) of a person, which are intercon-
nected by their shared orientation to the divine order of values (lex aeterna). 
It is at this point that the relation of the  Augustinian definition of inner peace 
to personal identity becomes clear. This connection is already etymologi-
cally obvious in the term identity. It comes from the Latin idem, “the same”. 
 According to Augustine, to be “the same” in all respects is syno nymous with 
the shared axiological orientation of all mental aspirations and phenomena to 
the lex aeterna, and where there is this kind of inner-soul “sameness”, there 
is also inner peace. The theoretically conceivable accordance of all relevant 
mental conditions in the sense of a shared orientation towards evil (malum), 
on the other hand, is for Augustine in many respects neither an expression 
of order, unity, tranquillity or peace, nor does it realize the genuine identi-
ty of a person. A human soul that does not follow the divine order of values 
misses its destiny as a creature of God (creatura). It falls into an ontological 
and ethical state of disorder and gets into a state of strife and disturbed unity 
with God and fellow human beings as well as with himself: “That is why the 
unholy, who have no peace due to their unholiness, are lacking the peaceful 
order in which there is no disturbance” (civ., 19, 13). Since the orientation to-
ward sin ultimately leads to eternal damnation, it is also self-destructive, so 
that there is also in a final sense a lack of peace in the realm of the self. For 
the same reasons, the sinner cannot succeed in a peaceful construction of 
5 For the concept of ordo in Augustine, see Enders.
6 Translations that are not listed in the bibliography are mine. Regarding the Confessions, I 
have always consulted the excellent German translation by Flasch and Mojsisch together 
with the English translation by Hammond. 
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 personal identity.7 According to the essentialist position of Augustine, the in-
dividual must answer the question “Who am I?”, based on her or his  essential 
nature as a human being and thus as a creature of God. The person who sins 
out of conviction gives a wrong answer to the question “Who am I?,” and miss-
es her or his identity as creatura directed toward the Creator. In this sense, 
the Augustinian concept of personal identity must be understood in a norma-
tive way.
The fact that the concept of inner peace in the context of Augustine’s nar-
rative identity construction in the Confessions plays a major role, is evident 
from the frequency of relevant terms. The term pax is found 20 times—the 
associated adjective pacificus three times—, and thus corresponds numerical-
ly to the occurrences of confessio (23 times). Given the contextual overlap, it 
is not surprising that related terms, including quies, are also found 23 times 
(Lawless 45). As the following reflections shall show, Augustine uses the terms 
pax, ordo, unitas, and (re-)quies in the context of the systematic connections 
of inner peace and personal identity almost synonymous (Atkins 568).
Inner Peace and Personal Identity in the Confessions
Confessions I
The famous first passage in conf., 1, 1, 1, “our hearts are restless until they rest in 
you (inquietum est cor nostrum, donec  resquiescat in te),” shows that the ques-
tion of peace of mind and personal identity in the sense of a harmonious unity 
of the self is one  basic theme of the Confessions. The source of restful peace 
is the triune God, and the longed-for peace will only be fulfilled in the “Sab-
bath of eternal life” (conf., 13, 36, 51), as Augustine will explain in the course of 
the other books. The formal framework of the longing for peaceful rest at the 
beginning and the description of the fulfilment of this yearning at the end of 
the work, points to the substantial insight that the existence of man originates 
from the creator and strives back to him: “For you have made us toward your-
self (quia fecisti nos ad te)”8 (conf., 1, 1, 1). Augustine conceptualizes this return 
to origin as peregrinatio,9 as a rocky path in the foreign land, and a restless as 
7 On the connection between the sinless soul and a peaceful self-constitution see the litur-
gical Agnus Dei: “…Agnus Dei, qui tollis peccata mundi, dona nobis pacem.”
8 My translation. Hammond reads: “for you have made us for yourself.”
9 See Ps. 149: 5 and the implicit reference to the parable of the lost son (Lk. 15: 11-32) in conf., 
1, 18, 28. For further reading see Stewart-Kroeker.
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well as a peaceless enterprise. Augustine’s question, whether it is more precise 
to say that he would not exist, if God were not in him, or he exists only because 
he is in God (conf., 1, 2, 2), shows that man’s profound submission to God can 
be described only in paradoxes. But it is not only his creatureliness that refers 
man completely to God. God, as a punishment for the Fall, struck all children 
of Adams with ignorance of the good (ignorantia) and moral weakness (diffi-
cultas) (lib. arb., 3, 18, 52), and changed human nature to such an extent that he 
ceases to be capable of a sinless life (non posse non  peccare), the rescue out of 
this misery requires the intervention of divine grace. By himself, man is only 
free to sin, to which he is driven by the overwhelming sinful desire (concupis-
centia) as the source of his restless strife.10 In this sense, man is only “a part of 
your creation... [that] bears everywhere its own mortality, …the evidence of its 
own sin” (conf., 1, 1, 1). The almost complete moral depravity can only be healed 
by the perfectly good God. Between the good and just God and the sinful and 
corrupt man a gap opens up whose overcoming in the act of grace evokes 
the praise of God: “Great are you, O Lord, and surpassingly worthy of praise 
(laudabilis  valde)” (conf., 1, 1, 1). Augustine makes it clear that this praise of God 
is also a gift of grace (“You inspire us [excitas] to take delight in praising you” 
(conf., 1, 1, 1), in this way packaging his recently elaborated doctrine of grace in 
the confessio laudis of the first passage of the work. In addition to this enor-
mous ethical hiatus, Augustine also emphasizes the ontological gap between 
the restlessness of man and the tranquillity of God; while man as creatura ex-
ists in space and time and is subject to physical as well as psychic changes, the 
timeless eternity of God ensures his everlasting active rest: “Semper agens, 
semper quietus” (conf., 1, 4, 4). This, too, is an insight that can only be formu-
lated by the limited perspective of man in the form of a paradox. In contrast to 
God, the changeable human being is inevitably subject to a  diachronic change 
in his or her identity and finds ontological survival in the realm of immutabili-
ty: “You bind us together [conligis nos]” (conf., 1, 3, 3). The  underlying Neopla-
tonic motive of dispersing man,11 who is trapped in changeability and turning 
towards the  temporal, is illustrated by Augustine’s metaphorical self-charac-
terisation as “earth and ashes” (conf., 1, 6, 7).
The radical being of man in relationship to God also becomes apparent in 
another point. Although Augustine undoubtedly has his  readers in mind 
10 On the Fall as the cause of mental strife see Iul., 3, 23, 2: “For there should be peace in the 
interior of man before sin, not war”; and 5, 24, 4: “In the whole soul and in the whole body I 
have the creator as the God of peace, who sowed the struggle in me?” 
11 On the thought of dispersion into multiplicity see Plotinus enn., VI, 4, 7.
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when writing the Confessions (conf., 10, 3, 3), he considers his work as a dia-
logue with God, whose gracious  attention makes him a worthy subject of his 
deliberations. For this  reason, Augustine begins his life story with a hymn to 
God (conf., 1, 1-5, 6) and indicates through numerous direct addresses in the 
thirteen books that he sees the Confessions as a dialogue with the Creator. 
Therefore, the theoretical insight of man’s  focus on God is designed by Au-
gustine in the Confessions as a performative act.
Following the proem, Augustine begins with the narrative of his life, which 
he formally divides into the previously completed four of the seven stages of 
life according to the Roman counting. The reconstruction of his infanthood 
(conf., 1, 6, 7-7, 12) is characterized by his meta-narratives of original sin and 
grace as well as by the dichotomy between the greatness of the Creator and 
the weakness of man, both ontological and moral. Augustine now concretizes 
the general realization that man is grounded in God with reference to his own 
person, hereby making it the basic truth of his own formation of identity. 
In this context, too, it becomes clear that Augustine, within his  biographical 
narrative, makes the topic of “personal identity” an  explicit subject of theoret-
ical reflections: “My infancy is long ago, dead: and I am alive” (conf., 1, 6, 9); and 
“What was before that [i.e.  before my birth, D. K.], my sweetness, my God? Did 
I exist somewhere? Was I someone at all?” (conf., 1, 6, 9). Also, the transition 
from infantia to pueritia in conf. 1, 8, 13-20, 31, is an example of man’s fluid 
and elusive identity: “Was it really I who went onward from infancy and pro-
gressed to boyhood? Or was it rather that boyhood entered into me and took 
the place of my infancy? Infancy did not  leave me–for where did it go to? Yet it 
was no longer there” (conf., 1, 8, 13).12 (This becoming of the creatures contrasts 
Augustine with the timeless being of God: “And still you yourself remain the 
same (idem ipse)”, conf., 1, 6, 10). As idem ipse and “the most high [summus… es]” 
(conf., 1, 6, 10), God is the ideal of identity in the sense of selfsameness and uni-
ty. All finite forms of physical and mental “wholeness (incolumitatem)” (conf., 1, 
20, 31) have their origins in this “mystical unity (secretissimae unitatis) of yours 
from which my existence derived” (conf., 1, 20, 31).
Beyond the gift of life, God is also the donor of all natural goods of living be-
ings, of those who are in their species-specific nature, such as the life-sus-
taining “instincts” (conatus) (conf., 1, 7, 12), as well as of those given to him 
12 This consideration is a reference to the analysis of time in book 11 and the volatility of the 
three tempora.
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from the outside: “But neither my mother nor those who nursed me filled their 
own breasts with milk. You were the one who used to give me nourishment 
through them” (conf., 1, 6, 7). The moral condition of the underage baby—little 
Augustine claims no more than what is necessary for him—is just as much as 
the willingness of responsible caregivers to attend for the child a gift of God 
(dabas) (conf., 1, 6, 7), while the sin of which no one is free must be attributed 
to man himself (conf., 1, 7, 11). Augustine’s theology of grace shows here as well 
as his teaching of original sin: “But if I was also conceived in wickedness [in 
iniquitate], and in sin [in peccatis] my mother nourished me in the womb…” 
(conf., 1, 7, 12).
Relevant for the present question is the connection between the sin, which 
is caused by man, and the spiritual strife caused by it, which Augustine al-
ready states in the context of his boyhood narrative. The  train of thought is 
the following: in a well-ordered creation, the existence of sin is in need of 
explanation because it seems to conflict with the idea of a perfectly good 
God. Augustine seeks a solution to the problem by differentiating between 
God-given natural phenomena, and the sin brought into the world by man. 
Both the natural world and the sin are integrated by God in an all-em-
bracing ordo: “And though you are both disposer and creator of all natu-
ral phenomena, of sins you are the disposer only” (conf., 1, 10, 16). The di-
vine lex aeterna not only determines the ordo of all things hierarchically, 
but at the same time it enacts the punishment of the sinner. By perverting 
the order of things, the sinner also perverts his own nature, upsetting his 
soul, and is consequently punished with unrest and peacelessness: “For this 
is your decree… that every disordered (inordinatus) mind becomes its own 
punishment” (conf., 1, 12, 19). Man finds inner peace and spiritual unity only 
by turning toward God, the highest unity, while the sinful boy Augustine 
“was carried away into vain pursuits” because he “went outside [ibam foras] 
(conf., 1, 18, 28).13 
The attention to these lesser goods (academic or sporting success, enjoyment 
of games instead of learning) is punished by aversive affects associated with 
them. Augustine notes “fear of disgrace and beatings” (conf., 1, 17, 27), “fear [of] 
grammatical solecisms”, “envy” (conf., 1, 19, 30), and, more generally, “distress, 
disorder, delusion [dolores, confusiones, errores]” (conf., 1, 20, 31).
13 My translation.
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Confessions II
In the second book, in which Augustine reports on the aberrations of his youth 
(adulescentia), the dichotomy of rest in God on the one hand, and the peace-
less disposition as well as the mental fragmentation of the slaves of sin, are 
prominently featured. Augustine begins his remarks with the call to God: “For 
you are… a sweetness which brings happiness and peace [secura], pulling me 
back together from the disintegration [et conligens me a dispersione] in which 
I was being shattered and torn apart [discissus sum], when I turned away from 
you who are unity and dispersed into the multiplicity that is oblivion” (conf., 2, 
1, 1)14 and finishes them in the same way: “With you there is deep peace [quies] 
and life which cannot be disturbed [vita imperturbabilis]. …in my teens I was 
too inconstant in your steadfastness [stabilitate]; and I made myself a barren 
land” (conf., 2, 10, 18).
The youthful sins reported by Augustine are unspecified sexual debauchery 
and the famous pear theft. Using the example of sexual desire (which is not 
ordered in the legitimate paths of marriage and the procreation of offspring), 
the paradigm of sinful desire and generic term for all kinds of misguided de-
sire (concupiscentia), he demonstrates the difference between love for God 
and the neighbour (“the purity of love [serenitas dilectionis]” (conf., 2, 2, 2), 
and the “darkness of lust [caligine libidinis]” (conf., 2, 2, 2) or perverted love 
that “turns away from you and looks away from you for what is untainted and 
pure, but cannot find it except by returning to you” (conf., 2, 6, 14). This dis-
tinction is relevant in several ways. On the one hand, the difference between 
pious love of God and neighbour and sinful desire, the primary object of which 
are external, physical or specific spiritual goods (intelligence, good memo-
ry, quick comprehension, etc.), coincides with the distinction between virtue 
and vice (Kiesel “Voluntas, amor”). Augustine extends the ancient catalogue 
of virtues with the three Pauline virtues of faith, love, hope (1 Cor. 13: 13), and 
understands with Paul the rightly guided love (agapê, caritas) as the epitome 
of virtue. Accordingly, he summarizes his ethics with the imperative “Love and 
do what you will [dilige, et quod vis fac]” (Io. ep. tr., 7, 8). This love is determined 
by the orientation toward the hierarchical divine order of goods, whereby love 
itself takes the form of an ordered love (ordo amoris) (Bodei, 1993). In book II, 
Augustine mentions sensually tangible beautiful objects, honour, power, life, 
and friendship among others as examples of low-ranking goods with a certain 
14 See conf., 6, 14.
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“dignity [decus]” (conf., 2, 5, 10), and emphasizes their subordination to “God, 
and your truth and your law” (conf., 2, 5, 10).
The connection of right love and virtue or of misguided love and vice also lies 
in the Augustinian interpretation of the pear theft he committed as a teen-
ager together with his friends. While certain attitudes which are believed to 
be virtues (according to worldly conventions), are in truth vices (sovereignty 
is arrogance, false love is lust, pretended zeal is mere curiosity) because they 
strife for temporal goods and not for the eternal God as the epitome of hon-
our, true love and highest knowledge, the pear theft is a paradigm for the rad-
ical perversion of divine law and a “versuchte Umkehrung des Verhältnisses 
von Schöpfer und Geschöpf” (Brachtendorf “Augustins Confessiones” 68). As 
is well known, the intention of the theft is not to eat the juicy fruits (Augustine 
throws them away, conf., 2, 6, 12), but the joy of breaking the law itself. Thus, it 
is at the same time the paradigm of a false attitude that misses the creaturely 
nature of human beings and results in a disturbed and unstable identity lead-
ing to self-destruction: “My soul was foul and, becoming alienated from your 
firm foundation, it was disintegrating into oblivion” (conf., 2, 4, 9).
Important for our topic is the connection between emotions and spiritual 
peace. According to the Stoic conception, the sage develops only so-called 
“good feelings” (eupatheiai or constantia) that do not cloud emotional well-be-
ing, but no excessive and peace-disturbing affects (pathê or perturbationes 
animi) (Halbig). By contrast, Augustine emphasizes that even Christians gift-
ed by the Holy Ghost with divine love (amor Dei, caritas) are not free from 
stressful emotions. As Augustine shows by using the example of his mother 
and her concern for the son’s salvation (conf., 3, 11, 9), even pious fears can 
be existentially threatening and severe. In addition, Augustine considers the 
Stoic conception of a fundamental human capacity to eradicate harmful and 
morally dubious emotions in this life to be illusory (civ., 9, 4). In this respect, 
homo sub gratia differs from homo in pace.
Significant, however, is the difference between aversive affects that evolve in 
the value context of a godly life and those that are grounded in an orienta-
tion toward lower-ranking goods. Indeed, the former also have their origin in 
the punishment of sin: Adam and Eve, before biting into the forbidden fruit, 
knew only joy (gaudium) and love (amor) (civ., 14, 10) and, moreover, were not 
yet submitted15 under original sin and its threatening deadly consequence, 
15 Accordingly, Augustine’s choice of words is clear when he speaks of his coming into 
“this life which is mortal—or is it perhaps life-giving death?” (conf., 1, 6, 7), as well as of the 
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 eternal damnation.16 Yet, pious fears are set within the divine order because 
they spring from the love of God and charity, while affections directed to in-
ferior goods turn this order upside down. Thus, while God looks upon the for-
mer with pleasure and shows willingness to comfort and answer the prayers 
of the  burdened,17 the latter carry their punishment within themselves, as the 
aversive character of these emotions cause mental pain and peacelessness: 
“I transgressed all your true ordinances, but I did not escape your scourges” 
(conf., 2, 2, 4). In the context of his narrative identity construction against the 
background of the meta-narrative of his doctrine of grace, Augustine inter-
prets the inner peacelessness that causes painful affects not only as a pun-
ishment, but also as a remedy that should remind the youthful sinner of the 
ungodliness of his doings:
After all, you were always there…, sprinkling all my forbidden  pleasures with 
the bitterest of disappointments, so that I would seek a kind of pleasure that 
is free from disappointment, and when I did so I would find none other but 
yourself, Lord, yourself alone (conf., 2, 2, 4).
Confessions III
These motives continue in the third book, in which Augustine  reports on the 
period of his rhetoric studies in Carthage and his spiritual aberrations. The 
promising reading of Cicero’s protreptic script Hortensius, which gives him a 
first impulse to search for “immortal wisdom” (conf., 3, 4, 7), is followed by a dis-
appointing study of the Bible and the so motivated turn to Manichaeism. Augus-
tine relates how he did not bind his identity to the creator, who as the true one 
(unum) can also produce the peaceful inner unity of man, but to the world of ex-
ternal things as well as to sensual pleasure. The latter cuts through “that actual 
union that we ought to have with God” (conf., 3, 8, 15): “So my soul was in a poor 
state of health, and covered in sores [ulcerosa], it lay prostrate out of doors” 
(conf., 3, 1, 1). This attachment of the self to the outside world goes hand in hand 
with the false Manichaean image of God as well as with the alienation from the 
divine and the self: “I was wandering far from you. …I was seeking you not be 
following my mind’s understanding… but according to my capacity for physical 
 “pestilent odor (pestilentiosum)” (conf., 2, 3, 8) (my translation) of his father’s encourage-
ment to sex.
16 Since the Fall, humanity has formed a massa peccati (Simpl., 1, 2, 16).
17 Augustine demonstrates this with the example of his mother, who is comforted in her fears 
for Augustine’s salvation by the words of the bishop: “…it is impossible that the son of your 
tears should perish!” (conf., 3, 12, 21). See also 11, 19.
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sensation” (conf., 3, 6, 11). The inner emptiness that Augustine feels in himself and 
that could only have been filled with spiritual “incorruptible food” (conf., 3, 1, 1) 
cannot be filled with the Manichaean God, “but instead was utterly  drained” 
(conf., 3, 6, 10).
In the consequence, Augustine seeks solace in sensual passions. The false love 
that underlies his escapades is the cause of sorrowful afflictions, which Au-
gustine once again interprets as God’s discipline and means of correction:
My God, my mercy, how good you were, sprinkling that sweet gratification 
of mine with so much bitterness! …and I was happy to be constrained by 
burdensome bonds—with the result that I was being beaten with glowing 
iron rods of jealousy, mistrust, anxieties, rages and quarrelling (conf., 3, 1, 1). 
In this sense, the punishment for wrong love is inherent in this love itself,
Because when they sin against you, they also profane their own souls, and in-
iquity is self-deceiving whether in harming and perverting their nature, which 
you have created and set in its proper place (conf., 3, 8, 16). 
The mentioned connection between sin as the reversal of the divine ordo and 
the destruction of the peaceful order in man’s soul as its immediate conse-
quence is expressly described here, as is the dichotomy between love of God 
and neighbour and misguided love (conf., 3, 8, 15). The fact that Augustine con-
nects love of God and neighbour with the commandment of self-love fits in 
the framework of his presentation: whoever acts against God and his neigh-
bour harms first and foremost his own soul and its peace.
Confessions IV
At the heart of the fourth book are Augustine’s ethical- theological reflections 
on the early death of his childhood friend. Using the example of his young 
self’s emotional responses to the loss, Augustine analyses the devastating 
consequences a misguided love can have for the lover’s identity and peace 
of mind: “I had become the subject of my own questioning” (conf., 4,6,9). The 
systematic context is this: according to Augustine, the lover identifies with 
the object of his love and strives for union to complete the integration of the 
beloved into his own self. Hereby, the lover externalizes his identity through 
attachment to outside things as well as to persons (Kiesel, “Die Emotions-
theorie Augustins” 104-107). If love is directed to the eternal and unchanging 
God, the object of love is always available, and the unity and integrity of the 
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loving self are assured. Identification with changeable and perishable things 
(res  mutabiles), on the other hand, threatens the integrity of the self. Because 
the objects of love can be torn away by loss, robbery or death, the lover is 
always threatened by personal fragmentation, and in a state of inner peace-
lessness and unrest. Pain, fear, overflowing lust and insatiable desires are 
the emotional manifestations of this perverted love:
What is all love, if it does not want to become one with the beloved and em-
braces it in a way that it will be united with him? ...What makes pain what it 
is, if not the violent separation of once united things? Therefore, it is bitter 
and dangerous to become one with things that can be separated (ord., 2, 11, 8).
Augustine illustrates this phenomenon by the example of the love for his 
friend, whom he felt to be his “twin self [ille alter eram]” (conf., 4, 6, 11). With 
reference to Horace (Odes, 1, 3) and Ovid (Tristia, 4, 4, 72), Augustine describes 
the integration of the friend into his own identity: “How rightly someone once 
called his friend, ‘half of my own self [dimidium animae suae]’. For I felt that my 
soul and his were one soul in two bodies…” (conf., 4, 6, 11). The loss of the friend 
as part of his self thus destroys the integrity of the ego18 and causes emo-
tional confusion: “And that was why life was dreadful to me because I did not 
want to live as half a person” (conf., 4, 6, 11). Augustine finds no peace because 
the identification with himself is disturbed: “I was carrying about with me my 
shattered, bleeding soul; it could not endure being carried by me” (conf., 4, 7, 
12). This inner peacelessness motivates an unfulfillable desire for escaping his 
own self: “Where could I flee, to escape from myself?” (conf., 4, 7, 12). Augustine 
summarizes his personal experience of the mental turmoil that follows the 
death of such a loved one in a general  insight: “I was miserable, as every mind 
is miserable that is fettered by its love of earthly things yet torn into pieces 
[dilaniatur] when it is deprived of them” (conf., 4, 6, 11).
The negative assessment of friendship with mortals suggests a general pro-
hibition of affectionate interpersonal relationships and raises the question of 
whether this does not—against the  biblical testimony—nullify the command-
ment to love one’s  neighbour. Augustine seeks a solution to this problem by 
differentiating between two types of love for fellow human beings. The harm-
ful form of affection for the neighbour is not able, “to love humanity in a hu-
18 See also conf., 4, 8, 13: “For how else had that pain pierced me so easily and so deeply, if 
not because I had poured out my soul upon the sand by loving someone mortal as if they 
were immortal?”
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man way [diligere homines humaniter]”19 (conf., 4, 7, 12).20 To love people in this 
right way is to love them as creatures in the creator: “Only those who hold 
everyone dear, in the One who can never be lost, never lose anyone dear to 
them” (conf., 4, 9, 14).21 In particular, friendships as most intimate and intense 
relationships should be borne out of a Christian spirit: “Blessed are those who 
love you, and love their friend in you and their enemy because of you” (conf., 4, 
9, 14). Such interpersonal relationships are endowed by God and firmly united 
in the love of God as a gift of the Holy Spirit (conf., 4, 4, 7). This love also binds 
together and makes “from many [minds], one” (conf., 4, 8, 13). Unlike misguided 
love, however, it fits into the love of God and thus has a share in its stability 
(conf., 4, 9, 14): friends who are attached to each other in God will one day 
complete their love in the eternal unity of the community of the blessed.22 
Moreover, the imperishable love of God not only guarantees the inner peace 
of the lover, but also, through the common orientation toward the divine law, 
social peace among men.
This pious form of loving affection for a friend remains for the time being 
just as impossible for Augustine as the divine comfort: peace, tranquillity, and 
the healing of mental division and identity diffusion can only be granted by the 
eternal triune God as the source of all peaceful unity: “Stand with him, and 
you will stand fast indeed; take your rest in him and you will find peace” (conf., 
19 My translation.
20 See conf. 4, 8, 13.
21 See conf. 4, 12, 18.
22 This understanding of right and misguided love is systematically linked to the uti-frui 
distinction. See Mayer 65: “Zu den Prinzipien der in De doctrina christiana zusammenge-
fassten Hermeneutik gehört die mit Hilfe des ontologischen Schemas ‹mutabile-inmuta-
bile› vorgenommene Unterscheidung der Dinge (‹res›), in solche, die sich verändern, und 
in solche, die bleiben. Unter Hinzuziehung weiterer Schemata aus der Erkenntnislehre (Sig-
num-res) und der Ethik (Frui-uti) teilt A. die ‹res› auf in ‹significantes› und ‹significatae› 
sowie in ‹fruendae› und ‹utendae›. …Diese [Hermeneutik] hat nicht zuletzt die Klärung der 
mit dem ‹creator› identischen ‹aeterna atque incommutabilia› sowie der mit den ‹creatu-
rae› identischen ‹temporalia atque mutabilia› zum Ziel und steht zugleich im Dienste des 
Programmes ‹redire in patriam›.” See also Chadwick 72f; and Budzik 65. The interpretation 
by Dupont explains why the pious love of one’s neighbour guarantees, on the one hand, the 
longevity of the beloved and, on the other hand, why, in a certain sense, humans may also 
be enjoyed: “Only as far as the Lord is present in humans, are humans enjoyable (498).” See 
also the reading by Verheijen 180-182. Canning explains Verheijen’s view: “Human beings are 
also to be objects of frui in the proper sense of the term, but this is a heavenly not an earthly 
frui, and it is frui in deo because God alone, and not human beings, brings human life to full 
beatitude” (324).
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4, 12, 18).23 The Manichaean deity, to which Augustine continues to cling, as a 
“imaginary being” and “heretical belief” (conf., 4, 7, 12), on the other hand, can 
be no haven of peace and rest.
Confessions V
In the fifth book, Augustine describes his gradual estrangement from Man-
ichaeism and the ongoing turn toward Christianity. Decisive for the former is 
the disappointing encounter with the Manichaean bishop Faustus of Mileve in 
Carthage, who cannot scientifically substantiate and make plausible the cos-
mological myths of his faith (conf., 5, 6, 11-7, 13). The indiscipline of his students 
in Carthage leads Augustine on a career change to Rome, where he again gets 
into a Manichaean environment and, despite his doubts, continues to cling 
to the Manichaean conception of God and biblical criticism as well as to the 
substantiality of evil (conf., 5, 10, 18-21, 21). As the students in Rome also turn 
out to be refractory and unwilling to pay, he successfully applies for the posi-
tion of rhetorician at the Milan Imperial Court, where his acquaintance with 
the allegorical biblical exegesis of Bishop Ambrose shows him an intellectually 
satisfying way of dealing with Holy Scripture (conf., 5, 14, 24). A short phase 
of turning to academic scepticism is followed by the catechumenate in the 
Christian Church (catholica ecclesia) (conf., 5, 14, 25).
As in the previous books, Augustine explicitly addresses the  question of his 
personal identity in the context of his way of life in separation from God.24 
Because God cannot be found in the external material world, but only in the 
interior of man,25 the self-exodus of the young rhetorician goes hand in hand 
with the  unintended rejection of God: “So where was I, when I was search-
ing for you? You were right in front of me, but I had even abandoned myself, 
and I could not find myself, never mind you!” (conf., 5, 2, 2). Again, Augustine 
puts viciousness, remoteness of God, and peacelessness into one (“the wicked, 
those who are without rest”, conf., 5, 2, 2), and contextualizes this as part of 
his ordo-concept: “you [have] arranged all things so that they have magnitude, 
number and  weight (mensura et numero et pondero)” (conf., 5, 4, 7). He also sees 
the audacity of his students in Carthage as a disturbance of order (perturbant 
23 See conf., 4, 7, 12; 10, 15; 11, 16.
24 See conf., 5, 6, 10: “For almost nine years, in which my mind was aimless and  destitute, and 
I continued a ‘hearer’….”
25 On the connection between knowledge of the divine and the self, see sol. 1, 7: “I want to get 
to know God and the soul. Then nothing? No, nothing!” 
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ordinem, conf., 5, 8, 14), as well as the insolvent students in Rome whom he 
describes as “untrustworthy and [mentally, D. K.] crooked (pravos et distortos)” 
(conf., 5, 22, 22). While the teacher Augustine felt personally disturbed by this 
impudence of his disciples, the author of the Confessions desires their im-
provement “for your sake” (conf., 5, 22, 22), and defines this improvement as a 
recognition of the hierarchical order of goods: “If they come to prefer, instead 
of money, the true teaching that they master, and over that to prefer you, who 
are God” (conf., 5, 22, 22). The subordination of all goods under God, who is “of 
assured good [certi boni]” (conf., 5, 22, 22), would impart to them a stable self 
as well as “purest peace [pacem castissimam]” (conf., 5, 22, 22) in their souls as 
well as within their social environment.
The dichotomy between ordered and disordered love is also mentioned in the 
fifth book—this time exemplified by Augustine’s  mother Monica. The misguid-
ed and egocentric love for her son is demonstrated by her unwillingness to 
let Augustine go to Rome without maternal accompaniment, and Augustine 
characterizes it as “fleshly desire [carnale desiderium]” (conf., 5, 8, 15).26 The 
inner-soul peacelessness that results from this false love manifests itself in 
the emotional pain, which Augustine in this context, too, interprets as a divine 
chastisement and “righteous scourge of sorrows” (conf., 5, 8, 15). On the other 
hand, Monica’s concern for the salvation of her son springs from an upright 
love of God and neighbour. This love too is accompanied by restlessness: “…
how much more she struggled (sollicitudine) to give me spiritual birth then 
when she had given birth to me physically” (conf., 5, 9, 16). In contrast to the 
peacelessness of perverted love, the concern of pious love finds divine appre-
ciation and is rewarded with God’s answers to prayers: 
Would you have spurned this woman’s tears, not shed in pleading for… some 
fragile or changeable good, but for the salvation of her own son’s soul? Or 
driven her from your help though it was by your gift that she was what she 
was? (conf. 5, 9, 17).
Augustine uses the interpretive pattern of his theological meta-narrative at 
this point as well, attributing Monica’s sin to herself, but all the best in her 
personality to God. In addition, he emphasizes the providence of his fate by 
God, who did not let him die in  separation from him of a disease contracted in 
Rome: “though you did not allow me, such as I was, to endure a double death” 
(conf., 5, 9, 16).
26 My translation. Hammond reads: “the physical element of her attachment.”
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Confessions VI
The sixth book reports (including some side stories) on the  arrival of mother 
Monica in Milan and her contact with Bishop  Ambrose,  Augustine’s separation 
from his concubine, and subsequent  marriage plans. In spiritual terms, Augus-
tine is still in a state of upheaval: the abandonment of Manichaeism does not 
yet result in a definite turn toward Christianity, because Augustine continues 
to cling to a materialistic idea of God. 
Following the Socratic-Platonic self-understanding of philosophy as care of 
the soul (epimeleia tês psychês, Plato, Phd., 107c), Augustine reconstructs this 
phase of life as a “cross over from sickness to health” and considers it as “crit-
ical” (conf., 6, 1, 1).27 The  salvation of the soul, which Augustine sees as a peace-
ful  inner-soul unity, can only be found if man grasps his true identity as a 
creature of the one and spiritual God: Self- knowledge and knowledge of God 
are directly linked. Paradoxically, it is precisely the consciousness of this con-
nection that prevents Augustine from true knowledge of God. Believing that 
“you have made humanity in your image” (conf., 6, 3, 4), he seeks “this image of 
yours” (conf., 6 ,4, 5) not in the inner world of his mind but “restricted you on 
all sides to the configuration of human limbs” (conf., 6 ,4, 5). This false image of 
God is responsible for Augustine’s spiritual peacelessness, because it offers no 
safe place for his “storms of emotion” (conf., 6, 3, 4). The moral maladjustment 
of a perverted love orientation and his greed for “honours,  profits, marriage” 
(conf., 6, 6, 9), as well as his “disease of the flesh with all its deadly desirability” 
(conf., 6, 12, 21), have not yet been cured and are pushing on “the sickness of 
my soul” (conf., 6, 4, 6): “By so desiring, I endured the bitterest of struggles” 
(conf., 6, 6, 9).28
27 Augustine discusses Alypius’ addiction to the circus games in the context of the salvation 
of the soul (“At once he was struck by a wound to his soul that was  deeper (graviore vulnere) 
than the wound the combatant he was now eager to watch  suffered to his body” (conf., 6, 8, 
13), and parallelizes the successive effect of grace on Alypius with his own: “This, however, 
was being stored up in his memory as a medicine for him in the future [medicinam futuram] 
(conf., 6, 9, 14). Just as Monica’s warnings indicate the divine will, Augustine’s criticism of 
the games is in truth the work of God: “It was not I who had reproached him, though, but 
you” (conf., 6, 7, 12).
28 Augustine also sees this peaceless constitution of the soul as a lack of freedom when he 
describes himself as a “slave of lust” (conf., 6, 15, 25). Hereby, he refers to his emphatic con-
cept of freedom as freedom for good. See lib. arb., 1, 15, 109: There is “no true freedom except 
the freedom of the happy and those who are attached to the eternal law.” This idea refers to 
the Platonic Gorgias (466a-479c), where Socrates explains that only he who knows and acts 
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Augustine suffers from the aftermath of his glory (“it confused  [vertebat] my 
mind even more”, conf. 6, 6, 10), and consumes himself with sorrows (conf., 6, 
6, 10), being “in the same mud of  hungering [fruendi] after the momentary, 
fleeting things that were tearing me apart [dissipantibus me]” (conf., 6, 11, 18). 
Because, by enjoyment (frui) of transient goods, he inverts the divine order 
which commands only to use them (uti), he misses the goal of his pursuit of 
happiness: “And if any good fortune smiled on me, I was reluctant to grasp it 
because just before I seized it, it always fluttered out of reach” (conf., 6, 6, 10). 
The desperate attempt to find happiness in the enjoyment of perishable and 
corruptible things disturbs his peace of mind and leads to “sighing and groan-
ing” (conf., 6, 14, 24), because “winds were blowing and driving my heart first 
one way and then another” (conf., 6, 11, 20). Augustine describes the climax of 
his emotional suffering, the separation from his long-standing concubine, in 
the context of his view that the lover integrates the object of his love in his or 
her own identity, as intrapsychic fragmentation and tearing out a part of his 
self: “My heart […] was broken and pierced, leaving a trail of blood” (conf., 6, 15, 
25). This mental rupture in the turn to lower goods or to evil threatens to lead 
to a dissolution of the personal self, “as if I were already dead” (conf., 6, 1, 1).
As a doctor and therapist of his mental illness Augustine sees, unlike the phil-
osophical tradition,29 not philosophy but the triune God. Again, within the 
frame of his narrative construction of identity  relating to his doctrine of grace, 
he interprets his mental peace- and restlessness as a divine indication of his 
moral and theological misorientation, which should point to the right path: “I 
became more pitiable, and you drew closer still“ (conf., 6, 16, 26).30 This divine 
providence of Augustine’s journey through life “is everlasting” (conf., 6, 14, 24) 
and brings “that broad and well-worn way of the world” to a happy end (conf., 
6, 14, 24). At the end of the book, Augustine notes that this goal is peaceful rest, 
thus harmonizing the content of his claim that absolute calm is granted only 
to homo in pace at the end of time with the formal composition: “You are the 
only rest (requies)” (conf., 6, 26, 26).
for the good does truly what he wants, because only through the good the eudaimonia as the 
goal of all human aspiration can be achieved.
29 See Plato, Charm., 157ab; Epicurus, gnom. vat., 54; Cicero, Tusc., 3, 6, and (after Augustine) 
Boethius, cons., 1, pr. 1.
30 See conf., 6, 9.
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Confessions VII
The seventh book, which deals with Augustine’s transition from  youth (ad-
ulescentia) to manhood (iuventus), points out the  connection between a failed 
identity constitution and a  mistaken image of God too: “I was not even trans-
parent to my own self. Whatever was not extended through some degree of 
space…, I jud ged that no such thing could exist [not even God, D. K.]” (conf., 7, 
1, 2). Nevertheless, Augustine’s image of God has  evolved: “I believed with all 
my heart that you were imperishable and  invulnerable and immutable [incor-
ruptibilem et inviolabilem et incommutabilem]” (conf., 7, 1, 1). With the immu-
tabilitas of God, Augustine  highlights an essential characteristic of the divine 
natu re, which goes hand in hand with his inviolable rest. However, because 
physical natures bound in space cannot have this immutability, Augustine’s 
conception of God is not only wrong but also inconsistent, and  consequently 
cannot be a haven of peace and tranquillity: “Meanwhile I was scrutinizing 
those things that are contained in space, and there I found no place to rest 
[ad requiescendum]” (conf., 7, 7, 11). The idea of a physical but unchanging God 
is a reversal of the true order and prevents Augustine from  fitting in with this 
order and thus finding inner peace: “This was the  proper median and central 
zone of my salvation, to remain in your image and serve you by governing my 
body” (conf., 7, 7, 11). As pure spirit, God is at the head of ontological and moral 
order, while man as a bodily as well as a spiritual being is created in the image 
of God only in his spiritual nature and occupies an intermediate position by 
exercising the dominion of the spirit over the body and by submission to God. 
In this sense, the integration of corporeality into the conception of God turns 
everything upside down.
In presenting his indoctrination on the true nature of God, Augustine revisits 
his interpretation of God as a healer in the sixth book as well as the therapeu-
tic character of aversive affects:
Thanks to the unseen touch of your hand doing its healing work, my swell-
ing began to go down, while my mental perception, formerly agitated and 
obscured, was getting better day by day thanks to the effective ointment of 
wholesome afflictions (conf., 7, 8, 12).
This healing takes place through the acquaintance with the Platonicorum libri 
(conf., 7, 9, 13), which proclaim the spirituality of God and locate the  knowledge 
of God in the spirit of man: “All this  warned me to come back to myself. I 
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 entered deep within myself under your guidance, for you became my helper”31 
(conf., 7, 10, 16). This new realization is, firstly, linked to the insight that know-
ledge of God and pious love are connected with each other (“Love knows it”, 
conf., 7, 10, 16), and secondly, that the fragmented and broken identity has 
been a salutary chastisement by God: “And I realized that… you have made 
my soul dwindle away  (tabescere fecisti) like the threads of a cobweb” (conf., 7, 
10, 16). The  bitter remedy motivates misguided Augustine to continue with his 
search for God—with success: “And you called from far off, ‘Truly I am who I 
am’ [immo vero ego sum qui sum]” (conf., 7, 10, 16). The biblical name of God (Ex. 
3: 14) is an emphatic reference to the fact that the Christian God as well as the 
Neoplatonic divine is the paradigm of identity in the sense of selfsameness: 
“You who are the same [idem] forever” (conf., 7, 20, 27).32 Even the problem of 
evil, which Augustine saw satisfactorily clarified for many years only by Man-
ichaean dualism, can be solved now by referring to the Neoplatonically in-
spired privatio boni-theory: While only God “abides unchangingly” (conf., 7, 11, 
17) in the emphatic sense of the word, all other things are qua being creatures 
subject to becoming and change. Because the notion of destroying implies 
harm, and the concept of damage presupposes the existence of a good dimin-
ished by the damage, all created destructible things must be good. The fact 
that things are good to varying degrees is not a shortcoming, but a sign of the 
well-formed order of goods (conf., 7, 13, 19).33 Against the Manichean idea of a 
struggle between a realm of darkness and a realm of light Augustine states: “…
because there is nothing outside of it [i.e. of God’s created world, D. K.] that 
could burst into it and cause the order that you have placed upon it to become 
perishable” (conf., 7, 13, 19).
Augustine no longer conceives sin as substantial, but as a “deviation of the will 
that is misdirected away from the highest essence, which is you who are God” 
(conf., 7, 16, 22). Interesting is Augustine’s explication of this will: the evil will 
is, firstly, a will that turns to lower-ranking goods in a way that is only due to 
those of higher rank—this will coincides with the perverted love that we have 
already discussed (conf., 7, 16, 22). Secondly, it is a will “that casts out what lies 
31 This is a critique of the Neoplatonic superbia as well as a reference to his theology of grace. 
32 See also conf., 7, 20, 26.
33 See lib. arb., 3, 9, 91: “Likewise, you should think about the differences of souls, so that you 
too realize here that the misfortune that hurts you also serves to ensure that the perfection 
of the universe does not lack those souls who have had to  become unhappy because they 
wanted to be sinful.”
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deep within it” (conf., 7, 16, 22)—this describes the externalization of identity 
through the  integration of the transitory object of love into the self, which 
thereby is threatened in its integrity. Moreover, the evil will is a will that “puffs 
itself up” (conf., 7, 16, 22). Augustine here hints at pride (superbia) as the central 
human vice and mainspring of the Fall (civ., 14, 13), which favours perverted 
self-love over the love of God and strives to take on the rank of God himself.34 
On the other hand, the humilitas (conf., 7, 18, 24) exemplarily shown by Christ 
is the central virtue of those who are gripped by the true love of God. In conf. 7, 
10, 16, and 17, 23, Augustine reports on two Neoplatonic ascensions to God. He 
describes their  aftermaths by revival of the  metaphor of spiritual food intend-
ed to fill the inner emptiness: “…carrying with me no more than a loving mem-
ory and, as it were, longing to smell the sweet savour of food that I could not 
as yet consume” (conf., 7, 17, 23). The lasting enjoyment of God as well as the in-
tegration of God into his own self (metaphorically described as incorporation) 
and its healing transformation will only take place when Augustine recognizes 
Christ as “mediator between God and humanity” (conf., 7, 18, 24). Until then, 
he remains in the regio dissimilitudinis: “Then I discovered that I was far away 
from you, in a place of unlikeness” (conf., 7, 10, 16). This regio dissimilitudinis is 
relevant to our topic (“being unlike” is a counter-concept to “identity” in the 
sense of “sameness” and “self-sameness”), and can be interpreted in various 
ways.35 Enlightening in this regard is Augustine’s statement about the works 
of creation in the context of the interpretation of Gen. 1: 1: “The further things 
are from you, the more unlike you (dissimilius) they become—and not in terms 
of physical distance” (conf., 12, 7, 7). “Unlikeness” thus refers to the relationship 
with God: if Augustine doesn’t succeed in integrating the divine into his own 
self through enduring enjoyment (frui) of God, and in doing so becomes like 
him (as far as this is possible for human beings), he is still estranged from God 
and himself as a living being created in the image of God (imago Dei) and thus 
misses his genuine identity. In a certain sense, he is also “dissimilar” to himself 
in his striving and pursuits, because he is tormented by the unpacified discord 
between right and misguided love or good and evil will—it is no coincidence 
that Augustine elaborates on this struggle of will in the following book in de-
tail. Thirdly, he is also alienated from the mind as the core of his self.36 The 
mind acts as the place of reunification of the individual which is divided in 
34 See Augustine’s narration of the pear theft in conf., 2, 4, 9; 4, 14. Overall, there are 32 refer-
ences to superbia in books 1-9 of the Confessions (Trelenberg 271).
35 For the Platonic origin of this thought, cf. Plato, Pol., 273e; and Ferguson.
36 See Plato’s characterization of the rational soul part (logistikon) as “inner man (anthrôpos)” 
(rep., 9, 588c).
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past, present and future, thus creating unity in the diachronically developing 
self.37 It identifies the present with the past self as well as with the future self 
and makes these different selves similar to each another. With regard to social 
peace, false enjoyment of transient goods generates difference (dissimilitudo) 
and opposition between people too. While those who enjoy God are like each 
other in their shared pursuit of the vision of God and live in peace (en. Ps., 84, 
10), those who cling to temporal things struggle for limited goods that cannot 
be common possessions of all, and thereby become dissimilar and hostile to 
one another. 
The seventh book closes with reference to rest and peace in God together 
with Augustine’s Christian demarcation to the Platonic tradition. While the 
Neoplatonists teach “to see the homeland of peace [patriam pacis] …[they] fail 
to find the way to it” because of the disregard for Christ’s salvific act (conf., 7, 
21, 27).
Confessions VIII
The gracious gift of being “more firmly established in you” (conf., 8, 1, 1), which 
far exceeds mere knowledge of God and at the same time goes hand in hand 
with a greater firmness and stability in the self, is the theme of the eighth 
book. The familiar motifs from the previous books are taken up again. People 
burdened by “those things that seem good [quae videntur bona]” (conf., 8, 1, 2) 
are characterized as “vain [vani]” (conf., 8, 1, 2), so that their inner emptiness 
is grasped conceptually. Rightly guided love is called again the therapeutic 
of this emptiness as well as of mental peacelessness: “Let my very bones be 
flooded with love for you [dilectione tua]” (conf., 8, 1, 1). The absence of a lasting 
peace in the self is related to the changeability of the created world: “Why is it 
that one part of things alternates between advance and decline, conflict and 
reconciliation?” (conf., 8, 2, 8). 
While the previous books spoke primarily of the dichotomy of right and mis-
guided love, Augustine now discusses intrapsychic peacelessness as a struggle 
between the remaining perverted will, solidified by time and habituation, and 
the new will. In contrast to the evil will, which strives for the enjoyment of 
perishable goods, the pious will implies “to enjoy you, o God” (conf., 8, 5, 10).38 
37 See Augustine’s analysis of time in book 11.
38 Emotions, which Augustine summarizes under the generic term “love”, are closely connect-
ed with the will: “They are all …nothing other than volitions” (civ., 14, 6). Reversely, Augustine 
also sums up the will as love (amor) (conf., 13, 9, 10). Accordingly, he describes the struggle of 
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The designation of God as “the only sure pleasure” (conf., 8 , 5, 10) refers to the 
lastingness of God and the  spiritual peace of those who love God. But Augus-
tine is not that far yet. There still rages in him a painful volitional war:39 “And 
so my two wills, one old, the other new, one physical, the other spiritual, were 
in conflict with one another and by their strife [discordando] were shattering 
[dissipabant)] my soul” (conf., 8, 5, 10). This inner struggle causes a split in the 
self and frustrates a harmonious identity formation. In addition to tendencies 
of striving (voluntates), Augustine also knows a decision-making faculty (li-
berum arbitrium),40 which judges the voluntates and expresses a preference 
regarding their effectiveness to come into action. But weakness of the will 
(difficultas),41 as one of many punishments for original sin, prevents this pref-
erence of goodwill from being put into action. Augustine explains the fact, that 
hereby the personal self is divided in several ways, as follows:
I was enmeshed in both but more in the form of desire that I approved of in 
myself than in the one I disapproved of. For in that which I disapproved, my 
ego was less itself [magis iam non ego], because I was to a great extent al-
ready enduring it against my will [invitus] rather than engaging in it willingly 
[volens] (conf., 8, 5, 11).42 
Augustine is at war with himself:43 “With what rods of condemnation did I not 
lash my soul, to make it follow me as I tried to go after you? And it resisted, 
recoiled, but did not excuse itself” (conf., 8, 7, 18). During this time, Augus-
tine hears several conversion reports: the public confession of the rhetorician 
Marius Victorinus to Christianity, Pontician’s report on the Egyptian ascetic 
will as a conflict between the love of God and the perverted desire: “Likewise I was convinced 
that it was better for me to give myself up to your love than to give myself up to my desire; 
but although the former course of action was both attractive and convincing, the latter was 
more tempting and had me in its coils” (conf., 8, 5, 12, Hammond’s translation slightly modi-
fied). See also Kiesel “Die Emotionstheorie”; and “Voluntas.”
39 For different interpretations of the will struggle see Brachtendorf “Augustine’s Notion”; 
Müller; and Kiesel “Wille und Personalität.”
40 See den Bok.
41 On the Augustinian concept of difficultas see Drecoll and Kudella 117. See also conf., 8, 10, 
22: “So I was in conflict with myself, and my very identity was disintegrating, and the actual 
disintegration was in fact taking place quite against my will… for I was a son of Adam.”
42 I changed Hammond’s translation slightly.
43 In connection with our topic it is noteworthy that, analysing his will-struggle, Augustine 
speaks of his refusal “to serve in your army [militare tibi]” (conf., 8, 5, 11). See also conf., 9, 8, 
17, where Augustine tells us about his friend Evodius: “Then he put military service (militia) 
behind him and girded himself for your service instead.” 
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Antonius, and the instruction of two imperial officials in Trier, who had been 
inspired to a Christian departure from all secular aspirations by a coincidental 
encounter with the biography of Antonius. But these narratives result in even 
greater self-hatred: “The more intensely I loved [amabam] those salutary in-
tentions that I heard of… the more I came to detest and loathe myself [oderam] 
in comparison with them” (conf., 8, 7, 17). 
As in the sixth book, Augustine sees his mental state as a “disease [morbo]” 
(conf., 8, 7, 17), culminating in a state of crisis necessary for  healing. Augustine 
also interprets this emotional pain as divine chastisement: “So I was sick and 
tormented. …You redoubled the lashes of fear  [timoris] and shame [pudoris] 
to stop me from giving up again” (conf., 8, 11, 25). His healing and devotion to 
continentia is described by Augustine in the famous garden scene (conf., 8, 12, 
28-30) in the context of his meta- narrative as the work of divine grace.
Confessions IX
In the ninth book Augustine reports on his retirement from the profession as 
a rhetorician, the retreat with his friends to an  estate in Cassiciacum, and the 
subsequent return to Africa. During the trip, the mother dies in Ostia. Shortly 
before her death, she and  Augustine share a Christian and Neoplatonic-in-
spired vision. All these decisions and experiences are based on the fact that 
God has “pierced our heart with your love [caritate tua]” (conf., 9, 2, 3). The 
heart, which in antiquity was the seat of the spirit, is now so permeated with 
the love of God that the identity of Augustine has changed: he has become 
another. The identification with the divine Word is summarized by Augustine 
again in metaphors of the incorporation into the self: “And so we carried with 
us your words fixed deep within” (conf., 9, 2, 3). For that very reason the good 
will gains in strength (conf., 9, 2, 4), the emptiness of the heart fills with “joy”, 
and God begins “to grow sweet to my taste” (conf., 9, 4, 10). The  attachment to 
the “eternal simplicity [aeterna simplicitate]” (conf., 9, 4, 10) motivates the de-
sire to no longer fall into a splitting of the self in the manifold of the variable: “I 
no longer wanted to be  dragged out into the diversity [multiplicari] of worldly 
goods,44 both devouring time and being devoured by it” (conf., 9, 4, 10). 
In the context of a meditation of Psalm 4: 9, Augustine reflects on the rest (re-
quies) in peace (pax) and on the selfsameness of the divine  essence (id ipsum), 
and in this way explicitly binds together these three issues  systematically 
44 I modified Hammond’s translation.
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(conf., 9, 4, 11).45 Since the burden of his past sins disturbs this newfound peace, 
he signs in for baptism in Milan. The reference to the motif of peace is ac-
companied by the dominant presence of mother Monica in the ninth book. 
As a formative characteristic of Monica, Augustine names her peacefulness: 
She was “behaving as a peacemaker [pacificam]” (conf., 9, 9, 21), providing for 
reconciliation between those who quarrelled. Patiently she endured both her 
husband’s infidelity without instigating “acrimony [simultatem]” (conf., 9, 9, 
19), as well as the initial dislike of her mother-in-law, “who was stirred up 
against her by the mutterings of spiteful servant girls” (conf., 9, 9, 20). This 
maximum peacefulness is only possible because Monica has been taught by 
Christ, “her inmost teacher” of peace (conf., 9, 9, 21). Generally, Augustine also 
emphasizes in the narrative of his mother’s life story the initial sinfulness of 
human beings trapped in concupiscence, which must be healed by the divine 
doctor. In the case of Monica this happened through the sharp tongue of a 
slave woman who caught little Monica nibbling on her parents’ wine supply 
and called her a “drunkard”:
How did you restore her, how did you heal her? Surely what you did was to 
provoke a harsh and sharp reproof from another soul, and use it as a surgeon’s 
knife from your secret storehouse; and with one stroke you cut away that 
rottenness! (conf., 9, 8, 18).46 
The communion between mother and son in Christ culminates in the Vision 
of Ostia. The contemplative, Neoplatonic-Christian  ascension47 leads to the 
“food of truth” which “does not have the capacity either to have existed, or to 
come to exist. It simply is,  because it is eternal” (conf., 9, 10, 24), and where the 
being in relationship with the creator becomes impressive: 
Imagine… that anything which comes into being through transition grew si-
lent to that person (for all these things make the same declaration, if only one 
45 See Augustine’s comment on the death of his son Adeodatus, who now rests in the peace 
of God: “You were quick to take his life from this Earth, but I am not at all anxious when I 
remember him, for there is nothing for me to fear from his boyhood, or adolescence, and 
certainly not from his manhood” (conf., 9, 6, 14).
46 According to Augustine, physical pain can also be a divine chastisement, as it is shown by 
the following anecdote: “But I have not forgotten… the harshness of your punishment, and 
the marvelous swiftness of your mercy. You were tormenting me with toothache; and when 
it grew so severe that I could not even speak… As soon as we were knelt down in a suppliant 
posture, the pain vanished” (conf., 9, 4, 12).
47 For a detailed interpretation see Brachtendorf “Augustine’s Notion” 189-197.
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could hear it—we have not made ourselves, but the One who abides for ever 
has made us (conf., 9, 10, 25). 
Important to our question is the immediate chronological connection be-
tween the ascent to timeless beings and the death of the mother, which on 
the one hand illustrates the ontological difference between the eternity of the 
creator and the transitoriness of the creatures, and, on the other hand, shows 
the way to eternal life and the enduring fellowship with beloved fellow crea-
tures through the pious bonding with the creator. Nevertheless, as with the 
death of his childhood friend, Augustine portrays his grief in terms of a torn 
and divided self, and thus as a disruption of the personal identity arising from 
false love and “affection according to the flesh [carnalis affectus]” (conf., 9, 13, 
34): “Since, therefore, I was bereft of that great consolation that she provided, 
my soul was hurt and my life was in torment, for my life and hers had been as 
one [una facta erat]” (conf., 9, 12, 30). His prayer is not answered by God with 
a relief of the pain of separation in the first place. As in the previous books, 
he interprets this as divine discipline and doctrine with the aim of bringing 
the “habitual behaviour” of carnal love orientation as “fetters” [consuetudinis 
vinculum] home to Augustine.
But devout love is also not immune to worries, fears, and mental peaceless-
ness in a fallen world. While, immediately after her death, Monica’s “manner 
of life” and “her unfeigned faith” (conf., 9, 12, 29) let Augustine feel safe in the 
knowledge that the deceased would enter eternal blessedness, at the time of 
writing the Confessions he shed “a very different kind of tears for her, your 
servant. They flow from a spirit struck by the thought of the dangers threaten-
ing every soul that dies in Adam”48 (conf., 9, 13, 34). His request for forgiveness 
of Monica’s sins in the name of Christus medicus49 (conf., 9, 13, 35) takes up 
the topic of grace-induced salvation and at the same time reverses the rela-
tionship between Monica and her son: as Monica had prayed during her life-
time for the salvation of her son, Augustine now appeals as an advocate of his 
mother to God, thus referring to the mutual care and peace in the Christian 
community of love. This “peace” (conf., 9, 13, 37) in Christ, as the embodiment 
of which he has described Monica, he solicits now for her and thus gives the 
ninth book a worthy conclusion.
48 That is why the dying Augustine has David’s penitential psalms hung on the wall, being 
able to pray for the remission of his sins without interruption. See Possidius, Vita Augustini, 
31, 1-4.
49 On the Augustinian concept of Christus medicus see Arbesmann 1954.
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Confessions X
Although Augustine’s autobiographical account concludes with the ninth book, 
the tenth book is central to his narrative identity construction in several ways. 
On the one hand, it offers the author’s self-analysis at the time of writing,50 
and in this way links the past with the present self as well as the historical with 
the writing self, which selects and interprets subjectively certain experienc-
es:51 writing Augustine describes young Augustine and his experiences in the 
context of his current convictions and thus gives his narrative a specific co-
louring with his theology of grace. In addition,  Augustine analyzes the faculty 
of memory in the tenth book,  thereby addressing a mental faculty that is in-
dispensable for the identity construction of temporal beings, and deals with 
the inner man, whom he understands as a place of divine and self-knowledge.
Already the beginning of the book points to the connection between knowl-
edge of God and personal identity: “You know me: let me know you, let me 
know even as I am known” (conf., 10,1 1,1), and “I am open to you, Lord, who-
ever I am” (conf., 10, 2, 2). This connection has a paradoxical character. On the 
one hand, the knowledge of God requires self-knowledge, and on the other 
hand, knowledge of God is the presupposition of self-knowledge. The fact that 
 Augustine deals with memory to solve both is motivated by his  Platonic her-
itage: according to the Platonic doctrine of anamnêsis, the soul has seen the 
divine (the ideas) prior to being incarnated in the body, and must remember 
this vision for the purpose of self-knowledge and alignment with God (ho-
moiôsis theô).52
Augustine discusses as possible memory contents the images of physical 
things perceived through the senses, scientific teaching contents (grammar, 
dialectics, arithmetic, geometry) as well as affects developed in the past with 
50 There are about ten years between the death of his mother and the writing of the Con-
fessions.
51 To be sure, Augustine himself would see his narrative construction of identity as objec-
tive in the sense that he regards his meta-narrative (i.e. the doctrine of grace) as biblically 
founded and thus as divine truth. Nevertheless, the uncertainties about one’s own identity 
and the requests to God often expressed in the Confessions show the fundamental epistemic 
uncertainty (ignorantia) of fallen man, and Augustine himself confesses that the (subjective) 
interpretation of one’s own experiences can change in the course of personal development 
(conf., 10, 14, 21).
52 See Plato, Phd. 72e-77a; and Phdr. 249bc. On the question of a priori knowledge see conf., 
10, 10, 17, and on the connection of memory and identity conf., 10, 16, 25: “I am a creature who 
remembers; I am a mind.” 
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certain experiences. For all memory contents, Augustine establishes a link 
with the topic of personal identity. In the course of discussing sensually per-
ceived natural phenomena, he expresses his astonishment on the power of 
memory with a metaphor that considers the internalization of these things: 
“Even so, when I looked at them with my eyes, I did not absorb [nec… absorbui] 
them into myself by the act of looking at them”53 (conf., 10, 8, 15). The conclud-
ing insight that it is not the objects themselves, but merely their pictures that 
are within Augustine, expresses their significance for Augustine’s identity too: 
Before he can ask the question of the origin of natural beauties and powers or 
the place of man in the natural order within the framework of a sophisticated 
identity construction, he must first perceive their existence and incorporate 
this into his memory as permanent knowledge.
Augustine describes the learning of sciences and corresponding intellectual 
operations in terms of a synthetic and order-setting unity: “This is nothing 
than using our thought processes to bind together  (cogitando quasi conligere) 
things that our memory contains in a  random  disorder” (conf., 10, 11, 18). It is 
note worthy that Augustine uses in his  etymological interpretation of the verb 
 cogitare (“to think”) the same terminology as in his analysis of personal frag-
mentation and dissolution of the self in the transient manifold of the external 
world. Because the contents of knowledge “must be gathered up again so that 
they can be known: that is, out of their diffusion [ex quadam dispersione] they 
must be bound together: from this comes the term ‘cogitate’” (conf., 10, 11, 18). 
Augustine’s insight that only the mind (animus) is capable of this synthesizing 
activity, is also not surprising. It is true that the human mind belongs to the 
mutable works of creation,54 but insofar as it is an intangible nature and ac-
tualizes the god-like image of man as well as, ideally, the orientation towards 
God, it is the unifying faculty in the human being par excellence. Also, moods 
and feelings preserved in the mind are central in the context of human identity 
formation. On the one hand, the reconstruction of experiences is essential to 
the memory of emotions associated with these experiences: without the depth 
and density, aversive affects as well as pleasurable emotions bring about, hu-
man experiences are empty. On the other hand, the reflection and emotional 
mirroring of past emotions impressively show changes in self-image and iden-
tity over time: “When I happily recall my past sadness, my mind experiences 
53 I modified Hammond’s translation slightly.
54 See conf., 10, 35, 36: “So too you yourself are not the mind, because you are God and Lord 
over the mind. And all these things undergo change, but you remain unchangeable over all 
things”. 
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happiness and my memory contains sadness” (conf., 10, 14, 21). As we have 
seen in the previous books, the author of the Confessions, in remembrance of 
once-enjoyed sexual lust, may feel sadness, repentance, and revulsion for his 
former moral depravity, or gratitude for emotional pain, motivating him to long 
for God. The thought of mental processing or “digestion”55 of previously emo-
tionally troubling experiences can also be found here: “…happiness and sad-
ness are like sweet and bitter food for it. When they are committed to memory, 
it is as if they were transferred into the stomach to be stored there; they can 
no longer impart any taste” (conf., 10, 14, 21). This motif of incorporation as a 
metaphor for integration into one’s identity can also be found in the following 
passages, where Augustine ponders the  divine  presence in human mind: “You 
breathed your fragrance onto me: and I drew in my breath and I pant for you. I 
have  tasted you: and now I hunger and thirst for more. You have touched me: 
and I have burned for your peace (pacem tuam)” (conf., 10, 27, 38).56  Augustine 
defines the divine food, which he has tasted in small  bites, more closely as the 
“blessed life” (conf., 10 ,17, 29), “enjoyment of the truth” (conf., 10, 22, 33), and—as 
in the above quote—as peace. Because only God can offer reliable happiness, 
true peace of mind and its unclouded joy are found exclusively in him: “And 
that is the real ‘blessed life’—rejoicing toward you, about you, because of you” 
(conf., 10, 22, 32). This joy again is an expression of pious love which enjoys 
God alone. In this material world,  however, people are only “blessed in their 
hope of it” (conf., 10, 20, 29): “You shine brightly and are pleased, and loved, and 
longed-for” (conf., 10, 2, 2). Only in eternity God is “present experience” (conf., 
10, 20, 29). Even in the state of grace, man is still threatened by the disturbing 
invasion of perverted love, and suffers of mental strife: “Surely human life on 
earth is a time of interminable trial?” (conf., 10, 28, 39).57
In the last third of the book, Augustine describes his present state of mind as 
still tormented by wrong love which he outlines through the triad of lusts in 1 
Joh. 2: 15-17: “Anyone who loves something else as well as you, but does not love 
it for your sake, loves you the less as a result” (conf., 10, 29, 40). Again, Augustine 
points repeatedly to God’s unerring insight into the depths of the human soul: 
“After all, Lord, what is there of myself that could stay hidden before you—in 
whose sight the bottomless pit of human guilt is laid bare—even if I did not want 
to make confession to you?” (conf., 10, 2, 2). God knows the trials and tribula-
55 The metaphor of digesting emotional experiences is found excessively in  Nietzsche. See 
Nachlass 1881, 11[258]; Die fröhliche Wissenschaft V 364; and see Also sprach Zarathustra III, 
Vom Geist der Schwere 2.
56 See conf., 10, 17, 26.
57 See conf., 10, 32, 48.
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tions of Augustine’s soul, which make him question his own identity: “Before 
your eyes I have become a puzzle to myself” (conf., 10, 33, 50). False human self-
love and the penalty of ignorance prevent true insight into the inner self, which 
can only succeed with divine help: “But I do not know whether I am like this.58 
In this matter I know myself less well than you. I beg you, O my God, make me 
clear to myself as well” (conf., 10, 37, 62). God also knows the authenticity of his 
grief over the remaining false desires: “On this subject you know how my heart 
groans to you” (conf., 10, 37, 60). Only the temporary despair of God’s grace and 
the self-induced relapse into concupiscence can alienate man from God and 
thus from himself too: “I have been cast out from before your eyes” (conf., 10, 
41, 66).
Among the lusts of the flesh (concupiscentia carnalis),  especially sexual imag-
inations and nocturnal ejaculations torture him, in  addition to culinary temp-
tations, against which he leads “a daily war [cotidianum  bellum]”59 (conf., 10, 30, 
43). He reflects the latter in the context of self-alienation and a disturbed iden-
tity: “Surely, O Lord my God, I am still myself when sleeping? But there is such 
a big difference between my waking self and my sleeping self in that moment 
when I make the transition from here into sleep or back from sleep to here!” 
(conf., 10, 30, 41). The pleasures of hearing and the “physical pleasure of my 
eyes” disturb peace and “rest” (conf., 10, 34, 51) of the soul too. The temptation 
of curiosity “diverts my thoughts” (conf., 10, 35, 57) from the turn to the inner 
self as a place of God’s presence and of unity (conf., 10, 34, 52), outward into the 
sphere of diversity and dispersion. The healing of “that pestilence” of bitterness 
(conf., 10, 37, 60) takes place solely through the  ministry of God’s grace (conf., 
10, 29, 40; 30, 42). In the form of “continence [contentia]” through which “we 
are joined together and restored to wholeness, from which we trickled away 
into  multiplicity” (conf., 10, 29, 40), it unifies the personal self and creates a lim-
ited inner peace that leads to the “fullness of peace [pacem plenariam]” (conf., 
10, 30, 42; 38, 63; 11, 65) of the eternal blessed in the peaceful communion of 
“those who eat and are satisified” (conf., 10, 13, 70). The central notion 
of continentia should not be understood exclusively as sexual abstinence. As 
has often been said,60 the literal meaning of continentia is “holding together”, 
and, in the  light of the dispersion and fragmentation of the self into manifold 
58 I slightly changed Hammond’s translation.
59 My translation. For the remaining inner war in the baptized see. Iul., 2, 7, 5: “...in the bap-
tized, so to speak, survives a civil war of internal mistakes;” and 4, 33, 2: “You do not spend 
a day without an internal war.”
60 See Fischer 76; and von Herrmann, 33.
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external things, it is to be understood as a desired accompanying phenome-
non of the orientation towards God.
Confessions XI
With the eleventh book begins the interpretation of the creation account in 
Gen. 1, 2, 3. For Augustine’s narrative identity construction, this is just as rele-
vant as the ontological location of man (and therefore his own) in creation and 
his relationship to the creator, as well as for his concept of personal identity as 
a peaceful inner-soul unity that can succeed only by turning to the creator.61 
The interpretation of the first verse of the bible, “In the beginning God cre-
ated the heavens and the earth,” evokes the question of God’s  activity before 
this beginning, and thus the idea of a temporality of God. Augustine solves the 
problem with  reference to the concept of creation through the eternal Word 
that he  equates with Christ (conf., 11, 9, 11), and the fact that time itself is one 
of the works of creation (conf., 11, 14, 17). On the other hand, the creator him-
self is “antecedent to all times (ante omnia tempora)” (conf., 11, 13, 16), and his 
“eternity  (aeternitas)” (conf., 11, 1,1) is, in  contrast to the discursive and linear 
succession of temporal  beings, an all-embracing presence of the “all at once” 
(conf., 11, 8, 9): “Your ‘today’ is eternity” (conf., 11, 13, 16). The very same thing 
is the  reason for God’s absolute identity, who is “always the same [idem ipse]” 
(conf., 11, 13, 16), because he is not subject to diachronic change. As opposed 
to this, the presence of man is so fleeting that it cannot be grasped because it 
“has no extension in time” (conf., 11, 15, 20). 
The past and the future too are subject to volatility: “In eternity  nothing pass-
es, but everything is in the present” (conf., 11, 11, 13). The fact that in a certain 
sense the “past no longer exists; and what is future does not yet exist” (conf., 
11, 15, 18), refers to the ontological inferiority of the temporal. It is also signif-
icant that the human mind, as an entity created in the image of God, has the 
function of visualizing the three times (conf., 11, 20, 26) and thereby bringing 
them into being in an imperfect imitation of the divine act of creation (conf., 
11, 17, 22).62 The diachronic change of man and his imprisonment in either re-
61 The reference to the topic “personal identity” in the last three books of the  Confessions 
is, as will be shown below, remarkable. In this respect, Augustine’s exegetical deliberations 
concerning the creation account in the Confessions differ from his remarks in De Genesi 
adversus Manichaeos, De Genesi ad Litteram liber imperfectus, and De Genesi ad Litteram. I 
am grateful for this comment to the reviewer. 
62 See the Platonic concept of time (chronos) as a moving image of eternity (aiôn) in Tim. 37d.
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pentance or longing for the past and in his concern or desire for the future 
are partly responsible for disturbances of his identity: “My life is a kind of dis-
traction. …But I became alienated [dissilui] as I entered into time, not knowing 
the order in which it passes, and my thoughts, the inmost part of my soul, are 
ripped apart [dilaniantur] by turbulent vicissitudes, until I flow back together 
toward you, purged and shining with the fire of your love” (conf., 11, 29, 39). 
Because times never rest (conf., 11, 11, 13), Augustine’s heart, bound to temporal 
things, is without peace, “until I flow back together toward you, purged, and 
shining with the fire of your love” (conf., 11, 29, 39). This confluence in God, 
which allows him to “stand fast and be established in you” (conf., 11, 30, 40), is 
again expressed by Augustine metaphorically as an incorporation of spiritual 
nourishment into his own self: “Let me drink of you” (conf., 11, 1, 4). This trans-
gression of the ontological boundary between man and God becomes possible 
through Christ: “Your  right hand has supported me in my Lord who as the Son 
of Man is  mediator between you who are the One, and us who are many…. I 
forgot what is past, and instead of being distracted I reach out, not for what 
is in the future and so transitory, but for those things which are before me: I 
press forward, going in the right direction, rather than being distracted, to the 
prize of my highest calling” (conf., 11, 29, 39).
Augustine wishes the peace which the harmonious unity of the self will bring 
with it, not only for himself, but in “brotherly love” (conf., 11, 1, 3) also for the 
neighbour. In turn, the desire for universal peace expresses Augustine’s own 
activity as a peacemaker, thus fulfilling Jesus’ commandment to be peaceful 
(pacificus) (conf., 11, 1, 1).
Confessions XII
In the twelfth book Augustine presents a Neoplatonic interpretation of Gen. 
1: 1-2. According to Psalm 113, 16, Augustine understands God’s “heaven” cre-
ated in the beginning to be “the heaven of heaven” and “intellectual creation 
[creatura… aliqua intellectualis]” (conf., 12, 9, 9), where the city of God (civitas 
Dei) is gathered with all angels and saints.63 On the other hand, he interprets 
the first created “Earth” in Gen. 1, 1 as unformed and dark matter (Gen. 1: 2), 
which represents the basic material for the formation of individual things. Due 
to the creatio ex nihilo (conf., 12, 7, 7), all created things suffer to varying degrees 
from an ontological deficit: the higher the form of the creature, the closer it 
63 It is uncertain what Augustin understood exactly by the “heaven of heaven.” This interpre-
tation can be found in Fuhrer 120.
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is to God, and the farther it is from him, the more “unlike [dissimilius]” (conf., 
12, 7, 7) it is to him. With man’s task of perfecting his spiritual image in God to 
be similar to him to the maximum extent possible, the stability of the self, per-
sonal unity, and inner-soul peace emerge: God as a paradigm of identity (he is 
“the same and the same, and the same (idipsum et idipsum et idipsum),” conf. 
12, 6, 7), is a haven of peace and tranquillity, while the restlessness of creatures 
is related to temporality as well as to matter-based variability (conf., 12, 6, 6). 
The spiritually gifted beings have the option to pursuit either the eternal and 
unchanging God or temporal and variable things, and thereby strengthen or 
weaken both their inner peace and their diachronic identity: “It is true that 
anything that clings so closely to an unchanging form that it does not change 
[though it is capable of changing]” (conf., 12, 19, 28). This approach to God man-
ifests through the love of God and neighbour (conf., 12, 18 ,27), which is realized 
by the above-mentioned spiritual creature in the consummation of pure love 
and thus “rises above all the whirling fluctuation of time” (conf., 12, 9, 9). With 
the stabilization of one’s self and the inner peace thus effected, the external 
peace of communion with one another in heaven’s heaven goes hand in hand 
with the connection to
your loveliness without the blemish of abandoning it for something else: it is 
the pure intelligence of holy and spiritual things, who are the citizens of your 
city that is in heaven (above this visible heaven), harmoniously at one upon a 
foundation of peace [stabilimento pacis] (conf., 12, 11, 12). 
Augustine now sees the time before his conversion as a  departure from the 
Eternal, whose inviting voice was drowned out by the “outcry of the unquiet 
[tumultus impacatorum]”, and to whose  life-giving “fountain” he now returns 
“to drink from (bibam)” (conf., 12, 10, 10). Augustine will not leave the shelter 
“beneath your wings” (conf., 12 ,11, 13)—a reference to the dove of peace be-
tween God and man that Noah sent after the Flood to explore the water lev-
el (Gen. 8: 11), as well as to the peacemaker Monica—or “turn aside you until 
you bind up all that I am, from this disintegrating [dispersione] and misshapen 
state, into the peace of my dearest mother …and establish me [confirmes] for 
ever” (conf., 12, 16, 23).
Peace is also the subject of Augustine’s hermeneutical reflections on the mul-
tiple sense of Scripture in conf. 12, 14, 17 and 32, 43, underlying his remarks on 
various possible interpretations of the discussed Genesis passage. In confor-
mity with his previous analysis, he defines God as the source of immutable 
truth (conf., 12, 30, 41), who can “bring forth harmony amid such a variety of 
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true opinions” (conf., 12, 30, 41), and determines his very hermeneutic approach 
as “brotherly and peaceable [fraternam ac pacificam]” (conf., 12, 25, 35). At the 
same time, it is an expression of the pious “love [caritatem] on account of which 
he whose words are we trying to explain said it all” (conf., 12, 25, 35). This love 
connects the siblings in Christ both with each other and with God (conf., 12, 30, 
41), and stands in contrast with the false (self-)love of those who move “from 
truth to lies [mendacium]” (conf., 12, 25, 34; see also 13, 25, 38).
Confessions XIII
The twelfth book presents an allegorical, historical and typological exegesis of 
the entire first creation account in Gen. 1-2: 3,64 and at the same time offers 
a compilation of all theories that are systematically relevant to the topic of 
personal identity. 
God’s absolute ontological identity (“for you yourself are the same” [tu autem 
idem ipse es], conf. 13, 18, 22)65 is handled both from an ethical point of view 
(as the epitome of goodness he “can never be changed  either for better or for 
worse”, conf. 13, 3, 4), and under the aspect of beata vita: “To you, it is not one 
thing to live, and another to live in bliss—because you are bliss itself” (conf., 13, 
3, 4). At the same time, the goodness of creation is described in terms of form, 
order, and unity: the divine design of the world by the shaping of unformed 
matter  creates the unity (unitas) of things and subjects, and makes them a 
good  (bonum) (conf., 13, ,2) that has a definite place in the scala naturae and the 
divine order. The fact that the individual works of creation are each judged by 
God to be “good”, and that only creation as a whole qualifies as “very good”, is 
due to Augustine’s explanation of the higher order of the tympanic structure 
of the world: “parts which, even though they are beautiful individually, come 
together to accomplish an even more attractive whole” (conf., 13, 28, 43). By 
their giftedness with will and reason, natures who possess a rational mind 
(angels and men) are capable “to cleave [haerere] to you constantly” (conf., 13 
2, 3), and thus to reach “blessed rest [ad beatam requiem]” (conf., 13, 8, 9), or by 
turning away from him fall into unrest and misfortune. While the attachment 
to the creator through the love of God as a gift of the Holy Spirit “sublimates 
us to that place” (conf., 13, 9, 10), the sorrowful love and the oppressive burden 
of desires plunge us into the abyss (conf., 13, 7, 8). Right love is inseparably 
connected with goodwill and, by being oriented towards the divine order of 
64 For the sake of brevity, a detailed analysis will be omitted. 
65 See conf., 13, 31, 46: God, “who is… existence itself [est est].”
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goods, at the same time ensures the order in the human soul, which finds 
therefore rest and peace: “What is out of its proper place is restless” (conf., 13, 
9, 10), but “in having goodwill do we find peace” (conf., 13, 9, 10). 
The disciples of goodwill and true love, who consider God alone as the object 
of enjoyment, while using all other things for the sake of God, sees Augustine 
symbolized in the mainland (Gen. 1: 6-10) which is separated from the water 
(i. e. the adherents of “worldly, earthly happiness”, conf., 13, 17, 20).66 In the 
context of personal identity, the Augustinian attribution of earth to life and 
bitter water to death is significant: as we have already seen, love integrates 
the beloved object into one’s own identity, thus assimilating the loving person 
to the beloved. While the love of God approaches the epitome and creator of 
all life, and while its pleasures are “life-giving [vitales]” (conf., 13, 21, 29; 22, 32), 
the  sinfully loving one becomes the slave of,
pride in self-aggrandizement, and delight in excessive sexual appetite, and 
toxic curiosity [which, D. K.] are operations of a soul that is dead—not dead in 
the sense that it is utterly inert, but because it departs from the wellspring of 
life and is adopted by this passing age and is conformed to it (conf., 13, 21, 30). 
His pleasures are in this sense “deadly [mortiferis]” (conf., 13, 21, 29) because 
they result in the second and final death of eternal damnation. 
In keeping with his conviction of the inviolable integrity of God, Augustine 
states that evil also is subject to the “command” of God and his order: he sets 
firm “limits, as to how far the waters [of evil, D. K] are allowed to advance so 
that their waves break upon themselves” (conf., 13, 17, 20).
The condition of the possibility of an approximation of the human soul to God 
is also suggested by Augustine in the thirteenth book with deliberations, that 
come to their systematic conclusion in De trinitate (399-419) (Brachtendorf  “Au-
gustins Confessiones” 285-289): the divine trinity is represented in man through 
the unity of being [esse], knowing [nosse] and volition [velle] (conf., 13, 11, 12).67 
Although Augustine in the thirteenth book still underlines the  difference be-
tween that “which exists unchangeably, and knows unchangeably, and wills 
unchangeably” (conf., 13, 11, 12), and man, who accomplishes all of this in the 
context of his mutabilitas, his already mentioned explanations of the spiritu-
66 This is a pre-reference to the doctrine of the duality of civitas Dei and civitas terrena in 
civ. (412-426).
67 Remarkable is Augustine’s view that inner Christian peace is the prerequisite for being able 
to grasp the secret of the Holy Trinity (conf., 13, 11, 12).
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al creature, which, when fully connected to God, is not subject to temporal 
change (conf., 12, 19, 28), show that he considers a substantial approximation 
with God possible. This too is, like all good things that come to man, due “to 
your grace alone” (conf., 13, 3, 4). Augustine summarizes this effect of grace in 
terms that suggest that God gives himself to the blessed and thus integrates 
himself into their selves: in the human being God gives himself by creating 
man in the imago Dei. When Augustine chooses, with a view to human knowl-
edge, to say, “Whatever they see as being good, therefore, in the Spirit of God, 
it is not they but God who sees that it is good” (conf., 13, 31, 46), then he seems 
to refer to the doctrine of Christ as inner teacher in De magistro (388-391) as 
well as to his doctrine of illumination (vera rel., 71). After all, right-will is ac-
companied by the “love of God” which “has been shed abroad [diffusa] in our 
hearts” (conf., 13, 31, 46), and in this way man becomes similar to the triune god.
The formal conclusion of the thirteenth book and the Confessions as a whole, 
discusses what the homo sub gratia hopes (in spe), firstly, for the end of earthly 
history, and secondly, for the consummation of his own creaturely existence. 
While Augustine’s soul is still “sad [tristis]” and in a state of restless trouble 
[conturbas me] (conf., 13, 14, 15) even after God’s act of grace, the rest of God 
at the seventh day after the completion of his creation points to the perfect 
and never-ending rest of the community of the blessed at the end of time: 
“Lord God, grant us peace (for you have bestowed everything on us) the peace 
of rest, the peace of sabbath, peace where evening never comes” (conf., 13, 
25, 50). The motif that comes up in this quote which is part of his meta-nar-
rative of divine grace continues throughout the following considerations. 
God, who will endow his chosen children with the unclouded peace of eternal 
bliss, is also the giver of that which justifies the reward of that blissful rest: 
“…after our works (likewise ‘very good’ because you bestowed them on us), 
should rest in you in the Sabbath of eternal life” (conf., 13, 36, 51).68 The follow-
ing lines bring out the closest possible alignment with the divine as well as the 
associated integration of the creator into one’s own identity through the love 
of God: “Even then you will rest in us, as now you are at work in us; and so 
that rest of yours will pervade us just as those works of yours pervade us now” 
(conf., 13, 37, 52). Once again, Augustine refers to the connection between the 
timelessness of God and his absolute peace and immutability: “But you, Lord, 
are always at work and always in  repose: you do not see in time, act in time, rest 
in time; but yet you create our seeing in time, and time itself, and rest in time” 
(conf., 13, 37, 52). As Augustine has already shown, inner peace requires turning 
68 See conf., 13, 38, 53.
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to the good. In this respect too, the holy goodness of God is the ideal: “You are 
the Good, you need no good thing, you are always at rest, since you yourself are 
your own rest” (conf., 14, 38, 53).
His own alignment with and participation in this good is carried out by Au-
gustine performatively with his final word, which also illustrates the prayer 
character of the Confessions as well as their form as a narrative identity con-
struction under the guideline of a Christian meta-narrative: “Amen” (conf., 
13, 38, 53). Moreover, it etymologically refers to the theme of a peaceful and 
harmonious personal identity, secured by stability and permanence in God 
(the Hebrew verb root אמן means “sustained...; reliable, firm, faithful; to last, 
to stay, to endure” (Fohrer  16f.), and at the same time it impressively reveals 
the peaceful tranquillitas animi of the one who blesses everything managed 
by divine providence with a “So be it”.
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Abstract
This chapter elucidates Augustine’s uses of Paul’s phrase 
“ipse enim est pax nostra” (Eph. 2:14a) within his extant 
preaching. Although primarily exegetical and theolog-
ical, the implications of this exegesis and theology for 
spirituality and ecclesiology are also discussed. Con-
temporary biblical scholars often limit Eph. 2:14’s claims 
to reconciliation between Jews and Gentiles, and the 
way(s) that this reconciliation serves as a basis for liv-
ing out the bond between God and his people and as 
an inspiration for peace in this world. However, for 
Augustine, Eph. 2:14 teaches even more about living 
the Christian life and about reconciling human beings, 
whether they are inside or outside the visible church. 
Augustine employed Eph. 2:14 more than sixty times in 
various contexts. Eph. 2:14 appears in sermons for both 
Christmas and for Epiphany, in sermons directly or in-
directly addressing Jews, Pelagians, and Donatists, and 
in sermons intended to educate or encourage particular 
congregations. The true import of Ephesians 2:14a for 
Augustine is most clearly seen, however, in his overtly 
exegetical sermons. In these, Augustine invokes Eph. 
2:14 to emphasize the necessity of faith in Christ for ex-
periencing peace either in this age or in the age that is 
to come, that Christ is the only genuine pacificus, and 
that Israel’s “true” identity is only found among those 
who are united with the trans-temporal church. The 
sermons for Epiphany, which are by definition anti-Do-
natist, often plead for reconciliation, even as they cast 
doubt upon the genuineness of Donatist claims to pos-
sess faith in Christ.
Keywords: Ephesians 2:14, pax/peace, preaching, (anti-)
Donatist, reconciliation.
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Resumen
Este capítulo dilucida cómo san Agustín usa la frase de 
Pablo “ipse enim est pax nostra” (Efesios 2, 14a) en su 
predicación. Aunque principalmente exegéticas y teo-
lógicas, también se discuten las implicaciones de esta 
exégesis y teología para la espiritualidad y la eclesio-
logía. Los eruditos bíblicos contemporáneos a menudo 
limitan los reclamos de Ef. 2, 14 a la reconciliación entre 
judíos y gentiles, y la forma en que esta reconciliación 
sirve como una base para vivir el vínculo entre Dios y 
su pueblo, así como una inspiración para la paz en este 
mundo. Sin embargo, para san Agustín, Ef. 2, 14 enseña 
acerca de vivir la vida cristiana y de reconciliar a los se-
res humanos, ya sea dentro o fuera de la Iglesia visible. 
Agustín empleó Ef. 2, 14 más de sesenta veces en diver-
sos contextos. Ef. 2, 14 aparece en sermones tanto para 
Navidad como para la Epifanía; en sermones directa o 
indirectamente dirigidos a judíos, pelagianos y Donatis-
tas; y en sermones destinados a educar o alentar a con-
gregaciones particulares. La verdadera importancia de 
Efesios 2, 14 para Agustín se ve más claramente, incluso, 
en sus sermones abiertamente exegéticos. En estos, san 
Agustín invoca Ef. 2, 14 para enfatizar la necesidad de la 
fe en Cristo que permite experimentar la paz, ya sea en 
esta era o en la venidera. Asimismo, plantea que Cristo 
es el único pacífico genuino, y que la identidad “verda-
dera” de Israel solo se encuentra entre aquellos que es-
tán unidos con la Iglesia transtemporal. Los sermones 
para la Epifanía, que son por definición antidonatistas, 
a menudo abogan por la reconciliación, incluso cuando 
arrojan dudas sobre la autenticidad de las afirmaciones 
donatistas de poseer fe en Cristo.
Palabras clave: Efesios 2, 14, paz, predicación (antidona-
tista), reconciliación.
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Ipse Enim est Pax Nostra: Ephesians 2:14 in the Preaching of St. Augustine [163]
Gaudium nostrum, pax nostra, requies nostra, finis 
omnium molestiarum, non est nisi deus 
(en. Ps., 84, 10) (CCSL 39, 1171).
Introduction
Most non-Christians will be at least vaguely aware that the Christian New Tes-
tament has a lot to say about peace and its pursuit, whether the peace being 
sought is between family members,  between community members, between 
neighbors, between nations, or between God and his creation.
It is doubtful, however, whether even most Christians have seriously consid-
ered the claim that can be found in the first half of 2: 14 of Paul’s Letter to the 
Ephesians, namely, that “Christ himself is our peace” (ipse enim est pax nos-
tra). This chapter, although not an exegetical study of Ephesians 2: 14 in se, 
aims to assist just such a consideration by elucidating Augustine’s reading and 
application of this verse,1 and will do so via a particular focus upon the ways 
in which the Bishop of Hippo incorporated this phrase into his homiletical 
compositions, that is, his sermones ad populum and Enarrationes in Psalmos 
(cited hereafter, en. Ps.). The methodology employed in this study is relative-
ly straightforward. Drawing upon the work of H. J.  Frede,2 it has endeavored 
to corroborate his results via  computerized searches of the available (mostly) 
critical editions of  Augustine’s compositions in order to generate an  exhaustive 
1 While it may be explained—at least in part—by the fact that Augustine never  penned a 
commentary on Ephesians per se, the relative dearth of scholarly attention to his exegesis 
and use of this letter remains surprising. The most prominent among the handful of articles 
dedicated to Augustine and Eph. include: Dupont “Habitare Christum” 367-376; Manrique 
41–61; Rombs 321-327; Zumkeller 457-474; van Bavel 45-93; La Bonnardière “L’interprétation 
Augustinienne” 3-45; Doignon 201-211; La Bonnardière “Le Combat Chrétien” 235-238; and 
Lash 161-174. Unfortunately Nebreda “Un comentario de San Agustín, obispo de Hipona, a la 
carta de San Pablo a los Efesios” 287-298 and 367-378 remains unavailable to me. 
2 Augustine employed Ephesians 2: 14 more than sixty times throughout the course of his 
career in works of various genres and in response to a variety of contextual considerations. 
For an exhaustive list of his uses, see “Vetus Latina” 79-80; see 81 and 85 for the text of 
Eph. 2: 14. Of course, Augustine was far from the first Patristic author to make substantial 
use of Ephesians in general or of Eph. 2: 14 in  particular. With regard to 2 14 in the Latin 
exegetical tradition, comments are extant from Origen, Marius Victorinus, Ambrosiaster, 
Jerome, Pelagius, and  Theodore of  Mopsuestia. Relevant bibliography on the use of Eph. 
2: 14 by  Augustine’s  predecessors and contemporaries includes: Heine 132-37; for Marius 
Victorinus Edwards 138; “Commentaries on Galatians-Philemon” 40-41; and Greer 224-229. 
[164] Agustín de Hipona como Doctor Pacis:  estudios sobre la paz en el mundo contemporáneo 
list of places in Augustine’s extant works where Ephesians 2, 14 is cited, alluded 
to, or otherwise  referenced.3 
The Text of Ephesians 2: 14 in Context
Again, although what follows will not be an exegetical study, it seems helpful 
to supply the reader with the broader context of our verse. Table 1 supplies 
Ephesians 2: 11-18 in Greek,4 in Latin,5 and in the relatively literal NASB English 
translation.6
3 For this study I have employed the CLCLT, also known as the “Library of Latin Texts” 
(Turnhout, Belgium, Brepols Publishers). Accessed via Villanova University’s Falvey Library 
at http://clt.brepolis.net.ezp1.villanova.edu/llta/pages/Search.aspx 
4 This is the text of the Nestle-Aland Novum Testamentum Graece, 28th edition, provid-
ed by the German Bible Society and was taken from https://www.academic-bible.com/
en/online-bibles/novum-testamentum-graece-na-28/read-the-bible-text/bibel/text/ 
lesen/stelle/59/20001/29999/ch/af17f2be751b9117f86277ad74a4a067/.  Commentators 
are quick to note that neither the vocabulary nor the syntax of the Greek of Eph. 2,14-18 
is straightforward. The text of 2: 14a (“αὐτὸς  γάρ  ἐστιν  ἡ  εἰρήνη  ἡμῶν”), however, is esp. 
particular if one notes that the use of the emphatically positioned pronoun αὐτὸς “places 
the spotlight directly on Christ.” See Thielman 163. Also noteworthy, not least because it 
differs from the way this clause is usually rendered in Latin, is how the use of the geni-
tive possessive  pronoun “ἡμῶν” in the Greek “denotes that both the ‘circumcision’ and the 
‘ uncircumcision’ are recipients of the advantage which Christ brought.” See Yee 143 and n. 
61. See also O’Brien 192, who emphasizes that vv.14-18 “is closely tied in with… vv.11-13… and 
is rounded out by an inclusio… in which the ‘we’ and ‘our’ now refer inclusively to both Jew 
and Gentile believers.”
5 This is the text of the Biblia Sacra Iuxta Vulgatam Versionem Editio Quinta, provided by 
the German Bible Society and was taken from: https://www.academic-bible.com/en/ on-
line-bibles/biblia-sacra-vulgata/read-the-bible-text/bibel/text/lesen/stelle/59/ 20001 
/29999/ch/af17f2be751b9117 f86277ad74a4a067/. Except for one minor bit of syntax, i.e., 
should it read “est enim” or “enim est”?, the text of Eph. 2: 14a in this critical edition of the 
Vulgate is not significantly dissimilar from the reconstructed text as found in the Beuroner 
edition of the Vetus Latina (n. 2).
6 This version of Eph. 2, which is the “updated” NASB published in 1995, was taken from: 
https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Ephesians%202&version= NASB.






































11 propter quod memores estote 
quod aliquando vos gentes in 
carne qui dicimini praeputium 
ab ea quae dicitur circumcisio in 
carne manufacta 12 quia eratis 
illo in tempore sine Christo 
alienati a conversatione Israhel 
et hospites testamentorum 
promissionis spem non habentes 
et sine Deo in mundo 13 nunc 
autem in Christo Iesu vos qui 
aliquando eratis longe facti estis 
prope in sanguine Christi  
14 ipse est enim pax nostra 
qui fecit utraque unum et medium 
parietem maceriae solvens 
inimicitiam in carne sua 15 legem 
mandatorum decretis evacuans 
ut duos condat in semet ipsum 
in unum novum hominem faciens 
pacem 16 et reconciliet ambos 
in uno corpore Deo per crucem 
interficiens inimicitiam in semet 
ipso 17 et veniens evangelizavit 
pacem vobis qui longe fuistis et 
pacem his qui prope 18 quoniam 
per ipsum habemus accessum 
ambo in uno Spiritu ad Patrem
11 Therefore remember that 
formerly you, the Gentiles 
in the flesh, who are called 
“Uncircumcision” by the so-
called “Circumcision,” which is 
performed in the flesh by human 
hands— 12 remember that 
you were at that time separate 
from Christ,  excluded from the 
commonwealth of Israel, and 
strangers to the covenants of 
promise, having no hope and 
without God in the world.  
13 But now in Christ Jesus you 
who formerly were far off have 
been brought near by the blood 
of Christ. 14 For He Himself 
is our peace, who made both 
groups into one and broke down 
the barrier of the dividing wall, 
15 by abolishing in His flesh 
the enmity, which is the Law of 
commandments contained in 
ordinances, so that in Himself He 
might make the two into one new 
man, thus establishing peace,  
16 and might reconcile them both 
in one body to God through the 
cross, by it having put to death 
the enmity. 17 and he came and 
preached peace to you who were far 
away, and peace to those who were 
near; 18 for through Him we both 
have our access in one Spirit to 
the Father.
Contemporary biblical scholars, even those who accept that Ephesians was 
written by Paul, typically expend both ink and energy on the degree to which 
2: 14-18 may or may not reflect adaptation by the author of traditional materials, 
and, as a result, are want to limit the application of 2: 14 to the peace that Christ 
imparted in order to bring about reconciliation between Jews and Gentiles,7 
7 Yee argues that the author of Ephesians views the Gentiles from a decidedly  Jewish per-
spective and, thus, “has brought to light the way in which the marginalized Gentiles could 
become one with the Jews ‘in Christ’” (133). See 126, 136, 140, 142-143, 146, 183, and 187-189. See 
also Fowl 83-84 and 89-90. On 90, Fowl makes it clear that, for the author of Eph., the Jews 
and Gentiles “are not dissolved into one. Peacemaking here is not homogenizing. Rather… it 
involves eliminating the hostility that divided them.” 
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as well as to generate a  single, trans-temporal people of God.8 Tet-Lim Yee 
even goes so far as to claim that “the author’s utmost concern is to rede-
fine the identity of the people of God for the Gentiles for whom he wrote,” 
before going on to assert that this concern is betrayed in the very language 
that he used “to reframe the notion of the people of God and to undercut 
the old ethnic forms of self-identification,” in order to “replace them with a 
new community-identity in Christ” (126). At the same time, contemporary 
biblical scholarship can assert that “2:11-21 is the key and high point of the 
whole epistle,” and that 2: 14-18 “praises the eternal, personal union of Christ 
and peace” that “is a present, not only a past reality” since “Jesus Christ is 
still active as a peacemaker” (Barth 275 and 295). Much contemporary bibli-
cal scholarship also concludes that the claim “[Christ] is our peace” is solely 
rooted in his death as an atoning sacrifice for sin,” and ought not to be read in 
incarnational or sacramental terms. Markus Barth (298), for example, argues 
that Ephesians 2: 14-18 highlights “the means by which Christ made peace” and 
identifies it “with the price he paid.”9 Others go so far as to characterize the 
equivalence between Christ and peace that is both made and praised here as 
“not primarily… the peace he brings to individual souls,” but, rather, 
as the peace he brings socially and politically.10 
In what follows, we shall see that, to one degree or another,  Augustine’s read-
ing and application of Ephesians 2: 14 is  frequently at odds with these asser-
tions, arguments, and conclusions.
8 This is in spite of the fact that some are also willing to label Eph. 2: 14-18 “as the  locus clas-
sicus on peace in the Pauline letters.” For this see O’Brien 193, where he also points out that 
the term peace occurs in these five vv. no less than four  times. For the view that that these 
verses are best seen as reflecting traditional and  perhaps even older hymnic material, see, 
e.g., Barth 260-264 et passim. For the view that these verses are best seen as “encomiastic… 
via amplification,” see Yee 126-189, esp. 136ff. For a brief summary—but ultimately non-com-
mittal—discussion of the several alternatives, see Thielman 161-163. 
9 See also Barth 302-305. He supports his position by distinguishing between the sacrificial, 
which he takes to be the Pauline sense, and the incarnational, which he sees as based on 
passages like Luke 2: 1-14. As we shall see, Augustine saw no need for such distinctions and 
often employs our v. and Luke 2: 14, which according to the NASB English trans. reads “Glory 
to God in the highest, and on earth peace among men with whom he is pleased” [emphasis 
added], in the same context. 
10 As an example for this see Yee 180 and Barth 305. For the quotation, see Barth 262.
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Ephesians 2: 14 in Augustine’s Polemical Works
The only explicitly anti-Pelagian composition to make reference to our verse 
is the De peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo paruulorum (cited 
hereafter, pecc. mer). It is also Augustine’s first anti-Pelagian treatise, having 
been written in late 411 or early 412. In book 1 at 27.46 (CSEL 60, 44-45), Augus-
tine offers a long quotation of Ephesians 2: 8-10 and 12-20, in support of his 
larger claim that Paul, just as do the other  authors of scripture, offers ample 
testimony about both the fact and the nature of Christ’s incarnation. At the 
most fundamental level, the incarnation was salvific, redemptive, and enlight-
ening. Ne vertheless, in this context, Augustine offers neither an exegesis nor a 
specific application of our verse.
Augustine made yet another formal polemical use of Ephesians 2 some six or 
eight years later when he penned the two books of the Contra adversarium 
legis et prophetarum. The identity of Augustine’s opponent is as unknown to 
us today as it was to him. Writing in his Retractations (cited hereafter, retr.) 
approximately a decade later, Augustine  speculates that his opponent might 
have been a latter-day Marcionite before noting that, whoever he was, he 
seemed to want Christians to stop identifying the true God with the creator 
of this world and to stop believing that the “god” behind Jewish scriptures is in 
any sense the true God since it is impossible that this “god” could be anything 
more than a “most wicked demon” (pessimus daemon) (CCSL 57, 136).
Similar to what he did in pecc. mer. 1, 27, 46, Augustine opens  Contra ad-
versarium legis et prophetarum (2, 2, 5) with a long  quotation of Ephesians 
2, though this time he quotes 2: 11-20 in its  entirety (CCSL 49, 92-94). Here, 
however, the point of the  quotation is to demonstrate that Paul had an ex-
ceedingly high opinion of the Jews, of their covenant with God, and of their 
privileged position relative to Gentiles. After all, if the Jews were in fact serv-
ing a  demon, why would Paul describe them as being “near” (prope) (2: 13) 
to God relative to the Gentiles? And “how can [Paul] say that [the Gentiles] 
were separated from the company of Israel and strangers to the covenants 
and the promise and that they were without hope and without God in this 
world, unless Israel was (erat) the people of God and of Christ?” (WSA I/18, 
413) (CCSL 49, 93, 2, 189-192). In short, according to Augustine, in Ephesians 
2, Paul, who as a “Hebrew of Hebrews” (Phil. 3: 5) knew and served the God 
of  Israel, proclaimed this same God, the same law, and the same prophets 
to the Gentiles, even as he quotes directly from one of the Jews’ prophetic 
scriptures (Isaiah 28: 16) in order to give meaning to his equation of Christ and 
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the “cornerstone” (summo angulari lapide), just as Peter would do  elsewhere 
(1 Peter 2: 6).
In order to complete the picture of Augustine’s polemical uses of Ephesians 
2 in general and of 2: 14 in particular,11 it will be helpful to notice how he em-
ployed it in the so-called Tractatus  adversus  Iudaeos. This composition or, bet-
ter, sermon,12 is one of his primary and (probably) chronologically final efforts 
to clarify his vision of the relative positions of those Jews who had rejected 
Jesus, that is “Israel according to the flesh” (secundum carnem), and those, 
whether Jew or Gentile, who had accepted Jesus as the Messiah and, as a re-
sult, had been incorporated into “spiritual Israel” (israel spiritualem), the true 
people of God.13 It bears noting that scholars find it highly unlikely that any 
actual Jews were present when this sermon was preached (Fredriksen 310 and 
330).14 As will become clear in what follows, the most direct connection be-
tween the use of Ephesians 2: 14 in the Adversus Iudaeos and that which occurs 
in Contra adversarium legis et prophetarum 2, 2, 5 is the Book of Isaiah. 
Throughout this sermon’s first seven chapters, quotations from the He-
brew scriptures abound, with the majority being drawn from the Book of 
Psalms. In Chapter 8, Augustine engages explicitly with what he  perceives to be 
the standard Jewish mindset regarding their identity. He acknow ledges both 
that all Jews are of Israel in the sense that they are literally “descendants of the 
patriarch” (ex quo patriarcha propagati  sumus) and that, according to straight-
forward reading of Genesis 32: 28,15 Jacob and Israel “are one and the same 
[person]” (unus homo erat iacob et israel). But then he transitions to a consider-
ation of Isaiah 2: 2-3 and reminds his audience that Isaiah had prophesied that 
“the Law and the Word of God was going to proceed from Sion and Jerusalem 
11 Another important polemical use of our v. can be found in c. litt. Pet. 2, 70, 157-158. However, 
because this use is quite similar to what we find in anti-Donatist passages of the en. Ps. and 
the sermones ad populum it will not be treated in detail here. But see n. 31 infra.
12 Particularly helpful by way of an orientation to this work is Harkins. For an older but still 
brief theological reflection see Bori 301-311. 
13 Harkins dates Adversus Iudaeos 428-430 CE. Fredriksen 303, 310, 330, and 420-421 and nn. 
8-9, is less precise. In the midst of a discussion of its contents and after  noting the position of 
Lancel that it should be dated to 418-419, she claims only that this text “must date to some-
time after” Augustine’s ep. 121, i.e., to “some point  between 410 and 415.” See esp. 304 and 324. 
14 On 310, Fredriksen rightly emphasizes that at Adversus Iudaeos 7, 9, Augustine tells his au-
dience of his plans to “address [the Jews] as if [quasi] they were present” in the room. For this 
trans., see FOTC 27, 403. See PL 42, 57: “Quos paululum quasi praesentes alloqui libet.” 
15 According to the NASB, this v. reads “[the man with whom Jacob had wrestled] said, ‘Your 
name shall no longer be Jacob, but Israel; for you have striven with God and with men and 
have prevailed.’”
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to all nations (omnibus gentibus), not… to one nation” (non… uni genti), before 
going on to assert that this prophecy is one that “we see most obviously ful-
filled (manifestissime… impletum) in Christ and the Christians.”16 Augustine then 
skips to Isaiah 2: 6 and observes that the prophet also teaches that the Lord has 
“abandoned (dimisit) his people, the house of Israel.” Then, in what amounts 
to this chapter’s final exegetical move, Augustine, having assumed that God’s 
abandonment of Israel was due to that house’s lack of faith, appeals to Matthew 
19: 28 to support a further prophecy regarding the destiny of that house’s un-
faithful members:
[The Lord] abandoned those whom you imitate by your  unbelief [non cre-
dendo], and by imitating them you are lingering in the same danger of de-
struction… See what you are, not what you boast to be (esse iactatis)… [to the 
faithful from that house] he makes this promise: “you shall also sit on twelve 
thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel” (Matt. 19:28). [the faithful] will sit 
to judge the house of Israel, that is, the people of that  house whom he aban-
doned. How is it that, according to the same prophet: “The stone which the 
builders rejected: the same is become the head of the corner” (Ps. 118:22),17 un-
less because circumcised and uncircumcised meet and unite in the keystone, 
like the union of two adjacent walls, as it were in the kiss of peace. That is the 
reason that the Apostle says: “For he himself is our peace, who has made both 
one” (Eph. 2:14). They who have followed his call—whether from the house of 
Jacob or from the house of  Israel—are clinging to the cornerstone… they, how-
ever, whom he  abandoned from the house of Jacob or from the house of  Israel 
are the ones building destruction and the ones rejecting the  cornerstone.18
At first, it appears that this use of our verse and that which we find in Contra 
adversarium legis et prophetarum are contradictory or, at least, are in tension: 
in this use, the Jews are taken to task for having ceased to believe and, thus, to 
participate in God’s relatively inclusive plan of salvation; in Contra adversari-
um legis et prophetarum, however, the Jews are praised for their faithfulness to 
God’s revelations to them and for their part in ushering in God’s relatively in-
clusive plan of salvation. Nevertheless, the  tension resolves, at least according 
to Augustine, if one understands that God’s relatively inclusive plan of salva-
tion has always been about Christ and has always been dependent upon faith 
16 For this (slightly adjusted) trans., see FOTC 27, 407. For the Latin, see PL 42, 59.
17 Here Augustine may have in mind Isa. 28: 16, but the quotation he offers is significantly 
closer to Ps. 118: 22 (according to the numbering of modern Bibles).
18 For this (adjusted) trans., see FOTC 27, 408-409. For the Latin, see PL 42, 60.
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in Christ’s  faithfulness in bringing about an ultimate reconciliation between 
both God and humanity in all of its various factions. 
Ephesians 2: 14 in Augustine’s Exegetical Works
The assertion that “Christ is our peace” appears in several of  Augustine’s 
works that are explicitly exegetical and that aim to elucidate the Christian 
scriptures. In addition to a clear and detailed use of our text in In Iohannis 
euangelium tractatus CXXIV (77, 3) (CCSL 36, 521) (cited hereafter, Io. eu. tr.), 
Augustine made recourse to Ephesians 2: 14 in no less than nine different 
Enarrationes in Psalmos (cited hereafter, en. Ps.)19
In Io. eu. tr. 77
Tractatus 77 is a relatively brief reflection on John 14: 25-27.20 Significantly, it 
is 14, 27’s report that Christ promised to leave his peace with the disciples that 
draws Augustine’s attention; indeed, this promise occupies him for more than 
half of the tractate. Following a series of comparisons between what we might 
expect from this promise in this age and what we might expect from it in the 
age to come, e.g., in this age it enables us to love one another, in the age to 
come it will guarantee that we “shall never be able to disagree,” Augustine re-
minds his hearers that all true peace has only one source since it is “in [Christ] 
and from him [that] we have peace.” This is because, even for the remainder 
of this age, Christ has left himself with us,21 a thought that, in turn, compels 
Augustine to invoke Ephesians 2: 14:
19 See 33, s. 2, 19 (CCSL 38, 294); 47, 3 (CCSL 38, 540); 71, 1 (CCSL 39, 971); 78, 3 (CCSL 39, 1100); 
94, 8 (CCSL 39, 1337); 106, 1 (CCSL 40, 1570); 119, 9 (CCSL 40, 1786); 124, 10 (CCSL 40, 1843); 
and 126, 2 (CCSL 40, 2, 1857).
20 According to the New American Standard Bible (NASB), these verses read: “These things I 
have spoken to you while abiding with you. But the helper, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father 
will send in my name, he will teach you all things, and bring to your remembrance all that I 
said to you. Peace I leave with you; my peace I give to you; not as the world gives do I give to 
you. Do not let your heart be troubled, nor let it be fearful.” The use of John 14: 27 alongside 
Eph. 2: 14 is not, however, original to Augustine. See., e.g., Heine 134, where part of Jerome’s 
comment on 2: 14 runs: “He is our peace, who says, ‘my peace I give to you, my peace I leave 
with you,’” before adding that Christ “as peace, makes us to be peaceful.” 
21 In the context of the tractate as a whole, it becomes clear that Christ has left all three per-
sons of the Trinity with us, that is, with the Church. In paragraph 1, as he is recapitulating 
the verses that immediately precede John 14: 25-27, Augustine writes: “Iamuero et superius 
dixerat de spiritu sancto: ‘vos autem cognoscetis eum, quia apud vos manebit, et in vobis 
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“For he himself is our peace, who has made both one” (Eph. 2:14). Therefore 
(ergo) he himself is our peace for us both [et] when we believe that he is and [et] 
when we shall see him as he is (cf. 1 John 3:2). For if as long as we are in the cor-
ruptible body …when we walk by faith, not by sight, he does not abandon those 
who are pilgrimaging apart from him [a se] (cf. 2 Cor. 5:5-8), how much more, 
when we have come to the sight itself, shall he fill us out of himself [ex se]!22
This passage is also remarkable for how, within it, Augustine has so deftly har-
monized the perspective of John with that of Paul: in it he used a reference 
from 1 John and multiple references from Paul in order to make Christ’s words 
clearer. 
Ever attentive to the presence and absence of even the smallest textual detail, 
Augustine continues his discussion of John 14: 27 by asking why Christ did 
not modify the first reference he made to peace with the possessive pronoun 
“my” (meam), despite  having done so with the second reference to peace.23 In 
continuation with his theme of the stark difference between our experience 
in this age and that of the age to come, he explains that this is exactly how it 
should be since, despite the gracious gift of peace that Christ has given al-
ready, our peace in this life will not and cannot be exactly like Christ’s own 
since, unlike Christ, we are direct descendants of the post-lapsarian Adam and 
inheritors of his conflicted, sin-infected nature. We may have been forgiven 
this inheritance in baptism, but its effects remain with us for this rest of this 
life and make it a near-constant struggle. Yet again, he employs Paul to explain 
what he means. The peace that Christ,
leaves with us in this age must be called ours rather than his. For indeed, noth-
ing in himself does battle against him who has no sin at all; but we now have 
such a peace as that in which we will say, “Forgive us our debts” (cf. Matt. 6:12). 
Therefore, we have some peace (pax aliqua) since we are delighted with the law 
of God according to the inward man, but it is not full because we see another 
law in our members doing battle against the law of our mind (cf. Rom. 7:22-23).24
For Augustine, then, it is certainly true that Christ is our peace, but the reality 
of sin demands that we also admit that he will only be fully so via the con-
sistent exercise of the humility to confess our sins and transgressions, of the 
erit’; unde intelleximus in sanctis tamquam in templo suo simul manere trinitatem deum” 
(CCSL 36, 520). 
22 Trans. Retting, FOTC 90: 103 (slightly modified). For the Latin see CCSL, 36 520.
23 See. n. 20 supra. 
24 Trans. Retting, FOTC 90, 104. For the Latin, see CCSL 36, 521-522.
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hope that faith requires, and of the faith that has always been necessary for a 
relationship with God.25 
Enarrationes in Psalmos
As noted above, Augustine makes significant use of Ephesians 2: 14 in nine dif-
ferent Enarrationes in Psalmos. Given that there is  substantial thematic repe-
tition among these nine uses, it seems preferable to  discuss them under three 
(occasionally overlapping) rubrics instead of discussing all nine individually. 
These three rubrics are: 1. Comparisons between King Solomon and Christ 
as purveyors of peace; 2. Israel’s “true” identity; and 3. Assertions against the 
Donatists.
Ephesians 2: 14 appears in sections of two different Enarrationes in which Au-
gustine’s purpose would seem to be to exalt Christ via comparison with one 
of ancient Israel’s greatest kings, King  Solomon. In enarratio 71, which is of 
course dedicated to  exegeting Psalm 71 in Augustine’s Bible (Ps. 72 according to 
the numbering of modern Bibles), Augustine begins by discussing the fact that 
the Psalm is “for Solomon” (in salomonem), a detail that he, in fact, dismisses: 
the words of Psalm 71 “cannot refer to the Solomon who was King of Israel” 
since they do not “correspond” (non possint… advenire) with how King Solo-
mon is depicted elsewhere in the  Bible. And this observation leads Augustine 
to search for the “figurative” referent of the name Solomon. Augustine quickly 
expresses the conviction that “we must take it to indicate Christ.” Expressing 
no surprise at finding the Psalm’s true referent to be Christ, Augustine con-
tinues by noting that “this is entirely  suitable, because the name ‘Solomon’ 
is interpreted as ‘Peacemaker’” (pacificus). From this assertion, according to 
Augustine, several things follow, all of which are taught more or less explicitly 
by the Bible:
25 A very similar assertion is made in paragraph 19 of sermo 2 of en. Ps. 33 (Ps. 34 in the 
numbering of modern Bibles). In commenting on verse 15, which includes the exhortation to 
“seek peace and pursue it,” Augustine reminds his audience that: “The righteous themselves 
groan here below… to make it clear to you that we seek peace here, but will obtain it only at 
the end. Yet we do have peace in some degree here, in order that we may deserve to have it 
totally there.” For this trans. see WSA III/16, 38; for the Latin, see CCSL 38, 294-295. Modern 
Bibles follow the numbering system established by the Hebrew tradition of the Masoretic 
Text, while the ancient Latin Psalter followed the numbering system established by the Greek 
translation tradition, and by the so-called Septuagint in particular. In order to avoid undue 
confusion, whenever a psalm is discussed in what follows, its number in modern editions will 
also be supplied.
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Hence (ac) it can most fittingly be used of the mediator  through whom we, 
who were formerly God’s enemies, are reconciled to him and granted forgive-
ness for our sins… He certainly is our Peacemaker [ipse est ille pacificus], since 
he united Jews and Gentiles, and has broken down the dividing wall of hostility 
by his own flesh, annulling the law with its rules and regulations, to create 
from the two of them one new man in himself, thus making peace (cf. Eph. 
2:14-15)… Christ himself declared in the gospel, “Peace I leave with you, my 
peace I give to you (cf. John 14:27). Many other scriptural passages reveal our 
Lord Jesus Christ as the peacemaker, though the peace he imparts is not that 
which this world knows and seeks, but that of which it is said in a prophetic 
text, “I will give them true comfort, peace upon peace” (cf. Isa. 57:18-19 LXX) 
(WSA III/17, 452) (CCSL 39, 971).
It is not without significance here that Augustine felt confident enough with 
his understanding of what Ephesians 2: 14-15 teaches that he could alter the 
text of 2: 14 from “ipse est… pax nostra” to “ipse est ille pacificus.” Making this 
alteration allowed him to apply Ephesians 2: 14-15 to his larger point that Solo-
mon never quite lived up to his name and that, therefore, it is perfectly legiti-
mate to apply the name Solomon to Christ. Indeed, here, Augustine is claiming 
that Christ, having served  perfectly as the mediator between God and human 
beings, has obtained for us the only peace that truly matters, namely the peace 
of immortality that is rooted in the peace that his work of reconciliation made 
possible. Ergo, given that we have now “discovered who is the true Solomon” 
 (invenimus verum Salomonem), we now also know the best way to read the 
remainder of this Psalm.26
A similar but not identical application of our verse that includes a contrast be-
tween Solomon and Christ is made in paragraph 2 of enarratio 126. It is similar 
in that it again asserts that  Solomon  never actually lived up to his “peacemak-
er” moniker, though Christ surely did. It is different in that, here, Augustine 
offers a further contrast between them by noting that, while both Solomon 
and Christ built temples, the temple that Christ built is far greater precisely 
because it is the “true” spiritual temple of his body, the Church. According 
to Augustine, Christ’s claim in John 2: 19 that if anyone dares to “destroy this 
temple… in three days I will raise it up” proves this. Working backwards from 
the clarification offered by John 2: 21, namely that Jesus was “speaking of the 
temple of his body,” Augustine next claims that Solomon’s temple, although it 
26 In fact, Augustine transitions to his exegesis of the Psalm proper by exhorting his au-
dience to “concentrate next on what this Psalm teaches us about [Christ]” (quid deinde 
psalmus ipse de illo doceat adtendamus). 
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was dedicated to the Lord, was actually “a type and figure of the church and 
of the body of the Lord.” Moreover, “in building this temple Solomon himself 
prefigured our Lord Jesus Christ, the true Solomon, who built the true tem-
ple, and who was the real man of peace.” Indeed, “the true peacemaker is he 
of whom the Apostle says, ‘he is himself our peace, since he united the two’” 
(Eph. 2: 14). Augustine pursues the building metaphor in order to explain why 
this is. Christ,
is the true peacemaker because he is the cornerstone (cf. Eph. 2:20) who 
joined in himself the two walls that came from different directions. One was 
that of the Jews who believed in him, the other was that of the Gentiles, believ-
ers also. The circumcised and the uncircumcised, two peoples, were united 
into the church, and Christ was made the cornerstone (WSA III/20, 84) (CCSL 
40, 1857).
In case anyone in the audience might still be confused about how much re-
spect he or she owes to the all-too-human Solomon,  Augustine  furthers the 
contrast between him and Christ by using the words of this same Psalm to 
remind the audience who really built the actual physical temple. Augustine 
quotes part of verse 1, “Unless the Lord builds the house, they labor in vain 
who build it,” and then points out that, from this principle, it follows that not 
only did the Lord build the physical temple in Jerusalem that bore Solomon’s 
name, but this same Lord  Jesus Christ is also the one who “builds his own 
house” (aedificat domum suam), the Church. 
Ephesians 2: 14 also appears in several enarrationes in contexts where the 
chief concern is to establish the “true” identity of  Israel. Of these, the one 
that is both the most interesting and the most complex is enarratio 78 (Ps. 79 
in the numbering of modern  Bibles).27 This Psalm, which is traditionally at-
tributed to the mysterious Asaph, is actually a lamentation over the destruc-
tion of Jerusalem at the hands of foreign nations, i.e., the Gentiles. Verse 1 
27 See also the briefer and simpler portion of en. Ps. 47, 3 where our verse is invoked to help 
explain why Ps. 47: 3, when discussing Jerusalem and Zion, mentions the “mountains of 
Zion” in the plural. Augustine speculates that “perhaps” this is “because Zion embraces peo-
ples coming from different quarters to meet each other and be joined to the cornerstone.” 
Indeed, the believing Jewish people and the believers who have been drawn from the Gen-
tiles “are no longer averse even though diverse in origin; and once fitted into the corner 
they are diverse no longer. ‘He himself is our peace, since he united the two’ (cf. Eph. 2:14), 
says scripture. Christ is the cornerstone.” The clear implication here is that, in this age, it 
is belief that has established the metes and bounds of “true” Israel. For this trans., see WSA 
III/16, 337; for the Latin, see CCSL 38, 540. 
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includes the heartbroken prayer that “O God, the Gentiles have invaded your 
inheritance; they have defiled your holy  temple.” In seeking to apply this verse, 
Augustine, who is convinced that this Psalm is simultaneously “a telling and 
a foretelling,” or a “recounting of disasters” and “a prophecy,” not unreason-
ably asks how Christ’s advent, death, resurrection, and ascension  might have 
changed the identity of “[God’s] inheritance.” Augustine goes on to point out 
that “there were some from that Israelite people who believed in Christ,” be-
fore going on to catalogue them on the basis of the Gospels and the Book of 
Acts: Joseph and the  Virgin Mary; John the Baptist; Zechariah and Elizabeth; 
the “great number” who were baptized following Peter’s Pentecost sermon; 
Stephen, the Protomartyr; and Paul himself. “All these were from the Jewish 
people, and they were God’s inheritance.” And this in turn leads Augustine to 
offer an explanation of Paul’s own words from  Romans 11: 1-7, where, inter alia, 
he rhetorically asks “Surely God has not cast off his people?” before rejecting 
this idea in the strongest terms. Augustine takes this to mean that “the people 
who came from that nation to unite themselves to the body of Christ are God’s 
inheritance,” and that the relatively small  number of Jews who came to faith in 
Christ are the precise identity of “remnant” that has been elected from Israel 
by God’s gratuitous grace.
This rationale then leads Augustine to a definition of the Church. He notes 
that “this church (haec… ecclesia), this inheritance of God, has been assembled 
from both the circumcised and the uncircumcised, that is, from the people of 
Israel and from other nations” (ex populo israel et ex ceteris gentibus).28 And it is 
precisely Christ, the cornerstone, who has brought them all together.  Indeed, 
he has joined these two groups “in” himself, “for he is himself our peace, since 
he united the two, to create from the two of them one new man in himself, so 
making peace… in one body” (Eph. 2: 14-16). Interestingly, Augustine then re-
treats back to  Romans (and/or Galatians) in order to further explain this com-
posite body. For him, all who belong to this body are “children of God, crying 
‘Abba, Father!’ (cf. Rom. 8:15; Gal. 4:6). And the very  reason that God’s children 
all address him in this apparently redundant way is that ‘we cry ‘Abba’’ because 
that is [the Jews’] language, and ‘Father’ because it is our language.” In other 
words, according to Augustine, the composite nature of the true people of 
God is both consciously reflected and consciously preserved in the composite 
way that all of them, regardless of ethnic origins, are encouraged to address 
28 For this (modified)  trans. see WSA III/18, 129; for the Latin, see CCSL 39, 1100.
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God as their heavenly father. As we shall see, this insight is one that Augustine 
uses with some frequency.29 
The most overtly polemical use of Ephesians 2: 14 in Augustine’s en. Ps. is easily 
the handful of times that he invokes the verse and its wider context in order to 
challenge both Donatist exegesis and Donatist ethics.30 
Like enarratio 78, enarratio 94 (Ps. 95 in the numbering of modern Bibles) em-
ploys our verse in a context that offers both an expanded exegesis of Romans 
11: 1-7, and a discussion of the identity of God’s “remnant” that is found there.31 
29 For an additional homiletic efforts that invokes this insight while also combining Eph. 2: 14 
and Rom. 8: 15 (and/or Gal. 4: 6), see en. Ps. 106, 1 (CCSL 40, 1570) and s. 156,15 (CCSL 41Ba, 158-
159). In par. 1 of en. Ps. 106, despite not clearly defining “the people of God” for his audience as 
those who “have been freed from a vast, widespread Egypt” until par. 3, Augustine has already 
made the move that will allow him to define the true people of God as “the whole church of 
God spread throughout the world.” This move is based upon his belief that, “although [Ps. 106] 
was sung about the people of Israel,” it is “evident” (quantum apparet) from its content that 
this much broader definition of God’s people is required. Most important for our purposes 
is that, in this same context, Augustine also asserts that “it is hardly surprising that we sing 
the Alleluia twice, since we also cry out, ‘Abba, Father!’,” before going on to claim that we all 
use this redundant address because both of the composite parts, i.e., the remnant of the Jews 
who believe and those who have been called from out of the Gentiles, of the true people of 
God “cry out in that cornerstone who is our peace and builds the two into one” (Eph. 2: 14). 
In s. 156, 15, the point about the redundancy of Paul using both “Abba” and “Father” is made 
in similar terms. “From one direction the circumcision, from the other the uncircumcision” 
have both been reconciled and made into one people by that one who is “our peace” (Eph. 
2: 14) since in him “the walls [are] harmonized (concordia), [and] the corner [is] glorified (glo-
ria)” (CCSL 41Ba, 159). 
30 For a use of our v. in an expressly anti-Donatist work, see c. lit. Pet. 2, 70, 157 (CSEL 52, 101). 
In par. 155, Petilian has quoted Eph. against Augustine. In par. 157, Augustine returns the favor 
and, following two rhetorical questions (“But when the prophet says to you: ‘Peace, peace, 
and where is there peace?,’ what will you show the prophet? Will it be the part of Donatus 
(partem donati), unknown to the innumerable nations to whom Christ is known?”), Augustine 
cites Eph. 2: 14 to demonstrate that “For he is our peace, the one who made us both one, not 
Donatus who made one into two.” 
31 Also, all but identical to en. Ps. 78, is en. Ps. 94, 7’s discussion of how all of the earliest Chris-
tians had been Jews first. Here, however, it is a discussion of the meaning of Romans 11: 16-24’s 
metaphors of “wild” olive branches being engrafted into domesticated olive trees. See WSA 
III/18, 416: “There stands the tree, then. Some (aliqui) of its branches have been broken off, 
but not all (non omnes). If all the branches had been removed, where would Peter have come 
from? Or John? Or Thomas? Or Matthew? Or Andrew? Or any of the apostles? Where would 
the apostle Paul himself have sprung from, he who was speaking in these passages and bore 
witness to the good olive tree by his fruit? Were not all these branches of the same tree? And 
where did the five hundred brethren come from, the ones to whom the Lord appeared after 
his resurrection? What about those many thousands who were converted by Peter’s address 
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Interestingly, enarratio 94 seems to have been preached ex tempore by Augus-
tine while he was in Carthage and in obedience to the command of “our father” 
(patrem nostrum) Aurelius, the Primate of Carthage.
Throughout Paragraph 7, Augustine carefully argues that the proof that God 
did not in fact reject his people is to be found in the facts that the Jewish 
nation, like a wheat harvest, has already been “threshed,” that this threshing 
yielded some “grain” in the form of those who have accepted Christ as Mes-
siah, and that this grain is also the prophesied “remnant.” Those Jews who did 
not accept Christ, by contrast, are  simply the  “chaff” that is “left lying” (palea 
iacet), which, apparently, is Augustine’s way of affirming their rejection.
In Paragraph 8, the phrase “because all the ends of the earth are in his hand” 
from verse 4 allows Augustine to discuss Christ’s reconciling role explicitly. 
This is because the aforementioned phrase allows us to “recognize (agnosci-
mus) the cornerstone,” which is Christ. And this, in turn, pushes Augustine to 
invoke Ephesians 2:
[Christ] can be the corner only because he has tied two walls together in 
himself; they come from different directions, but in the corner they are not 
opposed to each other. The circumcised come from one direction, the un-
circumcised from another, but in Christ the two peoples are at peace (con-
cordauerunt), because he has become the cornerstone (cf. Eph. 2:14-15; 19), 
he of whom it was written, “The stone rejected by the builders has  become 
the headstone of the corner” (cf. Ps. 117(118): 22) (WSA III/18, 416-417) (CCSL 
39, 1337).
In Augustine’s view, the former “diversity” (diversitatem) of these two people 
groups is now irrelevant. The only thing that truly matters now is that they 
have both developed a “close kinship” (propinquitatem) by having embraced 
Christ, a detail that, furthermore, allows us to see how God’s promise not to 
reject his people might have been fulfilled. It is fulfilled insofar as one of the 
two walls that were joined in and by Christ the cornerstone was comprised of 
a remnant chosen from out of Israel. 
Augustine then considers the other wall, a consideration that also allows him 
to contrast God’s recently-formed people with the  heretical Donatists:
All the Gentiles (omnes gentes) too have come to the corners tone, there to 
receive the kiss of peace; they have come to this one Christ who has made one 
when the apostles, filled with the Holy Spirit, spoke in the tongues of all nations—those who 
at their conversion were so eager to praise God and accuse themselves?” (CCSL 39, 1336).
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people out of two, not like the heretics (haeretici) who have made two out of 
one. This is exactly what the apostle says about Christ our Lord: “he is himself 
our peace, since he united the two” (cf. Eph. 2:14) (CCSL 39, 1337).32 
Since it is obviously not true that literally “all” the Gentiles have come to Christ 
for reconciliation, here Augustine probably means—but does not explicitly 
say—that God is also at work with a remnant of all the gentile nations insofar 
as at least some members of each and every gentile nation will eventually be 
incorporated into God’s people.33 In any case, Augustine says no more about 
the “heretics” in this context. The negative comparison between them and 
the true people of God is made en passant. But, if this identification between 
the heretics and the Donatists is correct, it is one of several places in which a 
consideration of Ephesians 2 compels Augustine to contrast the true Church 
with the Donatist community.
A final but still instructive example of a use of our verse in the en. Ps. occurs 
near the end of Augustine’s comments on the rela tively brief Psalm 124 (125 
in the numbering of modern Bibles). Here, many of the same themes that ap-
peared in the en. Ps. 94(95) reappear, although in a less than identical form.
Near the very end of the enarratio and in connection with the final and prayer-
ful words of the Psalm that “[Let] peace upon Israel,”34 Augustine exhorts his 
audience to be peacemakers by reminding them that their identity as the true 
and final Israel of God is dependent upon their obedient fulfillment of Israel’s 
charge: “Let us be Israel (simus israel) and embrace peace, because Jerusalem 
is the ‘vision of peace,’ and we are Israel” [nos israel; emphasis  added].
Also interesting is how, in the immediately preceding paragraph, Augustine 
has again chosen to use the Donatists as an example of how not to embrace 
32 “Venerunt etiam omnes gentes ad lapidem angularem, ubi osculum pacis  agnouerunt; in 
illum unum qui de duobus fecit unum, non quemadmodum haeretici, qui de uno fecerunt 
duo. hoc enim idem ait apostolus de domino christo: ipse est enim, inquit, pax nostra, qui 
fecit utraque unum.”
33 See Paragraph 9 where, with help from Ps. 85(86): 9, the gentes are discussed both in terms 
of a possible source of fear for believers and as collectively under God the Creator’s sovereign 
control (CCSL 39, 1338): “A gentibus times scandala? et ipsas gentes ipse fecit; non permittet 
illas ultra eam saevire quam novit ille mensuram, ex qua proficias. nonne dicit alius psalmus: 
‘omnes gentes quotquot fecisti, venient et adorabunt coram te, domine?’”.
34 Here the Latin text omits any form of “to be,” reading “pax super israhel.” The form must be 
supplied by the reader. Boulding, the translator for the WSA series, opted for the straightfor-
ward “is.” See WSA III/20, 67. Given that this is a decision that must be made via the context, 
other options such as “[Let] peace be upon Israel,” or “[May] peace [be] upon Israel” are also 
possible. 
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peace.35 Not only are the Donatists  thoroughly  hypocritical  insofar as they 
claim to love what they actually hate, according to Augustine, their hypocrisy 
and, by extension, their self-condemnation even extends into the (pseudo-)
liturgy that they, following their thoroughly corrupt leadership, attempt day 
after day. The Donatists are,
Those who hate Jerusalem [i.e., God’s true people] and hate peace [qui oderunt 
pacem], those who want to rend our unity apart, those who do not believe in 
peace,36 who mouth words of false peace among the people and have no peace 
in themselves. They say, “Peace be with you,” and people reply, “[And] with 
your spirit,” but they are responding with a lie and hearing a lie [falsum dicunt 
et falsum audiunt]... As for [the Donatist leadership], if peace really were pres-
ent in their spirits, would they not commit themselves in love to our unity and 
abhor schism? Of course they would; and so they are mouthing a dishonest 
greeting and accepting a dishonest response.37
Our verse is featured most explicitly a few lines before this—albeit with several 
notable differences. Here, Augustine begins by bypassing the logic that he used 
elsewhere (and that has been discussed supra) to  explain how Christ is the true 
Solomon by simply asserting that “peace is the name of Christ himself” (ipsa 
est christus), a claim that is supported by an explicit reference to Ephesians 
2: 14 and that, presumably, has been derived from subtly omitting the “nostra” 
from that verse. Nevertheless, in the lines that follow, he introduces a different 
logical equation even as he explains how he can legitimately assert that “Israel” 
means “vision of peace.” He walks his audience through his logic step by step:
If the name Israel is said to mean “one who sees God” (videns deum), and the 
name Jerusalem means “vision of peace” (visio pacis), what does the compar-
ison of the two suggest?… [it suggests that] those who dwell in the “vision of 
peace” will not be displaced for ever. …[and that] the Israel that sees God sees 
peace. And this Israel is also Jerusalem, because God’s people is the same as 
35 For still more similar (but, yet again, not identical) assertions about the Donatists, see en. 
Ps. 119, 9 (CCSL 40, 1786) (WSA III/20, 508-509). Inter alia, here they are upheld as those who 
“tear our unity apart,” as those who “hate peace,” and as those who still need to be urged to 
love Christ. It is their very choice for schism that proves that they are in the wrong and de-
serve to be numbered among the haters of peace. 
36 Given that Eph. 2: 14 and the equation of Christ and peace has so recently and repeatedly 
been made explicit in this context, a strong case could be made that, via the phrase “qui non 
credunt paci,” Augustine is implicitly asserting that the Donatists, or at least their leadership, 
do not truly believe in Christ. 
37 For this (adjusted) trans., see WSA III/20, 66-67 (CCSL 40, 843-1844).
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God’s city. If, then, the people that sees peace thereby also sees God, we are 
right to infer that God himself is peace [deus ipse est pax].38
Interestingly, this final inference is followed immediately in the text by the 
words “Christ, the Son of God, is peace,” a claim that in addition to once again 
invoking our verse is, in context, clearly meant to remind the audience of the 
inseparability of the persons of the Trinity and of their shared attributes. 
Ephesians 2: 14 in Augustine’s Sermones ad Populum
Not surprisingly, our phrase turns up in many of Augustine’s sermones for both 
Christmas and for Epiphany, celebrations that typically incorporate biblical 
promises (or wishes) for peace.39
Ephesians 2: 14 in Augustine’s Sermones on Christmas
Some thirteen Augustinian sermons preached in connection with the Feast of 
Christmas are extant.40 And, of these thirteen, two, that is s. 185 and 193, make 
clear and significant use of Ephesians 2: 14.
Sermo 185 was actually preached on Christmas Day.41 From its opening lines, it 
reminds the audience (and its readers) that, with Christmas, the main theolog-
ical point is always the miracle of God’s Wisdom and Word manifesting him-
self to us as an infant (se demonstravit infantem). Becoming a human being 
is something that he did entirely for us. And, in the process, he fulfilled the 
“prophecy” of Psalm 85: 11, which, in Augustine’s Latin version, tells us that 
“truth has sprung from the earth, and justice has looked forth from heaven.”42 
38 For this (adjusted) trans., see WSA III/20, 66 (CCSL 40, 1843).
39 For a recent discussion of the issues surrounding these two series, see Drobner “Weihnacht-
en, Neujahr” 221-242. For a general introduction, Latin texts, and a German trans. of the 
Christmas sermons, see Drobner “Augustinus von Hippo, Predigten zum Weihnachfest.” And 
for the same treatment of the sermons on Epiphany, see Drobner “Augustinus von Hippo, 
Predigten zum Neujahr.”
40 These are ss. 184 to 196 inclusive.
41 Some scholars are confident that this sermon was preached in the initial years of the first 
phase of the Pelagian Controversy, i.e., from 412 to 416. Drobner  “Augustinus von Hippo, Pre-
digten zum Weihnachfest” 42 and 106-107, however, argues that it is impossible to assign it a 
date, though in “Weihnachten, Neujahr” 226 (cf. 241), he does highlight Augustine’s efforts to 
guarantee that “das Datum des 25. Dezember begründen.”
42 Normally, this would be Psalm 84: 12 in the numbering of modern Bibles. However, in this 
case, Augustine’s text, which is based upon the Greek tradition, differs substantially from the 
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One of the several ways in which this verse was fulfilled was precisely when 
Christ, “who said ‘I am the truth’ (cf. John 14:6)” was “born of the virgin.” More-
over, the line “and justice has looked  forth from heaven” is fulfilled whenever a 
human being “by believing in the one who was so born, has been justified not 
by herself but by God” [adjusted for accuracy] (WSA III/6, 22).43 In a real sense, 
justification by means of faith proves to be a major theme of this brief sermon. 
At the beginning of its third and final paragraph, Augustine quotes Romans 
5: 1-2, which opens with the declaration that “having, therefore, been justified 
by faith,” and which is followed by the exhortation “let us have peace with God,” 
before expressing the desire to “mix a few words of [Psalm 85:11]”  (pauca verba 
psalmi huius admiscere) with Paul in order “to discover their harmony [with 
each other]” (consonantiam reperire). They fit  together in the sense that this 
justice, which Augustine is careful to reaffirm has come from heaven and “has 
not proceeded from us” (non de nobis processit), is precisely what the angels 
were describing when they were manifested to the shepherds:
Thus is was… that the voices of the angelic choir sang the praises of the Lord 
born of the virgin, whose birthday we are celebrating today: “Glory to God in 
the highest, and on earth peace to people of good will” (Luke 2:14). Why “peace 
on earth,” …unless because “Truth has sprung from the earth,” that is, Christ 
has been born of flesh? And he is our peace, who has made the both into one” 
(Eph. 2:14), that we might be people of good will (homines bonae voluntatis), 
agreeably (suaviter) linked together by bonds of unity (vinculis unitatis) (WSA 
III/6, 22).44
With these comments, Augustine expands upon the “fulfillment” of Psalm 
85 :11 yet further. Not only does Paul’s teaching of justification by faith explain 
this verse from the Psalter, but so also do Luke 2: 14 and Ephesians 2: 14. Sig-
nificantly, in this context Augustine chose not to elaborate upon the exact 
identity of the two who were “both” made “into one.” Apparently, Augustine 
was less concerned to describe the precise groups to which the fundamental 
claim of our verse ought to be applied than he was to make plain that peace, 
goodwill, and genuine unity are available to those who believe upon Christ and 
all that his incarnation achieved. 
Hebrew or MT reading. According to Augustine, this verse reads: “Veritas de terra orta est, 
et iustitia de caelo prospexit.” 
43 For the Latin, see Drobner “Augustinus von Hippo, Predigten zum Weihnachfest” 112: 
“Christus qui dicit: ‘ego sum veritas,’ de virgine natus est… credens in eum qui natus est, non 
homo a se ipso, sed a deo iustificatus est.”
44 For the Latin, see Drobner “Augustinus von Hippo, Predigten zum Weihnachfest” 114.
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In s. 193, which was also preached on Christmas Day,45 Augustine also calls 
upon Ephesians 2: 14—even though Luke 2, which had been the gospel reading 
for the day, is referenced in the sermon’s opening lines. In fact, here, Augustine 
explicitly combines the two, using Ephesians 2: 14 to explain and exegete Luke 
2: 14: “[Christ], you see… is ‘peace on earth to people of good will,’ because 
(quoniam) ‘he is our peace, who has made the two into one’” (WSA III/6, 51).46
The section of this sermon is also significant pastorally because in the im-
mediate context, Augustine has also invoked Psalm 33: 12-14 (Psalm 34 in the 
numbering of modern Bibles), Romans 7: 18-25, and Galatians 5: 17 to exhort his 
audience to pursue peace on both the external and the internal front. Exter-
nally, following the advice of Psalm 33(34): 12-14, Augustine reminds his hear-
ers that they are obligated to “seek peace and pursue it” and that a major part 
of how to do this is to “turn aside from evil and do good,” especially by keeping 
one’s “tongue from evil and [one’s] lips from speaking deceit.” In other words, 
Augustine clearly reminds this part of his flock that obtaining and maintaining 
peace must include maintaining peace with one’s neighbors especially  through 
a firm commitment to honesty. Immediately on the heels of this exhortation, 
Augustine assumes the role of a member of his audience in order to raise a 
skeptical objection regarding the consistent disconnect that exists—even for 
Christians—between willing and doing. That is, Augustine assumes that at least 
some in his audience will claim that the peace that he has just exhorted them 
to will exceed their grasp precisely because of “another law in [their] mem-
bers” (Rom. 7: 23) and how, within each of them, “the flesh lusts against the 
spirit, and the spirit against the flesh” (Gal. 5: 17). Reverting back to his role as 
preacher, Augustine exhorts them to “stand firm against [their] evil desires” 
(persistat… adversus concupiscentias malas), but he is careful to be clear that 
this resistance is not up to them and their own will power. On the contrary, 
he reminds them that their ability to resist is contingent upon not being “too 
proud to confess” (non dedignetur esse confessa) and not trusting in their “own 
powers” (non fidat viribus suis) or, in other words, their persistence “in implor-
ing the help of God’s grace” (imploret auxilium gratiae dei).
45 Scholars have proposed dates for this sermon ranging from 410 to 425, holding open the 
possibility that it may have been preached in almost any year of that sixteen year span. Drob-
ner “Augustinus von Hippo, Predigten zum Weihnachfest” 42 and 224-225, however, argues 
that it is impossible to assign it a date. 
46 For the Latin, see Drobner “Augustinus von Hippo, Predigten zum Weihnachfest” 
229-230.
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Though such a discussion of this internal struggle might initially strike the 
modern reader as an odd theme to include in a Christmas sermon, it need 
not ultimately be taken that way. In a larger sense, this theme fits together 
well with Christmas in that, within Augustine’s theology, internal peace in the 
sense of experiencing a gradual “healing” from the “disease” of disordered de-
sires is a major part of what Christ’s incarnation, which, of course, should be 
the focus of all Christmas liturgy and worship, was intended to achieve—even 
if, in that same theological schema, we all remain thoroughly dependent upon 
God’s gratuitous grace for both the will and the ability to begin that process.
Ephesians 2: 14 in Augustine’s Sermones on Epiphany
Interestingly, no less than ten Augustinian sermons preached in connection 
with the Feast of Epiphany have come down to us.47 As preserved, almost all of 
these sermons are relatively brief and, not surprisingly, are relatively similar 
in content.48 Like most preachers, Augustine did not hesitate to recycle com-
ments and exegetical material for prominent annual feasts, especially when 
that material had proven effective. Several of these sermons include the fol-
lowing: 1. That Epiphany is Greek word that, in this context, means “a manifes-
tation [manifestatio] of the Lord”; 2. That this manifestation was to the Magi, 
who, of course, were Gentiles (Matt. 2: 1-12); and 3. Given that Epiphany has 
this connection to the Gentiles, that Epiphany may, in a sense, be contrasted 
to Christmas, which, because it involved a manifestation of the Lord to Jewish 
shepherds via angels (Luke 2: 8-20), has a connection to the Jews. As we shall 
see, the fact that these two manifestations had Christ in  common would seem 
to be the detail that drove  Augustine to incorporate Ephesians 2: 14 into his 
sermons on Epiphany so frequently. It also bears noting that both the cel-
ebration of and preaching about Epiphany were by definition anti-Donatist 
activities since although “the Donatists celebrated Christmas,” they “rejected 
Epiphany as an innovation of the Oriental Church” (Lawler 10).49 
47 These are ss.199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 204A, 373, 374 (cf. s. Dolbeau 23), and 375. For 
a brief English introduction to six of these sermones, i.e., ss. 199-204, see Lawler 3-19; 
for his trans. of these six, see 154-182. They do not, however, all make clear reference to our 
verse. See n. 50 infra.
48 S. Dolbeau 23, which is a full-length version of s. 374 is a notable exception. It seems likely 
that most of these sermons were radically condensed as they were copied and transmitted. 
As a result, barring new discoveries similar to Dolbeau’s, their complete contents will never 
be known. 
49 This conclusion is partially based upon information Augustine himself supplied. See s. 
202.1-2 (PL 38, 1033). More recently, Drobner “Weihnachten, Neujahr” 233 and 242 confirms 
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For example, in s. 373 our verse is used in the Augustine’s opening  remarks as 
he reminds his audience of exactly what it is that Christ’s  birth as a man had 
accomplished for all who would believe in and  worship him:
He [ille] is that cornerstone who coupled together, as it were, in his own unity 
[in sua unitate] the two walls, coming from different angles, of the circumci-
sion and of the uncircumcision, of the Jews… and of the Gentiles, and who thus 
“became [factus est] our peace, who made both into one” (Eph. 2:14). Therefore, 
that he might be announced to the Jewish shepherds, angels came from heav-
en; and that he might be worshiped by the Gentile Magi, a star shone brilliantly 
from the sky. So whether by means of angels or of a star, “the heavens declared 
[enarrauerunt] the glory of God” (Ps. 19:1) (WSA III/10, 320) (PL 39, 1663-1664).50
A different and, if anything, more explicitly reconciliatory set of  opening re-
marks can be found in s. 199. Exceptionally for the Epiphany sermons that 
clearly reference Ephesians 2: 14, this sermon also  incorporates John 4: 22 
and Isaiah 49: 6, in addition to the standard passages of  Matthew 2, Luke 2, and 
Ephesians 2. Augustine begins by noting that:
Recently we celebrated the day on which the Lord was born of the Jews; today 
we are celebrating the one on which he was worshiped by the Gentiles; be-
cause “salvation is from the Jews” (John 4:22); but this “salvation reaches to the 
ends of the earth” (Isa. 49:6). 
He then goes on to contrast the shepherds and the Magi by reiterating the dif-
ference in how their respective revelation were made, i.e., angels in contrast to 
a star, before reconciling them with the observation that both groups learned 
about Christ “from heaven (de coelo), when they saw the king of heaven on 
earth, so that there might be (ut esset) ‘glory to God in the highest, and on 
earth peace to people of good will’” (Luke 2: 14).51
this, though not without qualification. On 231-232 he also points out that, with regard to the 
actual celebration of Epiphany, “in Nordafrika aber stellen Augustins Predigten die frühesten 
Zeugnisse dar.” 
50 Opening remarks very similar to these may be found in s. 375.1 (PL 39, 1669), the authentic-
ity of which has been repeatedly questioned, s. 201.1 (PL 38, 1031), s. 202, 1 (PL 38, 1033), albeit 
with a considerably longer quotation from Eph. 2, and in s. 203, 1 (PL 38, 1035). It is also no-
table that in s. 203 Augustine plays with the grammatical mood of Eph. 2: 14 by shifting from 
the indicative to the subjunctive: “… ut esset pax eorum.”
51 A similar contrast is made and reconciled a few lines later: although the shepherds were 
obviously “nearby” and able to worship Christ on the very day of their revelation, the Magi 
were compelled to travel from very “far away.” Nevertheless, both groups “saw the one light 
of the world” (unam… lucem mundi utrique uiderunt). 
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Significantly, it is this reference to Luke that compels Augustine to introduce 
Ephesians 2: 14; indeed, no words intervene between the two quotations. More 
interesting, however, is the way in which Augustine attributes the peaceful 
reconciliation that Christ achieved between believing Jews and believing Gen-
tiles, a fact that is underlined by employing additional verses from Ephesians 2:
“For he is our peace, who made both into one” (Eph. 2:14). Alrea dy from this 
moment (iam hinc), by the way the infant was born and proclaimed, he (ille) 
is shown to be that cornerstone; already from the first moments of his birth 
he appeared as such (iam in ipso primordio natiuitatis apparuit). He began 
at once (iam coepit) to tie together in himself (in se) two walls coming from 
different directions, bringing the shepherds from Judea, the Magi from the 
East; “so that he might establish the two in himself as one new man, making 
peace; peace for those who were far off, and peace for those who were near” 
(Eph. 2:15 and 17).52 
Ephesians 2: 14 in Augustine’s “Regular” 
Sermones ad Populum
Augustine also uses Ephesians 2: 14 both in sermons intended to educate or 
encourage particular congregations and in sermons directly  addressing the 
problems raised by such dissident groups as the Donatists and the Pelagians.53
In fact, our verse is employed in what is arguably the most famous sermon that 
Augustine preached concerning the Donatists, the “Sermon to the People of 
the Church in Caesarea” (Sermo ad  Caesariensis Ecclesiae Plebem).54 In addition 
to knowing where it was preached, we know that this sermon was offered—ap-
parently ex tempore—on September 18, 418 to a (largely) Donatist crowd gath-
ered inside the Catholic basilica.55 Caesarea was the capital city of Mauretania, 
52 For this (modified) trans., see WSA III/6: 79; for the Latin, see PL 38: 1026.
53 For a brief discussion of the way that Eph. 2: 14 is used in s.156, an overtly anti-Pelagian 
sermon that is part of a series of six that has been demonstrated to date with very high prob-
ability to October 17 of 417. See CCSL 41Ba, IX-XXVIII; see also n. 29 supra. 
54 For a similar and (most probably) anti-Donatist sermo that also uses Eph. 2: 14 to encourage 
the spiritual good of genuine unity both within and between Christian communities, see s. 
360C (Dolbeau 27), esp. pars. 3-4. For the Latin text, see Augustine “Vingt-six sermons” 311-
314.
55 For a brief but helpful discussion of the background and context of this sermon, see Tilley. 
She points out that Augustine had traveled to Mauretania at the behest of Zozimus the Ro-
man pontiff and that his main reason for the trip was to participate in a public debate with 
Emeritus, the Donatist bishop of Caesarea.
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important in its own right, and “a major center for Donatism” (Tilley 770). Cae-
sarea’s Donatist bishop, a man named Emeritus, was in the audience and was 
personally invited by Augustine to embrace the Catholic cause and ecclesial 
unity.56 Not surprisingly, Emeritus did not accept the offer.
One of this sermon’s themes is that of family and how, from  Augustine’s per-
spective, all Donatists were estranged family  members with whom he longed 
to be reconciled. This theme was augmented by offering them praise for their 
faith and for the other goods that they, as Christians, possessed. Other im-
portant themes within this sermon include unity, charity or love, and peace. 
The claim that all three of these are  supposed to mark all relations between 
Christians is supported via  references to scripture. John 14: 27, which Augustine 
discussed in great detail in Io. ev. tr. 77, is repeatedly referenced in support of 
peace; 1 Corinthians 13 is also repeatedly referenced in support of the necessity 
of charity; and Psalm 132: 1 (133 in the numbering of modern Bibles) is refer-
enced in support of the need for unity.57 Interestingly, it is the use of the  latter 
in the fourth paragraph that offers Augustine an opening to employ  Ephesians 
2: 14.58
Therefore, when I am casting out discord and bringing in peace, how am I for-
feiting the titles of peace? Assuredly I plead with my Lord: “O Christ, you who 
are our peace, you who have made both one (cf. Eph. 2:14), make us one so that 
we might honestly sing: ‘Behold how good and how pleasant it is for brothers 
to live in unity’ (Ps. 132:1). Please bring in concord, please drive out discord.59
Here Augustine is attempting to assume the moral high ground. Not only does 
he claim that, as a Catholic bishop, he is blameless for the divisions that re-
56 In paragraph 6 (CSEL 53, 174), and in what must have been heard as an homage to St. Cypri-
an, the great 3rd-century martyr-bishop of Carthage, Augustine goes so far as to claim that 
the salvation that God so graciously offers is something that one “non potest habere nisi in 
ecclesia catholica.” 
57 It is also true that, by invoking this v. from the Psalter, Augustine is underlining his belief 
that the Catholics and the Donatists are, or, at least, should be “brothers.” For Augustine’s 
Latin version of this v., see n. 59 infra. 
58 He also quotes our v. twice. The first is offered in the sermo’s second line (CSEL 53, 167): 
“Exultamus enim in domino deo nostro de quo apostolus ait: ipse est enim pax nostra, qui 
fecit utraque unum.” Even the simplest member of the audience must have recognized from 
this that the sermon would amount to a major appeal for unity between the Donatists and 
the Catholics. 
59 Trans. is my own. For the Latin, see CSEL 53, 172: “Cum ergo discordiam excludo, pacem 
introduco, titulos pacis quare depono? dico plane domino meo: o christe, qui es pax nostra, 
qui fecisti utraque unum, fac nos unum, ut recte cantemus: ecce quam bonum et quam iu-
cundum habitare fratres in unum. introduc concordiam, pelle discordiam.”
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main between the two communities, but he is also claiming that he regularly 
 implores Christ to reunify them, even as he implicitly asserts that either the 
Donatists are unwilling to pray for reunification or that their relationship with 
Christ is so derelict that they are unable to do so.60 More striking still is how, 
despite the fact that he is well aware that, in context, Ephesians 2: 14 is ref-
erencing the reconciliation that Christ brought about between believing Jews 
and believing Gentiles,61  Augustine here applies it directly to the possible rec-
onciliation that Christ might yet bring about between Catholics and Donatists. 
The repeated use of our verse in this painstaking sermon preached in the pres-
ence of many Donatists clearly played an important role in Augustine’s attempt 
both to educate and to convict that (presumably) hostile audience. 
A good example of how Augustine incorporated our verse into a sermon that 
was more simply educational is sermo 25. This is a relatively brief sermon 
that was preached during the winter and, possibly, on a weekday before Au-
gustine’s home congregation of Hippo.62 
Ephesians 2: 14 appears in paragraph 7, a section in which Augustine’s edu-
cational aim is to demonstrate to his flock that, via a regular encounter with 
Christ through the Mass, they can have something close to the very thing that 
all of us desire above all else: peace. A few lines into the paragraph, Augustine 
quotes an exhortation from Psalm 33: 14b (Ps. 34 according to the  numbering 
of modern Bibles), namely, to “Seek peace and pursue it” (quaere pacem, et 
sequere eam), before asserting that it is peace “which we all long for even in 
this mortal flesh, even in this fragile  state of the flesh, even in this most illu-
sory condition of vanity.” He then  begins to address the obvious concerns of: 
1. If peace is to be  sought, knowledge of its location will be required; and 2. If 
peace is to be pursued, knowledge of which way it has gone will be required. 
60 See Origen’s comment on Eph. 2: 14a: “And the one who does not have peace, does not 
have Christ,” a sentiment that Jerome opted to retain in his commentary. For this see Heine 
134.
61 For another sermo ad populum in which this is true, see, e.g., s.306E (Dolbeau 18), esp. par. 3, 
where the two “walls” (parietes) that have been unified in Christ, that is, “in the cornerstone” 
(in angulari lapide), are expressly called “the circumcision and the uncircumcision” (circum-
cisio et praeputium) and where their cleaving together is expressly said to “fulfill” (impletum 
est) what Paul wrote in Eph. 2: 14. For the Latin text, see Dolbeau 212.
62 The first line of Paragraph 8 makes it clear that it is winter (“ecce … hyems est”) (CCSL 41: 
339). That it could have been preached on a weekday is less certain. That claim is based on 
Augustine’s comments in Paragraph 7 that “every day” (quotidie) in the Mass this particular 
congregation hears the exhortation to “Lift up your heart” (sursum cor), words that also fuel 
the claim that, at least during Augustine’s episcopacy, the church in Hippo celebrated Mass 
on a daily basis. 
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 Before addressing these concerns, however, Augustine observes that a third 
bit of knowledge will also be required, namely knowledge about exactly what 
peace is:
First see what peace is, then see where it has gone, then follow it. What is 
peace? Listen to the apostle, he was talking about Christ: “he is our peace, 
who made both into one” (Eph. 2:14). So peace is Christ. Where did [peace] go? 
He was crucified and buried, he rose from the dead, he ascended into heaven. 
There you have where peace went [ecco quo iit pax] (WSA III/2, 85) (CCSL 41, 
338).
The very next lines go on to address how all who desire peace, which, again, 
according to Augustine, includes every human  being, ought to go about pur-
suing that which we desire. We ought to pursue this thing we desire above 
all via the Eucharist and via a clear recognition of the implications of being 
incorporated into Christ:
Listen how you should follow; every day you hear it briefly when you are told 
“Lift up your heart.” Think about it more deeply, and there you are, following. 
Listen also, however, more widely, in order to follow true peace… listen to the 
apostle: “If you have risen with Christ, seek the things that are above where 
Christ is, seated at God’s right hand; savor the things that are above, not those 
that are on earth. For you are dead, and your life is hidden with Christ in God. 
When Christ appears, your life, then you too will appear with him in glory (cf. 
Col. 3:1-4) (WSA III/2:, 85-86) (CCSL 41, 338).
In s. 25, Augustine is intent to educate his congregation regarding their deepest 
wants. He does this by first asserting that he (as well as they, if they will just be 
honest with themselves) already knows that what they want above all is peace. 
He then demonstrates that they also need to be reeducated regarding precisely 
what peace is before, finally, reminding them that the way to obtain it is two-
fold: both by a healthy realization of the identity that they possess through faith 
in Christ and by a healthy participation in the Sacrament as regularly celebrat-
ed by those who, by being in Christ, comprise his body, the Church.
Conclusion
Despite the brevity and relative straightforwardness of the actual text of Ephe-
sians 2: 14, this study has demonstrated that Augustine has a rather complex 
relationship to it. Not only does he employ it with substantial frequency, but 
he also employs it in an impressive variety of contexts and in works of vari-
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ous  genres. This verse appears in polemical compositions, in overtly exegetical 
compositions, and in homiletical compositions.
Ephesians 2: 14 appears relatively rarely in Augustine’s polemical  works. It is 
used substantially only in works such as Contra adversarium  legis et propheta-
rum and the Tractatus adversus Iudaeos.63 His common concerns in the sec-
tions of these two works in which Ephesians 2: 14 appears are the status of the 
Jewish people (both past and present) and the nature and object of true salvific 
 faith. For Augustine, God’s relatively inclusive plan of salvation has always been 
about Christ and has always been dependent upon faith in Christ’s faithfulness 
in bringing about an ultimate reconciliation between both God and humanity, 
regardless of which group one belonged to or identified with.
The true import of Ephesians 2: 14a for Augustine is most clearly seen, 
however, in his overly exegetical works such as the Io. ev. tr. and the en. Ps. 
In the former, Augustine invokes Ephesians 2: 14 as part of a larger claim (and 
amidst multiple scriptural references) regarding the necessity of faith in Christ 
if one is to experience his promise of peace –either in the here and now or 
in the age that is to come. In the latter, Ephesians 2: 14 is used in support of 
at least three sweeping claims: 1. That Christ is a better and truer source of 
peace—indeed, he is the only genuine pacificus—than any who have preceded 
him, including King Solomon; 2. That Israel’s “true” identity is only to be seen 
by observing the true remnant who, through faith in Christ, chose to unite 
themselves with Christ’s “body,” the trans-temporal Church; and 3. That the 
status of the “heretical” and hypocritical Donatists is made plain precisely by 
their divisiveness: because they have split the Church, they have made their 
own alienation from Christ, the great Uniter and great Peacemaker, obvious. 
In these contexts, Augustine would also seem to be implying that, by not 
pursuing Christ’s program of reconciliation, the Donatists actions cast more 
than a little doubt upon the genuineness of their claims to believe in Christ.
Several of Augustine’s sermones offered in celebration of Christmas and Epiph-
any also contain clear references to Ephesians 2: 14, although it plays a more 
prominent (and frequent) role in those sermons offered during Epiphany than 
it does in those offered during Christmas. In two of Augustine’s Christmas ser-
mons, Ephesians 2: 14 is linked with Luke 2: 14 in order to explain exactly what 
it was that Luke wanted to communicate: according to Augustine, it is pre-
cisely by being united to Christ and, via Christ, to other believers in faith, i.e., 
63 Both of these works were composed within the final ten or twelve years of Augustine’s 
life. 
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in becoming one body, that it becomes possible to become a person of good 
will (Luke 2: 14), both externally in terms of one’s relationships and internally in 
terms of one’s disordered desires.
The more prominent (and frequent) role played by Ephesians 2: 14 in Augus-
tine’s sermons for Epiphany is due in large part to Augustine’s belief that the 
“manifestation” that Epiphany celebrates can be seen as something that both 
Jews and Gentiles, i.e., the two groups that Ephesians 2: 14 is most obviously 
concerned with,  experienced via their representative groups, with the shep-
herds representing the Jews and the magi representing the gentiles. More than 
a few of the sermones that incorporated Ephesians 2: 14 also allowed Augustine 
space to continue his anti-Donatist polemics. This is because the sermons for 
Epiphany were by definition anti-Donatist activities insofar as the Donatists 
rejected Epiphany as a recent innovation, and because one of Augustine’s most 
famous sermones, the Sermo ad Caesariensis Ecclesiae Plebem, despite being 
preached in the presence of some Donatists, was, at its heart, a plea for rec-
onciliation between the two communions and, from Augustine’s perspective, 
a plea for the Donatists to more perfectly follow Christ’s reconciliatory lead. 
Finally, this study has also demonstrated that Augustine did  occasionally em-
ploy Ephesians 2: 14 in sermons that were explicitly didactic. In s. 25, for exam-
ple, he used this verse in order to teach (a) that since everyone, despite being 
ignorant of where it is to be found or how to go about obtaining it, truly wants 
peace, and (b) that Christ alone is peace; from this teaching it follows (c) that, 
pursuing Christ is everyone’s best option for obtaining the one thing that he 
or she truly wants.
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Zumkeller, Adolar. “Eph. 5, 27 im Verständnis Augustins und Seiner Donatistischen 
und Pelagianischen Gegner.” Augustinianum, vol. 16, 1976, pp. 457-474.
  PART II  |  PARTE II
Augustine’s Influence  
in the Contemporary World
La influencia de Agustín en el mundo contemporáneo

Magnum Beneficium est Pax, 
sed Dei Veri Beneficium est 
(ciu., 3.9). Augustine’s Realism, 
Strategy, and Insight into Human 
Motives as a Prelude to Peace at 
all Levels of Human Existence
Magnum beneficium est pax, sed Dei veri 
beneficium est (ciu., 3.9). El realismo, la 
estrategia y la comprensión de las motivaciones 
humanas de san Agustín como preludio a la paz 
en todos los niveles de la existencia humana
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Abstract
The objective of this study is to examine the vi-
sion Augustine developed on the relationship be-
tween religion and politics, and how he conceived 
the Christian religion as the foundation of polit-
ical and social action. Firstly, he emphasizes in 
his reflections on officials in the res publica that 
their work was marked by tragedy. State institu-
tions and political relationships are characterized 
by the volatility and temporality. The only ones 
that do not seem to realize this are the politicians 
themselves, because the nature of their work does 
not contribute to the development of the ability 
to (self-) introspection and growth in humilitas 
(humility). Secondly, in his De Civitate Dei Augus-
tine strove to present human history as a mirror in 
which each leader can see the impact of his own 
inner motives. The struggle between Jerusalem 
and Babylon, greed and generosity, sincerity and 
opportunism is a battle in the interior for Augus-
tine. But in Book XIX of De civitate Dei Augustine 
finally also relates physical balance, irrational and 
rational motives, striving for integrity, the role 
of family and government, in order to show that 
inner peace and peace in any social context are 
interwoven.
Keywords: Augustine, leadership, mystagogy, pa-
tristics, politics, rationality, religion. 
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Resumen
El objetivo de este estudio fue examinar la visión 
que desarrolló san Agustín sobre la relación entre 
religión y política, y la manera en que concebía la 
religión cristiana como la base de la acción po-
lítica y social. En primer lugar, él enfatiza en sus 
reflexiones sobre los funcionarios de la res  publica 
cuyo trabajo fue marcado por la tragedia. Las ins-
tituciones estatales y las relaciones políticas se 
caracterizan por la volatilidad y la temporalidad. 
Los únicos que no parecen darse cuenta de esto 
son los políticos porque la naturaleza de su traba-
jo no contribuye al desarrollo de la capacidad de 
(auto) introspección y el crecimiento en humilitas 
(humildad). En segundo lugar, en De Ciuitate Dei 
Agustín se esforzó por presentar la historia hu-
mana como un espejo en el que cada líder puede 
ver el impacto en sus propios motivos internos. La 
lucha entre Jerusalén y Babilonia, codicia y gene-
rosidad, sinceridad y oportunismo, es una batalla 
interior para san Agustín. Sin embargo, en el Libro 
XIX de De civitate Dei Agustín, finalmente, rela-
ciona el equilibrio físico, los motivos irracionales 
y racionales, la lucha por la integridad, el papel de 
la familia y el gobierno para mostrar que la paz in-
terior y la paz en cualquier contexto social están 
interrelacionadas.
Palabras clave: Religión, política, racionalidad, 
mistagógica, patrística, san Agustín, liderazgo.
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Incomparable Times
In the fourth and fifth century, the influence of the Christian  bishops in the 
Roman Empire suddenly increased in a  tremendous way. The fact that many 
of them were well educated began to pay off. The bishops had developed the 
capacity to integrate the  rhetorical strategies and practices of the Greco- 
Roman orators into their own discourse. Moreover, they knew how to embed 
principles from classical philosophy into their interpretation of the Christian 
message. In doing so they reflected the culture of the upper class, to which 
many of them belonged personally.1 Bishops such as the aristocrat Paulinus of 
Nola and his pen friend Augustine, for instance, were deeply versed in clas-
sical rhetoric, literature, and philosophy. They became important figures in 
Roman society because Christianity became the dominant religion, but also 
because of their own contribution to this process. In addition, the allure that 
the ascetical life held for the aristocracy also consolidated the power of the 
bishops, as bishops such as Ambrose strongly propagated it (Natal  Villazala 
59-107). Research of episcopal dealings in the public domain has revealed, 
moreover, that other activities of theirs also contributed to the increase of 
their power and influence. In addition to their catechetical, homiletical, and 
liturgical activities, in both East and West, they developed programmes for 
the care of the poor,2 they also founded hospitals (Crislip, passim), and—rec-
ognised by the State as judges—bishops followed Roman procedures in issues 
related to property law, inheritances, or contracts, by interrogating—rather 
than inculpating—people in respect of the legal basis of slavery, the right of 
asylum, or adultery. Augustine once wrote to the tribune Marcellinus that this 
interrogation should be sharp and painful, so that the accused party would be 
all the more grateful for the evangelical clemency (mansuetudo) that should 
characterise the sentence (ep., 133, 2). The Church father’s intention in writing 
this will be explored below. What is clear in any case is that  strategies such as 
these increased the bishops’ power, although it must also be noted that Chris-
tian relations with the other religious or  philosophical traditions in the plural 
society of the time were sometimes unclear, and that there was a certain un-
ease between Christianity and Roman culture. But this does not mean that 
religion in Late Antiquity was a private affair. In the plural society of the time, 
1 This publication is based on van Geest and Hunink; van Geest “Waarachtigheid”; “Geor-
dend is de politie”; and “‘Quid dicam de vindicando.” See also the important studies of the 
growing unofficial power, a power as yet without legal sanction, by Brown; Cameron; and 
Rapp.
2 See Lepelley; and Holman.
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Christianity embodied a social practice which was connected with individuals’ 
own—at times ascetic—lifestyle. 
The situation of Christians in the fourth and fifth centuries cannot be easi-
ly compared with the current situation of Christians in my own secularised 
country, the Netherlands. Whereas in the former case, the Church increas-
ingly began to shape society; in the latter, bishops and other Church leaders 
are becoming ever more invisible in society. From the second half of the nine-
teenth century up to the 1960s, Dutch society was characterised by verzuiling 
(“pillarisation”). There was sharp segregation between the Protestant, Catho-
lic, liberal, and socialist sections of society, which was deliberately enforced 
by the elites at the top of these four “pillars.” It was sustained by the churches, 
media, vocational corporations, political parties, schools, hospitals, and even 
universities, and provided the members of the “pillars” with a strong sense of 
identity. In the Catholic pillar, political leaders were clerics such as Msgr W. 
Nolens and Msgr H. Schaepman. In the 1960s these pillars toppled over and 
came down with a crash. Prelates such as Herman Schaepman or Willem No-
lens had long since ceased to dominate politics or parliamentary debate. Few 
people can remember that a hospital such as St. Francis’s in Rotterdam was 
once founded and fully owned by the Augustinian Sisters of Heemstede—the 
doctors were employees of this congregation—and the existence of this hos-
pital certainly cannot be said to contribute to an increase in episcopal pow-
er and influence. Whereas self-confident bishops energetically fostered the 
growth of Christianity as a significant societal force in Late Antiquity (through 
networks, sermonising specifically geared to certain audiences, care for the 
sick, or the administration of justice), relations between Church and  secular 
leaders are currently characterised by a certain unease. Unless you are Des-
mond Tutu, Church dignitaries are relegated to the domain of  faith, i.e. the 
private domain that must be kept strictly separate from the  public domain. 
Despite the incomparability of the times, it is nonetheless useful to examine 
the views that a Church father like Augustine developed on the relationship 
between religion and politics, and on the Christian religion as the foundation 
of political and social action. Can his vision offer anything of value to peo-
ple who operate currently in the public domain? It will become evident that 
he offers no ready-made solutions for the problem of how Christianity  might 
provide a solid basis for the develop ment of Christian Democratic politics. 
Augustine never thought of this question because democracy as we know it 
was totally alien to him as a political system. What he does do in his political 
thought, however, is to intensify a sense of reality that is truly timeless. 
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The Tragedy of Politics and the State
When Augustine was young, around 390, he subscribed to the  notion, derived 
from Greek philosophy and Roman political ideology, that the polis or the civi-
tas offered free citizens a  trajectory towards individual perfection. With Plato 
and Aristotle, he  regarded “politics” as a creative process which generated a 
social order that enabled the free individual to obtain happiness through a 
step-by-step plan. Competent leaders, he believed, ordered society in such 
a way as to permit their subjects to attain the highest degree of happiness 
for themselves. This perfection was individual: disciplina was more important 
than concordia.3 
However, his reading of Scripture, which informed him of the vicissitudes of 
the Jewish people, caused Augustine to conclude after 390 that it was much 
more difficult to actually realise this life under the guidance of the philoso-
pher-politician, and on the basis of the right use of reason, than he had initially 
believed. As it turned out, people were much less reasonable than he  thought. 
Scripture taught him that the classical philosophers had been unable to re-
solve the tragic nature of the saeculum, where tension, discord, and chaos de-
termine life, and where neither society nor politics are capable of playing the 
grand role in the pursuit of happiness that they were supposed to. Having had 
a dose of realism through the pastoral work he began to do after becoming 
bishop of Hippo in 396, a town inhabited by fishermen and dockworkers, Au-
gustine started to emphasize that, even though people are social animals, their 
dealings with one another since the Fall have engendered chaos and aggres-
sion. Initially he still believed on account of humankind’s social character that 
the State should attempt to establish concordia, a condition which produces 
kindness, art, and civilisation in social interactions (qu. an., 33, 72; doc. chr., 2, 
39, 58). But having become more realistic after 397, he moderated his expec-
tations, because he realized that politicians were already hands full trying to 
curb violence of all kinds. He adjusted his ambitious expectations, writing that 
to attempt to counteract the forces that tended towards chaos, the opposite 
of order, was in fact politicians’ most important objective (doc. chr., 12, 27, 1). 
It was their task to prevent the people—to whom they belonged themselves, 
incidentally—from devouring each other like fish. That is all they can hope to 
achieve. They are not lords and masters of history, nor of the individual soul. In 
the best-case scenario, the leaders of the State create the conditions for that 
3 A groundbreaking work on this aspect is Markus’ Saeculum: History and Society in the Theo-
logy of St Augustine.
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peace that arises when society is in agreement with itself on the distribution 
and acquisition of the necessities of life (civ., 19, 6; 2, 21).4 Politicians can also 
bring about a certain measure of justice, the justice that flows from sacrificing 
one’s own pursuit of profit for the common good (Markus 72-104). 
But even so, later, when Augustine began writing his De civitate Dei (“The City 
of God”) (cited hereafter civ.) in 410, he became convinced that perfect jus-
tice—the perfect state where citizens and their leaders are of one heart—could 
never exist in any earthly State. Wars waged by people who cannot even un-
derstand each other’s language, and the dangers in society that increase as 
the masses grow in number, were further proof for him that peace can never 
be realised on any level.5 This ultimately led him to disavow Plato’s idea that 
politicians were the appropriate agents to lead people to individual perfec-
tion. But this does not mean that he thought politics meaningless. If politicians 
succeed in counteracting social chaos they have already achieved a great deal. 
In his reflections Augustine also took account of the fact that the activities 
of politicians are tragic. For a start, they must use language to realise their 
goals. And language also permits people to lie and to deceive, thus further 
distancing them from themselves and from others (Gen. adu. Man., 2, 7; 2, 30; 
conf., 1, 17, 27-18; 29; 3, 3, 6; 9, 2, 2; doc. chr., 6, 2).6 And secondly, no politi-
cal system endures (s., 105).7 Institutions of State and political structures are 
ephemeral and temporary. The only people who appear not to realise this tend 
to be politicians themselves, because the nature of their work is not conducive 
to developing the capacity of taking oneself lightly and to grow in humilitas 
(“humility”). Because of the impermanence of all empires or political systems, 
Augustine spoke increasingly of an Imperium christianum as he grew older 
(Lohse, 470-475). This brings us to the next topic.
The Uncoupling of Religion and Politics 
in Early Christianity 
In the second and third century, the period in which the Church was being 
persecuted by the Roman emperors, Christian writers had decidedly apoca-
lyptic ideas about the Roman Empire. Hippolytus, for instance, compared it 
to the last of the four beasts that the prophet Daniel had seen in a vision—the 
4 See Burt 127-129.
5 On this theme see civ. 10, 4-7.
6 This means Augustine believes there was no need for language in paradise. 
7 “Civitas manet quae nos carnaliter genuit.”
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most terrifying of the four, crushing everything before it (Dan. 7: 7-9). The em-
perors, he thought, increased their power by conquest and the empire was 
therefore a diabolical imitation of the Kingdom of Christ. But once Christianity 
had become a recognised religion, and bishops began to have power and in-
fluence themselves, the Christian perception of the Roman Empire changed. 
Eusebius of Caesarea, the first Church historian, believed that the unity of the 
Orbis Romanus under the Roman emperors had been God’s will. That Jesus had 
been born under the unifying reign of the Emperor Augustus was no coinci-
dence. This unity had facilitated the proclamation of the Gospel. Ambrose, Au-
gustine’s mentor, regarded the Roman emperor as a filius ecclesiae, the son of 
the Church par excellence, because he was able to Christianise the world using 
the institutions of the empire. Thus, Roman power became strongly sacralized. 
Around 400, Augustine agreed with his mentor that Christianisation could 
take place in an institutional way under the aegis of the emperor. But as his in-
teraction and correspondence with political leaders intensified, his view of the 
role of political leaders, and of humans in general, changed. Unlike Ambrose, 
his references to the Pax Romana as part of sacred history became scarce (civ., 
18, 46). He no longer regarded the Roman Empire as a praeparatio evangelica, 
and when he mentioned the Emperor Augustus, he emphasized the conflicts 
that marked his reign. He then explicitly linked the conflicts in the world to the 
restlessness of the human heart. This, he believed, prevented humanity from 
converting to Christianity collectively and along the institutional way. What is 
more: the actions of emperors and politicians were just as much the result of 
this restlessness, and in fact of an often fruitless ambition. On the basis of this 
observation Augustine emphasized that political leaders could not legitimise 
their claims on the obedience of the citizens by pointing to their belonging to 
a higher, divine order.8 In this way, Augustine desacralized the history of Rome, 
and, having become more realistic about the intentions of those who serve the 
public cause, he uncoupled religion and politics (civ., 2, 19). 
The reason for this uncoupling was his gradual discovery that political leaders, 
particularly through their pride, their love of power, and their ambition, are apt 
to make choices that do not benefit their people. They should not therefore be 
invested with sacral power. As a young Christian, he had stressed that perfect 
leaders ideally should be well-educated and thus possess wisdom. Ideally, they 
would be impervious to the allure of temporary success and the temptation 
to place themselves in the spotlight. Leaders of this disposition would be able 
8 Other aspects of Augustine’s view of imperial policy are discussed in van Geest and  Hunink. 
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to lead the people, along the  paths of the legally guaranteed order in society, 
to  understanding of the universe and of the cosmic order, and to happiness, 
which are both accessible to reason (ord., 2, 8, 25).9 The social  order is good 
only if it reflects the cosmic order, and treats each creature justly by assigning 
to it the place in the ordo that belongs to it.10 A human being must, for instance, 
never be used as an animal or an instrument; nor must he see himself as God 
(mus., 6, 16, 46; 6, 17, 58; 6, 17, 56; vera rel., 12, 23; 20, 38).11 A leader is good if, 
being wise and just himself, he gives his tormented subjects access to the uni-
verse and to happiness through reason (Cranz). Although Augustine continued 
to perfect his thinking on the natural and social order, he began to qualify 
this Platonic notion of political leadership  after 400. Just as perfect  justice will 
never be realised in society, no politician can embody perfect wisdom. Augus-
tine sometimes uses civ. to present the history of humankind as a mirror in 
which leaders can see the reflection of their own motives and the effects of 
their actions. The struggle between greed and generosity, sincerity and op-
portunism, dominates both history and the struggle that leaders must wage 
within themselves before they speak, decide, and act. The dramatic conflict on 
earth between these two cities, Jerusalem and Babylon, has no end: the two 
cities are intertwined in this world, just as they are intertwined in the hearts 
of politicians and of other mortals. 
The Intertwining of Church and State in the Person 
of the Bishop as a Mediator and Judge
As has been seen, bishops were given the authority by the State to adjudicate 
legal disputes and to reconcile quarrelling parties. This explains why Augustine 
spent a great deal of his time hearing litigants, passing sentence, and making 
peace between them. His biographer Possidius mentions that Augustine spent 
whole days dispensing justice in his  curia episcopalis. In the secretarium of 
his cathedral church, Augustine issued rulings every morning in suits relating 
to the law of property, inheritance, or contracts. He also presided over cases 
concerning the legal status of slavery, the right of asylum, and adultery. It is 
no surprise that his treatise on adulterous marriages (De adulterinis coniugiis) 
is written in a legal style. Contested wills were frequently placed before him 
9 See Cranz, passim. 
10 See, for example, ord. 2, 5, 17; 2, 6, 18.
11 See also ep. gal. 20: “Conturbatio enim ordini contraria est, ordo est autem a carnalibus ad 
spiritalia surgere, non ab spiritalibus ad carnalia cadere, sicut istis acciderat”; and Gen. adu. 
Man., 2, 9,12 “arrogando.”
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for adjudication. The prestige of his position also ensured that many requests 
were put to him, requests he always took seriously and which he sometimes 
pursued with local rulers or imperial authorities. From time to time he under-
took tiring journeys to be able to mediate in person. He even opened a legal 
advice centre to facilitate this juridical aspect of his activities, and he regularly 
consulted competent lawyers, such as his friend and colleague Bishop Alypius, 
who had excellent contacts at the imperial court. 
As in the case of rulers who have the authority to implement coercive mea-
sures, Augustine argued that judges must be able to judge their own deeds and 
motives within themselves: “Esto iudex in te!” In his analysis, the real weakness 
of the legal system is not systemic but results from human frailty. His view 
of justice was based more on his analysis of the capacities, limitations, and 
imperfections of man than on his thinking on social and political structures 
(Dodaro 99-115). He also confronted the rulers and judges with the basic rule 
not to do anything in legislation or in the administration of justice that they 
would not want done to themselves. In order to distinguish justice from injus-
tice, it is of course necessary to be competent, erudite, effective, and faithful 
to the legal precepts. But Augustine hastened to add that judges must person-
ally experience in their imagination the sentence they pass by  emphatically 
placing themselves in the shoes of the person they are sentencing. They will 
not have heard the case properly until they have themselves imagined the tor-
ments of the anxiety that the accused person is  experiencing. 
In ep. 133, which he wrote around 411 and was addressed to the imperial com-
missary Marcellinus, Augustine asked him why criminal justice was not ap-
plied to Donatists who had committed offences against Catholic priests. He 
maintained two principles in doing so.
The legal procedure stipulated that officers of the civil or ecclesiastical courts—
i.e. judges or bishops—were bound to observe that judges must interrogate 
rather than inculpate. This is also what Augustine did himself. Comparing the 
judge’s actions to  those of a doctor, he told Marcellinus that the interrogation 
should be  sharp and painful. It was part of his strategy to interrogate in great 
detail and very precisely. The accused was thus subjected to an inquisitorial 
trial, which was intended to foster in him a clear and unrestrained sense of his 
own badness. But this was not a goal in itself. Precisely because the interro-
gation was followed by a mild punishment, the realisation on the part of the 
accused ultimately served the intensification of a kind of gratitude at being 
let off lightly. Augustine’s main interest in determining the penalty was not, 
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cess of seeking of the truth in the accused person’s heart. 
The torment of the interrogation was not a goal in itself, no more than the 
pain that the doctor inflicts or the violence that the State  exercises are goals 
in themselves. Ultimately, the accused must become  aware of the paterna dil-
igentia, which Augustine was keen to reflect in his  dealings with the accused. 
It was the responsibility of bishops who  acted as  judges to practice evangeli-
cal clemency (mansuetudo). Whereas the punishments imposed by the secular 
magistrates were meant to be  deterrents, Augustine endeavoured to ensure—in 
line with his  pedagogical “system”—that his punishments would produce new 
insight and inner reform.
Peace at Every Level of Human Existence
In the so-called “table of peace” in the nineteenth book of civ., written around 
425, Augustine discusses the aspects of human existence that are crucial to 
the realisation of peace on Earth. He returned there to a train of thought that 
he had first expressed in 388. In De quantitate animae, he described for the 
first time the seven aspects of human beings in their mutual interdependence. 
The level of vegetative life (breathing, 1) is followed by the sensory life (feel-
ing, smell, sight, hearing, taste, 2), the intellectual life (thinking, manual and 
artistic skill, 3) and ultimately by the level of the moral life (4). This consists of 
obedience to precepts which, if practiced, ensures a balance in the soul (pul-
chre ad pulchrum), which then loses itself in God’s life (pulchre in pulchro, 5), 
is absorbed in God (pulchre ad Pulchritudinem, 6) and becomes one with God 
(pulchre apud Pulchritudinem, 7).
This line of reasoning, which dates from the year 388, one year after Augus-
tine’s baptism, was no longer entirely neo-Platonic. Although Augustine de-
scribed the elevation, the rise of human beings in a neoplatonic way, he clearly 
12 See ep. 133, 2: “Imple, christiane iudex, pii patris officium; sic succense iniquitati, ut con-
sulere humanitati memineris: nec in peccatorum atrocitatibus exerceas ulciscendi libidinem; 
sed peccatorum vulneribus curandi adhibeas voluntatem. Noli perdere paternam diligentiam, 
quam in ipsa inquisitione servasti, quando tantorum scelerum confessionem, non extendente 
equuleo, non sulcantibus ungulis, non urentibus flammis, sed virgarum verberibus eruisti. 
Qui modus coercitionis a magistris artium liberalium, et ab ipsis parentibus, et saepe etiam 
in iudiciis solet ab episcopis adhiberi. Noli ergo atrocius vindicare, quod lenius invenisti. In-
quirendi quam puniendi necessitas maior est: ad hoc enim et mitissimi homines facinus oc-
cultatum diligenter atque instanter examinant, ut inveniant quibus parcant. Unde plerumque 
necesse est, exerceatur acrius inquisitio, ut manifestato scelere sit ubi appareat mansuetudo.”
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already believed that all aspects of human existence are important in this rise 
or elevation to the highest being. The human is involved in this as a spiritual 
and physical being—in contrast to Plato; therefore, the physical does not need 
to be “eliminated.” Nearly thirty years later, Augustine still espoused this an-
thropology. It formed the basis for his table of peace. He wrote: 
The peace of the body is, then, the properly ordered arrangement of its parts; 
the peace of the irrational soul is the properly ordered satisfaction of the appe-
tites; the peace of the rational soul is the properly ordered accord of cognition 
and action; the peace of the body and soul together is the properly ordered 
life and well being of a living creature; peace between mortal man and God is 
properly ordered obedience, in faith, under eternal law; peace among men is 
the properly ordered concord of mind with mind; the peace of a household 
is the properly ordered concord, with respect to command and obedience, 
of those who are living together; the peace of a city is the properly ordered 
concord, with respect to command and obedience, of its citizens; the peace 
of the heavenly city is perfectly ordered and wholly concordant  fellowship in 
the enjoyment of God and of each other in God. The  peace of all things is the 
tranquility of order, and order is the arrangement of things equal and unequal 
that assigns to each its due place (civ., 19, 13) (trans. Babcock 368).13
Augustine assumes here that humans are composites of body and soul. Within 
the soul, the vital, non-rational part must be distinguished from the rational 
soul. Peace must reign in each of these three dimensions. The peace of the 
body is attained through “the properly ordered arrangement of its parts”; the 
peace of the vital, but non-rational part of the soul through the ‘the properly 
ordered satisfaction of the appetites’ (civ., 19, 13).14 If all organs and body parts 
function in accordance with the order of creation, and if the human is there-
fore free of any disordered tendencies, Augustine speaks of ordered life that 
causes well-being.15 Peace within the rational soul in turn presupposes order 
in the body and the mind. But peace within the rational soul is primarily the 
fruit of the “the properly ordered accord of cognition and action” (civ., 9.13).16 
13 See Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum.
14 “Pax itaque corporis est ordinata temperatura partium, pax animae inrationalis ordinata 
requies appetitionum.”
15 See civ. 19, 14: “Utrumque autem simul ei paci prodest, quam inter se habent anima et cor-
pus, id est ordinatae vitae ac salutis.” See also 19,13: «Pax corporis et animae ordinata vita et 
salus animantis, pax hominis mortalis et Dei ordinata in fide sub aeterna lege oboedientia.”
16 “Pax animae rationalis ordinata cognitionis actionisque consensio.”
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As in De quantitate animae and the Praeceptum, Augustine postulates in the table 
of peace that physical health is the basis for spiritual  well-being. Physical health 
is therefore of the utmost importance for the spiritual life. He writes in s. 277:
Look, my dearest friends; when this body of ours is healthy, even this fragile 
and mortal object, when it is regulated by the constitution of its parts, when 
there is nothing in it quarreling with anything else, not heat overcoming and 
driving out coolness, not warmth being extinguished by an excess of cold—and 
afflicting the body while the fight’s going on; not dryness absorbing the mois-
ture, not the moist overflowing and congesting; but all things it consists of are 
balanced with each other in a harmonious relationship, which is called health. 
In a word, the health of the body is the harmony of those things of which it 
consists (trans. Hill 35).
In the table of peace, Augustine also associates physical health with the in-
stincts, unconscious motives and impulses that also cause human actions, 
but that cannot be derived exclusively from rational considerations. He thinks 
these are produced by the non-rational part of the soul, the part of the soul 
that humans have in common with animals. The Church father suggests here 
that people who do not experience peace within themselves are oblivious to 
irrational processes that take place within the non-rational part of the soul. 
But he does not subscribe to the Stoic view that all perturbationes must be 
eradicated before reason can rule. As has been seen, he does not think that 
victory over pathè, apatheia, is a normal condition, because it is wrong to be-
lieve that the wise man should have no compassion as compassion involves 
suffering (s., 348, 2).17 He would write therefore in civ. that the affects cannot 
be eliminated but must be governed by the will. If the will is good, then fear 
will be good too (Fiedrowicz 431-440).
As has been seen, Augustine then assumes in the table of  peace that peace is 
established in man’s highest dimension of being, the rational soul (the only 
dimension that humans do not have in  common with animals), through the 
harmony of thought and action. It is clear that personal integrity is a form 
of peace, founded on physical and spiritual balance: on health, insight into, 
and a certain level of control over the “animal spirits” within the “I.”18 This 
17 See mor. 27, 53-54 (compassion with those in need must not perturb one’s own soul too 
much, but nor must apatheia cause inhumane behaviour). See also, for the influence of the 
notion of apatheia on Christianity, Mühlenberg 000.
18 See, for the latter point, Akerlof and Shiller. They deplore the fact that almost all of the ani-
mal spirits that Keynes identified in The General Theory as the cause of the Great  Depression 
have been pushed to the margins by later economists. 
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peace within the rational part of the soul is then immediately placed with-
in the perspective of peace between mortal man and God, a peace that en-
compasses “properly ordered obedience, in faith, under eternal law” (civ., 19, 
13). If someone has attained physical and spiritual balance, and his thoughts 
and actions are consistent, then, Augustine believes, this results in the con-
sciousness of  being part of an order of creation which is oriented to  peace. 
This is not very different from the notion of oikeiosis. In this context Augus-
tine then describes peace between people as their ordered harmony. In the 
table of peace, just as in the Praeceptum, personal integrity is also related 
to the way one treats others, in chance encounters or in more structured 
 forms of communal living such as the home, the city or the world. The dis-
course on peace within man is therefore followed directly by a description 
of peace within the home and in the city as the “ordered harmony” in which 
“with respect to command and obedience” (civ., 19, 13).19 Domestic peace, 
where paternal authority is characterised by caring compassion, just like that 
of the praepositus, is oriented to civic peace.20 This ordinata concordia lies at 
the basis of every people, defined by Augustine as “an assembled multitude—
not of animals but of rational creatures—, and is joined together by the com-
mon agreement on the objects of its love” (civ., 19, 6).21 This was a common-
place in Antiquity. Ideally, the family, the home, stood at the service of the 
city, just as the city was the foundation of the  empire. At the same time, he 
 emphasizes the social nature of the human race and the value of natural bonds 
and friendship (bono coniug., 1, 1). Anyone who is born, is born to become a 
friend. 
In the table of peace, social order is the result of the order and balance that 
individuals are able to realise within themselves. The individual’s highest task 
is to become a person of integrity. This integrity is  assumed and developed 
in his or her interactions with others. But Augustine  contends emphatically 
that integrity in this sense must be supported by the ordering of irrational 
dimensions and of the physical dimension. Integrity thus presupposes integri-
tas, wholeness, and also contributes to this.
19 See civ., 19, 13: “Pax hominum ordinata concordia, pax domus ordinata imperandi  atque 
oboediendi concordia cohabitantium, pax civitatis ordinata imperandi atque oboediendi 
concordia civium, pax caelestis civitatis ordinatissima et concordissima societas fruendi et 
invicem in Deo, pax omnium rerum tranquillitas ordinis” (trans. Babcock 385).
20 See Schrama “Augustinus” 133-148; and “Praeposito” 847-878.
21 “Coetus multitudinis rationalis rerum quas diligit concordi communione sociatus.” See 
19, 17.
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In this way, Augustine brings physical harmony, irrational and rational motives, 
the pursuit of integrity, the role of the family and of the government into a single 
vision, articulated in his so-called “table of peace” in fewer than twenty lines. It is 
a map showing the reader precisely what factors are required for individual and 
social peace and how these two things are interrelated. Peace within an individ-
ual person is interrelated with the harmony that is pursued on various levels of 
society. In the different social units, the individual must, on the one hand, have 
the scope to discover what rational and irrational forces move him. On the 
other hand, relatives or members of wider social units set boundaries that 
prevent the individual from being destroyed by his animal spirits, his jealousy, 
resentment, and illusions. The table of peace shows that Augustine believes 
personal integrity is founded upon physical and spiritual calm and equilibrium. 
But in order to be able to stimulate integrity as the bridge between individual 
peace and peace in society, he  demands the same from society at all levels. Au-
gustine regards the  social connections within society as instances that, each 
at their own level, create preconditions for the cultivation of personal integrity 
as a source of peace at the highest level of humankind, with all the beneficial 
effects that this has on society. 
Conclusion: The Usefulness of Idleness
It has yet to be investigated whether the bishops’ success in the fourth and 
fifth centuries was due to the sense of reality that Augustine expresses in his 
reflections on the business of politics and the inner life of politicians. But it 
is a paradox that their power in the Roman Empire should have increased at 
the time that Augustine was proclaiming frankly that political leaders cannot 
bring perfect happiness, and cannot do much more, in fact, than create the 
conditions to avoid chaos in the world, as well as that political institutions are 
essentially tragic due to their impermanence and transience. 
Augustine has no ready-made solutions to offer on the utility of Christianity 
for Christian Democracy, because he lived and worked under different social 
circumstances. Yet his gradually acquired insight that people do not act quite 
as rationally in the public domain as they think they do, is as timeless as it is 
realistic. The attention he pays to the  limitations of human beings is also valu-
able; it is even the prelude to his uncoupling of religion and politics, which is 
effected in order to avoid investing politicians with sacral power, thus obscur-
ing their shortcomings. 
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Augustine describes three ways of living in civ. The first is a life without re-
sponsibilities, spent searching for truth about the world and about oneself; the 
second is an active life, spent taking care of human affairs. The third is a har-
monious combination of the two former styles (civ., 19, 2). There is no doubt 
that he believed the third way of life to be most appropriate for the politician, 
no matter in what era or under what political system.
The torment of the probing interrogation was not a goal in itself; the accused 
had to become aware of the paterna diligentia and the mansuetudo of the 
judge (the bishop) in his dealings with the accused. According to Augustine’s 
own pedagogical “system”, only then his punishments would bring about new 
insight and inner reform.
Augustine was demanding of those who fulfil responsible political functions. 
As a former professor of rhetoric he knew that those in public  office gain in 
authority if it is clear to everyone that they pursue the same ideals in both the 
personal and the public domain. Clerics in  particular are expected to make 
choices in their daily lives that are in accordance with their state of life or the 
position they occupy. At the end of his life, Augustine described in De civitate 
Dei, in less than twenty lines, the interrelatedness between physicality, irra-
tional and rational motives, the pursuit of integrity, the role of the family and 
of  government. In his  so- called “table of peace”, he charted the factors that 
come into play whenever people seek peace both within themselves and in the 
world. Augustine presupposed that there is interaction between  tendencies 
that emerge from the body, from the instinctive,  moral, and social life. In his 
view, animal spirits, one’s own irrationality and subconscious  motives, are not 
just possible causes of personal, but also of economic or social instability. He 
thought that integrity rests upon a balance in the personal life. Body and mind 
must work together.  Equilibrium in the mind presupposes equilibrium in the 
body. Both form the basis for personal integrity, the virtue which Augustine 
believed is itself the foundation of peace in any form of community. It tran-
spires therefore that Augustine’s thinking on the order of the world and the 
quality of human society at all levels is infused with a sense that integrity, in 
our sense of the word, is a crucial virtue. 
The phenomenon of man always remained a riddle to Augustine. In the 
Confessiones, at the end of his descent into memory and the subconscious, 
he expressed this very strikingly in his famous phrase “Mihi quaestio factus 
sum” (“I have become a question to myself”) (conf., 10, 33, 50). Living both in 
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a  complex society and in an incomprehensible creation, people, Augustine 
thought, are faced with the tremendous challenge to seek the truth and to 
find the Truth. But perhaps more than any Church father before him, he was 
strongly aware of the fact that no one can even approximate the truth about 
themselves or the Truth behind all things if they do not live a truthful life. 
Magnum Beneficium est Pax, sed Dei Veri Beneficium est (civ., 3.9) [213]
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Abstract
Confessions is the tale of the journey to the patria 
pacis from out of the ashes of humanity’s restless, 
sinful anxiety. Augustine’s quest for inner peace 
is wrapped within this journey home, and it is a 
quest that has a trinitarian and an ecclesiological 
structure. Interior peace is only achieved through 
our participation in Christ, which itself is struc-
tured by our inclusion within Christ’s body (the 
Church) through the power of the Spirit. We find 
this peace when we find our rest, that is, when we 
find our proper place. Love dictates our place and 
within the body of Christ we find the proper (mor-
al) love that directs our praise toward God. This 
love is also the presence of the Spirit within the 
soul—this love is the Spirit—and so interior peace 
is not only a condition of the soul but also its de-
ification. This points to the underlying reality of 
the soul’s interior nature, whose existence and 
identity is grounded in its imaging of God. We find 
our peace in uniting with God because our proper 
place—the place wherein we find rest—is as images 
of the divine.
Keywords: Augustine, divine image, love, peace, 
Spirit.
The Soul in Pieces and its Quest for the Peace of Christ [217]
Resumen 
Las confesiones son el relato del viaje a la patria 
pacis desde las cenizas de la inquietud y la an-
gustia pecaminosa de la humanidad. La búsqueda 
de san Agustín por la paz interior se encuentra 
en este viaje a casa, y es una búsqueda que tie-
ne una estructura trinitaria y eclesiológica. La paz 
interior solo se logra a través de nuestra partici-
pación en Cristo, que a su vez se estructura por 
nuestra inclusión dentro del cuerpo de Cristo (la 
Iglesia) por medio del poder del Espíritu. Encon-
tramos esta paz en nuestro descanso, es decir, 
cuando hallamos nuestro lugar adecuado. El amor 
dicta nuestro lugar y dentro del cuerpo de Cristo 
encontramos el amor apropiado (moral) que di-
rige nuestra alabanza hacia Dios. Este amor es la 
presencia del Espíritu dentro del alma, por lo que 
la paz interior no es solo una condición del alma 
sino también su deificación. Esto apunta a la reali-
dad subyacente de la naturaleza interior del alma, 
cuya existencia e identidad se basa en su imagen 
de Dios. Encontramos nuestra paz en la unión 
con Dios porque nuestro lugar apropiado, el lugar 
donde encontramos descanso, es como imágenes 
de lo divino.
Palabras clave: Paz, san Agustín, Cristo, Espíritu, 
amor, imagen divina.
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Lord God, grant us peace; for you have given us all things, the peace of quiet-
ness, the peace of the Sabbath, a peace with no evening. This entire most beau-
tiful order of very good things will complete its course and then pass away; for 
in them by creation there is both morning and evening (conf., 13, 35, 50).
Augustine’s final prayer for peace in Confessions (cited hereafter, conf.) brings to 
conclusion a search he initiates in the opening lines of the text when famously 
he declares: “Our heart is restless until it rests in you” (conf., 1, 1, 1). Here Augus-
tine sounds the depths of the restless human heart and locates its resolution in 
the peace we achieve through praising God. As Augustine moves through conf. 
this message takes its shape as a  life-long quest and is used as a multi-pronged 
launching point to offer: a  framework to structure his autobiographical narra-
tion of spiritual  development; a hermeneutical key to unlock basic theological 
themes on the nature of creation, salvation, and the relation between humanity 
and God; as well as a rhetorical device to invite the reader to join Augustine’s 
quest for peace through the praise of God. Augustine’s  opening call, then, gives 
us a window into conf.—its structure, intentions, and goal.
In this chapter, I will focus on how Augustine in conf. situates  peace within 
his account of human interiority. One way to broach this issue is with Au-
gustine’s query, in conf. 10, 30, 42, on why the good,  almighty God does not 
heal Christians of temptation and sin  immediately so they may enjoy interi-
or peace. This is a profound and haunting  question for Augustine, and one 
that underlies his wider search for an enduring  peace in Christ  through the 
Church. It is also a good place to begin because it underscores an important 
point about Augustine’s search for interior peace, namely, that it is not found 
within an insulated space of the individual soul but rather within an interior 
spiritual space reformed within a Christological, ecclesiological, and Trini-
tarian framework.
In the Voice of Angels: Fragmentation, 
Unity, and the Search for God
The drive for unity is one of the most conspicuous and funda mental concerns 
that accompanies Augustine’s search for interior peace in conf. He voices this 
concern in a variety of contexts, using it to highlight basic features of his 
accounts of  creation and salvation. In conf. 4, Augustine notes the relation 
 between peace and unity, connecting it to righteous love and contrasting it 
with sinful love: “Since in virtue I loved peace and in vice I hated discord, I 
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noted that in virtue there is unity, in vice a kind of division (conf., 4, 15, 24).”1 
Further, in conf. 12, in the midst of his discussion of creation, Augustine ar-
gues that angels enjoy an “unshakeable peace,” and connects this with the 
spiritual unity angels possess (conf., 12, 11, 12). Angelic unity is grounded on 
the angels’ love of God:
Its delight [voluptas] is exclusively in you. In an unfailing purity it satisfies its 
thirst in you. It never at any point betrays its mutability. You are always pres-
ent to it, and it concentrates all its affection on you. It has no future to expect. 
It suffers no variation and experiences no distending [distenditur] in the suc-
cessiveness of time (conf., 12, 11, 12).2 
Augustine’s account of angelic unity and peace provides an important contrast 
with the lack of peace and restlessness he voices in the opening lines of conf. 
Humans and angels are both created ex nihilo and so with a certain type of 
change, or mutability, at their origins, namely, the change from nonbeing to 
being (conf., 12, 6, 6-12; 7, 7; vera rel., 17, 34-18, 35; nat. b., 1, 19, 27; civ., 12, 5).3 
This distinguishes all created beings from God, who is the only true eternal 
being. In the case of the angels, their mutability is suspended or deferred, as 
it were, through their love and  praise of God, and in this they participate in 
divine eternity. It is this  participation that gives angels their unity and peace. 
Augustine’s account of angelic peace highlights a few important points. Fore-
most, it underscores the close connection between unity, peace, and divine 
eternity. The peace and unity Augustine seeks is one of stability and perma-
nence, which he associates with divine eternity. In saying this, the point is not 
that Augustine’s account of unity and peace shuns notions of dynamism, affec-
tion or desire in favor of a static,  nonchanging baseline that is sometimes read 
into ancient accounts of eternity (Farley 165-167). Though not as developed 
as in On the Trinity, already in conf. Augustine reads his account of creation 
through a  trinitarian lens, intimating that creation finds its life and place through 
the  reciprocal, self-giving love of the persons of the Trinity (trin., 15, 17, 27-15, 
19, 33); (conf., 13, 5, 6-13, 7, 8; 13, 9, 10-13, 11, 12). To be unified and at peace in-
volves a stability in, rather than a rejection of, the  desire, affection, and dyna-
1 “Et cum in virtute pacem amarem, in vitiositate autem odissem discordiam, in illa unitatem, 
in ista quamdam divisionem notabam.”
2 “Cuius voluptas tu solus es teque perseverantissima castitate hauriens mutabilitatem suam 
nusquam et numquam exserit et te sibi semper praesente, ad quem toto affectu se tenet, 
non habens futurum quod exspectet nec in praeteritum traiciens quod meminerit, nulla vice 
variatur nec in tempora ulla distenditur.”
3 See also Drever 48-84; and Marion 24-42.
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mism of life, insofar as this is  grounded in one’s  participation in the trinitarian 
love of the eternal and  immutable God. It is this  relation to God that allows one 
to defer  continually one’s mutable origin ex  nihilo and avoid the oblivion—the 
 nonbeing—at the foundation of one’s  existence.
In returning to the notion of distentio, Augustine’s account of  angelic unity and 
peace also connects to his analysis of human temporality in book 11. Augus-
tine reads the difference between the peace angels enjoy and the restlessness 
that plagues humans in part through the distinct relations to mutability and 
 temporality angels and humans experience. Angelic love and affection is di-
rected toward God such that angelic existence and identity is not spread thin 
and dispersed (distenditur) through time. Augustine returns often to this idea 
that a creature’s peace entails  being collected together and unified in divine 
eternity rather than  scattered and spread apart in time. This is the lesson of 
conf. 11, as Augustine moves from a metaphysical account of human temporal-
ity as the stretching of the soul’s attention through the objects it encounters 
(i.e., the distentio animi), to a moral account of how the sinful soul experiences 
this stretching as a shattering and scattering into pieces of its inward identity 
and existence as a result of its turning from the integrative and unifying power 
of divine eternity to the mutable (nihil) origins of its creation (conf., 11, 14, 17-11, 
26, 33; 11, 29, 39-11, 31, 41). Here, Augustine associates the lack of human peace 
with human temporal and mutable being, both of which were originally a part 
of God’s good creation but have become corrupted through sin.
Interior peace involves transcending sinful temporality and the ways our af-
fections and loves are pulled through the events, things, and people we ex-
perience. More specifically, Augustine identifies interior human peace with 
a unity of the soul that transcends time in participating in divine eternity but 
that does not transcend human mutable origins. That is, we remain de (ex) 
nihilo rather than de Deo and so never share in the divine simple existence 
characteristic of divine being itself (id ipsum) (conf., 12, 7, 7; 12, 15, 20-21; trin. 15, 
16, 26). Augustine summarizes his claims here with the prayer that concludes 
his account of human temporality in conf. 11:
You are my eternal Father, but I am scattered in times whose  order I do not 
understand. The storms of incoherent events tear to pieces my thoughts, the 
inmost entrails of my soul, until that day when, purified and molten by the fire 
of your love, I flow  together to merge into you (conf., 11, 29, 39).4 
4 “Pater meus aeternus es; at ego in tempora dissilui, quorum ordinem nescio, et tumul-
tuosis varietatibus dilaniantur cogitationes meae, intima viscera animae meae, donec in te 
 confluam purgatus et liquidus igne amoris tui.”
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This interior peace and unity that Augustine seeks in answer to the restless-
ness voiced in the opening of conf. 1 is precisely what the angels enjoy, and 
the promise of salvation is that we might join the angels in their praise of God 
(conf., 12, 11, 12-13).
Augustine’s account of angelic peace, finally then, underscores that unity and 
peace are fundamentally relational in being grounded in God. At issue in this 
relation is not only the stable foundation of our existence but also our ownmost 
self-identity. We must remember this so as not to equate the interior peace of 
the soul with an individual or private spiritual space wherein we retreat to find 
our core identity. We see a rejection of this idea already in Augustine’s account 
of the angels in conf., but it becomes clarified in his later writings as he devel-
ops further his account of angelic peace. Here he argues that angelic peace is 
formed not when they turn in on themselves in a type of isolated privacy, but 
rather when they turn first to God in praise and then come into themselves as 
a result of their relation to God (Gn. litt., 2, 8, 17-19; 4, 24, 41-4, 29, 46). In this, 
angels’ existence and self-identity derives from elsewhere, that is, from their 
relation to God, which then also means the peace they enjoy derives not from 
their own existence but from God.
At various points in conf. Augustine contrasts the angelic relation with God to 
the sinful relation humans have with God, and the lack of peace that follows. 
Memorably, in conf. 4 Augustine narrates the way he sought disastrously to 
replace his love of God with his love of a friend: “The reason why that grief had 
penetrated me so easily and deeply was that I had poured out my soul on to the 
sand by loving a person sure to die as if he would never die” (conf., 4, 8, 13).5 Au-
gustine goes on to identify more precisely that the danger of his misplaced love 
resided in his attempt to ground his existence and identity within the created 
(i.e., ex nihilo, mutable) nature of his friend rather than the uncreated (i.e., 
immutable) nature of God: “For wherever the human soul turns itself, other 
than to you, it is fixed in sorrows, even if it is fixed upon beautiful things exter-
nal to you and external to itself, which would nevertheless be nothing if they 
did not have their being from you” (conf., 4, 10, 15).6 This leads to the shattering 
of inner peace, with Augustine’s identity scattered in grief and loss, and to his 
recommendation, exemplified by the peace of angelic existence, that the soul 
must ground its love first and fundamentally in God: 
5 “Nam unde me facillime et in intima dolor ille penetraverat, nisi quia fuderam in harenam 
animam meam diligendo moriturum ac si non moriturum.”
6 "Nam quoquoversum se verterit anima hominis, ad dolores figitur alibi praeterquam in te, 
tametsi figitur in pulchris extra te et extra se. Quae tamen nulla essent, nisi essent abs te".
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Let these transient things be the ground on which my soul praises you, ‘God 
creator of all’. But let it not become stuck in them and glued to them with love 
through the physical senses. For these things pass along the path of things 
that move towards non-existence. They rend the soul with pestilential de-
sires; for the soul loves to be in them and take its repose among the objects 
of its love. But in these things there is no point of rest; they lack permanence 
(conf., 4, 10, 15).7 
Humans lack inner peace because in sin they do not praise God but rather di-
rect their love toward creation where they become “glued” to created objects 
in forming their identity and existence through the mutable nature of cre-
ation, which is bound to pass away into nonexistence. This leads to the inner 
restlessness, dissolution, and fragmentation about which Augustine laments.
When the soul turns from God, it not only turns from the stable source of its 
existence but also from the source of its ownmost inward identity. Like the 
angels, we find our self-identity in and through our relation to God. In our 
case, this identity is formed through the divine image, which, Augustine ar-
gues, images the Trinity (trin., 12, 6, 6-12, 6, 7). This is an image that is whole 
only when we are turned to God in praise and constituted  through the love of 
the trinitarian God (conf., 13, 9, 10-13, 11, 12; trin. 14, 1,1; 14,12, 15). This is why the 
lack of inner peace Augustine finds within himself constitutes a fundamental 
existential crisis that haunts the pages of Confessions: peace is the harbinger 
not only of a stable relation with the immutable God but also of the whole-
ness of one’s inward identity as an image of God. The loss of peace leaves one 
grasping for the stable existence found within divine immutable eternity, and 
profoundly disoriented by the distortion of one’s self-identity as the  divine 
image. Augustine underscores this idea in his later writings when he returns to 
the idea that sinful love “glues” the soul to mutable objects, arguing now that 
it upends inner peace by  distorting the divine image within the soul (trin., 10, 
5, 7-10, 6, 8). It is only  through the proper love of God, a love grounded in the 
trinitarian God’s love of us, that the divine image is reformed and human life 
made whole.
7 "Laudet te ex illis anima mea, Deus, creator omnium, sed non in eis infigatur glutine amore 
per sensus corporis. Eunt enim quo ibant, ut non sint, et conscindunt eam desideriis pesti-
lentiosis, quoniam ipsa esse vult et requiescere amat in eis, quae amat. In illis autem non est 
ubi, quia non stant".
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In the Voice of the Spirit: Unity and the Body of Christ
It is one thing to identify the source of inner peace and another to 
grasp it. Confessions is littered with failed attempts—Platonist, Manichean, and 
otherwise—to find peace, which together bring into relief the proper route 
to peace through Christ. Like the  gradual resolution of a blurry image, conf. 
slowly brings into focus the homeland of peace and rest for which the soul 
longs. Augustine describes this process as one in which the order of the soul 
is restored. In Augustine’s metaphysics, the peace of all things is contingent 
upon their proper order: “Things which are not in their intended position are 
restless. Once they are in their ordered position, they are at rest (conf., 13, 
9, 10).”8 All things tend toward their ordered place according to their weight, 
and love is the weight that determines the human place. Love is what moves 
us, motivates us, gives us our moral orientation, and shapes our identity: “My 
weight is my love. Wherever I am carried my love is carrying me. By your gift 
we are set on fire and carried upwards; we grow red hot and ascend” (conf., 13, 
9, 10).9 Augustine associates the lack of inner peace in humans with sinful love 
because love disorders our place within creation, leaving us restless. The way 
for humans to reorder their love and find their proper place and peace comes 
only through the gift of God, which Augustine identifies with the Holy Spirit:
Why then is this said only of the Holy Spirit? Why is it said exclusively of him 
as if there were a place where he then was, though it is not a place? Of him 
alone is it said that he is your ‘gift’. In your gift we find our rest. There are you 
our joy. Our rest is our peace (conf., 13, 9, 10).10 
The Holy Spirit is God’s gift who brings us divine love, restoring us to our place 
and leading us toward peace (trin. 5, 11, 12-5, 16, 17; 13, 10, 14; 15, 17, 27-19, 33).
In his later sermons on 1 John, Augustine goes even further in rendering the 
soteriological role of the Spirit’s love as ontological formation (ep. Io. tr., 7, 4-7; 
9).11 Here he argues that the Spirit’s love within us represents not only the re-
newal and reformation of our love of God, but also the presence of God with-
in us and our participation—deification—within God’s own life. When we love 
8 “Minus ordinata inquieta sunt: ordinantur et quiescent.”
9 “Pondus meum amor meus; eo feror, quocumque feror. Dono tuo accendimur et sursum 
ferimur; inardescimus et imus.”
10 “Cur ergo tantum de spiritu tuo dictum est hoc? Cur de illo tantum dictum est quasi locus, 
ubi esset, qui non est locus, de quo solo dictum est, quod sit donum tuum? In dono tuo requi-
escimus: ibi te fruimur. Requies nostra locus noster.”
11 See also van Bavel 169-181; and Teske. 
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God we not only find our proper place, and so achieve rest and peace, but we 
also—in some sense—become god through our participation in God. This is a 
strong soteriological and ontological claim, not yet fully developed in conf., but 
one that illustrates further that the attainment of inner peace is not achieved 
through an inward, solitary act of the soul, but rather only through intimate 
and radical participation within God.
The nature of this participation takes various forms in Augustine’s writings, 
and I would highlight two of them. One way of parsing Augustine’s claims 
about the work of the Spirit’s love is in terms of how it renews the divine image 
within us. As we have seen, one of the reasons disordered love is dangerous 
for Augustine is because it distorts the divine image within the soul, which is 
at the core of our identity. To say that the  Spirit’s love is the presence of God 
within us and our simultaneous participation in God is to register the reality 
of our core existence and identity—our place—as the divine image. Insofar as 
the Spirit’s love brings us to this place of peace, it restores our identity, which 
is only found through its intimate participation in—imaging of—God.
A second way of parsing Augustine’s claims on the Spirit’s love moves us fur-
ther into his trinitarian soteriology. Augustine argues that the Spirit’s love 
brings us into God—deifies us—because the place wherein our love is ordered 
is within the body of Christ. That is, we become god insofar as we join with 
Christ’s body. Augustine’s Pauline claims here have multilayered soteriological, 
eschatological, ecclesiological, and ontological dimensions. Not all of these di-
mensions are fully worked out in conf., but we can begin with the central so-
teriological role Augustine affords Christ in Confessions. In book 10 Augustine 
delves into the  depths of human memory, looking to discern the nature of the 
soul and its relation to God. There he finds God, though less as the evident 
answer to his restlessness than as a mysterious presence that bids him deeper 
into his soul’s depths (conf., 10, 7, 5; 10, 8, 15; 10, 16, 25-10, 17, 26). Here he finds 
the future promise of peace, but not an immediate resolution to his sinful rest-
lessness. Indeed, to his own consternation he discovers lodged deep within 
him temptation and sin from which he cannot fully exculpate himself despite 
his conversion to Christianity (conf., 10, 30, 41-42). Augustine concludes that 
the resolution to the sinful habits that plague him must flow through Christ. 
Christ offers the solution by becoming the mediator who teaches humility that 
brings with it righteousness and leads us into a life of peace (conf., 10, 43, 68).
For Augustine, Christ’s humility must reform us at both an ontological and 
moral level. At the ontological level, the divine image is deformed when, in sin, 
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we attempt to replace the image of the immutable and eternal God with im-
ages of the mutable and finite world. This is a type of inward, prideful idolatry 
that leads to the dissolution of our identity, the dangers of which we saw in 
Augustine’s grief over the death of his friend. In turn, this generates an im-
moral love of objects and people that lodges deep within the soul, the dangers 
of which Augustine narrates in his account of temptation in conf. 10. Both di-
mensions of sin lead to the disunity and restlessness of the soul, undercutting 
its interior peace. In repositioning God as the primary love within the soul, 
Christ’s humility restores the divine image and so reforms our identity, even 
as it realigns our moral and affective habits so that we love God and creation in 
the proper manners. Christ’s humility, then, provides the route back to  peace 
through the restoration of  inner-wholeness. In this respect it is important to 
see that humility is not about self-abnegation or self-denial. Most fundamen-
tally, it is about the restoration and wholeness of the self, but a self whose 
identity as the divine image is constituted through the divine Other and con-
sequently whose love is properly ordered only when flowing through God. 
In this, we can also see that the peace that comes through Christ’s humility 
entails more than what today we would associate with various types of in-
ward, contemplative, meditative exercises. Augustine famously  attempts his 
own version of this in his mystical ascents in conf. 7 (7, 10, 16; 7, 17, 23). There he 
draws on Platonist mystical practices to achieve momentary unity with God, 
but unity that fails because it does not move through Christ (conf., 7, 9, 13; 7, 18, 
24-7, 21, 27). Augustine concludes that routes that bypass Christ may provide 
a brief and far-off view of the “homeland of peace [patriam pacis],” but noth-
ing more (conf., 7, 21, 27). Here again, Augustine emphasizes Christ’s humility 
that comes through the humanity God takes on in Christ as the soteriological 
key toward the achievement of permanent peace. This is part of Augustine’s 
rereading of Paul and the importance Augustine comes to attach to the incar-
nation as the route to enduring peace (Cameron).
God’s participation in humanity through Christ opens the  route for humanity 
to participate in God, and so to enjoy the unity, peace, and stability possessed 
by the angels (Bonner; Meconi; Wilson-Kastner). Augustine’s claims on how 
peace is achieved  through Christ develop along various lines, one of which 
grows out of his understanding of the body of Christ. As we have seen, the 
Spirit’s love repositions us to rest (peace) by bringing us into participation in 
God. One of the ways Augustine envisions this participation is through our 
incorporation into the body of Christ. While this metaphor is not prevalent 
within conf., Augustine gravitates towards it in conf. 13 with his  extended 
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 analysis of the Church and its place in the Genesis creation narrative (conf., 
13, 19, 25-13, 23, 33). To the contemporary reader, the connection between 
the Church and the creation narrative may be an exegetical stretch. But it is 
a crucial dimension to Augustine’s overarching query in conf., into the origins 
of himself, sin, and salvation. Genesis reveals the source of his own sinful ori-
gins in Adam, but Augustine also discerns God’s providence already at work in 
providing the foundations for human  redemption within the Church (conf., 13, 
12, 13). Augustine finds in the separation of the light from the dark the delinea-
tion of the elect (conf., 13, 14, 15; 13, 18, 22; 13, 19, 25), and in the creation of the 
waters and earth the work of the Church in the sacraments (waters/ baptism) 
and preaching (earth/ scripture) (conf., 13, 17, 20-13, 18, 22; 13, 20-26-13, 21, 30). 
Augustine does not identify the Church here with the body of Christ per se, but 
the mystical and eschatological connotations he draws out, combined with 
the way he grounds the Church in the Spirit’s work, brings it into the general 
orbit of his claims on the body of Christ (conf., 13, 18, 23).
One of the important consequences of Augustine’s ecclesiological treatment 
of salvation in conf. 13 is the way it qualifies his earlier claims that salvation 
flows through Christ. In particular, it demonstrates that the path to interior 
peace must have an outward and corporate component in the Church. Sal-
vation is not bound solely to the inward refashioning of the individual soul 
(i.e., the divine image) in relation to God. Our participation in God is mediated 
through our integration into the community of the redeemed.12 That is, we 
become deified by becoming united to Christ’s body. This brings with it a so-
cial ethic and sense of  corporate identity, centered around the Church, that 
Augustine only begins to  explore in conf.
If we turn briefly beyond the pages of conf. we can fill-in this account. Here 
we see Augustine developing the implications of his claim that our redemption 
through our incorporation into Christ’s body is our inclusion into both the 
mystical (eschatological) heavenly body of the elect and the historical body 
of the Church. This incorporation brings with it the presence and redemptive 
love of the Spirit who dwells in and through the Church. We can see this, for 
example, in his meditations on the body of Christ (i.e., the totus Christus) in his 
early sermons on the  Psalms, which Augustine composes a few years prior to 
12 Raymond Canning has shown that, at points, Augustine extends the love within Christ’s 
body beyond Christians to the poor more generally (minimi mei), which intimates a wider 
unity between the love of God and neighbor in Christ, pp. 383-394.
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Confessions.13 The concept of the totus Christus is a central theme that animates 
the christological framework Augustine applies to his interpretation of the 
Psalms. Here Augustine experiments with a complex prosopological meth-
od that delineates a shifting identity in the voice (or speaker) of the Psalm 
based on the context and content of the passage.14 Among the voic-
es (identities) Augustine finds in the Psalms are: the twofold voice of 
Christ when he speaks in his divinity as the Word and in his humani-
ty for sinful people (pro  nobis); the voice of individual Christians as part 
of Christ’s body; and the voice of the Church when it speaks as the body 
of Christ. The diverse voices are united in the totus Christus.
Augustine develops various soteriological themes from the shifting identity 
of the speaker in the Psalms that complement the claims he develops in conf. 
around the incarnation. First, he argues that Christ’s speaking in the Psalms—as 
both God and humanity— represents the downward participation of God in hu-
manity and the upward participation of humanity in God. When Christ speaks 
as the head of the body it reminds us that salvation flows through God’s pres-
ence in Christ and that this salvation entails our incorporation into the body of 
Christ. Here Christ speaks in the voice of the Church as the head that unites the 
corporate body of the Church into his risen body.15 This inclusion into Christ’s 
body is our deification, which highlights the mystical and eschatological di-
mension he attaches to the body of Christ (conf., 7, 9, 14; 7, 18, 24; 7, 19, 25; s. 23b, 
1-2; en. Ps., 49, 2; 81, 2; trin., 13, 9, 12; 14, 12, 16-14, 19, 25).
Second, Augustine speculates in a few places about the way the Church can, in 
some capacity, speak as Christ. Augustine is experimenting with the idea that 
our incorporation into Christ’s body brings with it a new identity—a new type 
of corporate personhood—that can speak as Christ (the head). This is not to 
say that we become or speak as God in our own individual voices. Rather, we 
might say that it is indicative of the reforming of the divine image that occurs 
within Christ’s body in which we come to reflect and so in some sense speak as 
the divine. This only occurs insofar as we exist within Christ’s body and so im-
age God, underscoring that the divine voice that speaks through—and in some 
13 Augustine takes up the theme of the totus Christus in a wide variety of contexts in his ear-
ly sermons on the Psalms. Some examples include: en. Ps. 3, 9; 18, 2,10; 21, 1, 1; 21, 1, 7; 26, 2, 2; 
29, 2, 22; 30, 2, 3-4; 30, 3, 1; 30, 3, 8; 32, 2, 2. See also Cameron 165-212; and Williams 25-40.
14 For recent studies on Augustine’s prosopological exegesis, see Cameron 171-212.
15 Augustine draws on the corporate, ecclesiological context of participation in Christ’s body 
in numerous contexts. For example, see: civ. 10, 6; 12, 9; Io. ev. tr.; en. Ps. 10, 7; 26, 2, 13; 75, 3; 
125, 13; 149, 5.
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sense as—us is never our own private possession but rather is ours precisely as 
we give ourselves to God through Christ.
Beyond the mystical and eschatological themes Augustine develops, he also 
uses his Christological reading of the Psalms to draw attention to moral di-
mensions of the totus Christus. The central passage here is the famous verse 
in Acts 9: 40—“Saul, why do you persecute me.” Augustine argues that this is 
indicative of Christ’s presence within the historical Church. Christ’s cry of 
protest against Paul signals that the persecution of the Church is also the 
persecution of Christ. This lends a Christological basis to moral action: our 
treatment of others has real  consequence within Christ’s own body. This also, 
then, connects outward moral  action to the quest for inward spiritual peace. 
The body of Christ, which is the place where we find rest in God, will not be at 
peace as long as humans act unjustly and immorally towards others. 
Looking beyond his sermons on the Psalms, Augustine also develops the sacra-
mental context of the totus Christus when he connects our participation in the 
body of Christ to baptism and the Eucharist. In ep. 98, Augustine argues that 
we share [communicatur] in grace through  baptism, which joins us to other 
Christians in the unity of the Spirit (ep., 98, 2). In sermon 26 on John, Augus-
tine argues that our participation in Christ is conditioned by our partaking in 
the Eucharist. Here again, Augustine emphasizes both an historical dimension 
through our actual partaking in the Eucharist, as well as an eschatological and 
mystical dimension that is found in the divine predestination that grounds the 
 efficacy of the sacrament (Io. ev. tr., 26, 15). In s. 123 on John, Augustine reiter-
ates the ecclesiological and eschatological dimensions that flow through the 
 Eucharist.16 Here he associates the participation in Christ that comes through 
the Eucharist with the Church’s unification and its movement toward eternal 
blessedness. Cumulatively, these passages sketch a  soteriological account in 
which the interior peace of the soul that is achieved by participation in God 
flows through the corporate and historical sacraments of the Church that unite 
Christ’s body through the power of the Spirit.
Admittedly, the sacramental, moral, and mystical dimensions that Augustine 
attaches to the totus Christus in his wider writings are not present in the same 
manner in the Christology of conf. There are, however, two ways we might 
16 Deification encompasses both the process and goal of the human return to God. In this, 
it has an eschatological dimension. Those redeemed through Christ are deified now in the 
hope that they will be resurrected and reunited with God (en. Ps., 49, 2). For a wider study of 
the connection between Augustine’s account of deification and his ecclesiology and theory 
of signs, see Meconi 61-74.
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link Augustine’s examination of the  totus Christus to Confessions that further 
highlight the theme of interior  peace. First, we can think specifically about 
the mystical visions in conf. 7 and 9. As we have seen, in conf. 7 the chief lesson 
Augustine draws from his failure to achieve permanent interior peace is the 
need to ground this union in Christ (conf., 7, 10, 16; 7, 17, 23-7; 18, 24). Signifi-
cantly, Augustine’s post-conversion Christian mystical ascent at Ostia in conf. 
9, while it still fails to achieve a permanent union with God, is now conduct-
ed within a Christian communal context—with his Christian mother (conf., 9, 
10, 23-25). The quest for peace and the inability of humans to grasp it now 
becomes wrapped within a different hermeneutical lens, namely, the pilgrim 
Church and its eschatological hope for eternal peace.  Unlike his prior Platonist 
vision, the vision at Ostia is no longer interpreted as fleeting and futile. Rather, 
it offers to Augustine a proleptic vision of the life to come: “We sighed and left 
behind us ‘the first-fruits of the  Spirit’ [Romans 8: 23] bound to that higher 
world, as we returned to the noise of our human speech where a sentence 
has both a beginning and an ending” (conf., 9, 10, 24).17 The vision still ends, like 
the prior ones, but it is now couched in terms of the “first-fruits of the Spirit.” 
For Augustine, this signals the promise and hope of a future permanent union 
with God.18 It is also important to pay attention to the way Augustine connects 
the end of the Ostia vision to his departure from the Spirit and a return to hu-
man speech and finite existence. Here, we might infer that his mystical union 
with God is grounded in an eternal divine speaking that is present in the soul 
through the Spirit’s power. Within the Christological framework of his early 
sermons on the Psalms, we might also say that Augustine glimpses the es-
chatological and mystical vision of what it means to speak through Christ and 
so to participate in Christ’s body through the Spirit’s power. The cumulative 
point of conf. 7 and 9, then, and one that echoes Augustine’s sermons on the 
Psalms, is that we must move eschatologically toward peace and union with 
God through Christ, whom we encounter within a Christian communal con-
text (i.e., the Church).
Second, we can highlight the connection between conf. and Augustine’s ser-
mons on the Psalms by thinking more  broadly about how his accounts of the 
praise of God complement one another. In the opening lines of conf. Augustine 
announces that the soul is restless and lacks peace until its desires are properly 
17 “Et suspiravimus et reliquimus ibi religatas primitias spiritus et remeavimus ad strepitum 
oris nostri ubi verbum et incipitur et finitur.”
18 Elsewhere, Augustine explicitly connects Romans 8: 23 with the salvific hope of permanent 
union with God. See en. Ps. 31, 2, 20; 37, 5; 50, 19; trin. 2, 17, 29.
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aligned in the praise of God. Put differently, all things find peace in their proper 
place, and  humanity’s  place is dictated by its love, which finds its rightful orien-
tation in the  praise of God. Where is it, then, that we learn to praise God? This 
is the quest of conf., and I have argued that its resolution is found in Christ’s 
humility, which offers us a path toward ethical and ontological reformation—of 
act (love) and being (identity)—that Augustine tells us in conf. 13 occurs within 
the Church through the power of the Spirit. It is in this way that we learn to 
praise God aright, and it is here that we find peace when we join the angels in 
the praise and  worship of God. Augustine’s account of praise, then, gives us a 
glimpse into a more  nuanced, corporate  concept of interior peace that elevate 
his discussion beyond simply the individual soul finding rest in God. We find 
confirmation of this account in Augustine’s sermons on the Psalms, which give 
us a  robust notion of the Christological and ecclesiological dimensions that lay-
er human inwardness and are at the heart of interior peace. The voice of praise 
that permeates the Psalms is, for Augustine, the voice of Christ spoken in var-
ious forms and identities, but one that  includes and  incorporates the Church, 
and with it all of its members, in the praise of God. The Church provides the 
place for the proper  worship of God in constituting the body of Christ. We em-
body Christ, and  perhaps even speak as Christ, through our praise of God. This 
signals, then, that the interior peace of the soul comes through its inclusion 
within the  community of Christians.
Conclusion
Confessions is the tale of the human journey toward the patria pacis from 
out of the ashes of humanity’s restless, sinful anxiety. Augustine’s quest for 
interior peace is wrapped within this journey home. It is a quest that we 
have seen has a trinitarian and ecclesiological  structure.  Interior  peace is 
only achieved through our participation in Christ, which itself is structured 
by our inclusion within Christ’s body (the Church)  through the power of the 
Spirit. We find this peace when we find our rest, that is, when we find our 
proper place. Love dictates our place, and it is only within the body of Christ 
that we find the proper (moral) love that  directs our praise toward God. This 
love is also the  presence of the Spirit within the soul; indeed, this love is the 
Spirit, and so interior peace is not only a condition of the soul but also its 
deification. This points to the underlying reality of the soul’s interior nature, 
whose existence and identity is grounded in its imaging of God. We find our 
peace in uniting with God because our proper place—the place wherein we 
find rest—is as images of the divine.
[232] Agustín de Hipona como Doctor Pacis:  estudios sobre la paz en el mundo contemporáneo 
In this, the question of peace addresses the basic contours of the created na-
ture of our being. It also signals that the achievement of interior peace entails 
a life-long quest for a permanent and  profound transformation of our sinful 
reality. Our restless heart is not a superficial problem, but rather one that re-
quires a basic orientation of our identity toward ourselves, God, and other 
people. True interior peace requires our inner reconciliation as images of God, 
but this is a journey whose reforming process only occurs outwardly within 
the corporate context of the Church. Here we find the expansion, so to speak, 
of human interiority within the body of Christ. Interior peace is not found 
in a personal (private), inner meditative process of contemplation, even the 
sophisticated variety practiced within Platonism (conf., 7, 21, 27). As Augustine 
intimates in the opening lines of conf., interior peace requires the inward re-
ordering of our love of God. Insofar as the totus Christus provides the locus for 
true interior peace, we will find such reordering only through our participa-
tion in the Church and its accompanying spiritual and sacramental practices. 
This participation brings with it the transformation of our love of the neigh-
bor, and so also must inevitably lead to our moral reform in our relation to the 
world. Interior peace, then, requires a basic and permanent reconfiguration of 
our being in the world—of the place wherein we find our existence and iden-
tity—and so also of the world itself, which in turn points towards its escha-
tological horizon. We are not practitioners of peace but pilgrims in search of 
the patria pacis, which is a journey that will take us inward into God even as it 
moves us outward into the neighbor.
The Soul in Pieces and its Quest for the Peace of Christ [233]
Works Cited
Van Bavel, Tarcisius J. “The Double Face of Love in Augustine.” Augustinian  Studies, vol. 17, 
1986, 169-181.
Bonner, Gerald. “Augustine’s Concept of Deification.” The Journal of Theological Studies, 
vol. 37, no. 2, 1986, pp. 369-386.
Cameron, Michael. Christ Meets Me Everywhere: Augustine’s Early Figurative  Exegesis. 
New York, NY, Oxford University Press, 2012.
Canning, Raymond. The Unity of Love for God and Neighbor in St. Augustine.  Leuven, Au-
gustinian Historical Institute, 1993.
Drever, Matthew. Image, Identity, and the Forming of the Augustinian Soul. New York, NY, 
Oxford University Press, 2013.
Farley, Edward. Divine Empathy: A Theology of God. Minneapolis. MN, Fortress Press, 1996.
Fiedrowicz, Michael. Psalmus vox totius Christi: Studien zu Augustins “ Enarrationes in 
Psalmos.” Freiburg, Herder, 1997.
Marion, Jean-Luc. “Resting, Moving, Loving: The Access to the Self According to Saint 
Augustine.” The Journal of Religion, vol. 91, no. 1, 2011, pp. 24-42.
Meconi, David. (2013). The One Christ: St. Augustine’s Theology of Deification.  Washington, 
D.C., Catholic University of America Press.
-------------------------. “Becoming Gods by Becoming God’s: Augustine’s  Mystagogy of 
Identification.” Augustinian Studies, vol. 39, no. 1, 2008,  
pp. 61-74.
Teske, Roland. “The Ambiguity of Love in Augustine.” Confessions of Love: The Ambiguities 
of Greek Eros and Latin Caritas, edited by Craig J. N. de Paulo, New York, NY, Peter 
Lang, 2011, pp. 16-38. 
Williams, Raymond. On Augustine. New York, NY, Bloomsbury, 2016.
Wilson-Kastner, Patricia. “Grace as Participation in the Divine Life in the  Theology of 
Augustine of Hippo.” Augustinian Studies, vol. 7, 1976, pp. 135-52.

‘Live Together in Peace on 
the Way to God.’ The Rule of 
Augustine as a ‘Rule of Peace’
“Vivir juntos en paz en el camino de Dios”. 
La regla de Agustín como una “regla de paz”
8
Pierre-Paul Walraet
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Abstract
Love, harmony, unity, and peace are key to Augus-
tine’s ideal of the religious life. Augustine’s Praecep-
tum is explored from the perspective of peace. The 
monastic precepts, admonitions and recommen-
dations elaborated in the Praeceptum are geared 
toward peace in the community and finally toward 
eternal peace (in Deum, in pace). To this end, the 
Praeceptum emphasizes harmonious living to-
gether in community, observing the community 
of goods, fostering mutual respect in common and 
personal prayer, avoiding cases of anger and deal-
ing with them, fraternal correction through a re-
storative process, love that is not self-seeking but 
serves the common good, religious obedience to 
the superior. The brothers are called to seek peace 
and pursue it, aware that the peace here on Earth is 
still imperfect. The Praeceptum reflects aspects of 
Augustine’s vision and teaching on peace elaborat-
ed in Book XIX of the De Civitate Dei. In his Ennara-
tiones in Psalmos the bishop of Hippo uses images 
of a harbor, a furnace and a cartwheel to illustrate 
challenges in achieving peace, and points out faulty 
expectations for peaceful life in a religious commu-
nity. Authentic peace lived in community strength-
ens the longing and love for the spiritual beauty of 
God who is Perfect Peace.
Keywords: Brotherhood, fraternal correction, Prae-
ceptum, religious community, unity and peace.
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Resumen 
El amor, la armonía, la unidad y la paz son claves 
para el modelo de la vida religiosa de san Agustín; 
en Praeceptum, de Agustín, se explora este mode-
lo desde la perspectiva de la paz. Los preceptos 
orientan advertencias y recomendaciones monás-
ticas elaboradas en el Praeceptum hacia la paz en 
la comunidad y, finalmente, hacia la paz eterna (in 
Deum, in pace). Con este fin, el Praeceptum enfatiza 
en: convivir en armonía en comunidad, observar la 
comunidad de bienes, fomentar el respeto mutuo 
en la oración común y personal, evitar los casos 
de enojo y tratar con ellos, la corrección fraterna 
a través de un proceso restaurativo, un amor no 
egoísta sino que sirve al bien común, la obediencia 
religiosa al superior. Se llama a los hermanos a bus-
car la paz y perseguirla, teniendo en cuenta que la 
paz aquí en la tierra todavía es imperfecta. El Prae-
ceptum refleja aspectos de la visión y la enseñanza 
de san Agustín sobre la paz elaboradas en el Libro 
XIX de De Civitate Dei. En Ennarationes in Psalmos 
el obispo de Hipona usa imágenes de un puerto, un 
horno y una voltereta para ilustrar los desafíos que 
requiere la paz, y señala las expectativas erróneas 
de una vida pacífica en una comunidad religiosa. La 
paz auténtica vivida en la comunidad fortalece el 
anhelo y el amor por la belleza espiritual de Dios, 
que es la Paz Perfecta.
Palabras clave: Praeceptum, comunidad religiosa, 
unidad y paz, fraternidad, corrección fraterna.
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Introduction
Augustine, as Doctor Pacis, shapes religious life in every  generation by instilling 
peace-promoting values in the lives of brothers and sisters seeking God. The 
accent on peace in religious  community is not so much on the political order 
of society, as we might find in De Civitate Dei (cited hereafter, civ.), nor even 
on domestic order in a family  community of parents and children, nor even on 
the local faith community with its liturgical routines, its incorporation of new 
members and its ministers and pastors. This chapter focuses on Augustine’s 
concern for peace, order, tranquility and especially for the peaceful order for a 
unified well-ordered soul, intent on God, who is our Ultimate Peace.
Augustine’s particular concern for cura animarum for religious members of 
each fraternal order of religious life focuses on his Monastic Rule. In our anal-
ysis and discussion of the Rule we recognize first of all that the textual term 
peace does not occur in the entire treatise. The points of contact with the re-
ligious value of peace, however, occur at many points along the way, through-
out the text. Our method will be to focus on analysis of these contact points 
between the text of the Rule and the value of peace, through parallel reading 
Augustine’s other texts so as to underscore how the value of peace does ex-
plicitly inform a reading of the Rule as a rule promoting interpersonal and even 
intrapersonal saving peace.
The Rule, on first reading, accents the ordered social role of communal life 
lived in harmonious peace; on a second or deeper reading, the Rule accents 
a deeply personal atmosphere that is highly spiritual. We will also refer the 
reader to understanding peace as a characteristic evangelical mark the Doctor 
of Peace seeks to  inculcate personally and individually in each of the souls, 
that is, the anima et cor, and in the one corporate life (anima una) of those 
who congregate, who join to live life together unanimes. All are explicitly in-
tent—that is, share the same life aim in Deum; embodied communion with Ul-
timate Unity, Perfect Peace, and All-encompassing Love (“The Rule of Saint 
Augustine” 45).
Attain Peace in God
Interior peace was a significant outcome of the conversion of Augustine. 
While still in the garden of Milan, in 386, Augustine, in a like manner to Saint 
Anthony, experienced the silent reading of a Scripture passage as if it were a 
divine light relieving his anxiety and flooding into his heart: “Not in orgies and 
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drunkenness, not in promiscuity and licentiousness, not in rivalry and jeal-
ousy. But put on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make no provision for the desires 
of the flesh” (Rom. 13: 13-14).1
For Augustine, this chance text acted as a liberator from a  lengthy intolerable 
situation of anguish. The shadows of doubt were dispelled, at once. Immedi-
ately Augustine told everything to his friend Alypius, with an untroubled face 
now serene and at peace (conf. VIII, 12, 30).2
At the heart of Book X in Confessions (cited hereafter, conf.), Augustine offers 
a reflection on his conversion experience. The poetic-lyric prayer opens with 
the famous Sero te amavi, and continues:
You called and cried out loud and shattered my deafness. You were radiant 
and resplendent, you put to flight my blindness. You were fragrant, and I drew 
in my breath and now pant after you. I tasted you, and I feel but hunger and 
thirst for you. You touched me, and I am set on fire to attain the peace which 
is yours (conf., 10, 27, 38).3
Augustine felt set on fire to attain peace in God. This life perspec-
tive resonates with the solemn programmatic opening of conf.: “…you 
have made us for yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests in you” (conf., 
1, 1, 1.).4 The heart resting in God, attains peace in God5 as if now well placed, no 
longer feeling alien inside, awkward and displaced, out of place.
For Augustine, the oneness of mind and heart among brothers building a fra-
ternal community will be the religious route to achieve the intended goal—
unity in Deum. Attaining peace in God would become an aim to strive after 
and live for, within the context of a fraternal life with brothers in communi-
ty, modelled on the primitive Church community (Acts 4: 31-35). Hearts and 
minds find peace in fraternal oneness. If hearts and minds are not emotionally 
placed in their intended interpersonal position, namely not in unity and har-
mony, they are restless.
Shortly after the conversion experience in a garden at Milan in 386, Augustine 
made up his mind. He wanted to be a monk. His conversion to the faith of the 
1 See conf. VIII,12, 29.
2 “Tranquillo iam vultu.”
3 “In pacem tuam.”
4 “Fecisti nos ad te et inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in te.”
5 See conf. XIII, 9, 10: “In your gift we find our rest. There are you our joy. Our rest is our peace” 
(requies nostra locus noster).
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Catholic Church included a decision to live as a monk. For him, being a monk 
could not mean taking flight to live in solitude (conf., 10, 43, 70). Augustine did 
not desire to become a hermit in the Egyptian desert as had Saint Anthony.6 
Nonetheless, the life of the Christian anchorites and cenobites in the desert 
captured Augustine’s attention. Filled with awe, but also aware that this way of 
following Christ would surpass his own endurance, Augustine wrote, in 388, 
about the peaceful ideal of the coenobitic monasticism:
But if this far surpasses our endurance, who would not admire and  praise 
those who, having scorned and abandoned the allurements of this world, 
and come together in a most pure and holy common life, spend their time in 
prayers, reading, and discussion; and who, not  puffed up with any arrogance, 
not troublesome with any inflexibility, not spiteful out of jealousy, but meek, 
modest and peaceful, offer a most pleasing gift to God, from Whom they have 
gained the ability to do these things: namely a life lived in the greatest harmo-
ny and fully directed toward Him? (mor., 1, 31, 67 qtd. in Zumkeller 304). 
Augustine wanted to be a monk7 in a way that he would live  together with 
brothers in a community, dwelling in Christ (en. Ps., 132(133), 6), and fully de-
voted to the service of God in charity. For the distinctive Augustinian form 
of monastic life he would develop in North Africa,  Augustine took inspiration 
from the monks living even in the Italian cities, be it radically adjusted from the 
ordinary urban style of life. In Milan, Augustine saw such a dwelling place of 
consecrated men, presided over by a holy and most learned priest (conf., 8, 6, 
15; mor., 1, 33, 70). He got to know more of such places in Rome. This acquain-
tance with urban monks in Rome happened about a year after his conversion 
and baptism, before returning to North Africa, following the death of Monnica 
in 388 at Ostia.
6 A while before, Augustine and Alypius were informed by Ponticianus about the life of Saint 
Anthony, his conversion to follow Christ, and his influence as a monk on innumerable follow-
ers (conf., VIII, 6, 14-15).
7 Augustine explains the Greek word monos, meaning “only one”, to focus on intention rather 
than social arrangement. For Augustine, the term monk refers distinctively to the united ded-
ication of heart and mind among the many brothers in one common life (en. Ps., 132(133) 6). 
See also Burt 631-632: “Though maintaining their individuality, they [monks] should be aim-
ing at becoming one (monos), a community living together in peace and love… The peace of 
the religious community… depended on being friends with each other and friends with God.”
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On the Way to Peace Through Monastic Community Life
Before Augustine describes the illness and death of his mother at Ostia, quite 
immediately after their intimate conversation (conf., 9, 10, 23-25) about the 
divine Wisdom which they touched for one instant, he writes about a holy de-
cision he proposed to undertake. The passage opens with Psalm 67 (68), verse 
7, as also quoted in his Praeceptum (1, 2):8
“You make people to live in a house in unanimity” (Ps. 67: 7). So you made 
Evodius a member of our circle, a young man from my hometown. When he 
was a civil servant as an agent in the special branch, he was converted to you 
before we were. He was baptized and resigned his post on taking up your 
service. We were together and by a holy decision resolved to live together. 
We looked for a place where we could be of most use in your service; all of us 
agreed on a move back to Africa (conf., 9, 8, 17).
Following through on that holy decision, Augustine returned to Thagaste, in 
order to implement the plan he had undertaken to serve God, in the compa-
ny of some countrymen and friends, who wished to serve God in the same 
way.9 Once a priest, in 391, and with the permission of the old bishop Valeri-
us, the monk Augustine implemented his decision to establish a monastery in 
the garden of the basilica pacis (intra ecclesiam) at Hippo Regius. This allowed 
him to continue as a priest the monastic life in community. With the servants 
of God, he began to live according to the manner and the rule of the holy 
Apostles. When named his successor, and after the death of bishop Valerius, 
Augustine founded another monastery in the house of the bishop, in 395/396. 
 Augustine as bishop formed a clerical monastery with his priests, deacons and 
sub-deacons. These brother monks became well-formed—that is, communi-
ty-formed—clerics. Augustine’s biographer refers to the monastic commu-
nity’s strategic role in the establishment of peace and unity in the Catholic 
Church of North Africa, which suffered from the separatist movement of the 
Donatists:
As the sacred teaching spread, those who served God in the monastery under 
the holy Augustine’s leadership and in his company began to be ordained as 
clerics for the church at Hippo. And, then, as the truth of the Catholic Church 
preaching, and the holy life, continence, and complete poverty of God’s holy 
servants grew in reputation and daily became more famous, the peace and 
8 References to the Praeceptum are made in the text.
9 See Possidius Vita Augustini 3; and Zumkeller 424.
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unity of the Church began to seek bishops and clerics from the monastery 
which owed both its existence and growth to this remarkable man.10
When Augustine, monk and priest became bishop, he was concerned about 
maintaining the contemplative atmosphere of peace and quiet in the garden 
monastery, occupied by non-clerical brothers.11 The bishop of Hippo was firm-
ly resolved to remain faithful to his original vocation. He decided to contin-
ue his monastic life, in a different place, namely in the house of the bishop 
(domus episcopi). There he formed a community of clerics in a monasterium 
clericorum. Therefore, Augustine was no longer immediately on hand to lead 
and guide the garden monastery. Keeping in mind the brothers of the garden 
monastery whom he had left behind as their founding leader, Augustine com-
piled the Praeceptum, the “Rule for Men”.12 Instructing the brothers through 
 conferences13 was not possible anymore. By way of “compensation” for some-
thing otherwise routinely personal, dialogical and more dynamically vital, the 
written Praeceptum spells out the norm that it should be read aloud, once a 
week (VIII, 2).
Ordered by a “Rule of Peace”
The reason why brothers have come to live together to form a religious com-
munity is to live together in harmony (Ps. 67(68): 7), “being of one mind and 
of one heart” (Acts 4: 32) on the way to God, or intent upon God. This is the 
primum propter quod of the Praeceptum (1, 1-2). To seek love and harmony in 
God is the goal of building religious and fraternal community life according to 
the monastic legacy of Augustine of Hippo. Living together in harmony (uni-
animes) and being of one mind and of one heart (concordia) are conditions 
for realizing peace.14 Peace practiced in the religious community, ripples out 
through the community into the society. If the members of a religious com-
munity, following the Praeceptum, succeed in living together in harmony and 
10 Possidius Vita Augustini 11 (424).
11 Augustine “decided to leave the garden monastery in order not to endanger the peace of the 
community’s existence; as bishop, he could not avoid receiving many visitors to his house” (s., 
355, 2). See Zumkeller 40.
12 See Augustine “The Monastic Rules” 54. See also the English translation of the Praeceptum 
by Lawless 80-103.
13 De diversis questionibus octoginta tribus collects answers to questions posed by the broth-
ers on various subjects, between 388 and 396.
14 See civ. 19, 13: “Peace among men is an ordered concord” (pax hominum ordinata con-
cordia).
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experience  moments of oneness of mind and of heart, peace will emerge. The 
precepts Augustine laid down in the Praeceptum to be observed by those ad-
mitted to the monastery are meant to order the life in the community in such 
way that unity and harmony can be established, from which  earthly peace and 
peacefulness may result. Peace among the brothers who live together in com-
munity realizes peace in the house.
Further, to connect human concord with the transcendent religious horizon, 
the fraternal life of the Augustinian monastic community is actively intent 
upon the peace of the brothers with one another in God. Such is the horizon of 
the peace of the city of God. The peace of the heavenly city is the true peace15 
and the source of every other peace (civ., 19, 13). When Augustine preached 
to the people at Carthage about Psalm 85, he explored the final transcendent 
horizon of total, everlasting peace, the true and perfect peace:
We shall be in a city… that city, whence no friend departs, where no enemy 
gains entrance, where there is no tempter, no disturber of the peace, no one 
to cause divisions within God’s people… A peace made pure will reign among 
(within) God’s children: they will all love themselves as they see themselves 
full of God, and God will be all in all (see 1 Cor. 15: 28). For all of us God will be 
the object of our contemplation; he will be our common possession, he our 
common peace. Whatever he gives us now, he himself will be for us then in 
place of what he gives. He himself will be our peace, perfect and total (en. Ps., 
84(85), 10).
This description of the anticipated outcome of Augustine’s ideal of the monas-
tic life governs Augustine’s vision of the Praeceptum. Monastic life according 
Augustine aims at God being the object of the community’s contemplation; 
God being the community’s common possession and common peace.16 Speak-
ing in the same spirit about the perfect common life, Augustine publicly said 
to the faithful at Hippo’s basilica pacis, recalling the history of his monastic 
foundations in that city:
I began to assemble brothers to be my companions in this holy undertaking, 
men possessing nothing just as I possessed nothing and imitating me. Just as 
15 There can be no true peace where there is no real harmony; there is no real harmony when 
all hearts are privately and when each goes as far as possible to do what he will. See Io. ev. 
tr. 77, 5. 
16 The shortest summary Augustine ever gave of his monastic ideal could be this: “Unus in uno 
ad unum” (en. Ps., 147, 28). The brothers are “together one, in the one Christ, on the way to the 
one Father”. See “The Rule of Saint Augustine” 45.
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I sold my tiny bit of property and gave the proceeds to the poor, so they too 
who wished to be with me did the same, that we might live from our shared 
resources; but what we shared would be a great and very rich estate: God 
 Himself (s., 355, 2). 
In the opening of the Praeceptum, Augustine quotes a psalm. The psalm text 
he had before him reads: “God, who brings those of one mind together in one 
house.” Those of one mind, living together in one house, are a privileged place 
for encountering the Lord (tabernaculum). Augustine asks: “Do you want to be 
a house for God? Then be humble and peaceable and tremble at God’s word 
and you will yourself become what you are seeking” (en. Ps., 131[132], 4).
Being of one mind and one heart, intent on God, is not merely nor primarily an 
outcome of human efforts. It is a gift, the fruit of the action of God in the life 
of the community. The end of Augustine’s Praeceptum confirms this acknowl-
edgement: “May the Lord grant that, filled with longing for spiritual beauty 
(Sirach 44, 6) you will lovingly observe all that has been written here” (8, 1). In 
other words, brothers are dependent on the grace of God to live together in 
harmony and to be of one mind and one heart. In line with Augustine’s deepest 
faith conviction (civ., 15,4), we may say that peace, resulting from living out of 
the  basic principles of the Praeceptum, is a gift of God,17 and  contemplatively 
 understood, a religious experience of spiritual beauty (8, 1). To  become lovers 
of spiritual beauty is a significant religious objective Augustine has in mind. It 
is the heartbeat of Augustine’s spirituality of community life. This intentional 
prime aim should motivate the brothers to lovingly observe the Praeceptum, in 
view of experiencing God’s unity and harmony, beauty and peace.
The experience of fraternal unity and interpersonal harmony, from which 
flows a longing for spiritual beauty and peace is not a quick fix. Each chapter of 
the Praeceptum points out driving forces and restraining forces that promote 
or, conversely, do not promote unity, harmony and integrity as conditions for 
peace, as well as experiential ways to God who is Perfect Peace.18 It is our in-
tention to explore the Praeceptum from this perspective.
17 Augustine states: “Brothers dwell in unity by the grace of God—not by their own power, not 
of their own merits, but by his gift, by his grace, like the dew from  heaven. For the earth does 
not rain upon itself, and whatever the earth has brought forth would dry up if the rain does 
not flow down from heaven” (en. Ps., 132(133), 10; 403).
18 See Gillette 108: “The diverse parts of the Rule are orchestrated towards building communi-
ty in the bond of peace, through the process of caring, enduring, serving, forgiving, honoring, 
and correcting.”
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Community of Goods as Way to Peace
The life of the primitive Christian community forms the foundation 
of Augustine’s ideal of the religious life. Acts 4: 32-35 was also the rule of 
life for Augustine’s community of clerics (monasterium clericorum) gathered 
in the bishop’s house (domus episcopi).19 The distinctive Augustinian focus of 
this monastic ideal is on forming community. Interpersonal relationships build 
upon and draw inspiration from the double command of love: “Love God above 
all else, dearest brothers, then your neighbor also, because these are the pre-
cepts given us as primary principles” (Ordo Monasterii, 1)  (Lawless 75).20 The 
abiding goal of love is experienced peace. Commenting on Psalm 33(34), verse 
15, “seek peace and pursue it”,  Augustine says: 
Scripture does not promise you that you will have peace here; seek it, pursue 
it… we seek peace here, but will obtain it only at the end. Yet we do have peace 
in some degree here, in order that we may deserve to have it totally there. …
Let us be of one heart here, let us love our  neighbor as ourselves. Love your 
brother and sister as you love yourself, and have peace with them (en. Ps., 
33[34] II,19).21
The first practical implication in the Praeceptum of the double command of 
love to achieve unity, harmony and peace is concrete and down to earth: the 
community of goods. “Among you there can be no question of personal prop-
erty. Rather, take care that you share everything in common” (1, 3). Making 
private goods common is fundamental for building a monastic community and 
making a place for the Lord. By describing the social agitation of the opposite, 
that is, private possessions, Augustine provides a striking rationale for making 
clear the positive effects of  sharing everything in common:
What are we fighting over? Over the things we call our own. We do not go 
to law about things we possess in common, do we? We all breathe in the air 
that belongs to all of us, and we all enjoy the sunshine that is common to all. 
19 See s., 356, 1. At the beginning of this second sermon on the way of life of the clerics, the 
deacon Lazarus read Acts 4: 31-35, which before continuing the sermon was read again by 
bishop Augustine.
20 Referring to Mt. 22: 37-40: “Ante omnia, fratres carissimi, diligatur Deus, deinde et proxi-
mus, quia ista sunt praecepta principaliter nobis data.” The Regula recepta consists of the first 
sentence of the Ordo Monasterii followed by the Praeceptum.
21 See also en. Ps. 147, 15: “Pursue this peace, long for this peace… love peace in your homes, …
Love peace with your friends, and love peace with your enemies.”
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 Blessed are those who are so intent on making a place for the Lord that they 
take no pleasure in their private possessions (en. Ps., 131(132), 5).22
The terminology used (e.g. fighting) gives evidence that the emphasis on pri-
vate possessions does not promote the peace that is aimed for in the com-
munity, nor in the broader society. Social peace, on Augustine’s reading of the 
Acts story, is conditioned by common ownership and common use. His mo-
nastic rule lays out as a fundamental characteristic and norm of Augustinian 
community the precept of common property. 
Next, the Praeceptum refers to the role of the superior. Once the possessions 
are commonly shared, and nobody says, “this belongs to me”, the superior can 
take over care for the needs of each of the brothers without distinction. He,
Should see to it that each person is provided with food and clothing. He does 
not have to give exactly the same to everyone, for you are not all equally 
strong, but each person should be given what he personally needs (1, 3).23 
The unity and harmony in the Augustinian community is not  fostered by 
mechanistic equality or uniformity. The brothers or sisters are unique persons 
with strengths and weaknesses.24
Augustine’s community of the garden monastery was composed by unique 
persons. A conditioning background “distinction” is noticed between “those 
who owned possessions in the world” (1, 7) and “those who did not have pos-
sessions” (1, 4-5). Augustine is aware that living together in community is a 
challenge for both “former rich” and “former poor”. The first come from a more 
comfortable manner of life. The latter are considered more robust individuals 
(3, 4). Their former status in life and their background differ. Augustine weighs 
22 See also s., 355, 2, qtd. in Gillette 89. The monk-bishop of Hippo underlines that the really 
great and profitable common estate is God himself.
23 For those who had nothing before entering the monastery “allowance should be made for 
their frailty, however on the basis of individual need, even if previous poverty never permit-
ted them to satisfy those needs” (1, 5). Augustine’s definition on peace and order is applied: 
“The peace of all things is the tranquility of order. Order is the distribution of things equal 
and unequal, each to its own place” (civ., 19, 13). See also civ., 19, 4: “What is to be said of jus-
tice, whose task is to assign to each man his due…”
24 See ep., 130, 14, 31: “Let each of you do what she can in fasting, vigils, and every chastisement 
of the body, by which prayer is helped very much. If another cannot do as much, let her do 
what she can if she loves in the other what she does not do because she cannot. Hence, let 
one who cannot do as much not hold back the one who can do more, and let not the one who 
can do more not urge on the one who cannot do as much.”
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in on the aptness of a superior, considering personal background information, 
to determine fair distribution according to need.
Chapter I of the Praeceptum presents a list of admonitions addressed to those 
who were “rich” and to those who were “poor”: 
Do not call anything your own; do freely consent to possess everything in 
common; do not seek in the monastery possessions which were beyond your 
reach outside; do not consider present good fortune to consist in the posses-
sion of food and clothing…, do not put your nose in the air…; do not pursue 
hollow worldly concerns…; do not belittle the brothers who come to the holy 
society from a condition of poverty…; do not have a high opinion of yourselves 
because of making available some of your possessions to the community.
Through these warnings, Augustine instills renunciation of possessions via the 
personally appropriated virtue of humility in the members living in the mon-
astery. The central issue is not weighing up on objective scales equal portions. 
Rather, the central concern is developing good judgment and personally ap-
propriated values within members’ assessment of what is good and apt and 
concords harmoniously to the God’s eye point of view. Augustine’s observation 
about pride, considered a trap able to destroy even good works, speaks of it-
self. “Hasten on ahead” (en. Ps., 132(133), 13)25 could well point out the dynamic 
cutting-edge standard involved in each person’s attaining personal improve-
ment and poised blessedness in communal life and communal sharing.
…desire for that security where peace is fullest and most certain. …There the 
virtues, no longer struggling against any vice or evil whatsoever, will have as 
the reward of victory eternal peace which no  adversary may disquiet. For this 
is the final blessedness, this is the ultimate perfection, the unending end (civ., 
19, 10).
The above listed cautions, pointing out important attitudes, Augustine pro-
poses, should be honored by the brothers, in striving for unity,  harmony and 
peace. The purpose of these principle  attitudes is to bring order in the liv-
ing together of people with a diversity in background. One required attitude 
stands out: “No one should desire the extras  given to a few more out of toler-
ance than out of deference” (3, 4). The Praeceptum (3, 3-4) calls the brothers to 
be at peace when seeing another receiving more; when noticing that excep-
25 “Hasten on ahead with your heart where you cannot follow with your body” parallels 
Praeceptum, 1, 6: “…but they should lift up their heart, seeking the nobler things” (sed sursum 
cor habeant). See also en. Ps., 85(86), 6.
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tions are made: better food, a special diet for health reasons, better bedding, 
more blankets.26 Being at  peace is fostered when one is aware concessions are 
granted not to show  favor but out of concern for the person in special need. 
That a brother is at peace will become obvious when he is glad and grateful for 
having the strength to endure what others cannot.
The monastic community for which Augustine compiled the Praeceptum was 
characterized by multiplicity and rich diversity, due to the uniqueness and 
proper history of each of the members. In this human and social reality of a 
monastic community,  peace will be found in what Augustine later will call the 
tranquility of  order (tranquillitas ordinis).27 The meaning of order, applied to 
the shared life lived in an Augustinian endowed monastic community, implies 
that each member is assigned to his proper passive receptive and active con-
tributing place, by appreciating both his personal background and his proper 
strengths. On the way to God,  experienced multiplicity will not be an obsta-
cle to  striving for unity and harmony amid personal differences of need and 
 contributed gifts. For that desired peace and unity to happen, members old 
and young will need to be schooled in appropriate assessing skills, learning to 
judge wisely and not merely mechanistically and  rigidly. Good  judgment is a 
cultivated religious gift of perfecting the soul toward a life bent on real care of 
the other and mutual love.
The short final paragraph of Chapter I, echoing I, 2, summarizes our exploration: 
“Live then, all of you, in harmony and concord (unanimiter et concorditer 
vivite);28 honor God mutually in each other; you have become His temples 
(1,8).29 It is a call to life (vivite)! According to Agatha, the Latin concordia “calls 
to mind harmony, friendship, and peace—qualities that a loving heart can bring 
to birth.” She adds:
But can these be born among a group whose common difficulties have been 
probed earlier in this chapter? Yes, but not once and for all. Yes, again and 
again, every time that a monk’s mind and heart turn away from self-regarding 
26 The needs listed are physical and bodily. Meeting these human needs will benefit the inner 
tranquility which is indispensable for living in unity and harmony with one another. See also 
Gillette 97: “If everyone has what he or she needs, there will be less worry and fuss and there-
fore fewer complaints. Peace reigns where there is tranquility of order.”
27 See civ. 19, 13: “Pax omnium rerum tranquillitate ordinis”. Augustine’s  well-known definition 
for “peace.” Schrama 860-865 points out that Augustine’s Praeceptum and civ., 19 have themes 
in common. 
28 See Acts 4:32; Rom. 15: 6.
29 See 2 Cor. 6:16.
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to see and to worship him who is at the center of the community’s life (Agatha 
88-89).
The close-knit order of life inside the Augustinian monastery is concretely dif-
ferent from the way people’s life is ordered in the social world, characterized 
by personal and private property. A monastic common life requires efforts and 
adaptations from all brothers, regardless of their background, seeking now to 
share life together, to grow into  unity (civ., 19, 17), and to live peacefully in the 
house. The peace called concordia is experienced when brothers in the mon-
astery, regardless of their background, are intentionally and intently centered 
on God, and honor God in one another. The Augustinian accent on develop-
ing one’s interiority, each one’s soul, entails intent conversion to God so as 
to shape one’s judgments and decisions and behaviors dynamically based in 
Deum.
Awaiting the everlasting blessings promised for the future, the brothers 
in the community, like pilgrims, should use anything  earthly and tempo-
rarily, not letting these goods entrap or distract from the path that leads 
to God and the most blessed life.30 To facilitate this conversion of soul to 
the final horizon of God Augustine recommends to move from having 
to improving on how we exercise our soul weighing what is really  better: “…it 
is better to need less than to have more” (3, 5).31
An Ordered Life of Prayer as Way to Peace
Praeceptum 1, 8 (see above) serves as transition to Chapter II. The use of the 
image of the temple is striking: a place within each brother; a place prepared 
for God. Chapter II is dedicated to the personal and communal prayer life 
in the monastery. The precepts include ordering this dimension of the life 
in the religious community. The importance of the concrete oratorium is 
emphasized.
For peace to be established in the community, the tranquility of an ordered life 
of prayer is important. Aspects that bring order in a community life entirely 
centered on God are, thus, included in Chapter II of the Praeceptum, on prayer. 
Augustine exhorts the community to “be assiduous in prayer (see Col. 4: 2) at 
the scheduled hours and times” (2, 1). Time and space are set aside.  Together 
with the need for scheduled time and the observed hours  (horarium), the 
30 See civ., 19, 17.
31 “Melius est enim minus egere quam plus habere.”
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Praeceptum clarifies the need for an ordered space (oratorium). Space thus 
ordered is  mindfully set apart as an exclusive place of undisturbed quiet and 
 silence. This space should be freed from any business that disrupts the pur-
pose the oratory is to serve. No one can do anything there except that what 
the prayer space in the monastery is built for. Because, “if some wish to pray 
even outside the scheduled periods, during their free time, they should not be 
deterred by people who think they have some other task there” (2, 2).
Order is disrupted when a brother performs tasks that violate the  purpose of the 
place assigned for individual prayer. Peace in the community and in the heart 
of the brothers is fostered by a mutual respect for dedicated or mindfully pur-
posed privacy.  Peace is cared for by commonly providing a spiritual architecture 
(an oratorium) without disturbance. For the brothers in need for praying to God 
outside the appointed hours and times, an ordered priority space is provided. 
Whenever the brother enters the oratorium, he may move into this place with the 
right and good intention for turning to God in prayer: respecting 
the place and providing for his intention, the other brothers, thus respect the 
order of a shared communal religious life, dedicated as it is (primum propter 
quod…) to enable loving and turning to God. This specific norm of the rule 
concretizes the aim and purpose for life together.
Augustine, furthermore, emphasizes the importance of integrity and congru-
ency in the common prayer life of the brothers: “When you pray to God in 
psalms and hymns, the words you speak should be alive in your hearts” (II, 
3). Integrity and congruence are expressions of the peace of the rational soul 
which enjoys an ordered agreement of knowledge (what is alive in the mind 
and heart of the brother) and action (praying psalms and hymns). The brothers 
exercise their mind and heart in contemplation and act in accordance with it 
(civ., 19, 14).32
Table Fellowship as a Way to Peace
Not only is the oratorium the place where the Word of God is  listened to; 
the community is exhorted to also “listen to the customary reading from the 
beginning to the end of the meal without commotion or arguments” (3, 2), 
that is to say in peace, without resistance, in obedience and meekness (s. dom. 
m., I, 4, 11). Augustine adds: “Food is not for the mouth alone (Mt. 4: 4); your 
ears also should hunger for the Word of God (Amos 8, 11)” (3, 2). Because, as 
32 On Praeceptum, 2, 3, see Gillette 86-87.
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Augustine says elsewhere: “The voice of Christ, the voice of God, is peace, 
and it calls us to peace” (en. Ps., 84(85), 10). Hearing the voice of Christ and 
listening to the Word of God keeps the brothers focused on the aim of their 
life as religious in the community: in Deum, growing enthusiasm, and fullness 
of life in God.33 Moments of table fellowship are ordered moments. Atten-
tion should be given to both the body and the soul. The body hungers for 
food. But the brothers should not focus in such way on the bodily hunger for 
food as to forget the hunger for the Word of God. Augustine’s definition of 
peace, connecting soul and body, is applied in practice: the peace 
of the body and soul is the ordered life and health of the brothers living in 
community.34
Regarding table fellowship, Possidius points to another obstacle to peaceful 
relationships among the brothers as well as when invited guests join the meals 
of the community. An inscription in the table served as a caution for those—
even Augustine’s fellow-bishops and friends—who would openly disturb the 
peaceful fellowship at meals by openly voicing infectious and hateful criticism 
about  absent people. Possidius writes:
At the table he [Augustine] preferred reading or conversation to eating and 
drinking, and to counteract a contagious habit of men he had these words 
inscribed on his table: “If anyone feeds by  biting at other men’s backs, he will 
not find at this table the food that he lacks (Possidius Vita Augustini, 22; 425).35
Augustine once was very agitated. Friends at table forgot the  inscription. He 
rebuked them saying that either the warning in writing would be removed 
from the table or he would leave the table right away and  withdraw in his 
room.
Fraternal Correction as a Way to Peace
Striving and working for unity and peace in a religious community can be 
harmed, by the disruptive behavior of a wayward brother, by a manner of life 
that damages his integrity, and the integrity of the  community, and by atti-
tudes that are inconsistent with the way of life the brother committed himself 
to. What he does wrong gives offense to those who see him because it is not 
33 For a description of this aim, see en. Ps., 99(100), 12: “That rest which awaits us, where we 
shall be equal to the angels” (In illa requie, in illa aequalitate Angelorum).
34 See civ., 19,1 3: “pax corporis et animae ordinata vita et salus animantis.”
35 “Quisquis amat dictis absentum rodere vitam, hanc mensam indignam noverit esse suam.”
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in keeping with his holy state (4, 3). His behavior does not befit his call to mo-
nastic community life intent on the way to God.
The purpose of Chapter IV in the Praeceptum is not to develop a theory or 
theology of celibacy. The provisions included were, instead, a cultural condi-
tioned necessity for safeguarding the unity and well-being and peace of the 
community. They elaborate a procedure (4, 7-8-9)36 for how to deal in com-
munity with a  brother who behaves improperly, and whose heart is harmfully 
infected by sin, namely the provocative and lustfully looking at a woman. What 
should be done if it happens? Reporting the offender to the superior is not 
the first step. After that, given neglect of the warning by an individual brother, 
when noticing falling back into the improper behavior, then two or three oth-
er brothers—a small delegation of the community—should be informed first. 
Out of the community’s felt responsibility for one another, and prompted by 
honest fellow feelings for each member, a group effort seeks to convince the 
errant brother of his fault. He must be called back to order with firmness. 
His mind and heart are to be redirected back to the fundamental aim of his 
vocation, conducting his life on the way to God, on the way to Peace. All these 
efforts may still fail. In case of perseverance in evil-doing, finally the superior 
gets involved. He first calls the suspect brother to accountability. This shall 
happen in a private colloquium. The superior shall not immediately and pub-
licly expose the brother’s wrongdoing to the full community. However, in case 
the brother’s misconduct does not change, “then the others are to be sum-
moned without his know ledge so that he can be accused in the presence of 
all” (4, 9). Because the brother who does wrong is member of the community, 
all other brothers have a stake in redressing the problem and should engage 
the brother in working at a resolution to acknow ledge the evil and restore to 
good. Silence, at this point, would mean ruinous denial or tacit complicity and 
thus further harm both the erring member and the community’s common life, 
which can only be built up by supportive fraternal and healthy interpersonal 
relationships among all the brothers.
If the brother is proved guilty, a suitable punishment is determined by the 
superior or by the priest, with a view on the improvement of the behavior, 
again be it noted, so that peace might be re-established in the heart of the 
brother as well as in fostering mutual brotherly relationships in the commu-
nity. Dismissal from the community is not ruled out if he refuses the imposed 
36 Augustine builds upon Mt. 18:15-17, on what it means to live in an evangelical community. 
See also civ., 19, 16 on what to do when disobedience breaks the  domestic peace.
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 punishment. Dismissal is the ultimate step in the “tough love” procedure not-
ed in the Praeceptum.
Augustine’s dominant message of love makes its impression here as well. The 
heart of the brothers, the superior or the priest should always be ordered to 
fraternal love, in every step of whatever procedure is used, including the dis-
missal step. The unruly brother shall never be totally identified with his act of 
wrongdoing. Augustine clearly distinguishes sin from sinner. A communal act 
of totally identifying the person with his act would point to unjust harshness 
in both the superior or the other community members. Augustine concludes:
Diligently and faithfully, then, attend to my word about suggestive glances at 
women. Such advice holds also for detection, prevention, disclosure, proof, 
and punishment of other offenses, with love for the person and hatred for the 
sin (4, 9).37
It strikes us that punishment is reserved as the last remedy. Energy goes first 
and foremost into fraternal correction. Fraternal  correction is a relational pro-
cess. It keeps the interconnection between the brothers alive and restores 
by face-to-face encounter the bruised relationships. The community’s duty is 
based in building the fraternal relation of love, that is, even in finding a step 
forward. It is to lovingly persuade the brother who does wrong. The brothers 
seek to get him to think about his unacceptable behavior, which distances him 
from the community and his own good, and to amend it. The kind of message 
they should convey to the brother could be like this: no matter what you do 
or say, we will continue to love you, to support you, to hold you  accountable 
to be all that you can be as a human person and as a religious fellow brother 
in the community. To be all that you can be would mean to be faithful to your 
call and primary commitment to the fraternal community on the way to God 
in oneness of mind and heart.
The fraternal correction process as spelled out at length in the Praeceptum 
aims at restoring order in the community, at the rehabilitation of the broth-
er who did wrong. The process also  restores peace as a constitutive compo-
nent of fraternal relationships and as an indispensable condition for relational 
growth in the community. The purpose and end of fraternal correction is re-
forming the offending brother so as to  participate in the constitutive peace 
and harmony in community, a peace which he had bruised, a concord from 
which he had broken away (civ., 19, 16).
37 “Cum dilectione hominum et odium vitiorum.” See also civ., 14, 6. 
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The Rule’s lengthy attention to health and healing underscores the  Augustinian 
community’s vivid human-sacramental process of embodying and enabling 
the work of achieving health-as-shalom, glorifying God in honoring the inter-
personal dynamics present in a community of tough love.
Reconciliation as a Way to Peace
Chapter VI of the Praeceptum opens with this admonition: “Either have no 
quarrels or put an end to them as quickly as possible” (6, 1). This phrase mirrors 
an earlier warning: “If you notice in any of your number this roving eye re-
ferred to above, immediately admonish the individual and correct the matter 
as soon as possible, in order to curb its progress” (4, 7).
Both phrases accentuate interpersonal fraternal immediateness: “notice” leads 
to “act” as quickly as possible. When inner peace is at danger, when an inter-
personal peaceful relation in the community is disturbed, something needs to 
be done, as soon as possible. In terms of quarrels or cases of anger between 
brothers in the community, Augustine indicates two guidelines: one is to avoid 
having them; the second guideline is to put an immediate end to them. Quar-
rels should be transformed to reconciliation as soon as they arise. Augustine 
writes to Felicity, the superior of the women’s monastery at Hippo, and to 
Rusticus, the superior of the men’s monastery who served as priest to the 
women’s convent:
Put more effort into establishing harmony among yourselves than into rebuk-
ing one another. For just as vinegar spoils a container if it is kept there too 
long, so anger ruins a heart if it lasts until the next day. Do this, then, and the 
God of peace will be with you (Phil. 4: 9), and at the same time pray for us that 
we may quickly carry out the good admonitions we give (ep., 210, 2).38
A brother who quarrels, excludes the other from his love. Divided and sepa-
rated individuals do not live in harmony. They do harm to the prime reason for 
why members have come to live together to form a religious community (1, 2). 
For in discord, the Lord  cannot be not praised (en. Ps., 132(133), 13). To enjoy 
harmony with God and to praise Him, hearts must be open and at peace with 
everyone in the community. Therefore, Augustine underlines that whatever 
quarrels and disagreements might surface, that these be ended as quickly as 
possible: “A swift course of action is called for since the heart itself suffers 
corrosion until peace is reestablished” (Gillette 104).
38 See Gillette 99. See also ep. Io. tr., 4, 6.
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Augustine is straightforward in his admonitions to deal with  discord in the 
community, but also realistic. He says: “It is impossible, though, for disputes 
never to arise. They have broken out between brethren, even between saints, 
between Barnabas and Paul (see Acts 15: 39), but not so as to destroy the unity 
of hearts, not so as to kill charity” (en. Ps., 33(34), 2,19). Augustine encourages 
people to be active in searching for peace:
Seek peace, then, brothers and sisters. The Lord said, These things I tell you, 
that in me you may have peace. I do not promise you peace in this world (see John 
16: 33; 14,27). In this life there is no true peace, no tranquility. We are promised 
the joy of immortality and fellowship with the angels. But anyone who has not 
sought it here will not find it on arriving there (en. Ps., 33(34) 2, 19).39
Seeking peace and pursuing it (Ps. 33(34):15) entails the ongoing and  freely 
willed efforts in the monastic community to return to the anima una et cor 
unum from which quarrelling, anger, discord, insults, the use of harmful 
words, having gone too far, accusation, turn away. Seeking peace and pur-
suing it means “to right the wrong… at the earliest opportunity”, to mutual-
ly “forgive without further bickering”, and to make sure that the same lips 
from which harsh words have escaped “promptly heal the wounds they have 
caused” (6, 2).
Obedience in Love as Way to Peace
On several occasions, Augustine’s Praeceptum addresses the role of the su-
perior (praeposito). The superior shall provide each of the brothers with food 
and clothing (1, 3). A stubborn wayward brother is to be reported to the su-
perior (4, 9). A salutary punishment shall be determined by the judgment 
of the superior or the priest (4, 9). The priest or the superior may judge it 
necessary to severely correct someone (4, 11). Gifts are to be submitted to 
the superior as common property so that it can be given to whoever needs 
it (5, 3). The superior decides how often a brother’s clothes are to be laun-
dered (5, 4).40 The superior may oblige brothers to visit the public baths (5, 5). 
The superior designates the companions with whom a brother will visit the 
public baths or any other place (5, 7). And, the superior has a good opinion 
of his brothers.41
39 Perfect peace will be given to those who draw back from evil and do good. See s., 72, 9.
40 To avoid that an inordinate desire for clean clothes disturbs the inner peace of the heart.
41 See s., 355, 2: “bene autem sentio de fratribus meis”, referred to by Gillette 89.
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Chapter VII of the Praeceptum is on authority and obedience, citing scrip-
ture: “Obey your superior (Heb. 13: 17) as a father” (7, 1). A superior is in a posi-
tion of authority. The superior serves in love, because the double command-
ment of love applies to him. The opposite of serving in love would be the 
desire to rule over others by striving to be feared by them instead of striving 
to be loved (7, 3). The superior, by his formative religious role, should desire 
and pray that all in the community may reach the heavenly home where the 
duty of commanding them will be unnecessary because there will be no duty 
of providing for those who are already happy in that immortal state, and en-
joy the everlasting love and peace the contemplation of the spiritual beauty 
(spiritalis pulchritudinis) (8,1).
To be obedient is to be at peace. Disobedience breaks the peace (civ., 19, 16). 
Book XIX of De Civitate Dei links peace and obedience. First when Augustine 
speaks about the peace between mortals and God, it is an ordered obedience 
in faith to eternal law (civ., 19, 13). Further: “…domestic peace is ordered con-
cord among those ruling and those obeying… For those who are concerned for 
others give commands… But those who are objects obey…” (civ., 19, 13; 14). This 
description could be applied to the house in which the brothers live together 
under a superior whose principle task it is one of seeing to it that all precepts 
of the Praeceptum are observed (1, 2; 7, 2). In short, the peace and the unity in 
the monastic community is fostered and determined by both “commanding in 
love” and “obeying with respect.” To that end, the peace in the community is 
ordered through a superior who regards himself to be fortunate as one who 
serves the brothers in love, and not as one who exercises authority over the 
brothers (7, 3).42 In other words of Augustine, the superior does indeed com-
mand, however “not through desire to dominate but through dutiful concern 
for others, not with pride in exercising authority but with mercy in providing 
for others” (civ., 19, 14). The atmosphere of peaceful living together in the re-
ligious community is also actively ordered by the brothers who wholeheart-
edly and freely obey their superior as a father, as well as the priest who bears 
responsibility for the brothers and has greater authority over them (7, 1-2). 
The brothers in the community, including the superior who is to be a mod-
el of good deeds for everyone (7, 3), give practical expression to their obe-
dience when in their daily life, the common purpose takes precedence over 
the private purpose, and the common good over the private good. If this hap-
pens growth is assured, progress is made, and love which is not self- seeking 
42 “Non se existimet potestate dominantem, sed caritate servientem felicem.”
[258] Agustín de Hipona como Doctor Pacis:  estudios sobre la paz en el mundo contemporáneo 
(1 Cor: 13, 5) is put into praxis (5, 2).43 Self-seeking would disrupt peace in the 
community.
The superior of the community should lead through the spiritual good of 
true wisdom, by prudently directing his judgments, his courageous actions, 
self-control, and just dealings toward that end where it is finally God who shall 
be all in all (1 Cor. 15: 28) in sure eternity and perfect peace (civ., 19, 20).
Harbor, Furnace and Cartwheel
Many tend to think of a monastery as a safe and peaceful  harbor, a calm “get-
away” place of retreat where good and worthy people have chosen a life of 
quiet, peace, and contemplation, far removed from the clamor of the people, 
from the tumult and the noise of the great crowds, from the towering waves of 
the world, as though they were safe in a harbor. Focusing on the imagery of a 
harbor, Augustine applies its features to monastic life in community. Brothers 
joining a religious community, do not yet find there the awaited final joy. They 
do not yet experience the promised jubilation. Because, in the monastery, are 
still laments and worry over temptations. It is not yet an experience of the se-
curity and the peace of the Celestial City, which is to be a perfectly ordered and 
harmonious enjoyment of God and of one another in God.44 Augustine explains:
For even a harbor has an entrance somewhere—if a harbor had no entrance on 
any side, then no ship could enter it. So it must of necessity lie open on one 
side. Yet sometimes the wind rushes in from that open side. And even where 
there are no rocks, the ships are dashed against each other and are shattered. 
Then, where can that security be found, if not in a harbor? (en. Ps., 99(100),10; 
387-393).
Augustine, however, notices that the ships in the harbor45 are still more for-
tunate than the ones on the open sea, i.e. the people in the world. To assure 
and protect the vulnerable peace in the harbor of a religious community, the 
brothers should love one another. Quoting Saint Paul, the brothers should 
bear with each other in love, eager to preserve the unity of the Spirit in the 
bond of peace (Eph. 4: 2-3), just as the ships in the harbor are to be bound to 
43 See also op. mon., 25, 32.
44 See civ., 19, 13: “Pax caelestis civitatis ordinatissima et concordissima societas fruendi Deo 
et invicem in Deo.” Here, in this life, security and peace are in the hope of God’s promises. 
There, in the fulfilment of God’s promises, is full security and peace, when the bars of the 
gates of Jerusalem are made fast (Ps. 147: 13). See also en. Ps., 99(100) 11.
45 The brothers in the monastic community who have chosen a quiet life.
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each other by good and not be dashed against each other. And further, if by 
chance the wind rushes in from the open side, if conflicts arise, let there be 
careful piloting (en. Ps., 99(100), 10). Applying the imagery of harbor and ships 
to the religious life in community, reference is made to the office, the author-
ity and responsibility—the careful piloting—of the superior.
Augustine himself was a monastic community leader. In his exposition on 
Psalm 99(100) he speaks from experience. To assure and maintain peace and 
tranquility in the monastery, brothers in charge of community leadership, 
could putatively easily adopt a principle of precaution in favor of peace: be 
carefully not to admit evil and wicked people and exclude them from religious 
community living. Augustine, however, pleads against such a criterion using 
some refined psychological thinking. 
To recognize a man as evil, you must first test him within the monastery. So 
how do you shut out the man who is about to enter and who is to be tested 
afterward, but cannot be tested unless he has entered? Will you send all the 
wicked men away? (en. Ps., 99(100),10).
Just avoiding a priori bad people from joining the monastic community does 
not ipso facto guarantee unity, concord, happiness, and peace in a monastery 
that would, thus, be reserved only for so called “good people”. Augustine pleas 
against an a priori  judgment.46 He does want, in fact first of all, an a posteriori 
formation experience of monitoring. The deepest motivations of the heart—
often still unknown to new members—and equally the over-idealistic expec-
tations of the heart of those who wish to be admitted need to be scrutinized, 
discerned, tested and purified in the community, as in a furnace:47
For many have promised themselves that they would fulfil that holy life that 
holds all things in common, where no one calls anything his own, and where 
they have one soul and one heart toward God (Acts 4:32). They have been put 
into the furnace and they have cracked (en. Ps., 99 (100), 11).
Entering the common life of the brothers in the monastery, in the sweet hope 
for praiseworthy peace and security, is quite an unrealistic, even romantic ex-
pectation. Without doubt, Augustine’s idealized description of that common 
life is beautiful:
46 Augustine asks: “What is the work of peace? It passes no judgment on uncertain matters, 
it does not assert what it does not know. It is more inclined to think the best of any man or 
woman than to suspect the worst” (en. Ps., 147, 16).
47 A furnace “burns”, but also “purifies”, e.g. metal, silver and gold.
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Great men, holy men, live there in daily hymns, prayers, and praise of God. 
They occupy themselves in reading and support themselves by manual labor. 
They do not seek anything greedily, but use in contentment and love whatever 
their pious brothers bring to them. No one takes anything for his own that 
another does not have; they all love one another and bear with each other (en. 
Ps., 99 (100) 12).48
But at the same time, Augustine knows that the lived daily reality is different. 
Such perfect community as pictured above does not exist. A person who joins 
the community in the hope he will find perfect  Christian love, or vaguely imag-
ines that no one living there will ever have to be tolerated, is entertaining a 
naïve social expectation. The image of the harbor shows ships dashing against 
each other when the wind enters. A community with no difficult person to live 
with is a utopia. Therefore, living realistically the common life of real brothers 
in the monastery requires patience and tolerance with the bothersome men. 
Patient and tolerant  behavior by exemplary good brothers may even correct 
and reform the troublesome. Augustine offers a principle for peacefulness in 
the monastery: “[one] should tolerate the real actions of the wicked for the 
sake of the fellowship of the good” (en. Ps., 99 (100) 12).
Irritation, exasperation and intolerance with the tiresome habits of the few, 
may make a newcomer want to leave the community to at least find peace in 
himself. That means that he becomes “a deserter of so holy an undertaking” 
(fit desertor tam sancti propositi). Augustine assesses such a consideration a 
questionable decision:
…when he has left that place, he, too, becomes a critic and a  slanderer; he 
tells only of those things that he swore he could  hardly have endured. …What 
is more, he belches forth the bad odor of his indignation, and frightens away 
those intending to enter the monastery, since, when he himself had entered, 
he could not persevere. What sort of people are those brothers? They are 
envious, quarrelsome, completely intolerant, greedy. This one did this here, 
and that one did that. Wicked man, why do you keep quiet about the good 
brothers? You shout of those whom you could not tolerate, but you keep quiet 
about those who tolerated you in your wickedness (en. Ps., 99(100), 12).
The way “the deserter” pictures the common life of the brothers in the monas-
tery to the outside world is completely opposite to Augustine’s earlier quoted 
48 Did this description—probably inspired by Augustine’s experience in the Thagaste com-
munity, which was composed of relatives and friends—make living together as servi Dei easy, 
pleasant, and peaceful?
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description. The intolerant person depicts no more than a false caricature of 
those who wish to live Christ-like through love that is self-giving. Augustine 
uses the image of “the bad odor of indignation” the intolerant man belches 
forth. This reminds us, by contrast, of the concluding prayer in Chapter VIII of 
the Praeceptum. The brothers are exhorted to observe the Rule, exuding the 
fragrance of Christ in the goodness of their lives (8, 1).49 
Augustine left behind a wonderful paean to common life in his exposition on 
Psalm 132(133). This psalm is short and includes images, names and places: 
the oil, the dew, the robe, the hem, the beard, the mountains, Aaron, Her-
mon, Sion, etc. The bishop of Hippo applies this Psalm and its imagery also 
to brothers living together in unity and mutual love, thus building religious 
community. As in the Praeceptum, Augustine confirms that the brothers who 
really live in unity are those of whom it has been said: “And they had one soul 
and one heart toward God; and no one called anything his own, but they held 
everything in common” (Acts 4: 32). They have “the dew of Hermon flowing 
down over the mountains of Sion” (Psalm 132(133): 3). Therefore, they are “qui-
et, peaceful,  humble, and tolerant.” They pray. They do not murmur. The love 
of Christ is made perfect in them. Augustine notes in his preaching the gap 
between his ideal of the religious life and the experienced reality:
So those in whom the love of Christ has not been made perfect do not live in 
unity …even though they may be in the same place, [they] are hateful, trou-
blesome, and quarrelsome. By their own restlessness they disturb others, just 
as the restless beast in the yoke does not pull but also breaks with his hooves 
whatever is yoked to him. …all the murmurers are splendidly described in a 
certain passage in Scripture: “the  feelings of a fool are like a cartwheel” (Eccli. 
33, 5). …A cartwheel carries hay, and it murmurs. For it cannot find rest from 
murmuring. Many brothers are like this; they do not live in unity, except in the 
body (en. Ps., 132(133), 12) (Zumkeller 403-404).
Conclusion
Augustine’s Praeceptum was explored to discover that a fraternal life together 
in peace is a way to God. The opening purpose of the Rule concentrates on the 
“anima una et cor unum in Deum”50 as the life goal for those who serve God 
49 See 2 Cor. 2: 15; and 1 Pet. 3: 16.
50 In deum highlights the Augustinian accent on our aim and transcending finality, at once 
eternal, but also operating now as an active attraction, in community. God draws the commu-
nity’s life (anima) higher through fraternal love, experienced joy and delight, but still leaves 
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and as a statement to gain peace via a fraternal life lived together: minds and 
hearts intimately connected, seeking to be one soul and one heart on the way 
to God.
The precepts in Augustine’s Praeceptum foster and safeguard harmony, unity 
and peace in the ordinary daily life of the community. Their observance in 
obedience helps the brothers to transform their mind and heart, to interiorize 
the values of the Praeceptum, and to attract attention by the life they live (4, 1). 
Augustine underlines that harmony, unity and peace are more than a mere re-
sult of following laws and rules. One phrase in chapter VIII of the Praeceptum 
is of importance in this regard: “you are no longer  slaves under the law, but a 
people living in freedom under grace” (8, 2). Living in freedom under grace is 
a significant ‘”step” in the direction of living in peace (in pace) brought to per-
fection, fully possessed, loved and praised.51
Living Augustine’s Praeceptum as a “Rule of Peace” is an apostolic endeavor. The 
Augustinian endowed monastic communities can serve as parables of peaceful 
brotherhood in Church and society.52 Augustinian monasteries should support 
Church communities, families and groups who strive for earthly peace and 
point out the final perspective: celestial peace in the City of God, where God 
is experienced as the Absolute One, Perfect Peace and All-Embracing Love.53
hearts restless and turning toward greater personal appropriation. The “will toward whole-
ness” for the restless heart never attains full satisfaction, even in the grace of the fraternal life 
intentionally lived. The final fulfilled value, for Augustine, is always the eschatological patria 
of the Kingdom, the homeland to which life’s journey always points, even with moments of 
felt peace and enjoyed reconciliation. The God of peace (in deum) always transcends even the 
best practiced fraternal life.
51 Augustine uses the fourfold division of marked periods for God’s economy in human salva-
tion history as: “ante legem, sub lege, sub gratia, in pace”. The last period (in pace) will cul-
minate only in the final eschatological shalom of all salvation history. See also en. Ps., 147, 15.
52 See also Burt 631: “The peace of the larger societies flows from the peace of those that are 
smaller.”
53 See “The Rule of Saint Augustine” 45.
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Abstract
This essay examines Augustine’s critique of a her-
meneutic of agonism in relation to his consider-
ation of the Manichaean notion of the two souls, as 
well as his discussion of the two wills in the Confes-
sions. The essay treats these dimensions as found 
in his early works De Genesi contra Manichaeos and 
De vera religione, as well as his work De duabus an-
imabus, and lastly the Confessions. Augustine’s re-
curring treatment of the two souls is bound with 
his critique of agonism. It is also linked with his own 
deepening understanding of the hermeneutical 
consequence of the luminous self and the weight 
of consuetudo. In this context Augustine’s articu-
lation of peace as an openness to God and others 
comes to fruition. Peace, for Augustine, is not the 
assertion of one’s distinctive luminosity or even the 
resolve of a secure self at odds with the world in 
which it finds itself. Rather, peace is found in the 
realization that one is made open to difference, to a 
concord that does not require struggle and agony, 
and in fact precludes the consumption or erasure 
of this difference.
Keywords: Augustine, Manichaeism, Confessions, 
consuetudo peace, the will.
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Resumen 
Este ensayo examina la crítica de san Agustín de 
una hermenéutica del agonismo en relación con 
su consideración de la noción Maniquea de las dos 
almas, así como su discusión de las dos voluntades 
en Confesiones. El ensayo trata estas dimensiones 
tal como se encuentran en sus primeros trabajos 
De Genesi contra Manichaeos y De vera religione, 
así como en su trabajo en De duabus animabus y, 
por último, Confesiones. El tratamiento recurrente 
de san Agustín de las dos almas se vincula con su 
crítica del agonismo. También se relaciona con su 
comprensión más profunda de las consecuencias 
hermenéuticas del yo luminoso y el peso del con-
suetudo. En este contexto, la articulación de la paz 
de san Agustín como una apertura a Dios y a los 
demás llega a buen término. La paz, para Agustín, 
no es la afirmación de la luminosidad distintiva de 
uno, ni siquiera la resolución de un yo seguro en 
desacuerdo con el mundo en el que se encuentra. 
Más bien, la paz se encuentra en la comprensión 
de que uno está abierto a la diferencia, a una con-
cordia que no requiere sufrimiento ni agonía, y de 
hecho excluye el consumo o la eliminación de esta 
diferencia. 
Palabras clave: Paz, san Agustín, Maniqueísmo, la 
voluntad, Confesiones, consuetudo
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Introduction
Much of Augustine’s literary output before 400 is concerned  either directly or in 
passing with Manichaeism. The nature of this extensive critique of Manichaeism, 
however, is not so straightforward. Augustine, as he mentions in several trea-
tises, is  certainly drawing from his personal experience with Manichaeans and 
as a Manichaean himself.1 He also has friends, such as Romanianus, for whom 
he writes De vera religione and Contra Academicos, and  Honoratus, to whom he 
dedicates De utilitate credendi, who are still Manichaeans when he composes 
these works for them.2  Beyond his personal motivation for these early writings, 
two dimensions of Augustine’s critique of Manichaeism stand out. 
The first is more broadly construed as biblical exegesis. At the heart of his 
engagement with Manichaeism is how to read the Bible and to see Christ as 
the velamen of Scripture, or as Augustine says in De moribus Ecclesiae Cath-
olicae, to read the whole of the Bible as the Scriptura Christi (mor., 1, 1, 2). 
Augustine feared the implications of the oppositional hermeneutic of Man-
ichaeism, which would use passages of the New Testament against seemingly 
contrary testimonies in the Old Testament. Even more so, Augustine grew to 
be suspicious of the narratival limitations that Manichaeism had placed on the 
interpretation of the New Testament. The New Testament, severed from the 
prior activity of God in the Old Testament, through the Patriarchs, Israel, and 
the Prophets, appeared a truncated story. An effect of this Manichaean narra-
tival limitation was the removal of God’s prior activity, in  favor of stipulating a 
phantasmic, even ahistorical, Christ figure.3
Augustine’s response and deepening awareness of the implications of this 
Manichaean hermeneutic is witnessed in his extensive exegesis which dis-
closes his own theological vision, whether it be in relation to, amongst other 
things, his understanding of Christ, the Triune God, or the Church. The im-
portance and extent of this dimension of Augustine’s critique and engagement 
with Manichaeism, his identification of Manichaean scriptural interpretation 
1 The friendships that Augustine established as a Manichaean or friends who joined Man-
ichaeism through Augustine are repeatedly in the background of the narrative of the Con-
fessions in books III through VI. One of the more gripping illustrations of this is Augustine’s 
friend who dies abruptly in book IV and Augustine’s consolation in other friends, who were 
themselves likely Manichaeans. See conf., 3, 4, 7-9, 14 (CCSL 27, 43-47).
2 De utilitate credendi, De vera religione and De duabus animabus amongst others are written 
with such friends in mind.
3 Insofar as the Manichaean narrative opened to a historical past, Augustine perceived this to 
be mythologically figured. All pointed to the struggle of the Light and the Darkness.
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and his own counter-exegesis, cannot be overstated. Indeed, it is the broader 
context in which a second dimension of Augustine’s response to Manichaeism 
is situated. This essay will consider this second, somewhat more focused, as-
pect that endures through many of Augustine’s writings of this period: his cri-
tique of the dualistic Manichaean conception of the two kingdoms, natures, or 
even souls, and how this relates to his understanding of the two wills, which 
he discusses in the Confessions.
There are several features of Augustine’s protracted critique, such as his 
emphasis on consuetudo and the difficulty of the will, that will be discussed 
through a predominantly diachronic approach, beginning with his early writ-
ings of De Genesi contra Manichaeos, De vera religione and De duabus anima-
bus, and concluding with the Confessions. This diachronic reading is limited, 
however. It is possible to see in Augustine’s earliest engagement the seeds, if 
not the flower, of his thought in the Confessions. My intent is to give promi-
nence to the nuances of Augustine’s thought in these earlier works such that 
the Confessions intimates a development or deepening of his own consider-
ation. An additional limitation of this approach is the explicit focus on Augus-
tine’s theology. It is important to examine how Augustine considers the effects 
and  limitations of the Manichaean conception of the two natures, even souls, 
and his own solution which manifests itself in anthropological, cosmological, 
social, and intrapersonal aspects.
Augustine’s discussion of the two wills in the Confessions is not simply the 
rejection of dualism, but more significantly a critique of a kind of alienation 
from self, others, and the surrounding world. The “Manichaean” hermeneutic 
with which Augustine engages for so many of his early works ultimately places 
the individual in a kind of agonistic relation to all things, and rather focuses 
on the “true” self, a self safe and pure from the taint of otherness. Thus, we 
see in the Confessions Augustine’s solution of the two wills both as the local 
limitation of what can constitute any kind of agonism and as the rejection of an 
agonistic hermeneutic. For Augustine, peace and concord are not found in the 
security of one’s existential unboundedness as the Light (or any such notion of 
the self, be it ontologically figured or existentially so). Peace is not the citadel 
of the self, even if that self is bound in an agony of self-realization in a strange 
and divided world. Peace, rather, is found for Augustine in a self that remains 
open, even incomplete.4 Therefore, Augustine understands true peace to be 
4 For two discussions of Augustine’s conception of the self in such a manner, see Cavadini; 
and Mathewes.
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ultimately an openness to God and thus to all that exists. This openness chal-
lenges the conception of the self as autonomous and thus independent of re-
lation to God and all of creation, as it also rejects an agonism that replaces 
concord with the assurances of the self amidst strife and conflict.
On the Two Kingdoms, Natures, and Souls: 
Augustine’s Developing Critique of Manichaeism
In his earliest commentary on Genesis (Gen. adu. Man.), composed  circa 389, 
Augustine provides what may seem to be numerous ad hoc rejoinders to the 
Manichaean criticism of Genesis and to  Manichaeism more broadly. Toward 
the end of the second book of De Genesi contra Manichaeos Augustine’s cri-
tique becomes more pointed. Discussing 2 Cor. 11: 3, and the serpent or the 
deceit of heretical teachings that tempts the Church, Augustine  notes that the 
Manichaeans are proud in that they claim as their own a status that belongs to 
God. They hold the human soul to be of and share the same nature as God. In 
their pride they attract those bound by the “desires of the flesh” who are only 
too willing to hear that whatever they do that seems evil or excessive is not 
being done by themselves, but by the nation of Darkness (Gen. adu. Man., 2, 
26, 40) (CSEL 91, 165-166). In one’s true self, however, one is as God, indeed, of 
the same nature as God, true and pure Light free from all Darkness. Thereby, 
even when one seems to sin, this sin cannot be attributed to the Light of the 
true self; rather, the agent or actor who commits such sin or has such desires 
is another, one who is wholly other. It is not the Light, it is not the soul, but 
the Darkness.
Augustine rejects this division, be it existential or ontological, in favor of a 
unity of the human made by and in God, citing 1 Cor. 1: 7-12 (Gen. adu. Man., 
2, 26, 40) (CSEL 91, 166). Throughout this commentary Augustine emphasizes 
unity, though not an arbitrary, quasi-Platonic unity of the One, which would 
render all differences, material and otherwise, as the  discord of Dyad.5 Rather, 
Augustine’s conception of this unity is witnessed even in his reading of Adam 
and Eve, an exegesis that refuses a simple understanding of polarity. What is 
said of Adam does not simply apply to man, and of Eve to woman.6 On one 
level, Adam and Eve are images of the whole human: intellect and affections 
5 See Augustine’s discussion of this point in conf., 4, 15, 24 (CCSL 27, 52-53).
6 Manichaean references to woman are largely negative as the process of trapping the Light 
in the flesh is imaged, and in truth, is understood to recur through birth. Majella Franzmann 
provides useful context to this largely pessimistic image. See Franzmann.
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(Gen. adu. Man., 2, 11, 15) (CSEL 91, 136). Similarly, the verse “and they will be two 
in one flesh” (Gen. 2: 22) is taken by Augustine to refer to the unity between 
Christ and the Church (Gen. adu. Man., 2, 13, 19) (CSEL 91, 140). This great mys-
tery (sacramentum magnum) reveals the profound unity of the Church with 
Christ, even as the Church through Christ is bound with history in all its par-
ticularities and moves to the ultimate consummation of the Christian with 
Christ in the Church (Gen. adu. Man., 2, 8, 10-11) (CSEL 91, 129-131).
Against his articulation of the complex unity of the self, of humanity, of the 
world, all in God, Augustine discusses the deceit, even the duplicity, of sin. 
Sin, in this context, is a turning away from God, from truth, toward the phan-
tasms of one’s desires. It is the founding of a deceptive vantage removed from 
God and even from the hardships generated from and bound with one’s own 
self-promulgated reality (Gen. adu. Man., 2, 27, 41) (CSEL 91, 166-167). It is be-
cause of these difficulties (tribulationes) that the Manichaeans, Augustine 
notes, seek to blame another nature (extranea natura), when in fact they ought 
to fault themselves (Gen. adu. Man., 2, 27, 41) (CSEL 91, 168).7 In passing off 
blame to another “thing,” the human has strangely abandoned or excised part 
of himself such that true charity, the fullness of knowledge by which one loves 
God and  neighbor with one’s whole heart, soul, and mind (Matt. 22: 37-39), is 
not possible. What remains in this integral blameless self is at best a fraction 
of wholeness, and thus, a partitioned love.
In De vera religione, written within a year of Genesis contra Manichaeos, Au-
gustine expands or more properly hones his criticism of Manichaean dualism. 
While Augustine continues his critique of the Manichaean  dualist metaphysic, he 
also isolates what he sees as the hermeneutical horizon and existential framing 
of Manichaeism. Augustine notes that the Manichaean narrative is not simply 
grounded in the perpetual, substantial struggle of the Light and the Darkness 
(ver. rel., 9, 16) (CCSL 32, 198).8 He identifies the somewhat capricious and pre-
sentist nature of the Manichaean hermeneutic whereby those things that offend 
them are linked with the Darkness, and those things they prefer are from God 
(ver. rel., 9, 16) (CCSL 32, 198).9 This aesthetic leads the Manichaeans to view even 
7 “Id est per temporales tribulationes sua peccata cognoscendo et gemendo, et non iam ex-
traneam naturam quae nulla est sed seipsum accusando ut ipse veniam mereatur.”
8 “Contra eos tamen potissimum est instituta, qui duas naturas vel substantias singulis prin-
cipiis adversus invicem rebelles esse arbitrantur.”
9 “Offensi enim quibusdam rebus et rursus quibusdam delectati non earum quibus offendun-
tur, sed earum quibus delectantur volunt esse auctorem Deum.”
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themselves as divided or to propose the presence of another soul within them 
(duas animas esse in uno corpore existimant) (uera rel., 9, 16) (CCSL 32, 198).10
This is Augustine’s first overt reference to the two souls.11 However, too much 
should not be made of this point, for with this  observation we see Augustine’s 
critique of the full range of the implications of the Manichaean narrative. He 
recounts how for the Manichaeans the Darkness is understood not to be made 
by God, but rather has its own autonomous being, source, and regnum, such 
that it has its own life, land, offspring, and animalia (uera rel., 9, 16) (CCSL 32, 
198).12 This entity or reality with all its attendant living things is believed to 
have attacked the Kingdom of God. In response, the Light, under the pressure 
of necessity (oppressum necessitate), sent particles of Light, the good souls of 
God’s own  substance, to subdue the Darkness through admixture (uera rel., 9, 
16) (CCSL 32, 198).
From his more complete elaboration of the Manichaean myth,  Augustine ad-
vances his critique beyond the metaphysical, cosmogonic narrative. Augustine 
also identifies the implications of its hermeneutic in its aesthetic impulses, 
which form the foundation of its moral framework.13 This is to say that the 
10 Augustine holds the Manichaean vantage to be a consequence of their bondage to their 
disposition (consuetudo), which is entangled in carnal nets: “Et cum consuetudinem suam 
vincere nequeunt iam carnalibus laqueis irretiti...”
11 See Giuffré Scibona; see also Lössl. For its part, Ferwerda posits that Augustine is mistaken 
that the Manichaeans hold the notion of the two souls. Augustine confuses this “Gnostic” 
concept to be Manichaean. In contrast to these readings, Decret notes Fortunatus’s refer-
ence to the bona anima (c. Fort., 14, BA 17, 148) as an indication that Manichaeans used this 
terminology. Perhaps, the scholarly consensus is best represented by Jason BeDuhn who 
claims Augustine “consciously” misrepresents the Manichaean position. BeDuhn appeals to 
the technical Manichaean use of the animus/anima distinction (which we perhaps may as-
sume shows the philosophical, even Platonic, terminology that guides Manichaean anthro-
pology). BeDuhn claims the Manichaean would hold duas (sic?) animos but not duas animas 
(205). However, BeDuhn is mistaken in his assumption that this distinction holds true even 
in Augustine. Augustine’s early language is not as strongly governed by such philosophical 
precision as, it would seem, holds true for the Manichaeans. Nevertheless, from this nega-
tive assessment, BeDuhn continues to show how Augustine’s use of the term is functionally 
accurate. 
12 “Alteram de gente tenebrarum, quam Deus nec genuerit nec fecerit nec protulerit nec ab-
iecerit; sed quae suam vitam, suam terram, suos fetus et animalia, suum postremo  regnum 
habuerit ingenitumque principium....”
13 For an insightful account of Augustine’s reading of the Manichaean system see Fuhrer 539-
547. See also uera rel., 9, 16 (CCSL 32, 198): “Sed quodam tempore adversus Deum rebellasse, 
Deum autem qui aliud quod faceret non haberet et, quomodo aliter posset hosti resistere, 
non inveniret, necessitate oppressum misisse huc animam bonam et quandam particulam 
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Manichaean  conception of the two natures or souls need not be read simply 
as applying to an aboriginal state, which at some other concrete time becomes 
mixed. The function of this mixing is as much focused, perhaps even inten-
sively focused, on the present. It is a hermeneutic that is focused on the in-
terpretation of liberty and salvation from agony, in which the historically prior 
is equal in kind and quality to the present. One interprets the world in the 
agony of perpetual struggle, while holding the surety of one’s “true” existence 
as perpetually being freed from this agonism. The human then walks divided in 
a world divided, though this struggle need not assault the citadel of one’s con-
fident luminosity. Indeed, such luminousness is a shield and weapon against 
what one dislikes. The problems with the world, society, and with one’s self are 
all external, even foreign to the pure Light that is the true self.
Augustine summarizes what he sees to be the effects of this agonism and 
confident sense of the pure and autonomous self in the statement: liberty 
from justice and slavery under sin (libertas a iustitia et servitus sub peccato) 
(uera rel., 40, 76) (CCSL 32, 237). The freedom of the self, freedom from external 
conditions such as  society, nature, even one’s own history, is a freedom from 
justice. Yet, this very freedom or liberty is in truth a bondage to one’s own con-
trived notion of the self. This  libertas of self-exaltation does not manifest itself 
in arrogant pride, but in the prideful delusion that rejects the claim of all other 
things on the self.14 The freedom gained from a stipulated duality permits, as 
Augustine understands it, the individual human to be free from responsibility, 
free from the claims of social and corporate justice.
The Two Natures as Two Souls: De duabus animabus
In De duabus animabus (written around 391, shortly after taking his vows for 
the priesthood), Augustine expands on his identification of the two souls in 
substantiae suae, cuius commixtione (atque miseria) hostem temperatum esse somniant et 
mundum fabricatum.” Part of the ambiguity of the Manichaean narrative is found in its un-
derstanding of the “time” of the sending of the Light into the Darkness. The Light “sent” 
(misisse) some of its own substance into the Darkness. Augustine notes how this “sending” 
resulted in the making of the world. This “sending” is linked by the Manichaean Fortunatus 
with the sending of the souls before the making of the world: “Hinc ergo apparet antiquitas 
temporum nostrorum quam repetimus et annorum nostrorum ante mundi constitutionem 
hoc more missas esse animas contra contrariam naturam ut eamdem sua passione subiici-
entes victoria Deo redderetur” (c. Fort., 22) (CSEL 25, 107). Sending is bound with the act of 
liberation, but also with the struggle in the tension of this world between the Light and the 
Darkness.
14 This claim is repeated in the Confessions. See, for example, 7, 14, 20 and 9, 4, 9.
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Manichaeism, which he had only briefly mentioned in De vera religione (duab. 
an., 1, 1) (CSEL 25, 51),15 as he begins the treatise by pressing the Manichaean 
claim that there are two sources of life (vita). He draws this inference from the 
fact that the Manichaeans claim that there are things “living” which do not find 
“life” from God but from another  source (duab. an., 1, 1) (CSEL 25, 51). Augus-
tine’s argument for the two souls, contrary to the opposition to such a claim 
made by the Manichaean Secundinus some ten years later, is drawn from the 
Manichaean narrative of the two active, life-giving, yet opposing natures (Se-
cundinus Epistula ad sanctum Augustinum, 2-3) (BA 17, 512).16 Indeed, Augus-
tine  acknowledges that if things from the principium of the Darkness lack life, 
they are not souls properly speaking. They  cannot be understood, therefore, 
to want or not want, or to seek or flee anything. If one does not understand the 
Darkness as a willing, choosing force or thing, then it is nothing but a substan-
tial evil, like fire that simply burns because it is fire. Such an “evil” or kingdom 
of Darkness cannot be called soul. Yet, if this nature is understood as wanting, 
seeking, or fleeing (as the Manichaeans often seem to state), it must be living; 
it must be soul (duab. an., 1, 1) (CSEL 25, 51).17
Advancing this point, Augustine clarifies his understanding of what soul and 
life mean.18 Soul is not only attributed to that which is simply “life,” such as 
the body, but also to that life which one attributes to the mind or intelligence 
15 “Nam primo animarum illa duo genera quibus ita singulas naturas propriasque tribuerunt 
ut alterum de ipsa dei esse substantia alterius vero deum ne conditorem quidem velint accipi. 
Scibona (388) dates the work to 391, after Augustine had taken his vows for the priesthood 
and before his debate with Fortunatus. 
16 Lössl holds that Secundinus is “up to a certain point correct” (143). In contrast, Stroumsa 
presents a strong argument in favor of Augustine’s understanding of the Manichaean con-
ception of the two souls (198-208).
17 “Quapropter illas animas quae a Manichaeis vocantur malae aut carere vita et animas non 
esse neque quicquam velle seu nolle adpetere vel fugere aut si viverent ut et animae esse 
possent et aliquid tale agere. Quale illi opinarentur nullo modo eas nisi vita vivere.”
18 Augustine’s refinement of what is meant by “life” is in part informed by his exegesis of John 
14, 6. If Christ is life, such that there is no cause of being except through Christ, then certain-
ly any soul, anything that “lives” must be understood to find this life in the one God who is 
life (duab. an., 1, 1) (CSEL 25, 51-52). Augustine’s insight, against a Manichaean reading of this 
verse, which univocally predicates life to Christ, is the notion of participation. See duab. an., 2, 
2 (CSEL 25, 52): “Quod si tempore illo quaestionem de ipsa vita et de participatione vitae mea 
cogitatio ferre ac sustinere non posset....” Thereby, Augustine asserts that every soul insofar 
as it is a soul and participates in life, without which it could not be a soul, is from God. duab. 
an. 6, 6 (CSEL 25, 58). “Et ideo animam in quantum anima esset et vitae participaret sine qua 
nullo pacto esse anima potest (...) quamobrem maximi erroris esse ullam animam dicere non 
esse ex deo...”
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(duab. an., 2, 2) (CSEL 25, 52). One sees “life” or a “soul” even in a fly (musca), 
whose body is invigorated by the goodness of its soul (duab. an., 4, 4) (CSEL 25, 
55). If a fly can possess soul or life of a certain kind, surely such a conception 
of life applies to that soul or nature that the Manichaeans call evil or foreign 
(alienigenas), which does not simply live but lives immortally (duab. an., 3, 3) 
(CSEL 25, 54).19 As Augustine observes, the attributes of the kingdom of Dark-
ness, its immortality, its vigor, even its strength, reveal the goodness of the 
nature or soul of the Darkness. The Darkness, thereby, is a kind of life or soul.
Augustine, then, moves to a Scriptural commonplace used by the Manichae-
ans: that all life is from Christ. Surely, then anything from Christ is good, and 
thus, all life is good insofar as it is life. Augustine finds a useful image of this 
in Matthew 8: 22: “Let the dead bury their dead.” These dead are not actually 
dead (perhaps a Manichaean exegesis is that these dead are without life), but 
rather they live their lives viciously. To stress this point Augustine cites 1 Tim. 
5: 6: “A widow who is living in pleasure is dead” (duab. an., 2, 2) (CSEL 25, 53). 
Surely, Augustine comments, this  widow is not dead, but alive; she is only said 
to be “dead” because of vice. Insofar as she is living or is a soul, she is good. 
The Manichaeans, Augustine observes, have collapsed the ontological and the 
moral so that a substance is charged with a moral valence; indeed, it is even 
reduced to its moral valence (duab. an., 5, 5) (CSEL 25, 56).20
In asserting that everything that lives, indeed, everything that is, comes from 
God and finds its very life from Christ who is life, Augustine rejects any dual-
istic conception of being, and thus by extension asserts the goodness of even 
those who act viciously. He makes this clear through his re-reading of the 
Manichaean proof text for the two natures from John 8, 44-47: “You do not 
hear, because you are not from God; but you are from your father the Devil” 
(duab. an., 7, 9) (CSEL 25, 61).21 Augustine asserts that the children of the Devil 
are not ontologically distinct from the children of God. One ought to read 
John 8, 47, “You do not come from God,” in the same manner that one views 
all of creation, with the stipulation of the peace and harmony of all things in 
God (duab. an., 7, 9) (CSEL 25, 61).22 John 8: 47 refers, then, only to the human 
19 “Ergo pergerem quaerere animam illam quam malam dicerent.” Later, in the same section, 
“an illas animas quas alienigenas crederent.” See also duab. an., 2, 2 (CSEL 25, 52-53).
20 “Sed magis animas dicerem vitiosas etiam non in quantum vitiosae sed in quantum animae 
sunt deum sibi esse creatorem fateri oportere.” See also duab. an., 6, 8 (CSEL 25, 60-61).
21 “Recitarent adversum me voces illas evangelicas: vos propterea non auditis quia non estis 
ex deo, vos ex patre diabolo estis” (John 8: 47-44).
22 “Pacem concordiamque monstrarent.”
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in sin. It is not a statement about one’s very being, since all “belong” (pertineo) 
to God.23 Instead, this verse indicates what the human loves and rejects. To 
be not of God, for Augustine, is not to believe in Christ, reject his coming, and 
not receive him (duab. an., 7, 9) (CSEL 25, 63).24 This is why John 1, 11 states: 
“His own did not receive him.” That humans are God’s own pertains to human 
nature, the human’s very being, whereas “You are not from God” (John 8: 47) 
only represents the condition of the human will: to choose love of self, that is, 
pride, over God (duab. an., 7, 9) (CSEL 25, 63).25
Through these steps, Augustine has found footing on what he takes to be the 
central issues: fault is found with the will, not the substance, and this will must 
be one’s own. For example, if the Darkness is deemed the source of evil and it 
uses the soul, made from the Kingdom of Light, as an instrument for evil, the 
soul of Light cannot be held liable for willing to sin (duab. an., 10, 12) (CSEL 25, 
67-68). This soul of Light is an instrument by no fault of its own. Sin, on the 
other hand, can only be attributed to the will.26 This fault occurs even when 
one is not able to accomplish what one wishes—there is sin in the will to evil 
(duab. an., 10, 912) (CSEL 25, 68).27 To will evil is free from compulsion (cogere) 
from an external source or substantial necessity, though at times it may seem 
that one is compelled (duab. an., 10, 14) (CSEL 25, 69).28 Sin, with Augustine ex-
panding on his maxim in De vera reliogione, is the will for retaining or acquir-
ing that which justice forbids and from which one is free to abstain (though 
Augustine will turn shortly in De duabus animabus to the weight consuetudo) 
(duab. an., 11, 15) (CSEL 25, 70).29 
Augustine contends that the place of will should transform the Manichaean 
position of the two souls from an ontological claim to strictly a moral one. If 
23 As noted above, this statement is in contrast to the Manichaean conception of two kinds 
of souls: one from God that proceeds as part of God’s very substance and another that is evil 
that does not pertain to God in any way. See duab. an., 12, 16 (CSEL 25, 71).
24 “Nam si Christo non credere Christi adventum repudiare Christum non recipere certum 
indicium esset animarum quae non sunt dei.”
25 “Hic ergo partem naturae tenuit qui ait: sui eum non receperunt” (John 1:11); “ille voluntatis 
qui ait: non estis ex deo” (John 8: 47). “Evangelista enim dei opera commendabat Christus 
hominum peccata cohercebat.”
26 Augustine gives a definition of the will in duab. an., 10, 14 (CSEL 25, 68): “Voluntas est animi 
motus cogente nullo ad aliquid vel non amittendum vel adipiscendum.”
27 “Scilicet nisi in voluntate esse peccatum cum mihi auxiliaretur etiam illud quod iustitia pec-
cantes tenet sola mala voluntate quamuis quod volverint inplere nequiuerint.”
28 “Restat ut volens a cogente sit liber etiamsi se quisquam cogi putet.”
29 “Ergo peccatum est voluntas retinendi vel consequendi quod iustitia vetat et unde liberum 
est abstinere.”
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the evil race of darkness in its original condition did not have will before its 
mixture with the Light, then it is blameless (duab. an., 12, 16) (CSEL 25, 71).30 
If it is simply evil (like a substantial evil), then it seems necessary to recon-
sider what is meant by the term “evil” when applied to a thing, to substances 
that are divested of the will to evil. Perhaps, Augustine suggests, those things, 
even those people, that from a Manichaean vantage one might consider to be 
substantially evil, are in fact, simply good. The category of substantial evil is, 
thereby, a strictly aesthetic claim that means nothing more than difference.
Without the will to evil, there is no moral quandary. If the race of  Darkness 
is evil only by reference to its nature or substance and the souls of Light 
are good only in relation to their substance, then this  conflict is sim-
ply the exchange or interaction of different natures. If wood is burnt 
by fire, there is no moral dilemma.31 At least, there is no malevolence in 
the fire toward the wood. Likewise, the Kingdom of Darkness only sins (or is 
said to act in evil) by nature, and hence it is not malevolent (that is, it does not 
possess the will to evil) (duab. an., 12, 17) (CSEL 25, 73-74).
Augustine reaches the conclusion that even in the Manichaean system sin must 
only apply to the good souls, who have will (duab. an., 12, 18) (CSEL 25, 74).32 The 
Manichaean practice of repentance and forgiveness evidences this fact (duab. 
an., 12, 18) (CSEL 25, 74). Repentance cannot apply to the natural, even sub-
stantial, evil of the Kingdom of Darkness.  Rather, repentance and forgiveness 
only concern the souls that are a part of the Light, for they alone can actually 
sin or will otherwise (duab. an., 12, 18) (CSEL 25, 74). If  these souls sent into the 
Darkness do not have the power to resist the influence, manipulation, or will 
of the Darkness, then they do not sin. To use the same image, it is as if wood is 
thrown into the fire. No quandary exists for the soul of Light thrown into the 
irresistible force of what is deemed to be a substantial evil. Yet, if  these souls of 
Light have the power to resist and still consent to evil, then they do in fact sin, 
30 “Utrum illud malum genus animarum antequam bono misceretur habuisset aliquam vol-
untatem.”
31 This applies likewise to the commixture of the Darkness and the Light. The two souls, the 
highest good and the greatest evil, were once two separate kinds (duo genera) and now are 
mixed (duab. an., 12, 16) (CSEL 25, 71).
32 Augustine’s insight here into the Manichaean system agrees with the Manichaean Secund-
inus’s letter to Augustine, written some years after the Confessions. See Secundinus Epistula 
ad sanctum Augustinum, 2 (BA 17,512): “At si cum se ipsam cognoverit consentiat malo et non 
se armet contra inimicum voluntate sua peccauit (…) non enim punitur quia peccauit sed quia 
de peccato non doluit.”
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and not due exclusively to the irresistible nature of the Darkness (duab. an., 12, 
18) (CSEL 25, 75). It is rather like wood wanting to burn and loving the fire.
Augustine has cut through the Manichaean system to focus on the will of 
those souls, who although good by nature, will what they could resist. He takes 
up the question of human deliberation, which seems to have been central to 
the Manichaean assertion of the two souls. For the Manichaeans, human de-
liberation demonstrates the tension between two forces or the “mind” of two 
natures or souls (duab. an., 12, 19) (CSEL 25, 75).33 Augustine, who may have felt 
compelled by this example in his youth, asks why he is forced to admit two 
souls because of the common experience of deliberation.34 Surely, he notes, 
there may be two kinds of goods over which the soul deliberates?35 The dif-
ficulty of choosing the higher good over the lower good is heightened, not 
because of  another substance, but because of the human’s familiarity (con-
suetudo) with the flesh and the historical weight of one’s sins. This negatively 
inclined kind of consuetudo is a habit, familiarity, or even disposition that ob-
structs or hampers the ease with which one perceives (duab. an., 13, 19) (CSEL 
25, 76). Nevertheless, deliberation that results in choosing poorly or choosing 
the lesser good is a choice that proceeds from one who may have otherwise 
rightly willed the higher good. Augustine’s caveat, it is important to observe, is 
that such a difficulty in deliberation may be intensified by consuetudo.
The example of deliberation, that is, the process of weighing goods, is at the 
heart of Augustine’s reflection on the two wills in the Confessions., to which we 
will turn in the next section. In a similar way, Augustine’s consideration of re-
pentance is prompted by his reflection on deliberation. In De duabus animabus 
Augustine states that a condition for the possibility of repentance is the fact 
that one wills an evil or a lesser good that one ought not to have willed (duab. 
an., 14, 22) (CSEL 25, 78). The consequence of Augustine’s discussion of the will, 
deliberation, and repentance in De duabus animabus is that while Augustine is 
clearly rejecting the ontological agonism of Manichaeism, he is also probing 
more deeply into the difficulty of willing in light of the weight of consuetudo. 
33 “An ut discerem hinc ostendi animarum duo esse genera, quod in deliberando nunc in 
malam partem, nunc in bonam nutat adsensio.”
34 Stroumsa identifies the lengthy tradition of deliberation of two spirits in Jewish and Early 
Christian texts from the Roman period. He notes that all of these considerations of the two 
spirits, powers, or souls, though certainly possessing different implications, may have Zoro-
astrian origins (198-205).
35 Augustine also calls these two kinds of goods as the outer and the inner. See duab. an., 13, 
19 (CSEL 25, 75).
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This is not a wholly new development, for even as early as De moribus Eccle-
siae Catholicae Augustine had emphasized the weight of consuetudo.36 Rather, 
Augustine’s discussion of deliberation has provided him with an excellent tool 
for discussing both the struggle or weight of consuetudo and the freedom of 
the will, while pressing the Manichaean  system from its ontologically figured 
though functionally aesthetic,  moral  hermeneutic.
Augustine demonstrates in the conclusion of De duabus animabus his more 
acute assessment of the will and the human when he states: “O consuetudo 
peccati! O comes poena peccati!” (duab. an., 14, 23 (CSEL 25, 79). The Man-
ichaeans do not merely substitute a battle between substantial evils in place of 
the struggle of the will. They, moreover, do not seem attentive to the weight 
of consuetudo. Their rejection of the weight of this disposition reveals a con-
ception of the self as a luminous soul, exculpated from fault.37 Yet, as Augustine 
has noted at two points in the treatise, the Manichaean does repent, while still 
confusingly holding to the substantial and thereby moral impeccability of the 
soul. Augustine will take up these concerns and provide a more subtle critique 
in the Confessions.
The conflict of admixture, the agony of the soul in the world, seems to be the 
proper framework for the Manichaean dilemma. If this is the case, however, 
one still seems to be trapped in an agonistic universe, even trapped in one’s 
own body, in one’s own society. The soul of Light may repent, but that from 
which it wants release or reprieve still remains substantially evil. One’s focus 
is not on one’s own willing of evil or identifying the weight of consuetudo, but 
rather on seeking liberation from this evil substance and all that this entails. 
It is this vision, this disposition, not only to attempt to exculpate oneself from 
doing evil, but to free oneself from the implications of being created in and an 
ordered part of this world that is at the heart of Augustine’s understanding of a 
mala consuetudo. We see this already in Augustine’s writings before De duabus 
animabus, but the weight of consuetudo, a disposition that informs (as much 
36 Augustine uses consuetudo in several of his works before De duabus animabus, including 
the difficulty of consuetudo at the beginning of mor., 1, 2, 3 (CSEL 90, 5). Fredriksen (212-213) 
notes this reference, along with his use of consuetudo on the second day of his debate with 
Fortunatus, as indicating a shift in Augustine’s  thought. See also c. Fort., 22 (BA 17, 176). Jason 
BeDuhn holds Augustine’s use of  consuetudo in De duabus animabus to be a later addition, 
which follows his debate with Fortunatus. This decision is driven by BeDuhn’s claim of the 
great ”disturbance” for Augustine after his debate with Fortunatus. See BeDuh, 115-121; 141-
149; 166; 451, and n. 53.
37 Augustine, at the very least, thought this to be the case when he was a young Manichaean. 
See conf., 4, 15, 25-26 (CCSL 27, 53).
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as it is informed by) what one wills, comes to the fore in this short work. How-
ever, Augustine’s treatment of consuetudo in the Confessions provides greater 
precision to his  rejection of agonism in all its individual and social implications.
The Confessions: The Will in Augustine: Consuetudo
In book 8 of the Confessions, building up to the famous scene of his conversion 
in the Milanese garden, Augustine pauses to reflect on his struggle at this ear-
lier point of his life. He discerns how “his body more easily obeyed the slightest 
willing of the soul, so that the members of the body would be moved at com-
mand, than the soul obeyed itself in the will alone for accomplishing its own 
great will” (conf., 8, 8, 20 (CCSL 27, 126).38 Indeed, there are many activities in 
which willing is not the same as being able to do (conf., 8, 8, 20) (CCSL 27, 126).39 
Augustine is not talking about willing to do something like pick up a large rock 
and not being able to do it. He is strictly considering willing as such, specif-
ically, to will wholly or completely to love God. To will ought to be simple in 
that the willing and the doing are one and the same. It is this simple, undivided 
willing that escaped Augustine (conf., 8, 8, 20) (CCSL 27, 126).40
As he reflects on this, Augustine discusses the difficulty of the human in sin: 
“The mind commands the body and is immediately obeyed. The mind com-
mands itself and it is resisted” (conf., 8, 9, 21) (CCSL 27, 126).41 This resistance 
is not indicative of the presence or power of something other than himself. 
Rather, he judges that this difficulty occurs because the mind does not will 
from its whole self (conf., 8, 9, 21) (CCSL 27, 126).42 Augustine avers that this will, 
even as divided, is truly his own, not something foreign (as the Manichaeans 
might hold) (conf., 8, 9, 21) (CCSL 27, 126).43 He images this partial willing and 
partial not willing as a kind of sickness of the mind which is weighed down by 
habit (consuetudo) from wholly rising to Truth (conf., 8, 9, 21) (CCSL 27, 126-
38 “Faciliusque obtemperabat corpus tenuissimae voluntati animae ut ad nutum membra mov-
erentur quam ipsa sibi anima ad voluntatem suam magnam in sola voluntate perficiendam.”
39 “Potui autem velle et non facere si mobilitas membrorum non obsequeretur. Tam multa 
ergo feci ubi non hoc erat velle quod posse.”
40 “Et non faciebam quod et incomparabili affectu amplius mihi placebat et mox ut vellem 
possem quia mox ut vellem possem quia mox ut vellem utique vellem ibi enim facultas ea 
quae voluntas et ipsum velle iam facere erat et tamen non fiebat.”
41 “Imperat animus corpori et paretur statim; imperat animus sibi et resistitur.”
42 “Sed non ex toto vult, non ergo ex toto imperat.”
43 “Quoniam voluntas imperat ut sit voluntas nec alia sed ipsa.”
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127).44 He concludes: “There are two wills, one of these is not whole; what is 
present in one, is wanting in the other” (conf., 8, 9, 21) (CCSL 27, 127).45
Augustine returns to the example of deliberation central to his discus-
sion in De duabus animabus. As in the earlier work, he  states that the 
Manichaeans recognize two wills in deliberation and assert that  there are 
two natures of two minds, one good and the other evil (conf., 8, 10, 22) (CCSL 
27, 127).46 He does not,  however, immediately turn to the conflict of delibera-
tion, but  rather he outlines what he sees as the framework through which the 
 Manichaeans approach deliberation. As he had  begun to do in De duabus an-
imabus, Augustine perceives that antecedent to their consideration of delib-
eration is the Manichaean commitment to what he calls Manichaeism’s pride: 
to assert that one is of the same nature as God (conf., 8, 9, 21) (CCSL 27, 126).47 If 
one views oneself as God or of the same nature as God, and if God is without 
qualification good, one cannot ascribe an evil to one’s own  nature. Thus, as in 
De duabus animabus Augustine once again faults the Manichaean conception 
of the self. Augustine maintains that the Manichaeans blend the moral and 
metaphysical to preserve the impeccably luminous and unreservedly pure self.
To Augustine, this position introduces an escape hatch from any con-
sideration of evil.48 One can freely fall back on the divinity of one’s na-
ture, when asserting one’s distinction from the material “evil” of the world. 
What evils can one ascribe to one’s self? How does one know when it might 
be the good divine nature of Light that one truly is or when it might be the 
evil of Darkness that is truly foreign to the soul? In  truth, the question seems 
more, what evils does the soul of Light want or desire to ascribe to itself or 
take responsibility for? To this problem, the Manichaean is always free to open 
44 “Non igitur monstrum partim velle partim nolle sed aegritudo animi est quia non totus 
assurgit veritate sublevatus, consuetudine praegrauatus.” Concerning consuetudo,  Shanzer 
(61-62) notes that in books VI and VII of the Confessions the term may signal a more overt 
sexual meaning. 
45 “Et ideo sunt duae voluntates quia una earum tota non est et hoc adest alteri quod deest 
alteri.”
46 “Qui cum duas voluntates in deliberando animaduerterint duas naturas duarum mentium 
esse adseuerant unam bonam alteram malam.”
47 “Illi enim dum volunt esse lux non in Domino sed in se ipsis putando animae naturam hoc 
esse quod Deus est...” 
48 James Wetzel (“Augustine” 90) summarizes Augustine’s criticism of Manichaeism: “What, 
after all, would be the sense of evil’s invasion and influence, if evil remains essentially alien 
and external to the good? The ontological partitioning of good and evil makes it difficult, if 
not impossible, to comprehend what manner of struggle the two natures could be involved 
in, either at the macroscopic level of the kingdoms or the microscopic level of the two souls.” 
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the escape of the willing potency of the substantial evil of the Darkness. Thus, 
as Augustine now considers his former Manichaeism, he recognizes that from 
this framework for the human (or soul) amidst the agonism of the soul in the 
world, there is always something or someone else to blame.
Augustine’s response to this is an emphatic grounding of action and of willing 
as predicated of himself alone. Augustine expresses this emphasis on himself 
as the sole agent when he writes: “I was the one deliberating so that I might 
serve my Lord God, just as before I was disposed, I was the one who wished 
and I was the one who did not. I, I was the one” (conf., 8, 10, 22) (CCSL 27, 127).49 
He was fighting with himself, and fragmented within himself. Yet, though this 
fragmentation occurred  somewhat unwillingly, it did not reveal the nature of a 
foreign mind, but his own punishment (poena) in sin (conf., 8, 10, 22),50 a penalty 
that all share from Adam (conf., 8, 10, 22) (CCSL 27, 127).51
This poena is the “penalty” of Augustine’s interjection in De  duabus animabus, 
“O comes poena peccati.” It also reveals Augustine’s continued consideration 
of the weight of consuetudo (his “O consuetudo peccati” in De duabus anima-
bus). For Augustine, one cannot truly divide the poena peccati from the con-
suetudo peccati. The will to sin is not a perpetually reoccurring, utterly free 
choice. The will is bound in its own disposition or habit (consuetudo) to sin and 
the effects of this disposition are witnessed in the fractured will.
To demonstrate the difficulty of the will, Augustine returns yet again two sec-
tions later in book eight to the Manichaean  example of the deliberation (conf., 
8, 10, 23) (CCSL 27, 127-128).  Through  observing the struggle of two wills in one 
person, the Manichaeans perceive two contrary minds from two contrary sub-
stances and two contrary principles, one good and the other evil (conf., 8, 10, 
24) (CCSL 27, 128). Augustine extends the line of argument previously advanced 
in De duabus animabus asking if  there cannot also be deliberation between 
two bad choices, such as what  weapon to kill someone with or even whether 
one should steal and then kill or steal and then commit adultery (conf., 8, 10, 
24) (CCSL 27, 128-129).52 Deliberation of this kind would reveal a division within 
49 “Ego cum deliberabam ut iam servirem Domino Deo meo (Jer 30: 9) sicut diu disposueram 
ego eram qui volebam ego qui nolebam. Ego, ego eram.”
50 Ideo mecum contendebam et dissipabar a me ipso et ipsa dissipatio me invito quidem fiebat 
nec tamen ostendebat naturam mentis alienae sed poenam meae.”
51 “Et ideo non iam ego operabar illam sed quod habitabat in me peccatum (Rom 7:17) de sup-
plicio liberioris peccati quia eram filius Adam.”
52 Augustine notes that deliberation is also observed in choosing between good things such 
as what book to read.
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the evil substance and the absence of the soul of Light, who stands as a silent 
observer to this struggle. 
Augustine responds to the attempt to vacate the will in these examples, with 
his own conversion, his struggle to will wholly God. He describes how he was 
sick, turning and rolling himself in his own chain, his own division of will, until 
it was fully broken (conf., 8, 11, 25) (CCSL 27, 129).53 Augustine, in this famous 
passage, sees God’s mercy in pressing him to break that which so thinly and 
narrowly held his will (conf., 8, 11, 25) (CCSL 27, 129). All the while his temp-
tations, which he calls his old friends (antiquae amicae meae), sought to re-
main, whispering to him to not let them go (conf., 8, 11, 26) (CCSL 27, 129). It 
is important to note that these are not memories, this is not an exercise in 
forgetfulness, but rather what informs and presses him are urges or desires, 
more properly a violent disposition (violenta consuetudo) (conf., 8, 11, 26) (CCSL 
27, 130). In seeking to give up such desires, his disposition toward such things, 
Augustine realizes that he cannot stand on his own but rather must throw 
himself on God (conf., 8, 11, 27) (CCSL 27, 130).54 His understanding of himself, 
his own strength and autonomy, is precisely the problem.
Augustine provides an image of this struggle earlier in book eight. He notes 
how he wished that a law such as the one the Emperor Julian passed prohib-
iting Christians from teaching literature and rhetoric, could have stood in his 
way as it had for Marius Victorinus. He wishes that something external had 
opposed him. At least he would be forced to act and maybe his will would 
have been changed by this external necessity. This is a remarkable observa-
tion: an external necessity might aid in the transformation of his will. His own 
will bound in necessity from a  certain consuetudo might be altered by an ex-
ternal necessity (conf., 8, 5, 10) (CCSL 27, 119).55 His very openness to the world, 
more properly to God’s activity, might assist or even shockingly induce a new 
consuetudo.
In order to describe this transformation, he first outlines how his own ne-
cessity, the bondage of his will, was formed. He notes that from a bent will 
(perversa voluntas) lust develops. As one becomes a slave to lust, a habit or 
disposition (consuetudo) is formed. When such a habit or disposition is not 
53 “Sic aegrotabam et excruciabar accusans memet ipsum solito acerbius nimis ac voluens et 
versans me in vinculo meo donec abrumperetur totum quo iam exiguo tenebar.”
54 “Dominus Deus eorum me dedit eis quid in te stas et non stas proice te in eum, noli metuere; 
non se subtrahet ut cadas; proice te securus excipiet et sanabit te.”
55 “Cui rei ego suspirabam ligatus non ferro alieno sed mea ferrea voluntate.”
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resisted, necessity (necessitas) imposes itself (conf., 8, 5, 10) (CCSL 27, 119).56 
Yet, somehow even when he was bound in this necessity, formed by a dispo-
sition to lust, Augustine detects that a new will (nova voluntas) had begun to 
be in him; a will to worship God freely and enjoy God completely (conf., 8, 5, 
10) (CCSL 27, 119).57 Within himself a fight began to take place between his old 
consuetudo and its desires and this new will (and newly forming disposition). 
Instead of two souls from two natures, Augustine here in the Confessions de-
scribes this tension as a struggle between his own two wills (duae voluntates 
meae) (conf., 8, 5, 10) (CCSL 27, 120).58 
In this struggle, Augustine recounts how his soul was torn apart. The desires 
of the flesh, established by his own willing of them, struggled against the 
spirit. Through such a force of habit, he seemed almost to obey unwillingly, 
more suffering than acting; though in truth, his own actions had fostered and 
strengthened his own habit (conf., 8, 5, 11) (CCSL 27, 120).59 The force of this 
disposition, of this habit, is such that the mind is dragged and held unwilling-
ly even as the mind so willfully sunk into this very  disposition (conf., 8, 5, 12) 
(CCSL 27, 120-121).60 To love God wholly, to will to love God wholly, is a struggle, 
even a  battle, against his own violent habit or disposition; against Augustine’s 
own conception of himself.
Augustine’s understanding of the force of consuetudo is set in even greater 
relief when we look back to the consuetudo carnalis of book seven. Here his 
spiritual ascent is abruptly halted by what he calls a consuetudo carnalis. In 
this vision, Augustine hears God’s voice saying: “You will eat me, but you will 
not change me into you, but you will be changed into me” (conf., 7, 10, 16) (CCSL 
27, 103-114)”.61 Through this confrontation, he realizes with a greater certainty 
even than he has of his own existence that God is truth and the Truth exists 
56 “Quippe ex voluntate perversa facta est libido et dum servitur libidini facta est consuetudo 
et dum consuetudini non resistitur facta est necessitas.”
57 “Voluntas autem noua quae mihi esse coeperat ut te gratis colerem fruique te vellem...”
58 “Ita duae voluntates meae una vetus alia nova illa carnalis illa spiritalis confligebant inter se 
atque discordando dissipabant animam meam.”
59 “Ibi enim magis iam non ego, quia ex magna parte id patiebar invitus quam faciebam volens; 
sed tamen consuetudo adversus me pugnacior ex me facta erat, quoniam volens quo nollem 
perveneram.” Augustine describes the two laws: the law in one’s members and the law of the 
mind (Rom. 7: 24-25). 
60 “Lex enim peccati est violentia consuetudinis qua trahitur et tenetur etiam invitus animus 
eo merito quo in eam volens illabitur.”
61 “Cibus sum grandium: cresce et manducabis me nec tu me in te mutabis sicut cibum carnis 
tuae sed tu mutaberis in me.”
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(conf., 7, 10, 16) (CCSL 27, 104). God presses on Augustine to conform to God’s 
Truth. In so doing, he begins to perceive that all things are good insofar as they 
are, and even things that seem to be evil, such as dragons, fire, and hail, all, in 
truth, praise God’s name (conf., 7, 11, 17) (CCSL 27, 104-105). Augustine cannot 
find peace or embrace God without a willingness to abandon his consuetudo 
carnalis and be open to God’s transformation.
In the subsequent sections of book seven, Augustine discusses the very prob-
lem he has now for a decade identified with the Manichaean hermeneutic. He 
was unable and unwilling to admit that things which displeased him were from 
God. From the confidence of this aesthetic judgment, he refused to appreciate 
how all things, indeed, everything, points to and praises God. Therefore, he 
held to the Manichaean notion of the two substances so that he might exalt 
his own preferences and assure himself of his impeccability. Through this her-
meneutic, Augustine was able to discard uncomfortable difference as being 
ontologically evil, if only because aesthetically displeasing. From the surety 
of his self-defined individuality, he could authoritatively aver that such things 
could have nothing to do with God or more properly himself (and by extension 
God) (conf., 7, 13, 19) (CCSL 27, 105-1106). 
Augustine comes to reject this view, which so easily discards the unwanted 
or that which he is not able to consume or make his own, as he questions his 
own integrity and judgment. Bread, he notes, is displeasing to the sick, and 
light to weak eyes, and so even to some justice is loathsome (conf., 7, 16, 22) 
(CCSL 27, 106). The problem is the vantage of the viewer; that is, the distorted 
will that bends away from God. In essence, the human seeks a kind of agonism 
with things in order to preserve one’s eminence. Through a carnalis consue-
tudo, one’s formed disposition, the human seeks to consume and incorporate 
and discard at will. Yet the very difficulty faced in this endeavor presses or 
even forms one’s desire for agonism. Because human beings seek to assert 
themselves as the sole arbiters of what is good, just, and beautiful, they must 
ground opposition, the displeasing, the ugly, even those things which cannot 
be commodified, in a kind of agonism, whether we think of this in the Man-
ichaean framework of an ontology or, as Augustine identifies in other places, 
an agonistic aesthetic.
What stands out in these passages from the Confessions is that it is the beau-
ty of God, a beauty that cannot be consumed but consumes, that draws in 
Augustine. On the other hand, it is the weight of his carnalis consuetudo that 
drags him down and back within his confident conception of himself (conf. 7, 
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17, 23) (CCSL 27, 107).62 This carnalis consuetudo, as James Wetzel has insight-
fully noted, is, on one level, the desire to consume (“The Question” 170-171). We 
can even extend this to the desire to consume what is different; to consume 
all things and make them one’s own. Augustine’s consuetudo, then, is a kind of 
disposition that seeks to possess and to consume, even that which is wholly 
other, even God. Through this consumption, Augustine also strives to assert 
his eminent autonomy over and against whatever he wills; a  freedom, as he 
says in De vera religione from justice, from the claims and contributions of 
creation, humanity, and God.
As Augustine’s reflection on the carnalis consuetudo reveals, the resolution of 
the agonism put forward by a belief in two principles or two souls is not to 
turn around and consume all things into a kind of simple homogeneity. This is 
still to hold the exalted view of the self as divine (or functionally divine). Dif-
ference, authentic as well as good, must remain, and the will to consume must 
give way to the will to love even those things which do not appear to be worthy 
of love, as well as to love those things such as God which cannot be possessed, 
but in the end will possess Augustine. Perhaps this is why Augustine ends book 
seven with a discussion of the grace of God through the Incarnation (conf., 7, 
18, 24-21.27) (CCSL 27, 108-112).
Conclusion
Augustine’s critique of the Manichaean dualistic system and hermeneutic 
reveals his own thought. Even if we concede that Augustine unfairly depicts 
Manichaeism as holding two souls and not two minds or principles, Augus-
tine’s reflection on the tension of the Manichaean hermeneutic of agonism is 
fairly his own. This does not mean that Augustine has nothing but criticism 
for Manichaeism. On the contrary, through his sustained engagement with 
Manichaean dualism, we can see how he attempts to move the Manichaean 
position toward a focus on the will to sin in the soul. If Manichaeans are dis-
posed to be concerned with this issue, as Secundinus at least in part suggests, 
all the better.
Augustine’s focus on the human person, on the mind, indeed, on the will as the 
point of discord and tension takes place through, in part, his recurring treat-
ment of the Manichaean notion of the two natures, minds, and two souls. The 
62 “Sed rapiebar ad te decore tuo moxque diripiebar abs te pondere meo et ruebam in ista 
cum gemitu et pondus hoc consuetudo carnalis.”
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fruit of the reflection is a substantial dimension of Augustine’s understanding 
of concord and peace. Augustine places his suspicion on the self or mind who 
wills and one’s own selfish consuetudo, not in the external world or in some 
unrelated substance within himself. The seeds of this insight, if not in full, are 
found as early as De Genesi contra  Manichaeos and De vera religione, though it 
is in De duabus animabus that we begin to observe a more focused reflection 
on the weight of consuetudo and its function in relation to an agonistic her-
meneutic. 
Through his recurring reflection on consuetudo, we come to see that Augustine 
does not simply discuss the hindrance of consuetudo, but also, especially in the 
Confessions, takes up the corresponding conception of the self that engenders 
even as it is sustained by such a carnalis consuetudo. Hence, Augustine’s artic-
ulation of his critique of Manichaeism does not simply fault pride as such, but 
the pride that closes off the human from humanity’s created openness. Peace 
is found in openness to God, to others, to the beauty of the created world, 
even, perhaps shockingly, to difference. Peace is not the consequence of the 
consumption of beauty or the satiation of desire on even the most luminous 
of goods; peace is grounded in the disposition—bona consuetudo—to love God 
and others. While this is a disposition that may experience conflict, it does not 
find security and rest in agony or even the prideful resolution of such agony in 
the luminousness of the self—the secure citadel. Such a notion of the self is, for 
Augustine, the cause of so much carelessness and stolid dismissiveness. Peace 
truly can only be sought from a disposition that acknowledges the source of 
peace is beyond the confines of the self, and is open to the agency of that 
which is different.
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Abstract
This chapter is intended to show that Augustine’s 
political philosophy can speak with a radical voice 
into situations of extreme ideological conflict to-
day—most especially where these involve gross dis-
parities of wealth. The key to allowing this radical 
Augustinian voice to speak, is first to spend a good 
deal of time identifying the exact coordinates into 
which it can speak. These coordinates may surprise 
us, and they are the chief innovation of this chapter. 
For convenience sake, I lever the search for these 
coordinates against the general idea of radical so-
cialism, understood as a philosophy of history. The 
result of this approach is that it eventually brings us 
out on Augustine’s doctrine of predestination; and 
allows us to begin to see it as the practical touch-
stone of a new radical Augustinianism. This new 
radicalism does not need to make use of the device 
that liberation theology made use of, viz., a prefer-
ential option for the poor. Instead, it moves beyond 
all such class distinctions to direct itself against the 
very dynamics which have shaped political logic in 
the West since Plato.
Keywords: Marxism-Leninism, Plato, predestina-
tion, rationality, utopianism.
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Resumen
El objetivo de este capítulo es mostrar que la filo-
sofía política de Agustín puede hablar hoy en día 
con una voz radical en situaciones de conflicto 
ideológico extremo, especialmente cuando estas 
implican grandes disparidades de riqueza. La clave 
para permitir que esta voz agustiniana radical ha-
ble es pasar primero mucho tiempo identificando 
las coordenadas exactas en las que se puede hablar. 
Estas coordenadas pueden sorprendernos y son 
las principales innovaciones de este capítulo. Por 
razones de conveniencia, comparto la búsqueda 
de estas coordenadas con la idea general del so-
cialismo radical, entendido este como una filosofía 
de la historia. El resultado de este enfoque es que 
finalmente nos revela la doctrina de la predesti-
nación de san Agustín y nos permite comenzar a 
verlo como la piedra de toque práctico de un nuevo 
agustinismo radical. Este nuevo radicalismo no ne-
cesita hacer uso del dispositivo que la teología de la 
liberación utilizó, a saber una opción preferencial 
para los pobres. En cambio, va más allá de todas 
estas distinciones de clase para dirigirse contra la 
misma dinámica que ha configurado la lógica polí-
tica en occidente desde Platón.
Palabras clave: Marxismo-leninismo, Platón, pre-
destinación, racionalidad, utopismo.
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Some Necessary Preliminaries
In this chapter, I hope to show readers how to recover and deploy  Augustine’s 
radical voice for peace. The urgent need for this  voice continues in many plac-
es around the world. I am particularly thinking of  those places where people 
are separated by vast differences of circumstance and fortune. Note that I am 
being careful not to use the world “class.” That word automatically invokes the 
idea—made famous by socialism—of political history as coordinate upon a con-
spiracy; namely, the conspiracy of the wealthy against the poor. Socialism says 
that this conspiracy has been the chief animating force in the post-industrial 
modern world. That is to say, the property-owning class, qua the property they 
own, have lived in automatic consciousness of what they would  automatically 
stand to lose were their position to fall. Which means that in  inheriting their 
material advantage over the working classes —or in building it up within their 
lifetimes—they have had to pursue an unusually active  degree of self-interest.
All humans are self-interested, so this argument continues; it is the basis of 
our survivalist impulse. But whereas the working classes have experienced 
this impulse blamelessly, at its most basic level of daily bread, the capital-
ists have had always to devise and plot in order to present their unbridled 
pursuit of it in the best possible light. They have controlled history, both in 
the sense of keeping the working classes in a state of resigned, or even awed, 
submission and in enculturating the mystique of their own hallowed lot. It 
is by reason of this, its apparently cynical and unceasing manipulation of 
all around it, that socialism has regarded this capitalist class as the coordi-
nating point for any true and viable thinking on change. More, it is the very 
existence of this class by means of its giant self-conscious effort (to perpet-
uate itself) that makes the very thought of change possible. For if the way 
things were in capitalist societies were instead akin to a law of nature, then 
change would be as inconceivable as changing the law of gravity. However, 
if it can be seen to be the result of a culpable human attitude of mind, then 
why should radical measures not present themselves? History itself might 
now be redirected or realised anew. The vigilance and awareness that was the 
preserve of those with property to lose might now be transferred to 
the classes beneath them, such that they would become enlightened and in-
dignant at the injustice put upon them all these years, and  receptive to a new 
education that would show them how now to set things right. The long-term 
virtue and issue of this vision would then be a kind of world society without 
class, in which the conscious and active participation in the making of history 
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would fall equally and indiscriminately to every human being. A true and final, 
Stateless democracy.
Augustine and Socialism
For a long while now, it has been recognized that numerous conceptual as-
sociations can be made between Augustine and socialism, and Augustine and 
communism.1 One does not even have to reach very far to make the case. Au-
gustine was after all at the forefront of early Christianity’s mission to present 
itself as the religion of the weak and unprotected—of the lowest in society, 
of the poor. He stressed alms giving and charity. He gave up his own  family 
inheritance to the Church and as Bishop and Judge, he routinely took the 
part of his needy parishioners in Roman North Africa, insofar as they were 
continuously beset by greedy officials and steepling taxes. What is more, he 
showed a lifelong commitment to the communistic ideal. His own journey to 
the Church had pivoted on what he came to regard as a shameful inability 
to give up on worldly ambition and success. When he was finally able to con-
vert, in 386, he would round on this aspect of his life decisively and dramati-
cally. His first attempt at an ideal Christian community at Cassiciacum would 
be based upon an active and conscious denunciation of Mammon, understood 
as the rival god—the preoccupation which keeps a man in belief of his own 
self-sufficiency. Later on, when it came to working out the form of organiza-
tion for his priestly household at Hippo Regius, his focus would turn to private 
property as an obstacle to human friendship and fellow ship, but most of all, to 
the true love of God. It would become a staple of his mature thought that holy 
communities are, as it were, always waiting to spring into life, but for the diffi-
culty of human nature and pride, whose first and most devastating expression 
is in private possession. In this, he was referring to the logic that pride can be 
nothing without something of which to be proud. When you add to this the 
fact that all creation is God’s—that God made it and that it is good as God made 
it—then you can see at once why Augustine could feel so  confident about sin-
gling out the institution of private possession for such sustained attack.2
Throughout his priestly career, he would argue that devotion to the common 
possession of the necessities of (material) life can give to a Christian commu-
nity its optimum chance to come into a high and sustained  understanding of 
1 Beginning, in the 20th century with Ryan (26-39). 
2 A mere sample would be civ., 5, 15-16; Gen. litt. 11, 15; lib. arb., 2, 19, 53, 199-200; tr., 12, 9, 14; 
en. Ps., 39, 7; Io. ev. tr., 6, 25-26; en. Ps., 83, 3; s., 113, 4.
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the unique goodness of God. Here, Augustine was singling out a key differ-
ence between the Christian God and the gods of the pagan world. Unlike those 
latter gods, the Christian God (of the New Testament) was not partial in his 
blessings; nor could he be influenced by invocation or sacrifice. To Augustine, 
those ideas belonged firmly to the world of the Earthly City, in which justice 
must be understood from within the parameters of space and time. Against 
this entire conception, he placed the Christian God in a new vision of justice, 
beyond space and time altogether, in eternity: the Heavenly City of Jerusalem, 
the City of God. This God was quite simply above and beyond the schemings 
of human acquisitiveness. He was somehow and miraculously the same to one 
and all. He did not (anymore) belong to a particular people, or a particular class. 
As Augustine would put it in his Confessions: “You are good and all-powerful, 
caring for each one of us as though the only one in Your care, and yet for all as 
for each individual” (3, 2, 19).
Caveat Lector
When then you couple these observations to the fact that Augustine did not 
leave an explicit political vision—or for that matter write an explicit political 
treatise—you can see at once how it becomes possible to enlist him as the fa-
ther of radical action and change in the world on the socialist model. Because 
in the absence of any specific veto in writing from Augustine, these interpreta-
tions of his message can and do remain fair and valid. What I wish to do in this 
chapter, however, is to move away from the question of “class” and what it im-
mediately brings into a conversation today. I want to move away from the idea 
that the fundamental unfairness of human life—which is today addressed by 
the term “social justice”—is something that has a natural, human cause; such 
that it could, and should, then, have a natural, human remedy. I want to get 
away from that dynamic, or mechanism, by which so much of human history is 
still automatically understood.
And I want to stress again that the “getting away” from it is not a reaction, or 
an argument against it. No. It is simply an experiment. An investigation con-
ducted against the normal direction of travel. An attempt to find Augustine’s 
radical political voice at the far end of his most uncompromising and other-
worldly theology: his doctrine of predestination. As well as an attempt, when 
we have done that, to present it as a practical message of peace; notwith-
standing all appearances to the contrary.
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Western Science and the Status Quo
I want to begin here by repeating the key point from my opening above. So-
cialism, and at its extreme end, communism, reacts against the long and ven-
erable idea of the status quo. The idea that in its fundamentals, human history 
is inert and unblinking—and that most fundamental of these fundamentals is 
that one part of humanity shall lord it over the other. Think of Heraclitus’ dic-
tum: “War is the father of all and king of all, and some he shows as gods, others 
as men; some he makes slaves, others free” (Heraclitus, 215, tr. Kirk).
The point of dictums like these is to make you realise that to  react against their 
wisdom would be like changing the seasons (or “changing the law of gravity,” as 
I put it above). More, they are meant to encourage you to pour your intelligence 
into discovering and enumerating the sense in which they are true. With this 
 activity itself then to be considered as yet one more act of  recognition and obe-
dience—the recognition that man is liable to rebel against the manifest destiny 
of Nature and God, and the obedience by which he apologises and repents of 
that. This neatly captures the spiralling logic which has always defined Western 
political  thought; most especially through its Christian era—and against which, 
therefore, radical socialism was bound to feel that only violence might prevail.
Think of it like this. The first great discovery of Western political  thought is 
that man is a zoon politikon. That is to say, the very same rational faculty which 
can dislocate him from all around him in the twists of self-consciousness and 
subjectivity is also that which can bring him into the wider and higher view 
of science and ethics. The discovery of classical Greek political thought is the 
idea that rationality only comes home to man when once he begins to feel and 
appreciate his power to bring himself, and his society, into positive alignment 
with the world out there; with the Universe and its laws; with the gods. In 
other words, man is subject to the same forces of life as any other zoon; the 
difference is that whereas they can align themselves thoughtlessly, according 
to pure instinct, man must each time choose to do so. This act of choosing, 
enacted moment upon moment, is what actually puts him into time—it is what 
creates time from his point of view of it. The non-rational animals cannot be 
aware of time because they do not face the series of choices which define the 
human animal’s moment in time.
Now, of course, if we are here defining the human animal on its basic differ-
ence to all other animals, then we are defining something that has all along 
existed, and we are therefore in danger of losing the sense of what the clas-
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sical Greeks discovered; for indeed it was a proper discovery with major con-
sequences. What the classical Greeks discovered was that the human animal, 
bound everywhere by its rational faculty to endeavour to choose to live well, 
does so by myriad different customs. Sail the seas (as the classical Greeks did) 
and you will discover at once that each new society has its gods and its laws, 
its customs and taboos. These will vary endlessly from place to place, such 
that they must simply be learnt anew by the traveller each time, upon each 
new shore. In a world like that, there is not yet any conception of what we 
would today call “knowledge.” There is nothing underlying, there is nothing 
foundational. There is instead only what is conventional; what is subject to 
change. What the classical Greek mind would then do against all of this flux 
and confusion would be to notice that, deep down, this very chaos is in actual 
fact being generated by forces which are foundational. Strictly speaking, this 
discovery is something that the classical Greek mind would first make in its 
speculations on the physical world. The so-called Presocratic philosophers—
the “first philosophers” of the Western world—would concern themselves 
nearly solely with the investigation and enumeration of the laws of the natural 
world. They produced the first rational explanations for the phenomena of the 
land and the sea and the air that for eons before could only be accounted for 
by supernatural devices. Socrates would then become notorious as the phi-
losopher who would take it upon himself to apply this new tool to the human 
world, and to the business of “living well.”
The overall story, and the overall discovery, however, is as I have described 
it. The classical Greek mind begins to learn to treat the outward phenomena 
of the natural and human worlds as merely the exempla—or products—of the 
stable and predictable forces which generate them. Behind the 1000 different 
cultures of 1000 different shores is now seen to be the foundation—the con-
stant—of the human animal qua the mechanism of its basic form. Qua its basic, 
instinctual requirements of life.
Put yourself down amidst any human society, anywhere in the world, and what 
you will see behind the feathers and smoke and tribal dances is something 
that can be documented, by the impartial observer in a notebook, as knowl-
edge, in just the way of the modern anthropologist. This way of always looking 
through to what is really going on, is what can be attributed, correctly, to the 
classical Greek mind. It is its discovery. The discovery of the power of the ob-
serving human mind. And it is a great power! For whatever is being observed 
by the observing human mind, is at that exact same moment rendered pow-
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erless, objective and inanimate—whether it be the thundering heavens or the 
beating heart of man himself. The tribe dancing before the anthropologist is 
just as powerless and deceived as to the true meaning of its actions as Plato’s 
prisoners were down in the cave. This power is potent, this power is unstop-
pable. And, as per my example par excellence of the modern anthropologist, it 
continues to dominate today. And therefore, we say that the high point of its 
expression remains—for student and citizen—what can be read plainly in the 
great works of Plato and Aristotle. There you will encounter, time and again, 
the great and apparent virtue of surrender. That is, the surrender of the pas-
sionate part of man to his rational part. The surrender of the heart to the mind. 
In other words, what the anthropologist does to the newly discovered tribe in 
the jungle is only possible because of what she has first done to herself. It is 
only because she has first been educated into the virtue of the surrender; it 
is only because she has first looked through herself, and ordered herself, that 
she can now sit so quietly and concentratedly in front of the tribe, and not be 
 moved by the feeling and energy in their dance, and instead catalogue it for 
knowledge and posterity, as an example of behaviour x.
This whole approach to life, this whole method of life, in which reality and truth 
are that which the wise man, which the philosopher, must always see through 
to, is as much a discovery for “thought” as it is for “politics.” But in pressing it 
to its extreme in tightly argued dialogues, Plato and Aristotle ensured that its 
enduring image would indeed be the polis: or the final setting in which the hu-
man animal is able to observe itself acting in perfect obedience to Nature. This 
classical Greek idealism is taken to such a high pitch that it is possible to “walk 
right the way around” the ideal image of man in society which it presents and 
see always the same thing; that is to say, to see no difference of genesis between 
society and man. Society can look back at man and see the mirror image of it-
self; and man can look back at society and see the same. Man stands in relation 
to society as the acorn stands in relation to the oak tree. In this perfect ide-
alism which so pleases and soothes the mind, there is also—I repeat—a perfect 
ambiguity of genesis. Man, who before was disordered and disobedient, heart 
to mind; man, who before stood apart and fearful of Nature in his “self-con-
sciousness and subjectivity,” is now as seamless a part of its wholescale oper-
ation as the acorn, or the squirrel. He is no longer the spanner in the works. 
He has instead been conformed to the highest instinct (to the highest telos) of 
his  being. From his point of view, this is virtue. From the point of view 
of the world of ideas, it is justice.
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To recap. The classical Greek discovery of man as a zoon politikon is in ac-
tual fact the discovery of a perfect and eternal world of ideas from which 
man stands in alienation by virtue of his disobedience. His rational faculty 
makes it possible for him to disobey; and this disobedience is experienced 
by him in the first instance as the series of choices that he must make. A 
series of choices whose linear progression mark out the dimension which 
he calls “time.” From this starting place, the ladder of perfection must be to 
use knowledge (science) with the purpose of now beginning to make these 
choices correctly (ethics). This ladder, properly scaled, returns man to the 
state of perfect justice; which for him, is the true and ideal polis. Or should 
it rather be said, that the scaling of this ladder introduces man to the state 
of perfect justice? Here we encounter again that key phrase of mine from 
above: “A perfect ambiguity of genesis.”
For all that it does, then, classical Greek political thought also launches the 
Western mind into the paradox of this phrase. I repeat again, the idealist solu-
tion to the problem of human life, when taken to its classical Greek extreme of 
conclusion, actually eradicates all proof, save of itself. Plato’s great work, The 
Republic, eradicates all proof, save of itself. Plato’s Republic uses human  beings. 
It arranges them in the perfect  patterns which then become it, and become 
justice itself.3
Reason allows man to “wake up!”—to see the Universe as science sees it, and to 
see at once his messy discordance from it. It allows him to develop and learn 
the way back into coordination with it. The good life, the happy life. But the 
moment that this new life has been achieved; the moment that he has moved 
from time into eternity; this same reason of his offers him no explanation (or 
we should say even “memory”) of where he once was, or how he entered into 
the perfection that he now has. For he, and the Universe, are now in unshake-
able status quo.
I wrote at the start of this section that this idea of the status quo is precise-
ly that which socialism and communism react against. However, students of 
Western political thought have for a long time now been coached to see it 
somewhat differently. Ever since World War Two, in fact; and then the Cold 
War, and the 20th-century experiments in totalitarianism. I must explain what 
I mean by this.
3 I discuss this thesis of mine at length in my book Inventing Socrates, but especially in chap-
ter 2, “The way of truth.”
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The Dominance of the (Psychological) Problem of Evil
The fact is that these telling events have tended to be analysed theoretically, 
in the universities, as gigantic assaults on the colour and spice of individual 
freedom. The image of drab and uniform Eastern bloc streets has been pa-
raded as the proof-horror of what happens when “freedom” is permitted to 
be defined collectively, as the corporate destiny and national possession of a 
people—rather than as the personal destiny and possession of the single-unit 
“man” of modern, constitutional, liberal democracy. An entire generation has 
been taught in this way to regard the status quo as the special and peculiar 
conspiracy of ethical monism.4 This is true as far as it goes. From the point of 
view of individual freedom and ethical pluralism, the status quo is something 
that can only come into being through an enormous, total effort of policing, 
repression and control. In this picture, the status quo is what happens when 
your  birth-right is taken from you. This birth-right is your freedom to pilot 
your own course through life. (It is the antithesis of obeying the orders of Pla-
to’s philosopher kings). However, for precisely this way that it constructs and 
presents itself, this analysis—this theory—can really only then be a partial view 
of the matter. Partial in the sense that it is dominated and directed by the great 
question of the 20th Century, which being the question of “human evil”—name-
ly, “How could the atrocities of National Socialism and International Commu-
nism have occurred?” Or more to the point, “How could human beings have 
been manipulated so as to have been their willing instruments?” The answer, 
from the point of view of the (Western) liberalism of today, is that they were 
made to act as one. However, if you can now peel yourself away from this great 
question of the 20th Century, and if you can focus instead on where I began 
this section—viz., with Heraclitus and his realism—then you may begin to re-
alize a whole wider and longer look on the matter.5 That is to say, if Heraclitus 
was merely being rational in relation to the true facts, if he was merely stating 
the proto-science that the history of philosophy credits him with, and if the 
post-Socratic science of the good life was really this realism’s high example, 
then the status quo that it brings about must be just as much socialism’s nem-
esis as it is the capitalist West’s (as ethical monism). If the daily exempla of the 
human condition and human nature are to be seen through and studied for 
4 In the English-speaking world, the landmark works of this School are still Karl Popper’s The 
Open Society and its Enemies, and Isaiah Berlin’s Four Essays on Liberty. 
5 For cutting-edge accounts of the cracks now appearing in the Western edifice of the “Open 
Society,” see Kaufman (494-507); and Breyfogle (554-566).
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the reality which underlies them, and if this cold hard fact looks like Heraclitus’ 
dictum, or Plato and Aristotle’s aristocratic inequality of man, then the social-
ist impulse for fairness and justice must run up against the immovable object 
of the “scientific condition of man,” or “human nature.”
In this way, socialism allows us to see something very clearly (but which it is in 
the habit of the history of Western political  thought to overlook). The scientific 
cast of mind—which is the Western mind to this day—and which began with the 
classical Greek reduction of the natural and human worlds to their laws and 
processes—must inevitably tend, in the first instance, to the kind of dictatorship 
and eugenics that  Plato proposed. What is more, this political programme, be-
cause it is based upon a total belief in the possibility of total knowledge—plus the 
belief that man has nothing occult in him (such as the Christian “original sin”) 
that would withstand this knowledge—must then go on to rub out all historical 
trace of man’s deviant condition before enlightenment. If Plato is telling us that 
the whole problem of the human race up until philosophy was the straight-
forward lack of the proper knowledge of how to order itself individually and 
collectively (because man, when enlightened, cannot but act in accordance 
with it), then his human race post-philosophy must by this very logic contain 
no “memory” of its previous state: for any such retention would provide for 
the possibility (and it needs only be a “possibility” to negate the force of Plato’s 
system) of a return, or a fall, to it. I believe that this is what Ernst Troeltsch 
(404) meant when he talked of Platonism’s “rationally necessary conceptual 
element.” The purely idealist solution to the problems of human life, and by 
that we mean to politics itself, must for all its purity deliver man into a Heaven 
on Earth that is eternal, and that in being eternal, “cannot account for why 
he would have entered it in the first place.” Man is redeemed, but at the ex-
pense of the sense of that word, which disappears from view. This unforeseen 
result is the shadow which haunts Western political thought. But which, as 
I hinted at earlier, is hardly if ever remarked upon; for it has been covered 
over by the theoretical explanations and denunciations of radical socialism 
which I have given above. These fixate on the spectacle of mass psychology, 
and walk it back to Plato. All the while, radical socialism itself looks to Plato, 
and finds in him the parent of its own great fear, which is that Western ratio-
nalism will become such a sharp blade that it will cut right through all human 
hope of change and peace and show the inequality of man to be, in fact, the 
first and last law of history—quite impossible to resist, once discovered. Like 
when Charles Darwin discovered the comparable role of the law of “natural 
selection” in the kingdom of the non-rational animals.
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What radical socialism—and by that, I mean the new theory of human history 
developed and preached by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels—correctly sees, 
is that the Platonic—then Aristotelian—idea of true knowledge “as knowledge 
of what is conceptually stable and predictable in the Universe” must have the 
eventual, and irreversible, consequence of delivering the human race into 
the method of life by which it would finally line up on that reality. And once 
that were to happen, history would be “locked in” to its eternal pattern. In 
effect, there would be no human element in it—no man to make appeal to. No 
man to make the emotional appeal of social justice to. Instead, it would be like 
trying to appeal to a stone, or a planet, or mathematics, or physics. The radical 
socialism of Marx and Engels requires the engine of history to become some-
thing that can bear regret; and as I put it at the start of this chapter, “culpabil-
ity.” Only man, or better, only a class of men, can do this. Only a class of men 
can be viably identified as the engine of history, then logically redirected un-
der a comprehensive programme of re-education, and yes, redemption. Only 
a class of men can be subject to the valence of “right” and “wrong.” If man is 
the pilot of history, rather, say, than God, or even atoms, then there is a chance 
that he might yet still arise and save himself (his corporate self, the Stateless, 
final communistic world society).
A Perfect Ambiguity of Genesis
Some pages earlier, I talked of the “spiralling logic” of Western political thought 
and noted that it became especially tight in its Christian era. I can now set this 
comment down in its proper context. In attempting to understand the world 
and his place in it by means of his mind, critically and reductively, man births 
reason and science—along with the final proof of universal “process,” if not 
“design.” Of course, Christian philosophy comes quickly to learn to emphasise 
“design,” and to use science as the final proof of what its doctrine had been 
teaching all along. This goes well, until eventually there come those, like Thom-
as Hobbes, who can see the long-hidden danger in this confluence. If obeying 
God is now the same thing as obeying the laws of nature, and vice versa, and if 
this obedience (this “surrender,” as I put it earlier) stands to reason (indeed, is 
the definition of reason), then Man has become like unto an automaton, and all 
the great questions of humanism, including the greatest question of all, which 
is the question why man should submit to God and law (and society) in the first 
place, become unanswerable (because they can no longer sensibly be asked). 
We are back to the strange situation that I have characterised in the phrase, 
a perfect ambiguity of genesis. And “genesis” is very much the operative word 
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here, for we can at once see that the question of human obligation is in actual 
fact subset to the terminating question of any human life, which goes: “Why 
was I born into this station of life, rather than some other? Why should some 
be born free, and others slaves?” Hobbes’s famous and ingenious solution to 
all of this is to craft, or contrive, a genesis for the great law which this great 
question anticipates. Moreover, a human genesis. That is, a human genesis for 
a law which should otherwise stand outside and apart from all such historical 
generation because really it is a precondition, or axiom, of history itself—The 
Leviathan. Let us be clear: Hobbes solves at great effort and length what Em-
manuel Kant said that it would be better that we simply accept. Namely, that 
the ultimate “laws of the Universe” can only be what they are if we first accept 
that no human hand played a part in their creation. In other words, human 
rationality is plainly such that it needs laws. But by the same token, it needs 
those laws to be inhuman and ahistorical. As the Austrian philosopher Ludwig 
Wittgenstein put it best:
To ask whether a formal concept exists is nonsensical. For no proposition can 
be the answer to such a question. (So, for example, the  question, “Are there 
unanalysable subject-predicate propositions?” cannot be asked. (Wittgen-
stein, Tractatus, 4; 1274).
Clearly the laws of logic cannot in their turn be subject to laws of logic. (There 
is not, as [Bertrand] Russell thought, a special law of contradiction for each 
“type”; one law is enough, since it is not applied to itself) (Wittgenstein, Trac-
tatus, 6, 123).
Mathematicians do not in general quarrel over the result of a calculation. (This 
is an important fact.) (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investi gations, II, 11).
In sum, the theoretical picture of the world which science has given man the 
power to construct turns out to contain no natural place for him. Law is per-
fect and eternal, and man, it seems, is neither of those things—or more accu-
rately, he can only ever be partly those things. He can touch eternal perfection 
in his mind, but he cannot hold to it for any serious length of time, for want 
of the will and concentration. This “want” is precisely what has always been 
addressed and treated in the coercive aspects of life in society. Classical Greek 
political thought notes this, but includes this coercion in its general, positive 
conception of reason and law—it teaches that man will always choose willingly 
to submit to law as soon as he sees that it is the same thing as right reason. 
The Christian tradition after Paul and Augustine, learns to take a different view 
of the matter. This is because it has a radical alternative to the idea of human 
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perfection as something that must be realized and proved in society on Earth. 
It has the Heavenly City, to which it  transposes all true and final justice and 
happiness. This allows it to take a more literary and artistic view of man’s in-
veterate deviancy. This deviancy is sin, yes, and is therefore “bad.” But it also 
signifies and demonstrates the way that the heart and soul of a man is secret 
and subject only to God’s final judgement to come. That is to say (post hoc, 
ergo propter hoc), it is precisely because no utopianism—no totalitarianism—
has ever been able to succeed on Earth that we get to see the proof of man’s 
final, supernatural destination. This Christian tradition says, then, that society 
and its coercion is important, but that it is only remedial—it cracks a man on 
the back, but it doesn’t reach inside him and judge and correct his inner self. 
Only God can do that.
I repeat, the Pauline and Augustinian view of political life actually gives to sin 
the role of a radical “double-life.” In the first doctrinal instance, it is the sense 
in which we are born damned, and in which there can never be a “heaven on 
Earth,” no matter how hard we try. Then, in the  second instance, it is the very 
reason why every giant historical scheme to create monism and conformism 
has failed. For in every instance, these schemes have succeeded only in show-
ing that there is something in the human animal that makes it naturally re-
sistant and impervious to God’s Law as much as to “human law presented as 
God’s Law.” There is art in the human animal that will simply always rebel. And 
what it will rebel against each time, is not the content of the laws, but the pris-
on of the concept of law itself. Christian orthodoxy is obliged to call this art 
“sin,” simply because it cannot logically call it “good.” But at the same time, it is 
well aware—at least, it is in the purpose of this chapter of mine to show that it 
should be well aware—that this very art by which Adam and Eve first disobeyed 
God’s Law and fell, must also then be the route back to him; for it is no more, 
or less, than what Augustine would set down for all time as the cor inquietum 
(“restless heart”) (conf., 1, 1, 1).
This radical double-life of sin is famously described by Paul as a whole new 
law of its own, supervening on and wrecking the hitherto certainty of pagan 
humanism, that it can both know and isolate good and evil—and then act de-
cisively and faultlessly on the former: “I find, then a law, that, when I would do 
good, evil is present with me” (Rom. 7, 21).
Augustine’s development on it, is to create a whole new literary register and 
genre based upon it. We have since learnt to call it “autobiography;” though 
in Augustine’s case, we are more strictly talking of  “spiritual  autobiography.” 
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This whole new way of thinking about the human condition takes the dou-
ble-life of sin—takes Paul’s new law—and sets it within the meta-narrative of 
the Garden of Eden. Man bites the apple in order to enter into an intellectual 
freedom from God. Man bites the apple in order to find himself, by himself 
(pride), within the law of the Universe which his freedom from God now gives 
him scope to discover. Yet each time he is doomed (and the story of every 
human life to Augustine now becomes the story of this tragedy played out) 
to discover only that law qua law is sufficient unto itself; that it takes care of 
itself; and that in discovering it, man therefore discovers nothing, save what 
a Universe bound by law would look like.6 As Augustine will explain it (in his 
Wittgensteinian voice), the postlapsarian question of God and law is really a 
question of measurement rather than truth. If we decide to measure God’s 
creation by laws, then it is laws that we will discover (in the same way that 
we would discover kilograms, if we chose to measure God’s creation by them 
rather than pounds). The truth doesn’t enter into it. It is simply a case of man’s 
choosing—of man’s choosing apart from God. Of man’s prideful choosing apart 
from God. Of original sin.7
The poet William Blake would put the situation rather  brilliantly succinctly in 
his poem, “The Human Abstract” (Blake). Its final stanza shows that the tree of 
knowledge did not represent something ontological, that God forbad man to 
possess, but that man only found what he went looking for. Man went looking 
his pride, and he found it in his brain: “The Gods of the earth and sea/ Sought 
‘thro Nature to find this Tree; /But their search was all in vain: /There grows 
one in the Human Brain.” 
Augustine’s innovative description of all of this is to say that we are never really 
searching for the truth, but for ourselves in the truth: “What do I want to say, 
Lord, except that I do not know whence I came into what I may call a mortal 
life or a living death” (conf., 1, 6, 7).
In other words, when we are scripting monumental theories of justice such 
as Plato’s, or more recently John Rawls’, we are never really depicting what 
we think we are depicting. We think we are depicting the future careers in 
happiness of men and women, but really all that we are depicting is the unfeel-
ing career of rationality itself. Yes, only rationality is being described in these 
6 I explain the implications of this for historical and future philosophy (mathematical and 
political) at length in my Ludwig Wittgenstein (New York, Oxford University Press, 2018); but 
in this instance, see especially, pp. 1-32.
7 For more on this, see Hollingworth (195-213).
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hundreds of thousands of pages. As for men and women, their only part in the 
scheme can be to play their part and surrender and obey. In other words, it 
is men and women, correctly arranged, who create the ideal conditions for 
“deliberative rationality” (Rawls 566).8 They become the precondition of the 
condition which is to bind them.9 Or what is the same thing, rationality in-
corporates itself out of the third-person perspective which it collects from 
everyman and everywoman.10 By this means, Western political thought—and 
especially its modern form—has learnt to disregard what I have called “the 
terminating question of any human life” (viz. “Why me, here, now?” “Why was 
I born into the 3rd World rather than the 1st World?”). How far this is from Au-
gustine’s view of the matter—from his radical political voice—will now be made 
apparent.
Finally, I have invoked Ludwig Wittgenstein to make a point bearing vitally on 
this essay. Consequently, I have spoken of Augustine’s “Wittgensteinian voice” 
as something readily apparent. If the reader remains concerned by this, or 
would simply like to know exactly what I mean by the latter term in particular, 
they should consult my essay “Time and Freedom in the Confessions and the 
Tractatus,” in the volume Augustine and Wittgenstein. They should also con-
sider the other essays in that volume as excellent examples of the dynamic 
possibilities of reading these two thinkers  together (Hollingworth “Time and 
Freedom” 151-168).
Predestination in the City of God
Let us consider the following passage from Augustine’s The City of God, which 
may be considered the highpoint of his predestinarian view of human society:
Wicked men do many things which are against God’s will. So great is his wis-
dom, however, and so great his might, that all things which seem to be at odds 
with his will tend towards those outcomes or ends which he himself has fore-
known as good and just. For this reason, when God is said to change his will—
8 “The idea is to approximate the boundaries, however vague, within which individuals and 
associations are at liberty to advance their aims and deliberative rationality has free play” 
(566).
9 See Rawls (587): “The perspective of eternity is not the perspective from a certain place 
beyond the world, nor the point of view of a transcendent being; rather it is a certain form of 
thought and feeling that rational persons can adopt within the world.”
10 See Plato (The Republic, 604d): “One must accept the way the dice fall and then order one’s 
life according to the dictates of reason. One ought not to behave like children who have 
stumbled, wasting time wailing and pressing one’s hands to the injured part.”
Politics, Peace and Predestination [309]
as, for example, when he becomes angry with those towards whom he was 
formerly gentle—it is the people who change, rather than God. They find him 
changed, but only in the sense that their experience of him has changed, just 
as, to injured eyes, the sun “changes” and becomes, in a sense, harsh where 
once it was mild, and hurtful where it was once delightful, even though, in 
itself, it remains exactly as it was before. By God’s “will” we mean that which 
God produces in the hearts of those who obey his commandments, of which 
the apostle says, “For it is God who worketh in you both to will” [Phil. 2:13]. 
So too, God’s “righteousness” is not only that whereby God himself is called 
righteous, but also that which God produces in the man who is justified by 
him. Again, what we call the “Law of God” is really the Law of man, given by 
God. For it was assuredly to men that Jesus spoke when he said, “It is written 
in your Law” [John 8:17]; and, in another place we read that “the Law of his 
God is in his heart” [Ps. 37:31]. Thus, according to this will which God produces 
in men, He is said to will what he does not actually will in himself, but causes 
his people to will; just as He is said to know what he causes the ignorant to 
know… According to this sense of “God’s will,” therefore, whereby we say that 
God “wills” what He causes others to will, to whom the future is not known, 
God “wills” many things which he does not actually perform. His saints, for 
example, with a holy will inspired by him, will that many things should come 
to pass which do not in fact do so: as when they offer pious and holy prayers 
for others but what they pray for does not happen, even though, by his Holy 
Spirit, God has produced in them the will to pray. Thus, when, according to 
God’s teaching, the saints will and pray that someone may be saved, we can, in 
a manner of speaking, say that God wills it but does not perform it. For what 
we mean when we say this is that God wills something when he causes others 
to will it. According to his own will, however, which, together with his fore-
knowledge, is eternal, God has certainly already made all things in heaven and 
on earth which he has willed: not only things past and present, but also things 
future. But before that time arrives at which he has willed that something is 
to come to be which he has foreknown and disposed before all time, we say, 
“It will come to pass when God wills it.” This does not mean that God will then 
have a new will which he did not have before; but that something will then 
come to pass which has been prepared in his immutable will from all eternity 
(civ., 22, 2).
Here we see, spectacularly clearly, the main elements involved in this view 
of Augustine’s—and how they have made it so notorious down the years. On 
the one hand, there is the insistence that no matter what, the Christian God 
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is good in everything he does, and indeed doing everything that is done to 
constitute being. He is the eternal, all- seeing Author of life Itself. On the oth-
er hand, there is the recognition that from the human point of view at least, 
the course of this life can, and will, throw up events which could not, on any 
sane view, be called “good.” Moreover, as we have been noticing throughout 
this  chapter, political logic in the West since Plato has relied completely on 
the  human mind’s facility to correctly differentiate between what is good, and 
what is not; then on developing scientific methods of attaching the human 
mind permanently to the former, by means of encountering it at the level at 
which there can be no mistakes of misapprehension, and no  dissolution of 
what is there: the essential level. Over the millennia, this science of the Good 
Life has been advanced to such a degree, that even great wars have been fought 
in the name of the certain knowledge of what is good for man, and what is not. 
They continue to this day. So, we—in the  Christian West at least—say that we 
know exactly what good and evil are; and believe that we have techniques 
for holding to and furthering the former. Yet according to the orthodoxy and 
doctrine of Christianity, God is just as much responsible for the evil that we 
shun as he is for the good that we embrace. This brings us to the tipping point 
of Augustine’s predestinarian view. In order for God to be the author of all 
that is, he has also then to have been eternally aware of what he was always 
going to author. (The point stretches even our grammar here on the page; but 
then it has to). Thus, situated as he is in eternity, God is in foreknowledge of 
all that is. Every good thing and every evil thing, is in his gift. This sets up an 
immediate collision between our wisdom and God’s. If we are not Christians, 
this collision will be more than  enough to confirm us in our decision not to 
be. If we are Christians, then it must become the immediate source of some 
considerable  anxiety on our part. This anxiety is referenced in what Augustine 
has to say in the passage above on the saints, and how they pray for the souls 
of men and women, and how only a certain number of those prayers can ever 
be answered by God.
God already knows who is going to Heaven and who is not, because he was 
the one who made the decision in the first place, in his eternal foreknowledge. 
There are two logical responses to the anxiety of this thought. The first is 
apathy—to sit on one’s hands and do  nothing; for on this view there is clear-
ly no point in doing anything (if the ultimate prize of life has already been 
 distributed). The second is a  redoubled effort at Christian virtue. In this sec-
ond response, made  famous as Max Weber’s Protestant Work Ethic, the pilgrim 
grasps to the fact that, if God has preordained life, then man is nonetheless 
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still  living it (out in time). And if man is doing that, and if in Church on Sundays 
he still hears of the Ten Commandments, and of how he can and must cling to 
them, or repent and amend his ways if he has not; and that all of this will be 
reckoned and weighed at the end on the  scales of his  final judgement;  then 
he can only conclude that notwithstanding the devastating logic of predes-
tination, he has yet been  granted the responsibility for his actions and the 
course of his life. Given this, might he not then work and earn his way into 
Heaven? This ethic, made consciously or unconsciously against the withering 
onslaught of God’s majesty, has therefore gone on to become the beacon of 
modern Capitalism’s sense of wellbeing when it is in bullish mood. And be-
cause it was made in the face of predestination’s towering logic, as a means of 
effectively harnessing it to ride with it, it is curiously then also as non-Chris-
tian as it is Christian. To fully take this in, we need to think of everything com-
passed above under our investigation of—to use Troeltsch’s term again—the 
“rationally necessary conceptual element” of Western  thought, after Plato.
For example, look at our passage above from Augustine. Look at the enormous 
care he takes to distance God from any condemnation  according to the vicis-
situdes of life. Does this not remind us of what I said above on Hobbes, and of 
his own reaction to the imputation of this view, that obeying God becomes no 
more than obeying the laws of Nature? It should. Hobbes saw that when God is 
distanced like this in answer to the great, troubling questions of life (Why was 
I born poor and unprivileged? Why did God provide for the (manifest) evil of 
it?), then he also dissolves into the very logical—into the very scientific—view 
which has made the questions visible to us in the first place. That is to say, as 
man comes into the full power of his ability to explain the Universe rationally, 
on a principle (à la Greek philosophy), he also comes into the full power of his 
ability to script passages like Augustine’s above. It is only when once we can 
conceptualize the Universe irreligiously—as atoms and process rather than 
living forces and daemons—that we can mount the full, Augustinian, predes-
tinarian view. It is only when once we have rendered the Universe inanimate, 
that we can bring in the idea of ultimate responsibility for its state as such.11
Think of it like this. You first have to have defined the crime before you can 
bring in the accused. If God is now in the dock, then it is for the crime of hav-
ing knowingly created this apparently unfeeling Universe, in which good and 
evil come to be distributed arbitrarily.
11 Consider, for example, how this twist of logic is replicated in Adam Smith’s “invisible hand”—
the beneficent Deity who makes it that free-market forces will work to the higher good (182-
183).
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Now relate this to the ground that we have covered in this chapter. We are 
saying that materialism—whether it be of the presocratic or Marxist-Leninist 
kind—replicates exactly the logic that Augustine has put to  work in his passage 
above. In reaching as far as Augustine is prepared to, right to the very summit 
of God’s omniscience, we do two things. One, we render God indistinguishable 
from the totality of operations that constitute the universe of being—and then 
call that awesome spectacle his “majesty.” And two, we then fall automatically 
to using man, the human animal, as the increment and metric of the universe 
of  pleasure and pain—for if we are disbarred from saying that God undergoes 
anything that could constitute the changes associated with volition or emo-
tion, if we are disbarred even from saying that he can undergo the revelations 
in time that constitute the “point of experience,” then it is man who must be 
recruited into this role instead. Augustine makes this quite clear in what he 
says above. By declaring God responsible for the “totality of operations,” as I 
have called it, Augustine logically disqualifies him from bearing responsibility 
for any particular moral event in time. In fact, the definition of such a “moral 
event in time,” becomes the  description of the partial line of sight which it is 
man’s lot to bear as a created being. All that can be said of God in relation to 
moral events—and by that we mean to the cruel happenstance of them—is that 
he will somehow and mysteriously work them all to good in the end. The effect 
of all of this, then, is no different to the effect of materialism. Materialism kills 
religion and kills God, only to find that it has not killed the “religious question.” 
The scientist looks into the cosmos’s unblinking eye and realizes that it is now 
up to him to do good or evil with the knowledge he has come into. So, too, does 
the political ideologue. So, too, again, does Weber’s protestant worker. From 
within theology, this has also been the source of the charge often levelled at 
Augustine, that his God is so far distanced from man as to be no different, in 
practice, to such severe conceptions as Plotinus’ One.
To me, however, all of this comes as positive news; for it is, in fact, what I re-
gard to be the essence of Augustine’s radical political voice.
The Unfairness of Birth
We must think again of the passage from The City of God above. We must think 
carefully of quite what exactly establishes the distance in it, between us and 
God. Is it not the very fact that we have had no input or control as regards the 
cardinal decision of our life, which has been our birth into this Universe? In 
a temporal world, it is logically impossible for any of us to choose to be born. 
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That decision must always be made for us by others, by our parents, and by 
their parents before them, and so on; all the way back to Adam and Eve. And 
from them, to God. God, in other words, is the termination of what I have 
been calling “the terminating question of a human life.” And this, I now want 
to suggest, comes out as the principal difference—and distance—between him 
and us. It is the very difference between temporality and eternality. And it 
is the difference that has made for the logic of politics in the West, as I have 
defined it in this chapter. If we are each of us catapulted into life on the whim 
of God, some rich some poor, then it is God who must bear the final respon-
sibility for the social injustice—the social unfairness—which it has become the 
principal business of ethics and politics to  correct. And if, like Augustine, we 
are Christians, then we have simply like him to shrug our shoulders and state 
it as an article of Christian faith that the ultimate justice of it all will one day be 
seen at the final reckoning. What we cannot do, however, is to go so far as to 
actually try to “reverse  engineer” God’s whim. What we cannot do is to go as 
far as Plato went in The Republic and apply systematic eugenics in the attempt 
to eradicate the accidents of birth. And let us remember as well, the resurgent 
popularity of eugenics closer to our own time, in the 20th century, and how it 
was coterminous with the development of the modern, cradle-to-grave State 
of the capitalist West. Nor, for that matter, can we make the philosophical 
move of radical socialism, and call the accident of birth the accident of class—
and try to resolve the matter at that level.
That we must not try to reverse-engineer God on his whim (or his  wisdom), is 
because of the supreme danger of rationality—not of the danger of it identified 
in the post-World War Two years, to which I have already made reference in 
this essay. The danger of historicism and what another analyst of the problem, 
Michael Oakeshott (29), was to call the “bogus eternity of an ideology.” No. The 
supreme danger of rationality to which I refer is the mesmerism by which we 
lose touch with our true home, our true cry, our true nostalgia. Augustine’s 
restless heart.12
I mean how any grand, systematic and orchestrated solution to the problem of 
the unfairness of birth—any ideal city—must always also have the consequence 
of explaining away the very door which Augustine is trying to leave open.
Augustine knew full well that the plain act of looking for God’s majesty in 
words must eventually reproduce the exact same logic of realism that godless 
12 The same mesmerism by which Pelagius reverse-engineered Grace so as to arrive at the 
“debt” which it repays. See Augustine, grat. Chr., 1, 24.
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science claims for its own. Whether you are a Pre-Socratic believing in eternal 
cycles of just retribution, or a biologist believing after Darwin that Nature se-
lects, or a Marxist believing that history progresses, you are all of you believing 
what the Augustinian Christian believes when he refuses to be detained by the 
(mere) appearance of chaos and caprice in the Universe and holds steadfastly 
to the conviction that there is some underlying—or in his case overlying—pur-
pose to it all. However, in Augustine’s case, this does not mean that these be-
liefs are all of a piece. Instead, it is all of it an illustration of the chief limitation, 
that is the chief pride, of the fallen human mind. When Adam and Eve turned 
from God, they began humankind’s long journey of losing contact with the 
supernatural part of its story. For Augustine, it becomes the very definition 
of the fallen human mind that it relegates the supernatural to the realm of 
appearance. That, technically speaking, is the first and only positive move that 
it makes. From then on, everything that it does is negative and tautological. It 
is the description of what is there, for what it is—plus the ethic of doing that.
Ultimately, the tragedy of this comes home to man as his own  pecu liar form 
of self-harm and self-mutilation. In creating a new, natural,  Godless, inani-
mate and material Universe for himself to inhabit, man really only succeeds 
in placing himself at odds with the rationality of that schema. In constructing 
the grand theories of society and peace which would require the perfect co-
operation of humans for their proof, man really only succeeds in proving the 
inveterate disobedience of his species. As painstaking and detailed a manual 
for peace as Rawls’ theory is (and all such like it), it is a manual for insects not 
men. There is a reason why the word “utopianism” has its force of meaning.
For Augustine, the difference between a man and an insect is that the man 
has a supernatural meta-narrative. For the insect, everything of importance 
in its life, plays out within the span of its life, birth to death. For the man, it is 
the opposite: “For God will not judge a man according to how he changes for 
better or worse in the midst of his life; rather, he will judge him according to 
how he is found at the end of it (civ., 17, 4). 
Augustine’s radical political voice uses predestination to bring us alive to this 
fact. Insects move like atoms and can have no sense of the difference between 
the natural and the supernatural, whereas man is the centre of exchange who 
makes out the balance. For example, only a man—only a fallen man—can write 
as Augustine did in book XXII above, because only a fallen man satisfies the 
conditions required for the “sense of injustice.” When Augustine observes that 
God ‘“wills” what He causes others to will,” he is observing nothing more re-
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markable than were he to observe that “God wills for the ants to build nests 
and collect food.” Likewise, when he observes that on occasions, the saints may 
“offer pious and holy prayers for others but what they pray for does not hap-
pen,” he is marking out the difference between the human sense of injustice 
and the rational principle of Divine Fiat. From the point of view of establishing 
that latter principle in words on the page, the content of what God ordains 
cannot be relevant; just as were we to use the example of a martyr being burnt 
at the stake to establish the principle of the second law of thermodynamics. 
Or—and here is the real point of this chapter—were we to follow Marx in us-
ing the concept of class to establish the law of revolutionary change. If you 
will only zoom far enough out, then every little thing becomes the example of 
some law; while laws seduce us into certainty concerning political good and 
evil—for that is how rationality works. What matters, and what Augustine is 
really wanting to draw our attention to, is man’s role in breaking this pattern. 
When man chooses, as Augustine does above, to praise God’s law, he is doing 
what no citizen of an earthly political utopia could, or would, ever do. Man can 
only write and praise as Augustine does when he knows as certain fact that 
God has damned him then enlightened him. His knowledge of this certain fact 
is what makes his choice real and meaningful. He loves God’s law not because 
it makes sense, but because it does not make sense. And as he continues in this 
radical love, he learns to be radically suspicious of all institutions and argu-
ments—all polities—that present us with something that it would make sense 
to love. For in us, as Augustine puts it, there is a distinguitur tempore (“distinction 
in time”): “because we were first darkness, and then were made light” (conf., 
XIII, 10, 11). In us, then, there is always the “sense of genesis”; and because our 
genesis is always in God’s hands not our own, there can be the sense also of 
the injustice of it as we survey a world of rich and poor and our own, unasked 
for beginning in it.13
Conclusion
Augustine was deeply moved by human suffering and would do whatever he 
could to alleviate it. At the same time, he was the first major Christian phi-
losopher to grasp the otherworldly trajectory of Christian hope and love—
plus the political implications of that new stance in a hitherto pagan world 
13 See Augustine, ench., 8: “None of us is born because he will, and none of us dies when he 
will: [Christ], when he would, was born; when he would, he died: how he would, he was born 
of a Virgin: how he would, he died; on the cross.”
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of strictly earthly allegiances. The long, vexed  history of the interpretation 
and reception of his political ideas since has been the struggle to locate him 
(and his Pilgrim City) between these diverging facts. All that I have tried to 
show here, is that the key to the answer at last may lie in how we make the 
cut. If you try to cut through the history on the question of Christian citi-
zenship of earthly cities, you get nothing more out of Augustine and his ad-
herents than timeworn common sense: render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s. 
However, if you cut through on the question of political knowledge (viz., the 
scientifically acquired  knowledge of the good life), then you release the full 
resources of his mature theology and arrive at a deep and deeply useful 
 understanding of what he meant by dividing all humanity into two  cities ac-
cording to two loves. When Lenin wrote “Practice is higher than (theoretical) 
knowledge, for it has not only the dignity of universality, but also of  immediate 
actuality (213).” He was really only being honest about what I have called the 
“spiralling logic” of Western  political  thought. The  scientific approach to hu-
man life seeks out the  materialistic common denominator which then threat-
ens to entrench some patrician status quo and/or extend to meaninglessness 
the  actuating sequence of  change. Marxism-Leninism overcomes this through 
practice, but at the expense of forcing men to love a vision so picture-perfect—
so obedient to itself—that within it, they disappear from view.  (Liberal democ-
racy has been able to duck the question altogether by evolving a virtue—moral 
pluralism—that cannot be distinguished from the free-market  capitalism de-
nominating it). For Augustine, this turns out to be the key to our real location 
and real need—which, of course, is the same for the rich man as it is for the 
poor. The point of his magnum opus work, The City of God, the point of its 
1500-page doctrine of predestination, is not what is inside it but that it was 
written by a man. If no man had written it,  Augustine thinks that it would 
have existed anyway. It would simply be the truth. It would simply be God’s 
immutable will. Heaven and Hell, and who goes where.14
Augustine’s radical message of peace, his single instruction to rich and poor 
alike, is that nothing is therefore resolved between the covers of history save 
history itself. The serial record of natural events may or may not go on to be 
written up in books like his The City of God. But if they are, then the humans 
writing them will always be left on the  outside looking in. And what they will 
14 I hope there is nothing disturbing in my calling Augustine’s City of God a “1500-page doc-
trine of predestination.” My point is no more than the old one that “there are no pockets in 
a shroud,” or to bring in Wittgenstein one final time, ‘He must, so to speak, throw away the 
ladder after he has climbed up it.’ (Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 6.54)
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see through that window will only ever be the injustice of predestination. For 
how could it be otherwise? (The ants, if they could see, would only be able to 
see justice and their seamless part in it; which goes to show what I am saying 
here, which is that the human eye is a “moral eye,” blinded by its own need to 
see everything through the lens of necessity).15
The great projects of pagan social and political theory have always looked to 
history as the single City in which the final perfection of man will be decided 
and proved. However, Augustine would use his own life to  decide and prove 
the great counter idea, which is that this single city—this material existence 
which we call life on Earth—only really exists insofar as it can be observed 
from out of the vantagepoint  called the “supernatural,” which we participate 
in by means of our soulful  selves. This is why his Confessions begin with their 
famous invocation; which is actually Augustine’s asto nishment that we can call 
on God at all, given the evident sufficiency of the psychological and empirical 
 methods of accounting for a life. It is not that those methods are wrong. No! 
 Augustine’s point is rather that because they are logical, whatever they go on 
to depict must itself then also be perfectly logical. Yet this is clearly an inhu-
man requirement (remember what I said about the “double-life of sin”), and 
so man always stands apart from his observed self. “Where can I go beyond 
heaven and earth!,” Augustine will write in desperation, “So that you may come 
to me, my God, who have said, ‘I fill heaven and earth’! [Jer. 23:24]” (conf., 1, 2, 2).
Man can only have the intellectual perspective on his own life and wider 
events in the world—he can only produce normative theories of society and 
state—because he can never in fact locate himself in those selfsame creations 
of his. And that he cannot, is because they are never the true diagnosis of who 
he is, and where he is, and most importantly, where he is from, but rather the 
set of instructions for how he would have to behave in order to be the agent 
of those theories of his, on the page, in the city. Augustine’s definition of the 
Roman “commonwealth” against Cicero in book XIX of The City of God is the 
arch-example of this. It is utterly indiscriminate and impersonal, such that 
anyone, anywhere, could follow out its rationality, but no-one could recognise 
it as their home (civ., 19, 24).
Augustine will insist on this distinction between Creator and created—this 
“distinction in time”—right on up to the City of God in Heaven.  There, at the 
climax of the fulfilment of God’s plan, it is saved from collapsing into the dead-
dry predestination of the page by the fact that it clings in willing and self-con-
15 See Augustine’s explanation of this with reference to the Stoics at civ., 5, 9-10.
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scious love to its Creator God. Because of this, the City of God can never be 
talked of, and written of, in the second-hand, as though it were like the Earthly 
City, constituted and known through the mechanical interactions of its parts. 
No! For the City of God is a person, not a pattern. It has no analysable sub-
stance, and cannot be replicated on that basis; for it is no more, or less, than 
the continuing love of its members for God:
Hence it is in such wise from you, our God, that it is completely other than you 
and not the selfsame. Not only do we find no time before it, but not even in 
it, because it is adapted always to behold your face and is never turned away 
from it. Thus it comes about that it is never varied by any change. Yet there is 
in it a certain mutability, from which it would become dark and cold, unless it 
clung to you with a mighty love so as to shine and glow from you as at eternal 
noontide (civ., 12, 15, 21).
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How do We Use Our Words 
in the World where Lies 
are Rampant? From Augustine’s 
Argument on Lying
¿Cómo usamos nuestras palabras 
en un mundo donde las mentiras son rampantes? 
El argumento de Agustín sobre la mentira
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Abstract
This chapter examines how Augustine inspires us to live 
at peace with our world where lies are rampant. We see 
many cases of lies having power and truths  being ignored 
in  politics, media and other situations. In some of his works, 
Augustine expresses the idea that every kind of lie is a sin. 
His strict ban on lying has often be seen as abstract and 
 unrealistic, because we consider lying to be sometimes 
useful and  helpful, while regretting the situations in which 
lies are rampant. In the first part of this chapter, the author 
points out how Augustine’s ban on lying has a certain kind 
of permissibility and that he leads us to focus on wheth-
er a liar loves truth/God or not. Augustine sets a certain 
 criterion for the sin of lying in one’s mindset in terms of 
loving truth/God or not. The second part of this chapter 
will show that  Augustine thinks a person who tells a lie will-
ingly does not love truth, and as a result she or he will lose 
true happiness. Augustine thinks that the liar’s mindset, 
which  willingly tells a lie, will cause great evils as well. This 
mindset also  loses the healing of Christ. In the last part of 
the  chapter, the  author argues that Augustine finds utility 
in words that prevent our being liars and enable the enjoy-
ment of the unity of truth and God. According to Augustine, 
we can speak truth when we speak what we heard from the 
truth. The truth is the Word, Christ. Augustine’s argument 
on lying deeply connects with his Christology and that 
 enables him to suggest how to use our words in the world 
where lies are rampant.
Keywords: inner-dialogue, lying, truth, veritatem facere, will.
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Resumen
Este capítulo examina cómo Agustín nos inspira a vivir en 
paz en nuestro mundo donde las mentiras son desenfrena-
das. Vemos muchos casos donde se valoran las mentiras y 
se ignoran las verdades en la política, los medios de comu-
nicación y otras situaciones. En algunas de sus obras, Agus-
tín expresa la idea de que todo tipo de mentira es un peca-
do. A menudo, se ve su prohibición estricta sobre mentir 
como abstracta y poco realista, porque consideramos que 
mentir a veces es útil, al mismo tiempo que lamentamos 
las situaciones en las que las mentiras son desenfrenadas. 
En la primera parte de este capítulo, el autor señala cómo 
la prohibición de mentir de Agustín tiene un cierto tipo de 
permisibilidad y que nos lleva a centrarnos en si un menti-
roso ama la verdad/Dios o no. Agustín establece un criterio 
para mentir en la mentalidad de uno en términos de amar 
la verdad/Dios o no. En la segunda parte de este capítulo, 
veremos que Agustín piensa que una persona que dice una 
mentira voluntariamente no ama la verdad y, como resulta-
do, perderá la felicidad verdadera. Agustín cree que la men-
talidad del mentiroso, que de buena gana dice mentiras, 
también causará grandes males. Esta mentalidad también 
pierde la curación de Cristo. En la última parte del capítulo, 
el autor argumenta que Agustín encuentra utilidad en nues-
tras palabras ya que impiden que seamos mentirosos y nos 
permiten disfrutar juntos en la unidad de la verdad/Dios. 
Según Agustín, podemos decir la verdad cuando hablamos 
lo que escuchamos de la verdad. La verdad es la Palabra, 
Cristo. El argumento de Agustín sobre mentir se conecta 
profundamente con su cristología y eso le permite sugerir 
cómo usamos nuestras palabras en nuestro mundo donde 
las mentiras son desenfrenadas.
Palabras clave: mentira, verdad, voluntad, diálogo interno, 
veritatem facere.
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Is Augustine’s Absolute Prohibition of Lying Unrealistic?
Lies have power. Politicians who often tell false stories still gain support-
ers; Internet media earns money by sharing false but shocking news. People 
can showcase their lives on social networking services with fictitious sto-
ries and selective photos. The terms “post-truth” and “alternative facts” have 
emerged. People seem to enjoy disrespecting truth and sharing falsehoods. 
On the other hand, it is true that we fear living in our world where lies run 
rampant. In such a world, people who can lie successfully have power and 
others may feel threatened. Legal justice and science lose meaning. How to 
confront this ongoing situation is an urgent issue for us. 
As Bok pointed out, lying or deceiving was not focused on as a topic of academ-
ic research in the twentieth century,  although there were many opportunities 
to think about problems concerning such topics.1 Brinton (437) also pointed 
out that “the subject of persuasion were neglected by twentieth century reli-
gious and philosophical writers concerned with the ethics of belief.” Whether 
telling a lie is acceptable when a speaker intends to persuade others for good 
reasons is a major issue with lying. Although twentieth century philosophers 
“have done so  little to analyze the problem of deception” (Bok 10), as Brinton 
says,  Socrates and Plato already had an interest in the ethics of persuasion, 
and  Augustine, being in line with the aforementioned philosophers, worked 
on examining the issues raised by lying.2 Augustine’s two books on lying, De 
mendacio (394/5) and Contra mendacium (420), which are said to be the first 
books written on the theme of lying, are classics on the topic. It is clear Augus-
tine’s doctrine on lying influenced arguments made by later writers: Gregory 
the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Kant and so on.3 
In his De mendacio and Contra mendacium, and also in some arguments in his 
other works, Augustine consistently argues that every kind of lie is a sin, and that 
we should not tell any lie.4 Although his doctrine has  authority, this strict ban on 
1 “The striking fact is that, though no moral choices are more common or more troubling than 
those which have to do with deception in its many guises, they have received  extraordinarily 
little contemporary analysis” (Bok XIX).
2 Brinton explains the influence of Plato on Augustine and the difference of their arguments on 
the ethics of persuasion. Regarding the argument on lying from Plato to Augustine, see Sarr.
3 Regarding the evident citations from Augustine by Gregory the Great and Aquinas, and the differ-
ence between Church fathers, see Ramsey (1985). Regarding the arguments on lying by Aquinas, Kant, 
Newman and Nietzsche, compared to the Augustinian position, Griffiths (“Lying”) is introductive.
4 “Every lie must be called a sin” (ench., 7. 11). After the Bok’s book (1979) was published, many 
articles that examines Augustine’s arguments on lying started to be published. Three papers 
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lying seems to be unrealistic and not workable in our actual lives, because we 
sometimes consider lying to be useful and helpful. We can easily imagine situ-
ations in which lying would save lives. For example, when non-Jews lied to the 
government in Nazi Germany to save Jews; as such, it feels difficult to follow 
Augustine’s total ban on lying. In fact, Bok says that Augustine’s speculation “goes 
beyond the realm of ethics and belongs squarely in that of faith” (Bok 46), and she 
expresses her agreement with “the rejection of the absolutist prohibition of all 
lies” (48). While trying to defend Augustine’s position, Griffiths seems to be on the 
same side with Bok. He explains that what Augustine means when he expresses 
a strict ban on lying is not to exhort one to just stop lying, but to illuminate sin’s 
nature, to recommend confession and to turn the gaze away from the lie and 
toward the truth and God (Griffiths “Lying” 225). However, he also admits that 
“a community in which the  Augustinian ban on the lie was taken seriously—a 
community of truth—would look very different from any we now know” (229); and 
that “the consistent Augustinian cannot lie to save innocent life, whether one or a 
million; he cannot lie to comfort the sad, preserve public order, prevent physical 
suffering, or even to prevent apostasy or blasphemy” (230). 
Does Augustine really think that one should never lie under any circumstance? 
Decosimo suggests there is greater nuance in the prohibition on lying by Au-
gustine. Based on Griffith’s (“The Gift”) account, which focuses on the notion 
of God as “Giver” of speech to human beings, Decosimo explains that although 
Augustine sees lying as intrinsically sinful for human agents, he permits ly-
ing only when “one is functioning as God’s instrument,” in other words, only 
when “God or the justly acting state is the true agent” (Decosimo 689 and 
693). Augustine does not explicitly express the statement the way Decosimo 
interprets, but his interpretation is persuasive. I’d like to present two texts that 
Decosimo does not mention in his paper, but from which we could interpret 
that Augustine admits a certain kind of permissibility in lying. 
One text is in De mendacio. Augustine explains as following:
by Feehan (“Augustine on lying”; “The morality”; and “Augustine’s own examples”) are im-
portant in clarifying Augustine’s arguments. Although Augustine examines the definition of 
lying in his De mendacio, the definition is not necessarily definite. While saying that “a lie is a 
false statement made with the desire to deceive,” Augustine suggests there is still a room for 
consideration, saying that “but, whether this alone is a lie is another question” (mend., 5.; tr. 
Muldowney 60). To consider what is lying, Adler and Carson are beneficial. Regarding jokes 
that Augustine intentionally excluded from the examination, see Levenick. I also exclude the 
theme of jokes and fictions from the examination of this chapter, although they are an im-
portant theme when we discuss utility of our words. I’ll examine them in another paper. 
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Therefore, in regard to the passage: “The mouth that belieth,  killeth the soul” 
(Sap. 1:11), the question arises as to what mouth is signified. When Holy Scrip-
ture uses the term “mouth,” it often signifies that  inner chamber of the heart 
where whatever is uttered by the voice when we speak truthfully pleases us 
and is determined upon. Hence it is that he lies in his heart who takes pleasure 
in lying; but he cannot lie in his heart who through his speech so expresses 
something other than what is in his mind that he knows he is doing evil solely 
for the sake of avoiding a greater evil and knows that both evils are repugnant 
to him (mend., 16, 31; tr. Muldowney 92-3).5
The scriptural phrase “the mouth that belieth, killeth the soul” is a phrase that 
those who think no lie is permissible use as a testimony for their opinion. Lies 
are spoken with a physical mouth in so far as lying is regarded to be an act of 
speech. Augustine, however, interprets here that a mouth is also in one’s heart. 
The mouth in one’s heart is not one that speaks words silently before the words 
it uttered with sounds.6  Augustine distinguishes between those who utter 
falsehoods with  pleasure from those who utter falsehood with displeasure, and 
regards the latter as not telling a lie with the mouth in his or her heart, although 
she or he tells a lie with his physical mouth. The mouth in one’s heart is an ex-
pression that signifies whether one has a mindset that loves the truth/God and 
is pleased to be veracious or not. The mouth can be expressed as one’s state of 
will. In fact, interpreting the scriptural phrase “Be not willing to make any kind 
of lie [Noli velle mentiri omne mendacium]” (Eccl. 7, 14) in the following argu-
ment, Augustine focuses on the term velle in the phrase, and explains that “the 
will itself is considered as the mouth of the heart” (mend., 17, 34; tr. Muldowney 
96). For a person who really loves the truth/God and wants to be veracious, to 
utter falsehood even for the sake of avoiding a greater evil goes against his or 
her will in so far as what she or he utters is false. However, even if she or he 
utters the truth, to cause a greater evil by uttering the truth goes against his 
or her will in so far as she or he causes what she or he does not want to cause. 
Augustine pays attention to the situation that one is involved inevitably in a sin, 
5 “Sic ergo quod scriptum est: os autem quod mentitur, occidit animam; de quo ore dixerit, 
quaeritur. plerumque enim scriptura cum os dicit, conceptaculum ipsum cordis significat, 
ubi placet et decernitur quidquid etiam per vocem, cum verum loquimur, enuntiatur: ut 
corde mentiatur, cui placet mendacium; possit autem non corde mentiri, qui per vocem aliud 
quam est in animo ita profert, ut maioris mali evitandi causa malum se admittere noverit, cui 
tamen utrumque displiceat” (PL 40).
6 Augustine argues also on internal words uttered silently in one’s mind and their relationship 
with external words, non-linguistic words and divine words, for example in De magistro, De 
doctrina Christiana and De Trinitate 15. See Toom (231-8).
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and finds a certain kind of permissibility in one’s mindset that is not pleased 
with telling a lie, as this mindset signifies his/her love toward the truth/God. 
In another text, we find a similar understanding by Augustine.
It cannot be denied that people who lie only for the salvation of others have 
made great progress in goodness; but it is the good will of those who have 
made such progress, not their lying, that is rightly praised and even rewarded 
with temporal gifts. It is  enough to excuse their lying without praising it as well, 
especially in the case of the heirs of the new covenant, to whom these words 
are addressed: “Let your word be yes, yes or no, no: anything more than this 
comes from the evil one” (Mt. 5, 37).7 
Augustine leads us to focus on one’s good will (benevolentia). He does not pro-
hibit the act of lying itself in a case that one has a good will.8 He admits that 
the act of lying is excused. However, he does not admit that the act is praised. 
This explanation accords with what we read in the previous text.9 Augustine 
focuses on the mindset of a person who tells a lie willingly or unwillingly, and 
argues that he or she should not be praised and should not be pleased with 
the act of lying even if he or she tells a lie for a good reason. He finds a consis-
tent love toward truth/God in the mind of a person who tells a lie unwillingly. 
Therefore, we should not simply say that Augustine’s ban on lying is absolute. 
We should interpret that with more nuance he thinks that we should not tell 
any lie willingly, because every lie is a sin.
Augustine’s focus on the mindset of a person who tells a lie willingly or unwill-
ingly as a criterion for discerning whether the person is a liar or not is unique. 
In the beginning of De mendacio, he starts his argument on what is a lie by 
examining the case of inconsistency between the speaker’s belief or opinion 
and the fact or the utterance, but he does not set out the criterion of lying 
in these inconsistencies. Proceeding from the argument about what is a lie 
and moving to the argument on whether a lie is sometimes useful, Augustine 
mentions the idea of a lie by the mouth in one’s heart that we saw above. In 
7 See Augustine ench., 7, 22: “Plurimum quidem ad bonum profecisse homines qui non nisi pro 
salute hominis mentiuntur, non est negandum; sed in eorum tali profectu merito laudatur, 
vel etiam temporaliter remuneratur, benevolentia non  fallacia; quae ut ignoscatur sat est, non 
ut etiam praedicetur, maxime in heredibus testamenti novi, quibus dicitur: sit in ore vestro: 
est est; non non: quod enim amplius est a malo est” (PL 40). English translation by Harbert.
8 Whether one has a good will or not is not decided by his or her self-judgement. It depends 
on whether the will goes righteously toward God who is the ultimate goodness.
9 This accords with Decosimo’s interpretation as well in the point that Augustine mentions 
“the case of the heirs of the new covenant” whose words are in accord with divine words. 
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this argument, he sets the criterion of lying in one’s mindset that ought to love 
truth/God. We can see that Augustine develops his argument in this book and 
shows his unique criterion for discerning whether the person is a liar or not. A 
similar idea is shown in his De doctrina Christiana. In the argument on how to 
discover the truth in the contents of the Scriptures, he says that,
Anyone who derives from the divine scriptures an idea which is useful for sup-
porting this double love of God and neighbor but fails to say what the writer 
demonstrably meant in the passage has not made a fatal error, and is certainly 
not a liar (doctr. chr., 1, 36, 40; tr. Green).10
He suggests focusing on the love that an interpreter has when one discerns 
whether his or her interpretation is correct or in error. Augustine’s emphasis 
on one’s mindset toward truth/God is  continuous.
Results of Telling a Lie
However, whether one tells a lie willingly or unwillingly, the result seems to be 
the same, in that the lie that is uttered is the same. Is there any difference in the 
result when, for example, a politician tells a lie to citizens willingly for a public 
benefit, as opposed to when a  politician does the same unwillingly? As we see 
above, Augustine thinks that the difference between telling a lie willingly and 
telling it unwillingly  depends on whether the person loves truth/God or not. 
Let us refer to Augustine’s argument on what happens to those who do not love 
truth. In book 10 of Confessiones, he explains that enjoyment is what all people 
want, since “all agree that they want to enjoy [consonarent se velle gaudere]” 
(10, 21, 31), and that truth also is what all people want, since even those who 
would gladly deceive others do not wish to be deceived.11 So he concludes that 
all people “prefer to rejoice over the truth [de veritate se malle gaudere]” (10, 22, 
33).12 Then, if everyone wants to rejoice over the truth, why can it be that some 
10 Partly changed in the citation, it is noteworthy that Augustine mentions the mindset of a 
liar in this argument as well. Also in De mendacio 19, 40, Augustine focuses on the importance 
of loving God and neighbor after the argument about the mouth in one’s heart. 
11 See conf., 10, 23, 33. “Everyone wants this happy life, this life which alone deserves to be 
called happy; all want it, all want joy in the truth. I have met plenty of people who would 
gladly deceive others, but no one who wants to be deceived. Where else, then, did they come 
to know this happy life, except where they also came to know about truth? Since they do not 
wish to be deceived, they must love truth” (tr. Boulding 259).
12 The object that one enjoys signifies what his or her will (velle) intends. The intention of 
the will is, as it were, an intention toward an ultimate aim of hisor her life. Solignac adds a 
comment to the term gaudium/gaudere: “Les mots latin ‘gaudium. gaudere’ sont plus riches, 
semble-t-il, que les correspondants français ‘joie, se réjouir’. Ils indiquent un épanouissement 
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do not love the truth and would gladly deceive others? Augustine explains that 
those people “love truth in such a way that those who love something else wish 
to regard what they love as truth” (10, 23, 34).” In this argument in Confessiones, 
it is not obvious whom Augustine has in mind when he criticizes those who 
deceive others,13 but it is obvious that he thinks that they love what they should 
not love, while intending to love truth. Their will (velle) drifts in the wrong di-
rection, that is, if they even have will at all. 
He explains what would happen to those people as a result. 
They love truth when it enlightens them, but hate it when it accuses them. In 
this attitude of reluctance to be deceived and intent to deceive others they 
love truth when it reveals itself but hate it when it reveals them. Truth will 
therefore take its revenge: when people refuse to be shown up by it, truth  
will show them up willy-nilly and yet elude them. …It is paid back in a coin 
which is the opposite to what it desires, for while the soul cannot hide from 
truth, truth hides from the soul (conf., 10, 23, 34; tr. Boulding 260).14
Generally, a liar or a deceiver has parallel realities of truth and  falsehood in his 
or her mind (mend., 3, 3). Liars think that they themselves know and uphold 
the truth. If they do not know or believe something to be true, they cannot be 
liars. Therefore, we should not interpret that the truth that Augustine argues 
here is a specific reality in one’s mind. The truth that would elude liars is one 
that is identifiable by joy (gaudium) and a happy life (beata vita).15 Augustine 
thinks that a person who enjoys what he or she should not enjoy cannot enjoy 
a truly happy life.16 In this way, a person who gladly deceives others loses joy, a 
parfait de l’âme dont le bonheur est essentiellement lié à la possession et à la jouissance de la 
vérité, c’est- à-dire de Dieu. (Skutella, Solignac, Tréhorel and Bouissou 201.)
13 It would be natural for us to suppose that he keeps Manicheans in his mind,  according to 
Kotzé’s examination.
14 “Amant eam lucentem, oderunt eam redarguentem. quia enim falli nolunt et fallere volunt, 
amant eam, cum se ipsa indicat, et oderunt eam, cum eos ipsos indicat. inde retribuet eis, ut, 
qui se ab ea manifestari nolunt, et eos nolentes manifestet et eis ipsa non sit manifesta. (...) 
contra illi redditur, ut ipse non lateat veritatem, ipsum autem veritas lateat” (Latin text from 
Skutella, Solignac, Tréhorel and  Bouissou). 
15 To Augustine, veritas is the object of quest. Kuntz explains the range of Augustine’s quest 
for truth, selecting eight phases. 
16 See De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus Manichaeorum, 1, 3, 4. “We all certainly 
desire to live happily; and there is no human being but assents to this statement almost be-
fore it is made. But the title happy cannot, in my opinion, belong either to him who has not 
what he loves, whatever it may be, or to him who has what he loves if it is hurtful or to him 
who does not love what he has, although it is good in perfection. For one who seeks what he 
cannot obtain suffers torture, and one who has got what is not desirable is cheated, and one 
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truly happy life—that is to say, that they lose truth. The same applies to a per-
son who tells a lie willingly for a good reason. Regardless of whether it is for a 
good reason or not, he or she would lose true happiness, because he or she is 
happy with lying, when he or she should not be happy at all. Augustine thinks 
that a liar’s mindset causes the loss of true happiness as a result. 
We can find other consequences of lying that Augustine suggests in his texts. 
In the beginning of conf. 10, Augustine explains the purpose of confessing. That 
is, that even if he does not confess himself to God, everything would still be 
naked to His eyes (10, 2, 2). To other people, however, he can offer no proof 
that he confesses truthfully (10, 3, 3). Nonetheless, he does confess also to 
other people, as “the charity that makes them good assures them that I am 
not lying when I confess about myself; that very charity in them believes me” 
(10, 3, 4). Augustine thinks that to confess is to do the opposite of lying. In 
the argument in book 10, Augustine relates the act of his confession with the 
expression of “veritatem facere.” He begins his confession with a declaration: 
“Truth it is that I want to do [volo eam (veritatem) facere]” (10, 1, 1). Then, what 
is “veritatem facere”? “Veritatem facere” is a scriptural phrase (Io. ev. tr., 3, 21; 
1, 6). Augustine explains it in Io. ev. tr.: 
And when your own deeds will begin to displease you, from that time your 
good works begin, as you find fault with your evil works. The confession of 
evil works is the beginning of good works. You do the truth, and come to the 
light. How is it you do the truth? Thou dost not caress, nor soothe, nor flatter 
yourself; nor say, “I am righteous,” while you are unrighteous: thus, you begin 
to do the truth (12, 13; tr, Schaff).17
Also, in this argument, Augustine links confession with doing the  truth. Augus-
tine does not think that doing the truth is an act that can be completed within 
a single action. Not caressing, not soothing, not flattering oneself makes him 
or her “begin to do the  truth (incipere  facere veritatem).” Augustine regards 
“doing the truth” as a continuous act which is done with the mindset of recog-
nizing one’s evil and not justifying oneself.
who does not seek for what is worth seeking for is diseased. Now in all these cases the mind 
cannot but be unhappy, and happiness and unhappiness cannot reside at the same time in 
one man; so in none of these cases can the man be happy. I find, then, a fourth case, where 
the happy life exists, —when that which is man’s chief good is both loved and possessed. For 
what do we call enjoyment but having at hand the objects of love?” (tr. Scothert).
17 “Cum autem coeperit tibi displicere quod fecisti, inde incipiunt bona opera tua, quia ac-
cusas mala opera tua. Initium operum bonorum, confessio est operum malorum. Facis veri-
tatem, et venis ad lucem. Quid est: Facis veritatem? Non te palpas, non tibi blandiris, non te 
adulas; non dicis: Iustus sum, cum sis iniquus, et incipis facere veritatem” (PL 35). 
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Here also it is noteworthy that Augustine focuses on one’s  mentality to dis-
please oneself with their deeds. As we saw above, in the arguments on lying, 
Augustine argues that one should not be praised and should not be pleased 
with the act of lying even if he or she tells a lie for a good reason. Following this 
argument, Augustine also says that “your sin would not have displeased you, if 
God did not shine into you” (12, 13). He emphasizes the necessity of God’s sup-
port in order to recognize one’s own sin. That is, if you tell a lie and are pleased 
with it, you are without God’s support. In the following argument, Augustine 
mentions the name of Christ and explains as follows: 
Awake, then, while it is day: the day shines, Christ is the day. (…) He that walks 
in His love and mercy, even being free from those great and deadly sins, such 
crimes as murder, theft, adultery;  still, because of those which seem to be 
minute sins, of tongue, or of thought, or of intemperance in things permitted, 
he does the  truth in confession, and comes to the light in good works: since 
many minute sins, if they be neglected, kill. Minute are the drops that swell 
the rivers; minute are the grains of sand; but if much sand is put together, the 
heap presses and crushes. Bilge-water neglected in the hold does the same 
thing as a rushing wave. Gradually it leaks in through the hold; and by long 
 leaking in and no pumping out, it sinks the ship (Io. ev. tr., 12, 14).18
Augustine explains here the result of not confessing. He warns that even a min-
ute sin would be able to bring about a much greater sin, using the metaphor of 
a grain of sand having the power to crush a ship when the grains are added to-
gether. If we focus only on the direct result of a single act of lying—for example, 
the fact that a life was saved by telling a lie—there might seem to be no differ-
ence between an act that is done willingly and an act that is done unwillingly. 
That is to say, the act might look like a good thing that should be praised. How-
ever, Augustine does not think this result is the end result of the lie. He encour-
ages us to see additional things that will result from the will that is pleased with 
one’s act, justifies it, does not reflect on oneself and does not confess his or her 
evil. Augustine warns that such a mindset can bring about a greater evil. As we 
18 “Evigilate ergo cum dies est: lucet dies, Christus est dies. ...In dilectione autem eius et in mi-
sericordia eius qui ambulat, etiam liberatus ab illis lethalibus et grandibus peccatis, qualia sunt 
facinora, homicidia, furta, adulteria; propter illa quae minuta videntur esse peccata linguae, 
aut cogitationum, aut immoderationis in rebus concessis, facit veritatem confessionis, et venit 
ad lucem in operibus bonis: quoniam minuta plura peccata si neglegantur, occidunt. minutae 
sunt guttae quae flumina implent: minuta sunt grana arenae; sed si multa arena imponatur, 
premit atque opprimit. hoc facit sentina neglecta, quod facit fluctus irruens: paulatim per 
sentinam intrat; sed diu intrando et non exhauriendo, mergit navim.”
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confirmed above, he thinks that doing the truth is a continuous act. He finds re-
petitive avoidance of the truth in the mindset of a person who tells a lie willingly. 
Let us refer to the argument in conf. 10 again to see another result of lying. 
O’Donnell points out the connection between Augustine’s mention of “veritatem 
facere” in the first chapter of the book (10, 1, 1) and the examination of the cur-
rent state of his desires in the last half of the book (10, 30, 41-39, 64), quoting 
the above argument in Io. ev. tr. 12.19 In fact, in the examination of his desire in 
Confessiones book 10, Augustine confesses minute sins of his own, just as he 
emphasizes the necessity of confessing minute sins in the above quotation from 
Io. ev. tr., 12, 14. In a  similar examination of the state of his desires in Soliloquia, 
he asserts his self-confidence in overcoming sinful desires (sol., 1, 10, 17). Con-
versely, in the examination in Confessiones, he emphasizes the weakness of his 
will and the difficulty of knowing himself and of overcoming sinful desires. “It is 
frequently hard to tell whether proper care for the body indicates that further 
support is needed, or deceitful, plea sure-seeking greed is demanding what will 
gratify it” (10, 31, 44); “whatever discernment there is in me is shrouded by dismal 
darkness and hidden from my sight, so that as my mind questions itself about 
its powers, it can scarcely trust any reply it receives” (10, 32, 48); “I have become 
an enigma to myself, and herein lies my sickness” (10, 33, 50). Augustine regards 
the weakness of will and the ignorance of what we should do as the evidence of 
the corrupted nature (natura vitiata) of human beings (pecc. mer., 1, 37, 68-39, 
70; ench., 22, 81). We cannot heal this corrupted nature by ourselves; rather, Au-
gustine thinks that Christ is the only one who can heal it. As such, he concludes 
book 10 with an argument for Christ.20 For Augustine, the examination of his 
desires is a demonstration of doing the truth (veritatem facere), and such exam-
ination is the way to find hope in Christ; i.e., in true healing. Now it is not difficult 
to imagine that Augustine thinks that a person who tells a lie willingly and does 
not do the truth cannot walk the way to find the hope; an example of the loss of 
true healing due  to weakness and ignorance is the result of lying.
How do We use our Words?
As we see in the first part of this chapter, if we accept Augustine’s ban on lying 
as an absolute prohibition of every kind of lie and try to follow it, we actually 
might not be able to say anything. It would be the same also for Augustine. We 
are often involved inevitably in a sin, as Augustine highlights in his argument 
19 See O’Donnell commentary for the word “qui facit eam” in 10, 1, 1.
20 Conf., 10, 43, 68-70 is appropriated to the arugment on Christ: “You will heal all my infirmi-
ties through him who sits at your right hand and intercedes for us” (69).
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on lying. Moreover, even when we believe that we act for a good reason and 
the result of the act seems to be good, it is difficult for us to judge whether the 
act is actually good or not, because we human beings do not know precisely 
what the truth is, nor what the ultimate goodness is.21 However, Augustine 
himself continues to speak. It does not come from his arrogance nor does 
he believe he might be wrong. As we saw in the second part of this chapter, 
Augustine performs “doing the  truth” through confessions. Confessing is the 
act of speech/writing by which Augustine is able to examine himself and rec-
ognize his actual state of being. Augustine says: “O truth, you hold sovereign 
sway over all who turn to you for counsel, and to all of them you respond at the 
same time, however diverse their pleas” (conf., 10, 26, 37). The expression “hold 
sovereign sway over” is “praesides” in Latin. Praesidere originally means to sit 
(sidere) in front of (prae) something. Augustine thinks that the inner-dialogue 
is a dialogue with the truth that sits in front of him, within himself.22 “They all 
appeal to you about what they want, but do not always hear what they want to 
hear” (10, 26, 37). The people who “love truth in such a way that those who love 
something else wish to regard what they love as truth” (10, 23, 34) are those 
who do not have a dialogue with truth within themselves, because they do not 
love the truth that lets them recognize the actual state of being. The inner-di-
alogue with truth prevents the person from being a liar, one who loves what 
he or she should not love. 
Having a dialogue with truth is not beneficial only for oneself; Augustine finds 
benefits in it also for others. By expressing such a dialogue  through verbal or 
written words, he confesses “also in the ears of believing men and women, the 
companions of my joy and sharers in my  mortality, my fellow citizens still on 
pilgrimage with me, those who have gone before and those who will follow, 
and all who bear me company in my life” (10, 4, 6), so that “both  hymns and 
laments ascend into your presence from the hearts of my brethren, which are 
your censers” (10, 4, 5). Here, Augustine refers to “those people (which includes 
us) as “the companions of his joy.” Sharing the same joy means loving the same 
thing, because we find enjoyment in what we love. The metaphor of censers 
 signifies the unity of the direction of the people’s love/will. Augustine thinks 
that the words spoken/written when one confesses encourage people to love 
the truth together. That is, to recognize our inevitable weakness and igno-
21 “Perhaps God will concern himself with why we lie, will forgive some liars and punish 
others, but we should never presume to make such judgements ourselves. To do that is to 
follow the Devil’s path, and that path lead nowhere but to our  damnation” (Denery 116).
22 As well known, in Soliloquia, the dialogue is performed with his Ratio. Regarding the devel-
opment of the dialogue, see Stock.
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rance and have hope for healing by Christ. Augustine finds utility in our words 
to change others’ minds, prompting them to do the truth and not be liars. 
That being the case, how do we use our words among people who do not love 
the truth and do not share our joy? In conf. 12, where he interprets the book of 
Genesis and examines others’ interpretation, Augustine mentions those peo-
ple.23 Here, he points out that there are people who say “Moses did not mean 
what you say, but what I say” (conf., 12, 25, 34), yet he does not deny that what 
each of them says is true. Augustine criticizes such people, saying that “they 
are proud, and without having grasped Moses’ idea they are infatuated with 
their own (amant suam), not because it is true but because it is theirs” (12, 25, 
34). Since Moses’ idea is considered to be the truth, people who love their own 
idea as if it is Moses’ do not love the truth, but love what they want to love. 
Augustine depicts them here as people who stubbornly insist upon their own 
idea without thinking much of others’. We should think back on recent events 
where people have insisted that facts that were inconvenient for themselves 
personally were “alternative facts.”24 They do not deny others’ statements, 
agreeing that they are facts, yet do not think much of it, insisting simply that 
their statements are “alternative facts.” We often have this kind of experience, 
where someone insists that what is convenient and favorable for them is a 
“fact.” Such experiences show how difficult it is to change their mind by only 
presenting facts to them. We also find that Augustine struggles dealing with 
such people. What he does to  counter said objectors is to “meet the challenge 
calmly, and reply on the lines he has already indicated,” and to “patiently put up 
with such people” (ibid). Continuing to criticize them, Augustine never seems 
to give up changing their minds peacefully by continually speaking to them—or 
in other words, by using words.
In the same argument, Augustine further elaborates upon such people.
This is why we must tremble before your judgement, O lord, for your Truth 
is not mine, nor his, nor hers, but belongs to all of us whom you call to share 
it in communion with him, at the same time giving us the terrible warning 
not to arrogate truth to ourselves as private property, lest we find ourselves 
deprived of it. For anyone who appropriates what you provide for all to enjoy, 
and claims as his own what belongs to all, is cast out from the truth to a lie 
23 Kenney (2010) examines the dialogues with the contradictores in book 12. The argument in 
12, 25, 34 is not mentioned there.
24 CNN Politics, Conway: Trump White House offered “alternative facts” on crowd size. See 
http://edition.cnn.com/2017/01/22/politics/kellyanne-conway-alternative-facts/index.html 
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[mendacium]; for anyone who lies is speaking from what is his own (conf., 12, 
25, 34; tr. Boulding 333).25
Augustine has his own idea that he thinks to be true, but he says that the truth 
is not his. It does not indicate an  attitude of relativism, as Augustine continues 
to criticize people who say that “Moses did not mean what you say, but what I 
say,” yet does not deny that what each of them says is true. In Augustine’s under-
standing, the people in question love what they want to love. The love toward 
what they want to love is not in accordance with love towards the truth, even 
if they believe that they love truth. Augustine expresses the state of the people 
who love what they want to love as people who “arrogate truth to themselves as 
private property [veritatem velle havere privatam].” The mindset of someone who 
wants to have the truth as private property does not agree to share the truth with 
others. If everyone had such a mindset, a relativist mindset, everyone’s love 
would go in different directions and there would be no chance for us to enjoy the 
unity of truth/God together. For that reason, Augustine criticizes them.
It is noteworthy that Augustine mentions the term mendacium in the above cita-
tion as well. Those who insist on presenting their own ideas as a truth that is their 
private property would not feel like they are lying. However, Augustine explains 
that they are cast out from the truth to a lie (a veritate ad mendacium), as is in the 
above quotation. The reason that they are cast out from the truth to a lie is that 
they arrogate truth to themselves as private property, even though truth belongs 
to all of us. They love the truth in the wrong way. In other words, they do not love 
the truth in the right way, even though they might think they do. Thus, they are 
cast out to a lie. You see that the concept of mendacium here is in accordance 
with the one that we read in De mendacio in the first part of this chapter. Wheth-
er one tells a lie with the mouth in one’s heart depends on whether he or she 
truly loves the truth or not. The direction of one’s love/will decides which way 
he or she will go, be it towards truth or lie. Furthermore, Augustine includes the 
scriptural phrase “anyone who lies is speaking from what is his own” (Io. 8: 44). 
The subject of, speaking from what is his own, in the scriptural text is the dev-
il. Based on these things, we can suppose that the reason that Augustine never 
stopped speaking to them is as follows: Even if objectors look like devils, we need 
to believe they are just fallen angels and to keep on speaking with them, because 
we cannot enjoy the unity of truth/God together if we are alone. If you are a 
25 “Ideoque, domine, tremenda sunt iudicia tua, quoniam veritas tua nec mea est nec illius aut 
illius, sed omnium nostrum, quos ad eius communionem publice  vocas, terribiliter admonens 
nos, ut eam nolimus habere privatam, ne privemur ea. nam quisquis id, quod tu omnibus ad fru-
endum proponis, sibi proprie vindicat et suum vult esse quod omnium est, a communi propel-
litur ad sua, hoc est a veritate ad mendacium. qui enim loquitur mendacium, de suo loquitur.” 
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relativist, or you try to destroy your objectors, you will never be able to enjoy the 
truth together with others. Augustine thinks that we love truth in the right way 
when we love it together with others including people who are seen as objectors. 
Regarding “from what is his own,” Augustine says in conf. 10 that “Your best 
servant is the one who is less intent to hearing from you what accords with his 
own will, and more on embracing with his will what he has heard from you” (10, 
26, 37). In the beginning of book 10, he already declares that “I can say noth-
ing right to other people unless you have heard it from me first, nor can you 
even hear anything of the kind from me which you have not first told me” (10, 
2, 2). Augustine thinks that hearing from God/truth precedes speaking truth. 
Therefore, the dialogue with truth within oneself is necessary for speaking 
truth to others. Speaking truth is veritatem facere, that is, a confession. When 
we use words for our inner dialogue with the truth, those words help us enjoy 
a truly happy life together with others. It may feel as if our inner dialogue is 
independent of the external world in which we live, but Augustine thinks that 
the inner dialogue develops a loving relationship with the external world. 
Conclusion
In the first part of this chapter, I suggested that Augustine’s ban on lying was 
not unrealistic. In fact, the ban has a certain kind of permissibility. Augustine’s 
arguement is that since every lie is a sin, no one should tell any kind of lie will-
ingly, because someone who tells a lie willingly is pleased with lying and does not 
love the  truth. What is the difference between the results of a lie that was told 
willingly and a lie that was told unwillingly? In the second part of the chapter, 
we saw what Augustine has found to be the results of lying, including: 1. The 
mindset of not loving the truth does not lead a person to true happiness; liars 
lose true happiness as a result; 2. The mindset of lying willingly can cause great 
evil that could harm others, even if the lie is minute, because such a mindset 
finds evading God customary; and 3. Such mindsets also deprive one of hope 
for healing, that is, hope for healing from the inevitable weakness and ignorance 
that all human beings have. Christ is the only being who can perform the heal-
ing. Augustine thinks that liars’ minds do not seek out the Savior, because they 
believe they can act honorably by themselves. As a result, they lose any chance at 
eternal healing. In the last part of the chapter, we saw that Augustine found util-
ity in our words. To avoid being a liar and to change the mind of a liar, Augustine 
thinks that having an inner-dialogue with truth within oneself is useful. When 
the dialogue is performed within oneself, the words assist in uncovering our ac-
tual state of mind, preventing us from being a liar who does not love truth; a liar 
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who loves what he or she wants to love. When we speak to others with the words 
that we hear through the inner-dialogue, the words help us to enjoy the truth 
together with others, because the words make people recognize the weakness 
and ignorance within themselves and invites them to listen to the others’ ideas.
Therefore, Augustine’s strict ban on lying does not come from unrealistic doc-
trine. Rather, it comes from his insight into reality. He actually realizes that there 
are situations where we cannot avoid telling a lie. He realizes our true arrogance 
when we tell a lie willingly for a good reason. It can be said that Augustine’s idea 
approaches the philosophers who argue that we humans can never grasp the 
ultimate truth as long as we live in this world. However, Augustine doesn’t think 
that we should be allowed to judge what is true and what is false practically for 
the present, like a Sophist does, by thinking that we would be able to arrive at the 
truth only by means of our intelligence. Focusing on our arrogance when we tell 
a lie willingly is unique to Augustine. This focus comes from his recognition of 
our ignorance and weakness; the “ignorance” being that we cannot fully know 
the states of our own will, and the weakness being that we cannot fully con-
trol the state of our will. Christ, as the healer of said ignorance and weakness, 
 therefore takes on a practical and essential role in Augustine’s argument on ly-
ing. The act of confessing to God and neighbor is set as an act done by listening 
to truth/Christ and speaking with words. Confession is the path that Augustine 
finds for living in our world where lies are rampant. 
In our world, some tell a lie to gain reputation. Some tell a lie to fill their pock-
ets. You may say that their lies are harmless in so far as they do not harm 
others, but Augustine would not agree with that opinion. As those people who 
tell a lie for their own benefit love what they want to love. Even in the event 
that someone tells a lie willingly to save others’ lives, he would criticize such 
a person. Augustine thinks that their mindset would prevent them from true 
happiness, and that their mindset would cause great evil in the future. He cau-
tions that even a sin that we may regard as minute would be able to threaten 
our peace. However, in our world where lies are rampant, Augustine is not 
merely lamenting the situation. He finds hope in the fact that we have words 
with which to love truth together with others. We use our words both for tell-
ing lies and for searching for the truth. Augustine tells us how to use our words 
to create a peaceful world. Feehan (181) says that “we must count Augustine as 
one of the principle thinkers over time who has helped us to understand just 
what is morally wrong with lying and liars.” I’d like to add that Augustine does 
not only teach us the evil of lying, he also helps us understand how fortunate 
we are to be able to overcome evil. Such fortune, a gift from God, can be found 
in our words which connect us with the truth and with other people by love.
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Abstract
The purpose of this chapter is to contextualize Au-
gustine’s world and show how that world shaped 
his understanding of the nature of war, peace and 
security, before identifying possible applications 
for today’s geopolitical situations. The emphasis of 
this contribution is on connecting the reception 
of Augustine’s thought with the current global 
environment, in order to assess how future chal-
lenges might be addressed, and to determine how 
stability, peace, and prosperity might be achieved 
for the maximum amount of people in the twen-
ty-first century.
Keywords: conflict short of war, just war, peace, 
social order.
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Resumen
El propósito de este capítulo es contextualizar 
el mundo de Agustín y mostrar cómo ese mundo 
dio forma a su comprensión de la naturaleza de 
la guerra, la paz y la seguridad, antes de identi-
ficar posibles aplicaciones para las situaciones 
geopolíticas de hoy. Esta contribución enfatiza 
en conectar la recepción del pensamiento de san 
Agustín con el entorno global actual, evaluar cómo 
podrían abordarse los desafíos futuros y determi-
nar cómo se puede lograr la estabilidad, la paz y la 
prosperidad para la cantidad máxima de personas 
en el siglo XXI.
Palabras claves: guerra justa, orden social, paz, 
conflicto sin guerra.
[344] Agustín de Hipona como Doctor Pacis:  estudios sobre la paz en el mundo contemporáneo 
Sobre el autor | About the author
Matthew A. Gaumer [matthewgaumer@gmail.com]
Captain Matthew Gaumer is a Defense Strategy Analyst for the Russia Strategic Initia-
tive of the U.S. European Command, at Stuttgart, Germany. He has commanded at the 
company level and served in multiple operational and joint assignments in Africa, Asia, 
Europe, and North America. He holds a BA in Philosophy from Loyola University Chicago, 
a MA in Catholic Thought from Saint Meinrad School of Theology, an Advanced MA in 
Theology; Religious Studies from the University of Leuven, a MA in Logistics Management 
from American Military University, and a dual PhD / SThD from the University of Leuven 
(Belgium). His military education includes the Transportation Basic Officer Leader Course 
and Combined Logistics Captain Career Course.
Cómo citar en MLA / How to cite in MLA
Gaumer, Matthew. “Peace through Order: Applying Augustine’s Concepts of Society, 
Security and Conflict in a Disordered World.” Agustín de Hipona como Doctor Pacis: 
estudios sobre la paz en el mundo contemporáneo, edited by  Anthony Dupont, Enri-
que Eguiarte Bendimez y Carlos Vilabona, Editorial Uniagustiniana, 2019, pp. 341-355, 
doi: 10.28970/9789585498235.12
Peace through Order: Applying Augustine’s Concepts of Society, Security and Conflict [345]
Global Unraveling and New Forms of Sovereignty
The well-known writer, Robert D. Kaplan, made waves among international af-
fairs literati with his short but poignant December 2013 article “Augustine’s World, 
What Late Antiquity Says About the 21st Century and the Syrian Crisis.” His cen-
tral insight captured something that had been percolating in the conversations 
of the well-connected, the scholars, media analysts, and the like for years: that is, 
not only is there an evolving disintegration of governmental authority and social 
systems, but the “postmodern version of Late Antiquity has just begun” (Kaplan 
4). Augustine’s time, like our own, was not marked by an outbreak of peace. 
This assessment is not a cause for panic, however, but rather for the humble 
acknowledgement that the world most of us have known, with its mostly static 
nation states, largely similar economic systems, and derivative ways of life, is 
in the process of changing (Haass; Kupchan). Evoking a comparison between 
Augustine’s Late Antiquity and our world means that societies and the world 
order are once again undergoing a fundamental transformation, and not just a 
moderate realignment. It is possible to infer from this transformation the po-
tential for a reversion to our not-so-long-ago past: significant breakdowns in 
social controls, a greater proliferation of violence, and the overall degradation 
of human existence on this planet (Diamond 154-66 and 286-92). 
With this in mind, it is interesting to discover that lessons can be learned from 
the reception of Augustine of Hippo in terms of how he understood the un-
raveling of the Roman world, the purpose and nature of social order, and his 
concept of peace. The remainder of the chapter is dedicated to analyzing the 
current global environment through Augustine’s lens, in the hope that the tec-
tonic changes of our time might be addressed, thereby leading to an equitable 
outcome for all, with peace as an end-state. 
The Late Roman Context
Data from various scientific disciplines, such as economic history,  archaeology, 
and military history, invariably lead to a picture of Late Antiquity riven by dis-
order, disruption, and decay. Between the years of Augustine’s birth and death, 
354 to 430, those alive saw a Roman Empire undergoing distressing changes. 
Two major Roman military campaigns (Battle of Adrianople in 378 and the Sack 
of Rome in 410) ended in the worst catastrophes since Hannibal’s invasions of 
the Italian peninsula during the Second Punic War (218-216 BCE), and the Teu-
toburg Forest massacre (9 CE) (Davis 82-87). There were eighteen major bat-
tles between Roman forces and internal and external enemies (Nodegoat). At 
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the same time, substantive imperial leadership all but disappeared until Theo-
dosius’ ascension in 379, border controls and taxation mechanisms collapsed, 
and Roman imperial troop levels surged, while liminal garrisons simultane-
ously emptied and assumed a defensive posture  (Southern 262-64), deploying 
troops to more contested areas of the  empire (Bachrach 62; Wijnendaele 22).
For Augustine and contemporaries, the heart of civilization appeared to be 
collapsing from internal decay and external pressures, a slow-motion reversal 
of imperium sine fine. This was also evident in the dissolution of the imperial 
supply chain and manufacturing base, and the resulting economic difficulties 
(Cowen). It would not have been difficult for a Roman to see the writing on the 
wall: manufacturing output and building construction were rapidly shrinking; 
metal and ceramic products were degrading in quality; there was less mon-
ey in circulation; less trade throughput between sea ports; and notably fewer 
foodstuff transfers between entrepôts (Ward-Perkins). In Roman Africa, tra-
ditional urban architectural preference for wall-free “open cities” changed 
too in the fifth century, with stone and less-permanent palisades appearing in 
 cities and settlements throughout the region (Sears 120). 
Matching this malaise in security and the economy, the Roman imperial admin-
istration, so highly regarded for its effective control over central institutions 
and far-flung provinces, was now split between Constantinople, Milan, Ravenna, 
and Rome, with a new preoccupation on internal policing with imperial forces 
 (Fuhrmann 239-42). In the last two decades of Augustine’s life, he learned of 
Rome’s sack by Visigoth troops in 410 (De Bruyn 411; Arbesmann 316); the or-
dered departure of the imperial mission from Britannia; the disintegration of 
border settlements and forts in Germania (redeployment of forces from frontier 
zones intensified instability as the deterrent effect of Roman armies vanished; 
Goldsworthy); and the siege of his own North Africa by Vandal elements (though 
he passed away before they took Hippo in 430) (Wijnendaele 92-96). 
With this background in mind, a viable way to analyze  Augustine emerges: 
there seems to be consistency in his treatment of war and the role of the State 
throughout his career. This contrasts with his views on other themes, which 
changed pronouncedly over time, for example: the permissibility of coercing 
heretics, the nature of law, and the doctrines of Cyprian of Carthage (Gaumer). 
Augustine’s Views on War and Peace, Order and Security
As early as 388, before his return to Africa, Augustine began to use language 
that would endure throughout his writing. It was language that connected the 
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utility of war as a mechanism of the State, to effect order with setting the con-
ditions for peace in human society: “…bellum geritur ut pax acquiratur” (ep., 
189 qd. in Lenihan 41 and 48). He supported these views across most categories 
of his literary corpus: philosophical and exegetical works, letters, sermons, 
polemical writings, and especially in Contra Faustum Manichaeum and De ci-
vitate Dei. While Augustine’s writings, as applied to war, peace, and order, are 
well known, and consensus has been long established in several main areas, I 
find this consensus to be constricted by the historical schools of thought that 
has shaped it. Too often Augustine is used as a foil by one side against another 
to show how the Late Antique thinker either despised or endorsed the cross-
over of worldly concerns into the life of the Church. 
At this point, I would like to offer an alternative understanding of the inter-
play between war, peace and order, by touching on Augustine’s “two cities” 
paradigm, which is articulated in De civitate Dei. While not entirely linear, Au-
gustine seems to have a relational model of the two cities, the earthly and 
heavenly cities. Before going further, it is important to note that the earthly 
city is not simply made up of those who are here and now in the material 
world, versus those in an immaterial heaven (Cary-Elwes). Augus tine makes it 
clear that believers are already citizens in the heavenly city, albeit imperfectly, 
while simultaneously living in the midst of the earthly city. This is the juncture 
where war, peace, and order enter my analysis. 
The goal of happiness, or a human’s strongest driving force, can only be achieved 
in a state of peace (Renna). Peace itself is internal (it is  personal harmony of the 
heart with God) and external to a person (concordia  between people), and both 
are predicated on the proper ordering of things (a certain type of harmony or 
concordia): “…pax omnium rerum, tranquilitas ordinis” (civ., 19,13, qd. in Lenihan 
60). In concrete terms, it is difficult to be happy and for a heart to be raised up if 
one’s basic needs are not met with food to provide energy, shelter to stay warm, 
or the reasonable assurance that oneself, one’s neighbors, and those one loves 
will not be violently killed. These basics can only be delivered when a baseline 
stability and general order are in place (Fukuyama 546-47). Without these ba-
sics, or when they are overindulged, interior peace is unattainable for the indi-
vidual and exterior peace impossible for a community (Swift 377).
One significant way stability and order are facilitated is through laws guid-
ing personal and group behavior. This question is much too expansive to be 
covered here, but, what happens when the desires of one person or group 
physically threaten another? For Augustine, as a pastor and Roman citizen, 
the unfortunate reality is that in the earthly city armed force is necessary to 
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protect a group’s stability and order against inordinate desires, such as greed, 
lust, envy, or hatred (Berrouard 643); it is, in a sense, “the normal condition of 
society” (Markus 13). In a manner, war is defensible if it is intended to assure 
peace, stability, and  order (Swift 382; Russell 875).
So, while the perfect peace of the heavenly city—total concordia, cannot be at-
tained in the earthly city, we can have a foretaste thereof, and peace is a good 
that should be sought as the sine qua non for happiness in this life.
Ensuring Stability in the Post-Westphalian System 
Returning to the present day, the remainder of this chapter is about ensuring 
order and peace in an increasingly disordered world. 
Before moving headlong into an application scenario, it is important to clarify 
something. While there are stunning similarities between the geo- strategic 
contexts of modern society and the late Roman  Empire, they cannot be di-
rectly equated. More to the point, the central  problem in the late Roman Em-
pire was that of hypo-coherence. Also known as complexity theory in medical 
and physics fields (Solomon and Shir 2003), hypo/hyper-coherence is also 
used in the humanities (Cline 165-66; Flannery) to classify regulatory mech-
anisms that keep complex  organizations and societies healthy, but which 
begin to decrease unified action to meet changes in time and space. We can 
take as an example the virus that the human immune system cannot detect 
and fight. The key issue facing our global society today is the opposite: hy-
per-coherence. This is the propensity for a system to overcompensate in re-
lation to changes, challenges, and threats, with a normative and monolithic 
response: more of the same (Dark). 
Our world faces dramatic challenges because there are currently too many such 
changes, they are simultaneous, and increasingly interconnected (Khanna). An 
example would be climate change, caused by excess CO2 (Bourne 156-58). Be-
hind this effect is the positive causal story of efficiency, economic growth, a 
rise in living standards, and technologi cal progress worldwide (Morris). The bad 
news is we are producing too many emissions and destroying our ecosystems. 
Despite the  warning signs, the factors that drive CO2 production must keep 
pace with growing human populations, resulting in a warming planet, contest-
ed natural resources, and the stage set for an overdue disease pandemic. In 
sum, instead of mitigating the problem, the hyper-coherence of our global sys-
tems means the problem is getting exacerbated and creating unparalleled risk 
for efficient governance and societal management (Patel and Palotty). 
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Hyper-coherence actually transforms the myriad structures that support our 
daily lives into a system of systems that is forecast to become a critical vulner-
ability (Sarathy). This is a  vulnerability that most people probably do not think 
about: the fragility of our global life support system (Cowen 56; Sharma). For 
the most part, the public do not realize that even a partial disruption to the 
world’s integrated physical and digital supply chains would cause financial mar-
kets, food stocks, and energy supplies to overcompensate for the shortfall, cas-
cade into panic mode and become frozen within a matter of one or two days. 
At worst, an eventual breakdown of our modern way of life could occur within 
weeks of a global supply chain breakdown. For example, cities around the world 
have only have approximately one to three days’ food and energy to sustain their 
populations (Bourne 4). It is easy to envisage the chaos that could ensue with-
out continuing supplies. Our society could survive without internet, perhaps, 
even without easy flights around the world, but throughout the world, society 
would come to an immediate halt without constant energy and a steady source 
of nourishment for our seven or more billion people. 
Another consequence of the hyper-coherence of our global system of systems 
is already evident in the return of major power competition. Unlike in past 
centuries, or during the Cold War, major powers no longer seek to impose 
ideologies, but seek instead to control supply chains to ensure stability for 
their populations (Khanna 138-50). Even though major power competition has 
returned, this should not be considered a validation of nation-State sovereign-
ty in the long term. 
Our global system, with its interconnected communications networks and the 
rapid transmission of ideas and people, means national borders are becom-
ing less significant (Sassen 2006, 2008, 2013; Elden, 2009, 2013). Furthermore, 
events such as the Arab Spring and the many color revolutions in years past 
demonstrate nation-States only have a  fragile control over their populations 
even while inequality within groups  retains its historical specter (Scheidel). 
One more aspect I should comment on is the global increase in alternative 
methods of conflict, which is one of the most immediate dangers today. Alter-
native methods of conflict are actions short of armed combat, but that seek the 
same ends as a traditional war. In the past few years this practice has surfaced 
around the world: unattributed cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure 
(Segal); influencing of other populations through misinformation; unattributed 
combat support; and the manipulation of international law to carry out policy 
objectives (Mazower). 
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These acts are difficult to confront as they fall outside historical  patterns of 
warfare, yet they have already caused entire regions of the planet to become 
destabilized and have increased the risk of  major wars. This is just one more 
example where conventional just war theory fails to  satisfy modern realities 
(Clark 141).
The Way Ahead
Instead of finishing on a depressing note, it seems more appropriate to end in 
the spirit of Augustine: with a focus on hope and love. To put it simply, world 
events today are testing the survival of our species. Geo-political undercur-
rents ensure that the violent tendencies of humanity will only be magnified 
unless a new approach to controlling threats and the application of security 
is developed (Randers 180-89). While that might seem impossible, Augustine’s 
writings from 1600 years ago do have value today. His overriding concerns for 
order, stability, and peace in the earthy city are simple yet relevant. This war-
rants further elucidation. 
There are four overlapping areas that are strategic focal points for realizing a 
future that is ordered, stable, and peaceful: hedging against ecosystem crises, 
hardening of resources, ensuring an equitable economic system, and global 
threat reduction. The first point has been touched on throughout this essay. 
An increasingly depleted and abused planet means all life is placed at a  higher 
level of risk. In this regard, what can be planned to mitigate calamities arising 
from ecosystem deterioration? 
For starters, government authorities should anticipate the sort of unified re-
sponse that would be required as climate change makes densely populated 
areas of the planet uninhabitable. The sorts of emergency responses to tsu-
namis, hurricanes, and the like, would be significantly less disruptive than the 
forecasts modelling southern Asia, with its billions, as uninhabitable in the 
not-too-distant future (Im, Pal and Eltahir). Part of anticipating such extreme 
events is the reality that potentially hundreds of millions of  people would re-
quire resettlement. To get climatological refugees to greener pastures would 
require in-transit humanitarian  assistance. Militaries, such as the Unit-
ed States’, have mature doctrine and demonstrated capabilities in this area, 
but no single organization could handle a global calamity alone. As the mass 
 migration from Asia and Africa into Europe in recent years has shown, govern-
ing authorities ought to dedication more assets to safeguarding refugees from 
exploitation, violence, and dangerous transport conditions.
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Closely associated with vigilance in responding to the human  dimension of 
ecosystem degradation is the existential imperative to accelerate planning 
development to protect life-sustaining resources. This specifically means 
protecting fresh water, energy reserves, farms, building minerals, and global 
common goods such as oceans, forests, and clean air against man-made de-
spoliation. It may seem evident this ought to be a critical priority to anyone 
concerned with social order and life of humans, but in practice this is easily 
taken for granted. Unless one has faced serious drought, famine, or deserti-
fication, it is hard to understand how quickly “normal life” can be turned into 
a race for survival. As the planet becomes more crowded, more contested, 
and less hospitable, the primary means of avoiding a worst possible scenario 
is in collaborative solution making. One model, small in scale but powerful 
in its promise, is the Svalbard Global Seed Vault, an island far to the north of 
mainland Norway. This example shows that governments can in fact overcome 
parochialism in jointly investing in the face of potential life-ending danger.
Connecting anthropology with ecology and agrology is the third focal point: 
generating a more equitable economic model. This proposal is not a recom-
mendation for wealth redistribution, rather a consideration of the types of 
emphasis the future will need. One of the key  weaknesses in the global econ-
omy today is the obsession with consumption and growth that depends on 
depleting resources. A more equitable model is centered on ensuring enough 
is provided globally to sustain  populations, thus reducing ballooning demand 
that triggers mass migration in search of life support. Another aspect is the 
role of protecting the global supply chain so that the only beneficiaries of it 
are in wealthier “fortress” countries. No amount of insularity can stop a wave 
of hungry and motivated souls indefinitely. On the flip-side, a more equitable 
global economic system would have greatly reduced protectionism with nom-
inal borders that allow for the freedom of movement of goods, not antiquated 
customs requirements that hurt the most vulnerable. Greater emphasis ought 
to be placed on making economic support available in a decentralized way. 
Such subsidiarity would allow more even and nimble access to resources that 
can stabilize communities that are at risk. A final note in the economic sphere 
is the importance for governing authorities to emphasize more investment in 
research and development. The best solutions besetting the world today are 
likely yet unthought or unformulated. 
The final focal point is imminent in its potential consequences. Order, stabili-
ty, and peace are simply pipe-dreams at this stage in human evolution without 
guarantors of safety: defense and policing agencies. Such organizations hedge 
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against human compulsion to violence and more importantly can deter and 
eliminate lethal threats. What I mean in this regard is that the reduction of global 
threats is more important that ever. Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, 
and electromagnetic risks are abundant and humanity is at an elevated risk by 
proliferated weapons systems that can easily distribute such deadly harbingers. 
In coming decades, global threat reduction will be most evident in the utility of 
coordinated responses to some of the most likely trends: pandemic detection 
and containment, protection of infrastructure  (waterlines, energy conduits, 
food storage, and transportation arteries as examples), and protection of cyber 
and space domains (hardening lines of communication). One aspect that can-
not be left out is the increasing demand for the ballooning rise of megacities 
to be secured against internal and external threats. While the majority of the 
human population already lives in urban areas today, within the next 30-40 
years, the percentage that will live in cities with more than 20 million peo-
ple will take on even greater preponderance in the global political order. That 
means megacities stand to be bastions of stability or potentially cauldrons of 
misery and violence. It is an important ending thought to realize that while this 
author approaches these strategic focal points from a military perspective, the 
only feasible way to get after them is through a whole of society approach. In 
this construct, security forces serve as a bulwark against man’s darker angels. 
While is it perhaps unrealistic to aspire to a post-violent human  society where 
governments no longer furnish protection and  security for their populations, it is 
not foolish to imagine people coming together to contain and solve global threats 
to our existence and way of life (Naím 233-44). It is worth imagining a world 
where all governments eliminate all stocks of nuclear and chemical  weapons, and 
where militaries and  security agencies protect against poaching of the environ-
ment and against  human rights abuses. Since the global supply chain network is 
the  enabling mechanism for nearly every material feature of our  lives  today, it is 
only  logical that armed forces should be transitioned away from the  policy con-
cerns of individual nations and re-focused on  hardening  supply chains so that 
civilian populations do not pay dearly for criminal acts (Lakoff). 
Augustine speaks to us today: order, stability, peace among people, and one-
ness are goods worthy of our efforts; in fact necessary (Keohane). Human 
nature and behavior dictate armed forces are necessary for the time being 
(Coker 89), but productive cooperation can evolve at the pace of global threats: 
ensuring peace, reducing lethal means of action, protecting interconnected 
networks, and most importantly, working to support the survival of our spe-
cies and planet.
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Abstract
This chapter claims that while the subject of 
peace permeates the Augustinian corpus, Augus-
tine’s theological understanding of peace—which 
progressed from an absence of conflict to the 
graced concord of love as the whole Christ—de-
veloped as he labored to preach on the Psalms. 
Augustine began to preach on the Psalms in the 
390s and continued to do so for the rest of his 
life, rendering his Enarrationes in Psalmos his lon-
gest work. The Psalms, replete with the language 
of peace —interior and exterior peace as well as 
the  peace of Jerusalem— were the texts Augustine 
regularly exposited as he preached ad populum 
in his own Basilica of Peace. By looking at Augus-
tine’s theology of peace through the Enarrationes, 
the chapter shows that peace as it appears in his 
preaching is only fully understood for Augustine 
when seen through his Christology. The Enarra-
tiones in Psalmos provide evidence of the practice 
of peace. Augustine suggests earthly peace and 
love might be exercised both within his congrega-
tion and among the dwellers of North Africa of the 
fifth century. Having examined the Enarrationes 
themselves, the chapter suggests the relevance of 
this reading for two other texts, considering the 
examples of an early and a late treatment of peace: 
de Sermone Domini in Monte and De civitate Dei, 
respectively.
Keywords: Psalms, preaching, peace, christology, 
Christus totus, Jerusalem.
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Resumen
Este capítulo afirma que, si bien el tema de la paz 
impregna el cuerpo agustino, la comprensión 
teológica de la paz de Agustín —que progresó de 
una ausencia de conflicto a la honrada concordia 
del amor como todo Cristo— se desarrolló mien-
tras trabajaba para predicar sobre los salmos. San 
Agustín comenzó a predicar sobre los salmos en 
390 y continuó haciéndolo por el resto de su vida, 
discutiéndolo de sus Enarrationes in Psalmos, su 
trabajo más largo. Los salmos, repletos del lengua-
je de la paz, tanto la paz interior y exterior como 
la paz de Jerusalén, fueron los textos que Agustín 
exponía regularmente cuando predicaba ad po-
pulum en su propia Basílica de la Paz. Al obser-
var la teología de la paz de Agustín a través de las 
Enarrationes, el presente capítulo muestra que la 
paz, tal como aparece en su predicación, solo se 
entiende completamente para san Agustín cuando 
se la ve a través de su cristología. Las Enarrationes 
in Psalmos proporcionan evidencia de la prácti-
ca de la paz. Agustín sugiere que la paz y el amor 
terrenales se pueden ejercer tanto dentro de su 
congregación como entre los habitantes del norte 
de África del siglo quinto. Después de examinar las 
Enarrationes, el capítulo sugiere la relevancia de 
esta lectura para otros dos textos, considerando 
los ejemplos de un tratamiento temprano y tardío 
de la paz: de Sermone Domini in Monte y De Civi-
tate Dei, respectivamente.
Palabras claves: salmos, predicación, paz, Cristo-
logía, Christus totus, Jerusalén.
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Introduction
The Psalms functioned like a scriptural and theological laboratory in which the 
thought of Augustine concerning peace developed as he preached. From his 
earliest years as priest and bishop in the 390s until nearly the end of his life, 
Augustine continued to preach and comment upon the Psalms, rendering the 
collection of these texts, his Enarrationes in Psalmos (cited hereafter, en. Ps.), 
his longest work both in number of words and in number of years that it took 
to complete. In his Confessiones (cited hereafter, conf.), as Williams has pointed 
out, Augustine wrote that the Psalms of David were not only a part of his con-
version, but that the texts themselves refashioned Augustine. 
As a priest and bishop, Augustine preached upon psalms in the basilicas of Car-
thage and Hippo in Northern Africa. These sermons, both on feast days and 
regular occasions, reveal a classically trained rhetor drawing on the depths of 
his training as he figuratively exposited scriptural texts for his people. Augus-
tine understood himself to be in competition on Sunday afternoons with the 
amphitheater in town. He commends his congregants for standing to hear and 
engage a full sermon rather than those in the amphitheater seated and enter-
tained (en. Ps., 147,21). Scholars like  Hildegund Müller suggest that the interior 
of Augustine’s basilica would likely have been rather plain. After the singing 
or reading of the text, Augustine would have stood to preach and remained 
standing. His sermons were recorded by notarii as he spoke. That others wrote 
them down adds to the value of the en. Ps. because Augustine never went back 
to revise them. They are not commented upon in his Retractationes (cited here­
after, retr.). On account of this, the texts preserve the dynamic relations and 
even side comments that Augustine makes to his congregation. He will explain 
to them that they have labored hard  enough for one day and that they will pick 
up with the remainder of a particular psalm the following day or following litur-
gy. He will reference the heat and the weather, exhort people to pay attention 
for a short while longer, or comment on a reaction that he might have received 
after saying something deliberately provocative. Thus, sermons of Augustine 
the exegete not only reveal him as a thinker and theologian, but him as thinker 
in the midst of his praying congregation. Augustine, as Michael Fiedrowicz has 
explained, is both performing and  inhabiting the texts, for the scriptures func-
tion as both mirror and medicine in his theology.
Besides the Psalms’ importance for Augustine in terms of his longstanding 
exegetical engagement as a preacher, they are simultaneously full of the lan-
guage of peace. Other than the book of Leviticus, which includes repeated 
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 instruction on peace offerings, the Psalms are the scriptural book with the 
highest density of peace language in both the Old and New Testaments. In the 
 Psalms one finds the two cities trope of Jerusalem and Babylon which struc-
tures Augustine’s De Civitate Dei., (cited hereafter civ.) The psalms give ex-
pression both to the experience of not knowing how to sing the songs of Zion 
at the rivers of Babylon as well as how to make ascents—physical in the case 
of the actual pilgrimage to Jerusalem and spiritual for Augustine and his hear-
ers—up to the city of  Jerusalem. Augustine, who commented on all 150 psalms, 
treats the issue of peace in his expositions of nearly fifty of those psalms. 
Yet, the frequency of Augustine’s investigating the issue of  peace in his preaching 
on the Psalms is only part of the reason for choosing the en. Ps. for this study. 
As Augustine scholar Michael Cameron has suggested and my own work devel-
oped, Augustine’s  understanding of Christ grew as he continued to preach on the 
Psalms. For he, like other patristic authors, read the Psalms as words of and in 
Christ. This is a most happy confluence for this study of Augustine’s  theological 
 development concerning peace. In the texts where Augustine is most frequent-
ly grappling with and commenting on the issue of  peace, he is also  working to 
expound and explain his own account of the mediation that Christ brought and 
continues to impart. And so, this study draws out from Augustine’s preaching 
on the Psalms a theology of Christ’s peace being  mediated to Augustine and his 
North African  hearers. In encountering the Psalms, we examine a site of Christo-
logical praxis where peace is not merely theorized but inhabited and desired by 
the living, breathing, body of Christ.
Method
The approach of this paper builds upon two complementary  methods of as-
sessing Augustine’s theology of peace in extant scholarship—peace as inner 
peace and peace as eschatological collective (this second type of peace also 
relates to earthly peace). 
George Lawless treats the issue of inner peace as an  aspect of  Augustine’s 
theological anthropology in conf. The word pax, in its variant forms, occurs 
nearly as much as the word confessio (45). As such, Lawless points out that, 
the quest for  peace, part and parcel of the quest for God, forms a major axis in 
 early Augustinian thought (60). One need not look further than the climactic 
address to God in the middle of Augustine’s exploration of  memory in conf., 10: 
“You  called, shouted, broke  through my deafness; you flared, blazed, banished 
my blindness; you  lavished your fragrance, I gasped, and now I pant for you; 
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I tasted you, and I hunger and thirst; you touched me, and I burned for your 
peace” (conf., 10, 27, 28). Augustine describes the experience of God in terms 
not only of sensory experiences fulfilled but also of peace. Yet, Augustine will 
continue from this high Latin poetics to investigate his sensory experiences 
and desires for the remainder of conf., 10.  I have argued in my own work that 
though Augustine searches for God in his own desires, he cannot find God 
as located or contained there. Peace is not fully found in Augustine’s sensory 
experiences, just as earlier in the book he was not able to establish God fully 
within his own memory (13­28).
Thinkers like Lawless show the desire for inner peace to be a primary expres-
sion for the individual’s quest for God, even when that quest might be partial 
and frustrated. Lawless intimates, but does not investigate, the correlation be-
tween individual peace and both the concord and discord which characterize 
human corporate relations in civ. Nevertheless, Lawless establishes the cen-
trality of the trope of peace for the individual’s search for God.
Concerning the eschatological collective, Thomas Camelot, in his article “St. 
Augustine, Doctor of Peace,” highlights the heavenly and  eschatological di-
mension of Christian peace.  Christian peace, as Camelot explains, is the hope 
of the heavenly city, a perfectly ordered and harmonious enjoyment of God 
and one another (p. 79). Those on  earth work—inspired by eschatological hope 
of true peace—in faith to enjoy peace here below. Though “imperfect and frag-
ile” this peace is the pursuit of Christians in the earthly city. Camelot and oth-
ers (Dodaro;  Elshtain) who comment upon civ., rightly point out the eschato-
logical nature of peace in the heavenly city, even as people strive for peace as 
an earthly good. 
Building from both of these methods of examining peace—one from the interior 
search of conf. and the second in terms of the heavenly city, civ.—I will follow 
a method that includes both the  individual and the collective. I acknowledge 
that the collective in Augustinian understandings of peace is at times about the 
state and politics, but I limit this study to focus on the Christological collec-
tive. This method is what I will call the Christus totus method of the en. Ps. The 
Christus totus, or “whole Christ,” was a communal construct of head and mem-
bers which Augustine developed while preaching on the Psalms. It allowed him 
to hold together the eschatological perfection of Christ ascended into heaven 
(Christ the head) along with those who individually and together are journeying 
here below (the members). In as much as head and members form one, whole 
Christ, terms like “peace” are not only held in hope, but practiced in practical 
ways by Christ’s members here below.
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This method is productive for five distinct outcomes for considering Augus-
tine’s theology of peace, each of which we will treat in turn. In the first in-
stance, focusing on Christology helps to hold together a very diverse semantic 
field for peace. Second, because Augustine is convinced that Christ is peace 
(Eph 2:14), tracking the development of his whole Christ simultaneously re-
veals developments in his ideas of peace. Third, his mature Christology is one 
of speaking, singing, and participating as the Psalms image the vibrant life of 
the whole Christ. This whole Christ becomes the place for preaching, sing-
ing, and participating in peace as well. Fourth, the whole Christ assumes that 
human beings do not have peace on their own. This assumption on its own 
could seem to reflect the darkened and grim view of human persons which the 
late Augustine is sometimes alleged (BeDuhn). However, as I intend to demon-
strate, in the whole Christ, the admission of the failures of or lacks in peace 
are ever a restatement of the need for healing in the whole Christ. In the final 
section, I place this work into relief with two of Augustine’s treatises. I explore 
how Augustine’s preaching on peace is suggestive for interpreting his later 
work (civ.) as well as how it might hint at development from his earlier (De 
Sermone Domini in Monte) (cited hereafter s. Dom. mon.).
Psalms and the Semantics of Peace
The en. Ps. show forth a diverse semantic field for the term peace. In his 
conclusion to en. Ps. 134, Augustine explains peace as it relates to Jerusalem, 
which, he preaches to his congregants, means “vision of peace” (134,36). Au-
gustine is speaking of the eschatological vision of the heavenly Jerusalem, a 
city where people will live without worry of the walls crumbling. Christ himself 
lives in the city and guards it. This “vision of peace” actually contains quite a 
number of terms and concepts brought together. Augustine writes that such 
a peace: cannot be praised sufficiently by the human tongue; those experi-
encing a vision of peace will have no further exposure to enemies within the 
Church, no exposure to enemies outside of the Church, no exposure to en-
emies in their own flesh, and no exposure to enemies in their own thoughts 
(134,36). Thus, the peace that correlates with rest and defines citizenship in 
the heavenly Jerusalem can be described as effecting multiple strata of reality. 
Peace affects one’s thoughts, physical body, the body of the Church, as well as 
relations with those outside of the Church. This is important because heavenly 
peace is peace in all of these aspects. Augustine’s treatment of peace in his en. 
Ps. might treat one aspect of peace or another in a particular sermon. Yet, in 
moments of summary when he reminds his congregants of his pedagogy, Au-
Practicing Peace, Preaching Psalms: The Centrality of the Enarrationes in Psalmos [365]
gustine will employ the “vision” of Jerusalem to maintain the theological unity 
of these various aspects of peace. 
At times, Augustine’s taking up the topic of peace arises from discord within 
the self (en. Ps., 102,15). At other times, a single figure will achieve an inner 
peace that figures the whole body of Christ (en. Ps., 76,8; Grove). Sinners in this 
world below seem to enjoy a peace of this world (en. Ps., 72,10) while members 
of Augustine’s congregation do not have peace. Those who learn to sing a new 
song are learning the song of peace (en. Ps., 149,2). Augustine grapples with 
the relation between the Law and peace (en. Ps., 118,31,5). These are but a sam-
pling of the multiform ways in which the word “peace” extends broadly within 
Augustine’s preaching. The result, as we shall see, is an expanded semantics 
of peace as the action of rightly ordered desire: singing, working in harmony, 
praying, preaching, and praising.
A question at this point arises: do these diverse formulations and applications 
of peace theologically cohere for Augustine? This essay claims that they do. 
Each of them has a place within Augustine’s whole Christ. Thus, in order to 
appreciate the unifying center of his diverse expressions of peace, we must 
first have in place Augustine’s unifying  Christology.
Developing Christology, Developing Peace
Augustine’s Christology evolved as he continued to preach on the  Psalms and 
read more deeply in Pauline texts. The scholarly consensus on Augustine’s 
Christology has also recently evolved. Twenty­five years ago, as noted by Mi-
chael Heintz (1993), it was debatable as to whether or not one could describe 
Augustine as having a Christology. However, as scholars have looked to Augus-
tine’s figurative exegesis as a source of his theology (I grant that “theology” is 
our word, not Augustine’s), more work is coming  forth about the relationship 
between his thinking about Christ and the act of sacred reading. I will trace a 
Christological develop ment in two moments. For the first, I rely on the work 
of Michael Cameron’s Christ Meets Me Everywhere (2012). For the second, I rely 
on my own Memory and the Whole Christ (2015). Both Cameron and I are at-
tempting to articulate watershed moments in Augustine’s development. Both 
moments have to do with the exegesis of Christ’s voice concerning the word 
“me.” Once we have established these two moments, we will be able to appre-
ciate fully Christ’s voice as that of peace (en. Ps., 84,10).
Psalm 21 stands as a foundational moment in Augustine’s exegesis. This psalm 
provided Augustine with a model for how the human and the divine in the 
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 incarnate word might relate and interact. The phrase at the heart of the prob-
lem is Christ’s cry of dereliction from the cross: “O God, my God, why have you 
forsaken me, and left me far from salvation?” (en. Ps., 21,1,1). Augustine opens his 
explanation of the first verse by stating that “the words of this psalm are spo-
ken in the person of the crucified one, for here at its beginning is the cry he 
uttered  while he hung upon the cross” (en. Ps., 21,1,1). With the question of who 
is speaking having been solved from the outset, Augustine has to explain how it 
is that these words could make sense on the lips of the crucified one. Augustine’s 
earliest psalm expositions showed him wrestling with the problem of how it was 
that the human flesh of Jesus could speak in the text without seeming like the 
human part of Jesus were praying to the divine part of Jesus. The same problem is 
at issue here. If Jesus were truly divine, then he would have never been forsaken 
by God. If Jesus were truly human, then he would have known the human feeling 
of abandonment. Augustine clarifies the speaker by plunging into the mystery of 
redemption. Christ is indeed speaking, but he speaks in “the character of our old 
self, whose mortality he bore and which was nailed to the cross with him” (en. Ps., 
21,1,1). In assuming human flesh, Christ also assumed a human voice and a human 
death. He spoke in human words so that human  beings might speak in his. He 
died a human death so that humans might die in him. 
This is mediation with a universal effect. Augustine uses “Adam” as a trope 
for all men and women, representing fallen  humanity after sin. Christ did not 
speak in imitation of, on behalf of, or even for the benefit of Adam. Rather 
Christ—who himself shares Adam’s flesh—speaks in the voice of Adam because 
he has taken it up as his own (Cameron 154). Augustine styles this as a great, 
redemptive “exchange”—death for life—transacted in human flesh (Babcock 
30-45). The Manichaeans had thought that someone other than Christ died 
upon the cross; divinity abhorred entanglement with material. Augustine’s in-
sight moved him in precisely the opposite direction. By taking up humanity’s 
cry of dereliction, Christ did not eliminate dereliction but made it possible that 
those who experience dereliction—or pray the words “My God, my God, why 
have you forsaken me” (Ps. 21:1)—might not do so alone but in him. This opened 
up a new way that Christ was a mediator of divinity to humanity. In taking up 
flesh, the Word also took up death and a voice. Christ on the cross could not 
have been more human and so his salvific exchange overcame the two most 
human problems: sin and death. Death and dereliction no longer needed to be 
experienced alone, but in him.
Augustine’s insight into Christ the crucified mediator employed one of his rhe-
torical skills. Prosopopeia was a Greek term for an author’s impersonation of 
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the voice of a character either well known or invented. Known as fictiones per-
sonarum in the Latin rhetorical tradition, this tool makes present the voice of 
a person. One sees through the eyes and speaks through the voice of another. 
But the concept is even older than rhetorical handbooks. The psalms them-
selves are written such that the one who prays the Psalms sees God coming 
in majesty, gates lifting high their heads, and laments as one in exile. Cameron 
explains that “by this device the self transcends itself to become the other, 
even if only  briefly” (181).
Augustine began to experiment with prosopopeia in his early psalm expositions, 
and it provided him a theological and basic hermeneutic for his later ones. At 
first, this method allowed a multiplicity of voices to speak in various ways: at 
times the Christian might speak, at times Christ, and at others the Church. 
These voices began to pray within each other—the individual in the Church, and 
the Church in Christ. Different voices came to form a “whole” in Christ. The 
practice of prosopopeia gave Augustine the mechanism by which Christ could 
speak in Adam’s voice and thereby reveal the redemption of the cross. Cam-
eron summarizes: “Prosopopoeia’s rhetorical transposition of voices provides 
Augustine with the Christian theological pattern that articulates that momen-
tous exchange” (199). Augustine would continue to treat the crucifixion in six 
other early psalm expositions. In each, Christ speaks in the first person from 
the cross (en. Ps., 15, 16, 17, 21, 27, 29, and 30). 
The picture of Christ the mediator that emerges from Augustine’s consider-
ation of Psalm 21 hinges on the theological union of voices. Christ speaks in 
Adam’s voice, employing prosopopeia not for the purpose of theatrics or dec-
lamation but for the purpose of redeeming human flesh from sin and death. In 
its mature formulation, Augustine’s Psalm 30 presentation of Christ the me-
diator and the exchange of voices captures what Augustine’s consideration of 
the crucifixion added to his understanding of mediation:
But in fact he who deigned to assume the form of a slave, and within that form 
to clothe us with himself, he who did not disdain to take us up into himself, did 
not disdain either to transfigure us into himself, and to speak in our words, so 
that we in our turn might speak in his. This is the wonderful exchange, the di-
vine business deal, the transaction effected in this world by the heavenly deal-
er. He came to receive insults and give honors, he came to drain the cup of suf-
fering and give salvation, he came to undergo death and give life (en. Ps., 30.2.3).
Augustine’s second watershed insight came with his considering the relevance 
of Acts 9:4, and the theology of the ascension, for his continued considerations 
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of speaking in Christ’s voice. I have shown that Augustine’s mediator Christ 
comes to its complete configuration after the ascension, which Augustine ex-
plains in conjunction with Acts 9:4, the conversion of Paul (Grove 35­57). 
When Saul was rebuked by God on the road to Damascus, a  voice from heaven 
asked him the question: “Saul, Saul, why are you persecuting me?” (Acts 9:4). 
Saul asks the voice to identify itself and Jesus responds: “I am Jesus, whom you 
are persecuting” (9:5). Augustine points out that Christ had certainly already 
ascended into heaven, and that Saul’s actions could not have directly harmed 
the resurrected and ascended flesh of Christ (en. Ps., 30,3,3). Rather, Saul had 
been “raging against” Christians on earth (en. Ps., 30,2,3). Augustine asks why 
it might have been that Christ did not say why are you persecuting “my saints” 
or “my servants,” but rather “why are you persecuting me?” (en. Ps., 30,2,3). 
His conclusion is that when the voice of Christ spoke to Saul it was saying the 
equivalent of “‘why attack my limbs?’ The Head was crying out on behalf of 
the members, and the Head was transfiguring the members into himself” (en. 
Ps., 30,2,3). The voice from heaven indicated that head and body were one. 
Further, Augustine explains that the relationship between head and body is 
continually established and renewed by means of the head. As a result, the 
head continues to transfigure the members into himself, even after ascending 
to heaven. This is Augustine’s complete configuration of head and members 
imagery. In speaking through the members, the head “transfigures” the mem-
bers into himself. Christ’s mediation after the ascension is an ongoing action 
of transfiguration of his own body still on earth.
The central consideration of this scriptural text hinges on the same word as 
Augustine’s consideration of Psalm 21: “me.” In Psalm 21, Christ speaks from the 
cross, “My God, my God, why have you abandoned me?” The “me” of the cry of 
dereliction is Christ, who is speaking in the voice of Adam. In Acts 9, Augustine 
again determines the referent of “me.” This time “me” is Christ speaking in his 
members. 
Augustine’s exegesis of Acts 9:4 helped him to discover the  indispensable part 
played by the ascension in Christ’s mediation (Grove 48­57). In Augustine’s hom-
ilies that treat the ascension, he builds on the language of “taking up” we have 
encountered in considering the incarnation and crucifixion. Christ had taken 
up human flesh in the incarnation of the word. Christ had also taken up other 
aspects of the human condition, including taking up a human death and a hu-
man voice such that he could speak in the voice of Adam on the cross. After the 
resurrection, Christ ascends—literally taking up a human body—to heaven. One 
could imagine this being the end of Christ’s mediation as Augustine is clear to say 
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that humans do not yet glory in immortality. Christ, however, does not set down 
again what he has taken up. Augustine reminds his congregants that if Christ 
purchased their redemption in his  death and  resurrection, he is now gathering 
up after the ascension that which he bought (Grove 50). Christ the individual’s 
body ascended, but the ascension made Augustine consider Christ’s being head 
of a body of which human beings are members (1 Cor. 12:12). Augustine maintains 
that the members of the body remained connected to the head in grace, even 
though physically they might be on earth. From heaven then the head would 
experience and understand the sufferings and plight of the members. 
Augustine puts this point vividly. The whole Christ functions like the tongue 
of a body speaking in the name of the foot. When one’s foot is trampled in a 
crowd, the tongue cries out, “You are treading on me!” not, “You are tread-
ing on my foot.” (50­51). The tongue was not crushed; the foot does not speak. 
Nonetheless, the unity of tongue and foot within the body allows the tongue to 
say “me” for both. Augustine thus does not differentiate among voices speaking 
Psalm 30, such as “Christ is speaking here in the prophet,” for he can simply say 
“Christ is speaking.” Christ speaks because on the cross Christ “transfigured the 
body’s cry and made it his own” (en. Ps., 30,2,11; Grove 50). The ascension ex-
tends that speaking relationship beyond Christ’s immediate bodily presence on 
earth. Head and members mean that once separate voices within a psalm—in 
this text the prophet, the people  redeemed, and the people in fear—are all be 
transfigured into the one voice from the one body of Christ. 
For Augustine, the mediatory acts of Christ on earth—like transfiguring hu-
manity’s cry by taking up Psalm 21 from the cross—did not cease  after he as-
cended to heaven. Rather, Augustine transfers these mediatory relations to 
the interaction between head and body. Both head and members maintain 
unique voices on  account of the actual difference of Christ being in heaven 
and humans being on earth. Nevertheless, in the mystery, or sacramentum, 
of their union, as intimate as bridegroom and bride, head and members speak 
together.
This union of voices provides the most useful way of assessing the develop-
ment of Augustine’s theology of peace. Peace maps onto the same development 
that I have just established. A comparison of two psalm expositions, one from 
his very first commentaries before his whole Christ was fully configured and 
one from his mature exegesis, proves this point. 
The first example is en. Ps. 28, an early exposition before the whole Christ was 
a fully formed concept for Augustine. The psalm closes with the line “The Lord 
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will bless his people with peace.” Augustine’s sermon here is flatly descriptive. 
Augustine simply states that peace was not promised to people here below 
and that strength is required to endure the “world’s storms and squalls” (en. 
Ps., 28,11). Augustine continues to explain, however, “This same Lord will bless 
his people by granting them peace in himself, for he said, ‘My peace I give to 
you, my peace I leave with you.’” (en. Ps., 28,11). Two observations are possible 
at this juncture. First, Augustine’s people are to be aware that life on earth 
has storms and squalls. Secondly, Augustine uses an insight from the Gospel 
of John—another important locus of his considering peace—to claim that the 
peace which might bless his people and be left with them is going to come 
from Christ.
In Augustine’s early exegesis much is undeveloped. Though the word peace 
actually occurs frequently in these early expositions (en. Ps., 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 15, 
16, 28, 29), Augustine has not yet configured how it is that the peace of Christ 
is mediated to his earthly body. By the time of his later expositions, this has 
become clear. Enarratio in Psalmo 125 provides a clear example. The psalm line 
of interest is, “Those who sow in tears will reap with joy” (en. Ps., 125.11). Augus-
tine describes this life as a tear­filled life in which those who sow are planting 
the good works of mercy. Further, Augustine describes that the place where 
these works of mercy are to be planted is Christ. For, he preaches, “no place is 
vaster than Christ” (en. Ps., 125). 
Those who sow works of mercy in Christ have a single harvest: peace. Yet, this 
peace is not for those who give half-heartedly. They imitate the kenotic gift of 
Christ. Augustine shows this with examples from the scriptures. He holds up 
Zacchaeus who welcomes Christ and gives half of what he owns to the poor 
(Lk. 19:8). He mentions the widow who gives of her two small coins (Lk. 21:1­4). 
These are the sowers and reapers of what Augustine describes as “peace on 
earth to people of good will” (en. Ps., 125,11). Inasmuch as they are in Christ, 
they are ever more aware of cultivating this good will, the sowing of mercy, 
and the reaping of peace. Augustine writes, 
“Perhaps you are also aware of some need suffered by your own kin, and then 
you offer help if Christ is in you; and you offer it to strangers too. And the same 
holds good for beggars among  themselves: professional beggars, I mean. Even 
they have the means to help one another in times of trouble” (en. Ps., 125,12). 
Implicating everyone in his congregation from wealthy to families to beggars, 
Augustine uses their location in the whole Christ to show that the peace which 
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they might reap is only that which is produced by showing mercy. He contin-
ues with a flourish, 
“One person is disabled and cannot walk; let another who can walk lend his 
feet to the lame man. Let someone who can see lend her eyes to the blind. And 
let one who is young and healthy lend his  strength to another who is old or ill 
and carry him” (en. Ps., 125,12). 
This is the Christological body in which peace is reaped by those who sow with 
earthly tears. Those who reap the harvest of peace are always planting works 
of mercy and charity within the body of Christ.
In this section we have traced the development of Augustine’s whole Christ. It 
has allowed us to see, in its mature formulation, that Augustine understood the 
whole Christ as a location in which the members were ever being transformed 
and transfigured by their head. Because Augustine also correlates Christ with 
peace, this head and members relation within Christ also neatly configures 
an Augustinian exegesis of peace. It is to the practical ways in which peace is 
mediated within Christ that we now turn. We look at the actions of the whole 
Christ: preaching, singing, and participating.
Preaching, Singing, Participating
In Enarratio in Psalmo 121, Augustine describes how it is that the whole Christ 
allows individuals to participate in the being of God.  Augustine extends that 
participation to peace. Augustine begins by describing participation in the 
“Selfsame” or “Being­ Itself”  (Idipsum) as a difficult idea to comprehend. He 
encourages his congregants to struggle, to try to understand, to strain at the 
 edges of their intellects. After identifying  Being-Itself with the Exodus the-
ophany (3:14), I am who am, Augustine turns to Christ. In the paragraph of his 
sermon which follows, Augustine preaches about participation in Being-Itself 
based on the same insights he gathered from Psalm 21:1 and Acts 9:4. The Word 
from the beginning became a participant in what we are so that we  might par-
ticipate in the Word. Augustine preaches:
You cannot take it in, for this is too much to understand, too much to grasp. 
Hold on instead to what he whom you cannot understand became for you. 
Hold onto the flesh of Christ, onto which you, sick and helpless, left wounded 
and half dead by robbers, are hoisted, that you may be taken to the inn and 
healed there. Let us run to the house of the Lord, run all the way to that city, 
so that our feet may stand there, in that place which ‘is being built like a city, 
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which shares in the Selfsame.’ To what am I telling you to hold fast? Hold onto 
what Christ became for you, because Christ himself, even Christ, is rightly 
understood by this name, I AM WHO AM, inasmuch as he is in the form of 
God. In that nature wherein ‘he deemed it no robbery to be God’s equal,’ there 
he is Being­ Itself. But that you might participate in Being­Itself, he first of all 
became a participant in what you are; ‘the Word was made flesh’ so that flesh 
might participate in the Word (en. Ps., 121,5).
The ongoing Christological participation of Augustine’s hearers with Christ 
their head is the way in which they can know the more difficult concept of the 
being of God. Yet in the same passage Augustine references the place where 
his and his hearers’ feet might stand, namely the “forecourts of Jerusalem,” as 
Augustine read in Psalm 121.
As the psalmist writes that peace might reign for Jerusalem, Augustine inter-
rogates his hearers as to what makes for the peace of Jerusalem? Augustine’s 
answer is simple. The peace of Jerusalem consists in acts of mercy and love 
(en. Ps., 121,9-12). As he preaches, he recalls passages which he has used before 
and with which his hearers might be familiar. In describing the peace of Jeru-
salem for his hearers, he again calls forth the contribution of Zacchaeus and 
the giving of even a cup of cold  water in the name of Christ (en. Ps., 121,10). It 
is through acts of charity and mercy that people here below participate in the 
peace of the heavenly Jerusalem. The root of this participation, according to 
Augustine, is a rising above one’s own “self­seeking” in order to seek the good 
of the other. Thus, Augustine is able to say that the ascent to God—a common 
trope both in the Psalms and his modified Neoplatonism—is undertaken by 
the Church, the saints, the pilgrims, and the needy  together (en. Ps., 121,11-14). 
Participation in Christ is how Augustine justifies his continuous preaching of 
peace. He quickly admits—and does so consistently throughout his sermons—
that there is not the fullness of peace for the body of Christ during its pilgrim-
age on earth. Augustine preaches, “I do not yet enjoy your peace, but I preach 
of your peace to others. I preach it not for my own gain, as do the heretics who 
seek their own advancement as they say, ‘Peace be with you,’ when in truth 
they do not have the peace they preach to the peoples” (en. Ps., 121,13). Rather, 
Augustine preaches peace for the sake of the house of the Lord in Jerusalem, 
so that even now his hearers might “Pluck fruit from it, eat, drink, grow strong, 
and seize the prize” (en. Ps., 121,14). He does not promise his hearers that they 
will produce the fullness of peace in their midst. Instead, by strai ning toward 
the courts of Jerusalem, they participate—together, not alone—in the peace 
which is rightly theirs in Christ.
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In addition to Augustine’s preaching, one of his favorite expressions for learn-
ing to participate in the heavenly peace of Christ is to learn to sing. The new 
song, which is the song of the whole Christ, is the song of peace (en. Ps., 97,1). 
It is not a song of this world, but one learned through the scriptures and sung 
by whole Christ (en. Ps., 149,2). To learn to sing such a song, however, is inher-
ently difficult on account of the discordant voices of bodily desires, fatigue, 
vexations, cravings, and wants that plague human singers (en. Ps., 84,10). The 
song is not determined by these things however. The voice that speaks peace 
is always Christ’s. Augustine preaches, “The voice of Christ, the voice of God, 
is peace, and it calls us to peace. Come, he says, love peace, all you who are not 
yet at peace, for what greater benefit to yourselves can you find in me than 
peace?” (en. Ps., 84,10). It is important here to see that Augustine is saying that 
the voice of Christ speaks to and in his people in the present. Though the full-
ness of peace is not realized on earth, the desiring of it, learning to sing of it, 
and speaking of it with the words of Christ simultaneously moves them along 
in their journey toward its attainment. 
Augustine is creating in his hearers a desire to speak of the city of God without 
end. He heightens this desire in his congregants: 
be in a city… my brothers and sisters, when I begin to speak about that city 
I do not want to stop, especially when offenses grow rank all around us. We 
cannot help desiring that city, whence no friend departs, where no enemy 
gains entrance, where there is no tempter, or disturber of the peace, no one 
to cause divisions within God’s people, none to collude with the devil in ha-
rassing the Church when the prince of demons is flung into the eternal fire, 
along with all those who support him and refuse to abandon his service. A 
peace made pure will reign among God’s children: they will all love themselves 
as they see themselves full of God, and God will be all in all. […] He himself will 
be our peace, perfect and total (en. Ps., 84,10).
This is his description of the peace that is currently being spoken by the voice 
of Christ into him and his congregation. The final line gives the heart of Augus-
tine’s eschatology of peace: it produces a vision of the self and the neighbor 
as full of God. The members of Christ will have fully assumed their identity. 
Yet, it would be a mistake to see such eschatological language as removed 
from the current bodily lives of his congregants. As much as Augustine seeks 
to lift their hearts, desires, and voices toward the peace which satisfies, this 
rhetoric functions as a spiritual exercise for those who undertake it. Those 
who seek and desire peace also, he claims, begin to act justly or to love justice 
as “peace’s friend” (en. Ps., 84,12). Quarrelling with peace’s friend includes for 
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Augustine: stealing, committing adultery, doing to another what one does not 
wish to endure, or saying to another what one would not wish to hear (en. Ps., 
84,12). By acting justly, one simultaneously lives more fully his or her identity 
as Christ’s peace. Augustine says of those who act justly, “You will not need to 
seek [peace] for long, for she will run to meet you, so that she may kiss justice” 
(en. Ps., 84,12). One acts justly and becomes just. As one desires, sings, and 
speaks of peace, he or she participates in Christ’s peace. Augustine describes 
this transfigurative journeying together as Christ refashioning those who fol-
low in his footsteps precisely by the fact that they are following, speaking, 
singing, and participating in the “Selfsame” along the way.
In each instance, the movement toward peace in Christ is a movement to-
ward unity. The care extended in mercy to the poor draws together the body 
of Christ. At the conclusion of his sermon on Psalm 147, Augustine describes 
those who see God as ones at peace. Augustine asks “In what peace?” and he 
answers his own question “in the peace of Jerusalem, for the psalm says, ‘He 
has esta blished peace on your frontiers.’ There we shall praise him. All of us 
will be one in the one Christ, and all of us will be intent upon him who is one, 
for nevermore shall we be a crowd of scattered individuals” (en. Ps., 147,28). The 
sermon ends with one of Augustine’s enduring concerns, that the process of 
seeking, desiring, and loving peace, whether by preaching, singing, or partic-
ipating,  might also have the effect of drawing along those who are scattered 
into the one Christ. 
As inspiring of a vision as that is, it is secondary evidence of the divisions with-
in North African Christianity about which Augustine was well aware and fre-
quently preached. Thus, from Augustine’s clear desire for union among those 
who are scattered, we turn now to his treatment of those situations where 
peace is not to be found. 
Lacking Peace, Seeking Peace
Augustine’s articulation of peace through the whole Christ is relevant for those 
lacking peace and those seeking peace. As such, three discernable theological 
points emerge.
First, earthly peacemakers in some way attain the peace that is our common 
good (en. Ps., 127,16). This qualifies Augustine’s more frequent statements that 
human beings are in conflict with themselves—their own bodies, desires, and 
wills. Humans are also in conflict outside of themselves, agreeing at times to 
partial peace that is “treacherous, unstable, precarious, unreliable” (en. Ps., 
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127,16). Yet, Augustine qualifies these honest statements about the difficulties 
and battles of the temporally embedded life by stating that we can see the fruits 
of our good works. He specifically brings up works like almsgiving. Peacemak-
ers, he says, “surround the Lord’s table like a nursery of young olive trees” (en. 
Ps., 127,16). These young trees are fruit bearing and do so by means of their 
deeds for Christ. The Lord, who comes hungry, thirsty, naked, and a stranger, 
is the beneficiary of their fruitfulness (Mt. 25:35­40). In other words, the other 
members of Christ are the recipients of the good works of the peacemakers. 
The consequence is that peace is never established for the self or self­interest. 
Peacemaking is inherently a communal and community-creating exercise. The 
whole Christ, for Augustine, extends to the ends of the earth and includes all 
creation. Peacemakers who truly share in the peace of the heavenly Jerusalem 
have this communal end.
Second, Augustine learns from Psalm 119 to deal peaceably with those who 
hate peace. His first worry is about hypocrisy on the part of one who has be-
gun to sing the new song of peace. He writes that one can test the truth of 
what he or she is singing only if one’s actions are in harmony with his or her 
song (en. Ps., 147,9). If one sings the song of peace yet is not at peace, there is 
a dissonance between song and act. A song of Christ is equally on the heart 
and the actions of the lips. This proved to be a challenging teaching, especially 
concerning one of Augustine’s frequently commented on North African antag-
onists, the Donatists. 
Augustine describes the Donatists as those who, at their own  choosing, com-
promise the unity of the whole Christ. At one point, using the  metaphor of the 
body, he refers to them as Christ’s self-amputating arm, a society only of the pure 
and self­selected (Cameron). In terms of peace, Augustine includes the Donatists 
among those who hate peace because they tear apart unity within the Catholic 
Church. Of great importance, however, is Augustine’s holding open the possi-
bility that those who hate peace might be drawn again into it. Augustine shows 
a hesitance to cut anyone off from the possibility of reunion within the body of 
Christ. He writes,
Whose voice is it in this psalm—ours or theirs? You must decide! The Catholic 
Church says, ‘Unity must not be sacrificed; God’s church must not be rent 
apart. God will judge later between the bad and the good. If the bad people 
cannot be sorted out from the good now, they must be borne with for the time 
being. Bad people can be with us on the threshing­floor but cannot be in the 
barn. In any case, those who appear to be bad today may be good tomorrow, 
just as those who today are proud of their own goodness may tomorrow turn 
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out to be bad. Anyone who humbly tolerates bad people for a time will attain 
everlasting rest.’ This is the Catholic voice (en. Ps., 119,9).
To be certain, Augustine would preach without relenting against Donatism, 
as Michael Cameron has shown. What makes this passage of interest is his 
approach to the church. Peace is not merely to be made with good people, for 
the church itself is a mixture of wheat and chaff on the threshing floor. Within 
the church these roles are not fixed. One who is good might become bad and 
vice versa. Thus, while Augustine supports the unity of the Catholic Church 
against any division, he fully realizes that those who strive for eternal peace 
will also tolerate those who sever and break the temporal peace of the church. 
It is a difficult conclusion: those who love peace and strive for it will tolerate 
even those who hate and break peace. For the lover of peace is one who tire-
lessly works for union and cannot make the mistake, as Augustine alleged that 
the Donatists did, of leaving behind many good people whom they stigmatized 
as evil (en. Ps., 119,9).
Augustine summarizes the way in which those who work for peace follow the 
uniting, incarnational pattern in Christ. He writes, “If Christ is peace because he 
made two into one, how can you make one into two? In what sense are you pro-
moters of peace, if when Christ makes two into one, you make one into two?” 
(en. Ps., 119,9). Augustine, committed to dealing peaceably even with those who 
hate peace, holds union and unity as that which cannot be compromised be-
cause Christ cannot be divided.
The third point concerning Augustine and situations that lack  peace returns 
to the Christological in-speaking which we have discussed in the evolution of 
the whole Christ. Following one of his oft quoted psalm lines “Seek peace and 
pursue it” (en. Ps., 33,2,19), Augustine is honest about the ways in which peace 
is lacking. The individual struggles with the lusts of the body over and against 
the spirit. One gives alms and still takes what does not belong to him or her. 
One clothes the poor while still in some way taking advantage of them. Augus-
tine reminds his hearers that they are still engaged in this earthly contest. And 
his advice to them is to speak, ask, and “say to God” their desire for peace. He 
reminds his hearers, “Listen there to our head joining his voice to ours” (en. Ps., 
143,9). This joining is both performed in recitation of the text of the psalm con-
cerning peace and it is also enacted in their own lives. Augustine is trying to 
foster peace by stimulating and sustaining in his congregants an ongoing rela-
tionship of speech with Christ. By speaking in Christ’s words, or experiencing 
his words joined to their own, Augustine and his congregants again know and 
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incarnate a word of peace which their voices and their circumstances could 
not otherwise produce. Those who seek peace speak in Christ. 
Relevance for Reading Other Augustinian 
Formulations of Peace
On Augustine’s teaching peace throughout his writings, Timo Weissenberg has 
argued that Augustine’s presentation of peace is unsystematic. Weissenberg 
resists approaching Augustine’s understanding of peace as developmental (19­
32). This chapter has opened the question about Augustine, development, and 
peace through a different lens: Christology. In accord with a growing body of 
literature, I have above presented representative evidence from the en. Ps. for 
the manner in which Augustine’s Christology developed as he preached on 
the psalms—texts in which he was looking for Christ’s voice. The question now 
becomes: if one takes seriously the relationship between Christ and peace 
for Augustine, then does Augustine’s developing Christology—in the places 
that it touches peace—reshape how he presents peace? This claim does not 
over­systematize his ideas of peace, but is suggestive for how peace might be 
studied through Christ.
To demonstrate this claim, I examine here two prominent places in which Au-
gustine treats peace outside of the en. Ps. The first, s. Dom. mon. was complet-
ed between 392-395. It is interesting for this article because it antedates the 
development of Augustine’s Christus totus  logic which I have laid out above. 
Further, Augustine returns to issues of  peace in s. Dom. mon. in his retr. (427) 
near the end of his career. The second example  comes from civ. where Augus-
tine takes up the issue of peace at  length in book 19. In the first example, the 
relation between Christ and peace is set  forth primarily through anthropology 
with no evidence of psalms or of the Christus totus. In civ. one compelling pas-
sage  suggests that the Christus totus of the Enarrationes has aided Augustine’s 
 presentation of peace and that the two texts can work together for increased 
understanding of his later thought.
In s. Dom. mon., Augustine interprets the line in the beatitudes that the 
peacemakers shall be called children of God (Mt. 5:9). Augustine’s presenta-
tion of peace is largely characterized by Lawless’s aforementioned catego-
ry of inner peace as an aspect of anthropology. Peacemakers, as Augustine 
presents them, resist God in no way. They bring their bodily lusts into right 
relation by means of reason; they further submit their reason to Christ who 
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is truth (s. Dom. mon. 1.2.9). In this way, both the inferior and the superior 
within Augustine’s anthropology are correlated to Christ as truth. This pro-
cess of drawing harmony out of disordered lusts is akin to the way in which 
Augustine describes the triple concupiscentiae (lusts of the flesh, eyes, and 
pride, cf. Gen. 3:6) in his conf. (10,30,41; 10,41,66) such that it resolves at the 
end of the book through Christ the true mediator (conf., 10,42,67­70). This 
correlation to Christ presents hope for the healing of the individual human 
divided against the self on account of sin. When Augustine later envisions 
“perfect peace” in the second book of s. Dom. mon., that peace—realized only 
in the eschaton—is the condition of no antagonism to beatitude such that the 
soul and body might be reconciled entirely (s. Dom. mon., 2,6,21­23). When 
Augustine revisits this work in his retr., he reaffirms that there would always 
be earthly discord within the human person, rebellion against peace on ac-
count of movements against reason until the fulfillment of all things (retr., 
1,19,1-2). Again, the dominating focus is on reconciling the individual at war 
within the self.
Much more could be said of the manner in which peace within the human 
person might be sought and practiced in these early works. But for the pur-
poses of this argument they show forth the relationship of Christ to peace 
as that of the true mediator who reconciles the post-lapsarian distentio of 
human body and soul as well as desires of the eyes, of the flesh, and pride of 
life. These issues of anthropological healing do not disappear for Augustine, 
and certainly they are present in his treatment of peace in his much later 
work of civ. It is, however, the whole Christ’s relation to peace that beckons 
in this later text. For there one, finds an important reference to the “cry of 
the members.”
In civ. 19-22, Augustine concludes his treatise with four books on the eternal 
destinies of the two cities. His most extensive presentation on peace is in the 
book 19, beginning with the mea nings of peace (e.g. eternal peace as the ulti-
mate good versus the way in which peace is at times used to describe mortal 
affairs of the earthly city, 19,11) and continuing through numerous issues of 
peace, justice, the person, the republic, and how one desires the peace that 
comes only with eternal life. Psalm references related to peace occur at the 
beginning and end (19,11; 19,26­27).1 
1 Augustine also cites or alludes to Psalms 96 and 113 in 19,11, but his rhetorical  focus at those 
points is against Porphyry. 
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At the outset, Augustine presents Jerusalem as the definition of the  peace that 
is the ultimate good of human persons (civ., 19,11). Augustine cites Psalm 147, 
“Praise the Lord, O Jerusalem” which also includes the line that the Lord “has 
made your borders peace” (147: 12­14). This  definition is relatively straightfor-
ward, but helpful in two ways. First, in interpreting the meaning of the name of 
Jerusalem as Augustine understood it, he references what he had said before, 
Jerusalem means a “vision of peace” (civ., 19,11). The place in which he said it 
“before” was in his en. Ps., 64,2 or 134,36. This reference itself indicates that 
Augustine is considering in civ. what he had worked out in his preaching on the 
Psalms. When one looks back to see what Augustine preached on the psalm, 
one discover that he explicitly cites (147: 12­14), one finds tremendously pow-
erful rhetoric. Augustine exhorts his hearers, “Be Jerusalem, all you who are 
here today” (en. Ps., 147,7) and “I implore you, citizens of Jerusalem, I charge you 
by the peace of Jerusalem, by her redeemer, by Jerusalem’s builder and ruler” 
(en. Ps., 147,1). This rhetoric works in the boundary space between individuated 
lack of peace (which his hearers have) and eternal peace (which they do not 
yet have). Augustine can thus preach without contradiction, “The psalm says, 
‘sing united praise’ because you, Jerusalem, are comprised of many; but it adds 
‘Praise him’ because you have become one” (147,1). This exposition is thought to 
be written during the first decade of the fifth century  (circa 403), antecedent to 
civ. and after Augustine has started using the  Christus totus in a mature manner 
in his preaching (Boulding 6.441). This rhetoric provides Augustine a temporal-
ly flexible space—already and not yet—where within the whole Christ he can 
consider that which the head has already attained and the members await with 
groaning and labor.
At the end of civ. 19, Augustine returns to cite Psalm 143:15: “Blessed the people 
whose God is the Lord” (19,26). Again, Augustine’s Enarratio in Psalmum 143,15 
is replete with Christus totus rhetoric, “What about you, body of Christ? What 
about you, who are Christ’s members?” (143,19). It is also here that the head and 
members rhetoric appears explicitly in civ. in the context of peace. Augustine 
writes in the oft quoted passage:
The peace that is proper to us, in contrast, we both have now with God through 
faith and shall have for all eternity with God through sight. But the peace that 
we have here, whether the peace common to both the good and the evil or the 
peace proper to us alone, is a solace for wretchedness rather than the joy of 
blessedness. Our justice, too, although it is true justice because it is directed 
to the true supreme good, is such that in this life it consists in the forgiveness 
of sins rather than in the perfection of virtue. The prayer of the whole city of 
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God that is on pilgrimage here on earth bears witness to this point. In all its 
members it cries out to God… (19,27).
Augustine is careful here to maintain a distinction between peace as final good 
and peace in the earthly city, likewise justice as perfection of virtue and justice 
as forgiveness. At the end of these careful distinctions, two aspects of the final 
line of this citation merit further reflection. First, the city of God is on pilgrim-
age. That statement opens questions of place, mode of pilgrimage, and how 
one journeys there together. It would be foolish to isolate civ. from the scores 
of en. Ps. that treat precisely this pilgrimage of the corporate Christological 
person—whether figuratively described as Jerusalem, Idithun, whole Christ, or 
any other number of titles that Augustine used as he continued to preach. 
Second, and most importantly, Augustine employs the “cry of the members.” If 
one only read the civ. without the complete picture of Augustine’s preaching, 
then this cry—whether the cry of peace as solace for wretchedness or the cry 
of justice as forgiveness of sin—remains simply the expression of hope within 
the vicissitudes of the earthly condition. But, in light of Augustine’s preaching, 
one knows that Christ “transfigures” that cry by making it his own not only on 
the cross but after the ascension in the ongoing speech of the members. This 
ongoing transfiguration forms the juncture between the peace and justice of 
the earth and the peace and justice of the final good. That, in sum, is what Au-
gustine’s Christology, worked out in the psalms, contributes to understanding 
peace in civ. Further, for scholarship, it suggests that Augustine’s preaching, 
especially in the places where he treats peace in the context of the Christus 
totus, can provide an instructive complement that deepens appreciation for 
the terms and possibilities in civ.
It may well be the case, as Weissenberg has suggested, that one cannot impose 
a too simple developmental progression onto Augustine’s occasional presen-
tations on peace. Yet, his Christology does develop and inasmuch as it does, 
it provides nuance to his treatment of peace. civ. 19,11 and 19,26­27 are but 
suggestive examples, which could open onto larger scale research throughout 
Augustine’s corpus. 
Conclusions 
Augustine, doctor pacis, could be accused of being rather pessimistic about 
earthly peace. Within ourselves and our desires, human persons cannot sus-
tain the peace that we seek. In our communities, we divide rather than unite. 
Even when we find the courage within ourselves to feed, clothe, and serve, we 
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can do good things for the wrong reasons, failing the integrity of purpose and 
being that characterize the citizens of the city of God. 
A more charitable reading of Augustine would be that he, in his en. Ps. took 
as a starting point the brokenness of the world around him, including with-
in himself. Searching for peace began from division, both within the self and 
society. Moreover, the search for  peace pushed him to look to the fullest and 
final example of the  heavenly  Jerusalem. He would explore this heavenly peace 
and the search for it in many ways, from seeking it at the height of his spiritual 
exercises in conf. 10 to the theological configuration of the heavenly Jerusalem 
in civ.
However, Augustine believed eschatological peace is indeed mediated to those 
who lack peace now. That structure of mediation, for Augustine, is the whole 
Christ—an earthy, all-encompassing, and uncompromisingly united Christ. In 
this structure, which Augustine realized through the practice of his own spir-
itual reading of the Psalms, those here below can participate in their head as 
they journey along their way. The way is also the end. Augustine preached, “I 
could not have seen it myself if I had not seen it through the eyes of Christ, if 
indeed, I had not been in him” (en. Ps., 118,30,4). His helping his congregants to 
realize their location in Christ gave them an already­but­not­yet experience 
of peace. That desire, yearning, and journeying to complete peace, however, 
also implicated them in their works. For journeying toward peace in Christ 
means becoming rightly disposed to both oneself and others. The poor, the 
needy, the repentant sinner, and the neighbor all became figures of primary 
importance in Augustine’s theology of peace. Peace simply cannot be prac-
ticed or attained if any of Christ’s members is ignored.
Augustine’s vision of peace is Christ’s. Yet he does not pass it off as an unat-
tainable goal or a contemplation removed from the slings and arrows of dis-
cord which he and his community faced on a daily  basis. Rather, Christ, in 
whom he and his congregants found themselves, spoke in their words so that 
they might speak in his. He united himself to their humanity to that they might 
be united to his divinity. This union is ongoing for Augustine. Christ speaks and 
sings a song of peace so that humans might be able to sing such a new song 
not only with their own voices but with Christ’s, not only with their own ac-
tions, but Christ’s. Indeed, for humans who seek peace, Augustine’s theological 
advice is that they—with all of their being—learn in Christ together to speak 
and then to sing.
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